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Foreword
The lives of girls and women have changed dramatically over the past quarter century. Today, 
more girls and women are literate than ever before, and in a third of developing countries, 
there are more girls in school than boys. Women now make up over 40 percent of the global 
labor force. Moreover, women live longer than men in all regions of the world. The pace of 
change has been astonishing—indeed, in many developing countries, they have been faster 
than the equivalent changes in developed countries: What took the United States 40 years to 
achieve in increasing girls’ school enrollment has taken Morocco just a decade.
In some areas, however, progress toward gender equality has been limited—even in devel-
oped countries. Girls and women who are poor, live in remote areas, are disabled, or belong 
to minority groups continue to lag behind. Too many girls and women are still dying in child-
hood and in the reproductive ages. Women still fall behind in earnings and productivity, and 
in the strength of their voices in society. In some areas, such as education, there is now a gen-
der gap to the disadvantage of men and boys. 
The main message of this year’s World Development Report: Gender Equality and Develop-
ment is that these patterns of progress and persistence in gender equality matter, both for 
development outcomes and policy making. They matter because gender equality is a core 
development objective in its own right. But greater gender equality is also smart economics, 
enhancing productivity and improving other development outcomes, including prospects for 
the next generation and for the quality of societal policies and institutions. Economic develop-
ment is not enough to shrink all gender disparities—corrective policies that focus on persist-
ing gender gaps are essential. 
This Report points to four priority areas for policy going forward. First, reducing gender 
gaps in human capital—specifi cally those that address female mortality and education. Sec-
ond, closing gender gaps in access to economic opportunities, earnings, and productivity. 
Third, shrinking gender differences in voice and agency within society. Fourth, limiting the 
reproduction of gender inequality across generations. These are all areas where higher incomes 
by themselves do little to reduce gender gaps, but focused policies can have a real impact.
Public actions need to address the underlying determinants of gender gaps in each pri-
ority area—in some cases, improving service delivery (especially for clean water, sanitation, 
and maternal care), for others, tackling constraints that originate in the workings of mar-
kets and institutions to limit progress (for example, in reducing gender gaps in earnings and 
productivity).
Development partners can complement public action. In each of the four priority areas, 
efforts need more funding (particularly to support the poorest countries as they address 
female mortality and gender gaps in education); better gender-disaggregated data; more 
experimentation and systematic evaluation; and broader partnerships that include the private 
sector, development agencies, and civil society organizations.
xiv F O R EWO R D
Gender equality is at the heart of development. It’s the right development objective, and 
it’s smart economic policy. The World Development Report 2012 can help both countries and 
international partners think through and integrate a focus on gender equality into develop-
ment policy making and programming. 
 Robert B. Zoellick
 President
 The World Bank Group
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GENDER EQUALITY MATTERS 
FOR DEVELOPMENT
Gender equality is a core development objec-
tive in its own right. It is also smart economics. 
Greater gender equality can enhance produc-
tivity, improve development outcomes for the 
next generation, and make institutions more 
representative.
• Productivity gains. Women now represent 
40 percent of the global labor force, 43 per-
cent of the world’s agricultural labor force, 
and more than half the world’s university 
students. Productivity will be raised if their 
skills and talents are used more fully. For ex-
ample, if women farmers were to have the 
same access as men to fertilizers and other 
inputs, maize yields would increase by almost 
one-sixth in Malawi and Ghana. And elimi-
nating barriers that discriminate against 
women working in certain sectors or occupa-
tions could increase labor productivity by as 
much as 25 percent in some countries.
• Improved outcomes for the next generation. 
Greater control over household resources by 
women can enhance countries’ growth pros-
pects by changing spending patterns in ways 
that benefi t children. And improvements in 
women’s education and health have been 
linked to better outcomes for their children 
in countries as varied as Brazil, Nepal, Paki-
stan, and Senegal.
• More representative decision making. Gen-
der equality matters for society more broadly. 
Empowering women as economic, political, 
and social actors can change policy choices 
and make institutions more representative of 
a range of voices. In India, giving power to 
women at the local level led to increases in 
the provision of public goods, such as water 
and sanitation, which mattered more to 
women.
DEVELOPMENT HAS CLOSED SOME 
GENDER GAPS . . .
The disadvantages faced by women and girls 
that have shrunk most rapidly over the past 
quarter century include: 
• Educational enrollment. Gender gaps in pri-
mary education have closed in almost all 
countries. In secondary education, these gaps 
are closing rapidly and have reversed in many 
countries, especially in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and East Asia—but it is now 
boys and young men who are disadvantaged. 
Among developing countries, girls now out-
number boys in secondary schools in 45 
countries and there are more young women 
than men in universities in 60 countries.
• Life expectancy. Since 1980, women are liv-
ing longer than men in all parts of the world. 
And, in low-income countries, women now 
live 20 years longer on average than they did 
in 1960. 
• Labor force participation. Over half a billion 
women have joined the world’s labor force 
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UNDERSTANDING PROGRESS 
AND PERSISTENCE
Income growth by itself does not deliver 
greater gender equality on all fronts. Indeed, 
where gender gaps have closed quickly, it is 
because of how markets and institutions—
formal and informal—have functioned and 
evolved, how growth has played out, and 
how all these factors have interacted through 
household decisions. For example, in educa-
tion, income growth (by loosening bud-
get constraints), markets (by opening new 
employment opportunities for women), and 
formal institutions (by expanding schools 
and lowering costs) have all come together 
to infl uence household decisions in favor of 
educating girls and young women across a 
broad range of countries. 
Gender gaps persist where girls and women 
face other disadvantages. For poor women in 
poor places, sizable gender gaps remain. And 
these disparities are even larger when pov-
erty combines with other forms of exclusion, 
such as remoteness, ethnicity, and disability. 
For ethnic minority women in Vietnam, for 
instance, more than 60 percent of childbirths 
occur without prenatal care—twice as many 
as for the majority Kinh women. 
Markets, institutions, and households can 
also combine to limit progress. Gender gaps 
in productivity and earnings, for exam-
ple, are pervasive. And they are driven by 
deep-seated gender differences in time use 
(refl ecting social norms about house and 
care work), in rights of ownership and con-
trol over land and assets, and in the workings 
of markets and formal institutions, which 
work in ways that disadvantage women. 
Globalization can help. In today’s globalized 
world, forces such as trade openness and the 
spread of cheaper information and com-
munication technologies have the potential 
to reduce gender disparities by connecting 
women to markets and economic opportu-
nities, reshaping attitudes and norms among 
women and men about gender relations, 
and encouraging countries to promote gen-
der equality. But their impact will be muted 
without effective domestic public action.
over the last 30 years as women’s partici-
pation in paid work has risen in most of 
the developing world. An important rea-
son has been the unprecedented reduc-
tion in fertility in developing countries 
as diverse as Bangladesh, Colombia, and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
. . . BUT OTHER GAPS PERSIST
Gender disparities still remain in many areas, 
and even in rich countries. The most persis-
tent and egregious gaps include: 
• Excess deaths of girls and women. Fe-
males are more likely to die, relative to 
males, in many low- and middle-income 
countries than their counterparts in rich 
countries. These deaths are estimated at 
about 3.9 million women and girls under 
the age of 60 each year. About two-fi fths 
of them are never born, one-sixth die in 
early childhood, and over one-third die in 
their reproductive years. And this number 
is growing in Sub-Saharan Africa, espe-
cially in childhood and the reproductive 
years and in the countries hardest hit by 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
• Disparities in girls’ schooling. Despite 
the overall progress, primary and second-
ary school enrollments for girls remain 
much lower than for boys for disadvan-
taged populations in many Sub-Saharan 
countries and some parts of South Asia.
• Unequal access to economic opportuni-
ties. Women are more likely than men to 
work as unpaid family laborers or in the 
informal sector. Women farmers tend to 
farm smaller plots and less profi table 
crops than men. Women entrepreneurs 
operate in smaller fi rms and less profi t-
able sectors. As a result, women every-
where tend to earn less than men.
• Differences in voice in households and 
in society. In many countries, women—
especially poor women—have less say 
over decisions and less control over re-
sources in their households. And in most 
countries, women participate less in for-
mal politics than men and are under- 
represented in its upper echelons.
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and young women when poverty, ethnic-
ity, or geography excludes them, and to 
reach boys where gender disadvantages 
have reversed. Cash transfers conditioned 
on school attendance are often effective in 
reaching these groups. Pakistan has used 
such transfers to get girls from poor fami-
lies to school, while Jamaica has relied on 
them to keep at-risk boys in school.
• To narrow disparities between women 
and men in earnings and productivity, 
a combination of policies is needed to 
 address the various constraints that dis-
proportionately affect women’s access to 
economic opportunities. Depending on 
context, these include measures to:
   Lift women’s time constraints, by pro-
viding child care as with Colombia’s 
subsidized day-care programs for work-
ing mothers, and improving infrastruc-
ture as with South Africa’s rural electri-
fi cation program.
   Improve women’s access to productive 
resources, especially to land as was done 
in Ethiopia by granting joint land titles 
to wives and husbands, and to credit as 
in Bangladesh. 
   Tackle information problems and in-
stitutional biases that work against 
women. These include the use of quo-
tas or job placement programs as is be-
ing done in Jordan, or reforming gen-
der biases in service delivery institutions 
as was done for agricultural extension 
through women’s self-help groups in 
the Indian state of Orissa. 
• To diminish gender differences in house-
hold and societal voice, policies need to 
address the combined infl uence of social 
norms and beliefs, women’s access to eco-
nomic opportunities, the legal framework, 
and women’s education and skills:
   To equalize voice within households, 
measures that increase women’s control 
over household resources and laws that 
enhance the ability of women to accu-
mulate assets, especially by strengthen-
ing their property rights, are of particu-
lar importance. Recent reforms of 
family law in Morocco that equalized 
the ownership rights of husbands and 
wives over property acquired during 
marriage are an example. 
PRIORITIES FOR DOMESTIC 
POLICY ACTION 
Policy makers in developing countries will 
need to focus on those gender gaps where 
the payoffs for development are potentially 
the largest, higher incomes by themselves do 
little to reduce these gaps, and a reorienta-
tion of policies would yield the greatest ben-
efi t. These priorities are:
• Addressing excess deaths of girls and 
women and eliminating gender disadvan-
tage in education where these remain 
entrenched.
• Closing differences in access to economic 
opportunities and the ensuing earnings 
and productivity gaps between women 
and men. 
• Shrinking gender differences in voice 
within households and societies.
• Limiting the reproduction of gender in-
equality across generations.
Focused and sustained domestic pub-
lic action is essential to bring about gender 
equality. And to be effective, these policies will 
need to target the root causes of gender gaps. 
In some areas, as with maternal mortality, 
governments will need to address the single 
binding constraint to progress (weak service 
delivery institutions). In others, as with dif-
ferential access to economic opportunities, 
policies will be needed that tackle the multi-
ple constraints that come from the workings 
of markets and institutions to limit progress. 
In these cases, policy makers will need to pri-
oritize these constraints and address them 
simultaneously or sequentially.
• To reduce excess deaths of girls and 
women in infancy, early childhood, and 
the reproductive years, policy action to 
improve the delivery of services (especially 
of clean water, sanitation, and maternal 
care) is of primary importance. Vietnam 
has been able to reduce excess mortality 
among young girls by expanding access to 
clean water and sanitation. And Turkey 
has reduced maternal mortality through 
improved health care delivery and a focus 
on expectant mothers. 
• To shrink persisting educational gaps, 
policies need to improve access for girls 
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complementing these efforts in each of these 
four priority areas and, more generally, in 
supporting evidence-based public action 
through better data, impact evaluation, and 
learning. 
• In some areas, as with educational gender 
gaps, this will require adjusting current 
support, such as ensuring that the Educa-
tion for All Fast Track Initiative reaches 
disadvantaged girls and boys, or sustain-
ing existing efforts, as with partnerships 
focused on adolescent girls. 
• In other areas, it will demand new or 
 additional action on multiple fronts—
some combination of more funding, co-
ordinated efforts to foster innovation and 
learning, and more effective partnerships. 
   The funding should be directed partic-
ularly to supporting the poorest coun-
tries in reducing excess deaths of girls 
and women (through investments in 
clean water and sanitation and mater-
nal health services) and removing per-
sistent gender gaps in education. 
   More support is needed especially to 
improve the availability of gender-
disaggregated data and to foster more 
experimentation and systematic evalu-
ation of mechanisms to improve wom-
en’s access to markets, services, and 
justice. 
   The partnerships should extend be-
yond governments and development 
agencies to include the private sector, 
civil society organizations, and aca-
demic institutions in developing and 
rich countries.
   To increase women’s voice in society, 
policies include quotas on political rep-
resentation, as has been done by many 
countries across the world, and mea-
sures to foster and train future women 
leaders and involve women more in 
groups such as trade unions and pro-
fessional associations. 
• To limit the reproduction of gender in-
equality across generations, it is impor-
tant to reach adolescents and young adults 
because this is the age when they make de-
cisions that determine their acquisition of 
skills, future health, economic prospects, 
and aspirations. Interventions, therefore, 
need to focus on: 
   Building human and social capital 
as cash transfer programs have done 
in Malawi, and improving informa-
tion about returns to education and 
health education programs, which has 
kept boys in school in the Dominican 
Republic; 
   Facilitating the transition from school 
to work with job and life skills training 
programs as in Uganda; and
   Shifting aspirations as with exposure to 
role models such as woman political 
leaders in India who challenge prevail-
ing social norms.
THE ROLE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
While domestic policy action is crucial, the 
international community can play a role in 
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WHY DOES GENDER EQUALITY 
MATTER FOR DEVELOPMENT?
The story of Ijuhanyondo village in Tanzania 
mirrors the evolution of gender equality across 
the world over the past quarter century.  Although 
many women continue to struggle with gender-
based disadvantages in their daily lives, things 
have changed for the better—and at a pace that 
would have been unthinkable even two decades 
ago. Women have made unprecedented gains in 
rights, in education and health, and in access to 
jobs and livelihoods. More countries than ever 
guarantee women and men equal rights under 
the law in such areas as property ownership, 
inheritance, and marriage. In all, 136 countries 
now have explicit guarantees for the equality of 
all citizens and nondiscrimination between men 
and women in their constitutions.
Progress has not come easily. And it has not 
come evenly to all countries or to all women—or 
across all dimensions of gender equality. The 
likelihood of women dying during childbirth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia 
is still comparable to that in Northern Europe 
in the 19th century. A wealthy urban child in 
Nigeria—boy or girl—averages around 10 years 
of schooling, while poor rural Hausa girls aver-
Overview
Baruani is refl ecting on how women’s and men’s lives have changed over the past decade in 
Ijuhanyondo—a village in Tanzania. “Ten years back was terrible,” she recalls. “Women were very be-
hind. They used to be only at home doing housework. But now, they are in businesses, they are in poli-
tics.” Others hold similar views. “We do not depend a lot on men as it used to be,” says Agnetha. “We 
have some cash for ourselves, and this assists us in being free from men and to some extent controlling 
our lives.” In addition to managing their businesses, the women now make up half the members of the 
street committee that runs the village.
Despite these positive changes, many challenges continue to weigh on women’s daily lives. Fewer than 
half the homes in the village have piped water. Even more diffi cult, Tungise and other women of the 
 village still fear violence by their partners: “When they are drunk, they can begin beating up women and 
children in the house. The worst bit of it is forcing sex with you.” Although legally women can inherit 
land or a house, tradition prevails. “Yes, women can inherit property,” says Flora, the executive secretary 
of the street committee. “In fact, in the will the father is supposed to give each son and daughter some-
thing, and nowadays the law is strict, equally. But still, men give to their sons and argue that women 
have the property of where they are married.”
Dodoma Rural Community Report, from “Defi ning Gender in the 
21st  Century: Talking with Women and Men around the World: 
A Multi-Country Qualitative Study of Gender and Economic Choice” 
(World Bank 2011)
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age fewer than six months. The rate at which 
women die relative to men is higher in low- and 
middle-income countries compared with their 
high-income counterparts, especially in the crit-
ical years of infancy and early childhood and 
in the reproductive period. Divorce or widow-
hood causes many women to become landless 
and lose their assets. Women continue to clus-
ter in sectors and occupations characterized as 
“female”—many of them lower paying. Women 
are also more likely to be the victims of violence 
at home and suffer more severe injuries. And 
almost everywhere women’s representation in 
politics and in senior managerial positions in 
business remains far lower than men’s.
Do these patterns of gender inequality–
in human and physical capital endowments, 
in economic opportunities, and in the ability 
to make choices to achieve desired outcomes 
(agency)—matter, particularly those that per-
sist even as the development process unfolds? 
This World Development Report (WDR) ar-
gues that they do for two reasons. First, gender 
equality matters intrinsically, because the abil-
ity to live the life of one’s own choosing and 
be spared from absolute deprivation is a basic 
human right and should be equal for everyone, 
independent of whether one is male or female. 
Second, gender equality matters instrumentally, 
because greater gender equality contributes to 
economic effi ciency and the achievement of 
other key development outcomes.
Gender equality matters in its own right
Following Amartya Sen, we see development 
as a process of expanding freedoms equally for 
all people.1 In this view of development, gen-
der equality is a core objective in itself (box 
1). So, just as development means less income 
poverty or better access to justice, it should also 
mean fewer gaps in well-being between males 
and females. This viewpoint is also evident in 
the international development community’s 
recognition that women’s empowerment and 
gender equality are development objectives in 
their own right, as embodied in Millennium 
Development Goals 3 and 5 (box 2). It is seen 
as well in the adoption and widespread ratifi ca-
tion of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). Adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1979, the convention es-
tablished a comprehensive framework for the 
advancement of women and has been ratifi ed to 
date by 187 countries.
Gender equality matters for 
development—It is smart economics
Gender equality matters also as an instrument 
for development. As this Report shows, gender 
equality is smart economics: it can enhance eco-
nomic effi ciency and improve other develop-
ment outcomes in three ways. First, removing 
barriers that prevent women from having the 
same access as men to education, economic op-
portunities, and productive inputs can generate 
broad productivity gains—gains all the more 
important in a more competitive and globalized 
world. Second, improving women’s absolute and 
relative status feeds many other development 
outcomes, including those for their children. 
Third, leveling the playing fi eld—where women 
and men have equal chances to become socially 
and politically active, make decisions, and shape 
policies—is likely to lead over time to more rep-
resentative, and more inclusive, institutions and 
policy choices and thus to a better development 
path. Consider each in turn.
Misallocating women’s skills and talent 
comes at a high (and rising) economic cost
Gender equality can have large impacts on pro-
ductivity. Women now represent more than 40 
percent of the global labor force, 43 percent of 
the agricultural workforce, and more than half 
of the world’s university students. For an econ-
omy to be functioning at its potential, women’s 
skills and talents should be engaged in activities 
that make the best use of those abilities. But, 
as the stories of many women illustrate, this 
is not always the case. When women’s labor is 
underused or misallocated—because they face 
discrimination in markets or societal institu-
tions that prevents them from completing their 
education, entering certain occupations, and 
earning the same incomes as men—economic 
losses are the result. When women farmers 
lack security of land tenure, as they do in many 
countries, especially in Africa, the result is lower 
 access to credit and inputs and to ineffi cient 
land use, reducing yields. Discrimination in 
credit markets and other gender inequalities in 
access to productive inputs also make it more 
diffi cult for female-headed fi rms to be as pro-
ductive and profi table as male-headed ones. 
And, when women are excluded from manage-
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function, is large: ensuring that women farmers 
have the same access as men to fertilizer and other 
agricultural inputs would increase maize yields 
by 11 to 16 percent in Malawi and by 17 percent 
in Ghana.3 Improving women’s property rights 
ment positions, managers are less skilled on 
average, reducing the pace of innovation and 
technology adoption.2 
The direct payoff to correcting these failures, 
many rooted in how markets and institutions 
The 2010 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Sum-
mit concluded with the adoption of a global action 
plan to achieve the eight goals by 2015. The summit 
also adopted a resolution calling for action to ensure 
gender parity in education and health, economic 
opportunities, and decision making through gender 
mainstreaming in development policy making. The 
resolution and the action plan refl ect the belief of the 
international development community that gender 
BOX 2  The Millennium Development Goals recognize the intrinsic and 
instrumental value of gender equality
Source: WDR 2012 team.
equality and women’s empowerment are develop-
ment objectives in their own right (MDG 3 and 5), as 
well as serving as critical channels for achieving the 
other MDGs and reducing income and non-income 
poverty. Gender equality and women’s empower-
ment help to promote universal primary education 
(MDG 2), reduce under-fi ve mortality (MDG 4), 
improve maternal health (MDG 5), and reduce the 
likelihood of contracting HIV/AIDS (MDG 6). 
BOX 1  What do we mean by gender equality? 
Sources: Booth and Nolen 2009; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009; Kabeer 1996; Sen 1999; World Bank 2011.
Gender refers to the social, behavioral, and cultural attributes, 
expectations, and norms associated with being a woman or a man. 
Gender equality refers to how these aspects determine how women 
and men relate to each other and to the resulting diff erences in 
power between them. 
This Report focuses on three key dimensions of gender equality 
identifi ed by men and women from Afghanistan to Poland to South 
Africa,  as well as by researchers: the accumulation of endowments 
(education, health, and physical assets); the use of those endow-
ments to take up economic opportunities and generate incomes; 
and the application of those endowments to take actions, or agency, 
aff ecting individual and household well-being. These are aspects of 
equality where shortfalls of choice are refl ected in shortfalls of wel-
fare. They matter in and of themselves. But they are also closely 
interlinked. 
Gender inequality is both similar to and diff erent from inequal-
ity based on other attributes such as race or ethnicity. Three diff er-
ences are of particular relevance to the analysis of gender equality. 
First, the welfare of women and men living in the same household 
is diffi  cult to measure separately, a problem that is compounded by 
the paucity of data on outcomes in the household. Second, prefer-
ences, needs, and constraints can diff er systematically between 
men and women, refl ecting both biological factors and “learned” 
social behaviors. Third, gender cuts across distinctions of income 
and class. These characteristics raise the question whether gender 
equality should be measured as equality of outcomes or equality of 
opportunity. The economic and philosophical literature on this 
issue is divided. 
Those who defend framing gender equality as equality of oppor-
tunity argue that it allows one to distinguish between inequalities 
that arise from circumstances beyond the control of individuals and 
those that stem from diff erences in preferences and choices. A sub-
stantial body of research documents such male-female diff erences in 
risk aversion, social preferences, and attitudes about competition. It 
 follows that if men and women diff er, on average, in attitudes, prefer-
ences, and choices, then not all observed diff erences in outcomes 
can be attributed to diff erences in opportunities. 
Those who argue for equality of outcomes argue that diff er-
ences in preferences and attitudes are largely “learned” and not 
inherent—that is, they are the result of culture and environment 
that lead men and women to internalize social norms and expec-
tations. Persistent diff erences in power and status between men 
and women can become internalized in aspirations, behaviors, and 
preferences that  perpetuate the inequalities. So, it is diffi  cult to 
defi ne equality of opportunity without also considering how actual 
outcomes are distributed. Only by attempting to equalize out-
comes can one break the vicious circle of low aspirations and low 
opportunity. 
Despite this debate, it is diffi  cult in practice to measure oppor-
tunities separately from outcomes. Indeed, equality of opportuni-
ties and equality of outcomes are tightly linked both in theory and 
in measurement. For this reason, the Report takes a pragmatic 
approach, focusing on both outcomes and opportunities in relation 
to endowments, agency, and access to economic activities. Follow-
ing Sen, we also believe that while people may  disagree in what is 
just or fair, they will agree on eliminating what are “outrageously 
unjust arrangements.” In other words, while it may be diffi  cult 
to defi ne whether gender equality is about outcomes or opportuni-
ties, most will agree that gross manifestations of gender inequality 
should be eliminated.
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of countries (such as Bangladesh, Brazil, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mexico, South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom) shows that increasing the share of 
household income controlled by women, either 
through their own earnings or cash transfers, 
changes spending in ways that benefi t chil-
dren.10 In Ghana, the share of assets and the 
share of land owned by women are positively 
associated with higher food expenditures.11 In 
Brazil, women’s own nonlabor income has a 
positive impact on the height of their daugh-
ters.12 In China, increasing adult female income 
by 10 percent of the average household income 
increased the fraction of surviving girls by 1 per-
centage point and increased years of schooling 
for both boys and girls. In contrast, a compa-
rable increase in male income reduced survival 
rates and educational attainment for girls, with 
no impact on boys.13 In India, a woman’s higher 
earned income increases her children’s years of 
schooling.14
Improvements in women’s own education 
and health also have positive impacts on these 
and other outcomes for their children. Better 
nutritional status of mothers has been associ-
ated with better child health and survival.15 
And women’s education has been positively 
linked to a range of health benefi ts for chil-
dren—from higher immunization rates to bet-
ter nutrition to lower child mortality. Mothers’ 
(and fathers’) schooling has been positively 
linked to children’s educational attainment 
across a broad set of countries; in Pakistan, 
children whose mothers have even a single year 
of education spend one extra hour studying at 
home every day and report higher test scores.16 
Women’s lack of agency—as seen in domes-
tic violence—has consequences for their chil-
dren’s cognitive behaviors and health as adults. 
Medical research from developed countries has 
established a link between exposure to domes-
tic violence as a child and health problems as 
an adult—men and women who experienced 
violence in the home as children are two to 
three times more likely to suffer from cancer, 
a stroke, or cardiovascular problems, and fi ve 
to ten times more likely to use alcohol or ille-
gal drugs than those who did not.17 Numerous 
studies also document how experiencing vio-
lence between parents as a child is a risk factor 
for women experiencing violence from their 
own partners as adults, and for men perpetrat-
ing violence against their partners.18
in Burkina Faso would increase total household 
agricultural production by about 6 percent, with 
no additional resources—simply by reallocat-
ing resources (fertilizer and labor) from men to 
women.4 The Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) estimates that equalizing access to 
productive resources between female and male 
farmers could increase agricultural output in 
developing countries by as much as 2.5 to 4 per-
cent.5 Eliminating barriers that prevent women 
from working in certain occupations or sectors 
would have similar positive effects, reducing 
the productivity gap between male and female 
workers by one-third to one-half (chapter 5) and 
increasing output per worker by 3 to 25 percent 
across a range of countries.6 But achieving these 
gains will not occur automatically as countries 
get richer: multiple and sometimes reinforcing 
barriers to gender equality can get in the way. 
These productivity gains are likely to be even 
larger in a more integrated world where effi ciency 
in the use of resources is essential to a country’s 
competitiveness and growth. Indeed, recent 
work shows that gender inequality has become 
more costly for most countries in a world of open 
trade.7 Gender inequality diminishes a country’s 
ability to compete internationally—particularly 
if the country specializes in exporting goods and 
services for which men and women workers are 
equally well suited. Industries that rely more on 
female labor expand more in countries where 
women are more equal.8 The relationship also 
goes the other way: countries with an advantage 
in making products that rely more on women’s 
labor also have become more gender equal.9 
And in countries and regions with rapidly aging 
populations, like China and Europe and Central 
Asia, encouraging women to enter and remain 
in the labor force can help dampen the adverse 
impact of shrinking working-age populations. 
So, in a globalized world, countries that reduce 
gender-based inequalities, especially in second-
ary and tertiary education and in economic par-
ticipation, will have a clear advantage over those 
that delay action (chapter 6).
Women’s endowments, agency, and 
opportunities shape those of the next 
generation
Greater control over household resources by 
women leads to more investment in children’s 
human capital, with dynamic positive effects 
on economic growth. Evidence from a range 
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Increasing women’s individual and collective 
agency leads to better outcomes, institutions, 
and policy choices
Agency is about one’s ability to make choices—
and to transform them into desired actions and 
outcomes. Across all countries and cultures, 
there are differences between men’s and women’s 
ability to make these choices, usually to women’s 
disadvantage. These gendered differences mat-
ter for women’s well-being but also for a whole 
set of outcomes for their families and for soci-
ety in general. Women’s agency infl uences their 
ability to build their human capital and take up 
economic opportunities. In Bangladesh, women 
with greater control over health care and house-
hold purchases have higher nutritional status. 
Women’s agency also matters for the welfare of 
their children. In Mexico, the daughters (but 
not the sons) of women with more control 
over household decisions work fewer hours on 
household tasks.
Women’s collective agency can be transfor-
mative for society. It can shape the institutions, 
markets, and social norms that limit their indi-
vidual agency and opportunities. Empowering 
women as political and social actors can change 
policy choices and make institutions more rep-
resentative of a range of voices. Female suffrage 
in the United States led policy makers to turn 
their attention to child and maternal health and 
helped lower infant mortality by 8 to 15 per-
cent.19 In India, giving power to women at the 
local level (through political quotas) led to in-
creases in the provision of public goods (both 
female-preferred ones such as water and sani-
tation and male-preferred goods such as irri-
gation and schools) and reduced corruption.20 
Bribes paid by men and women in villages with 
a female leader were 2.7 to 3.2 percentage points 
less than in villages with a male leader.21 In India 
and Nepal, giving women a bigger say in man-
aging forests signifi cantly improved conserva-
tion outcomes.22 Women’s greater public voice 
not only benefi ts women and children but can 
also benefi t men. In many rich countries, greater 
female participation in economic activity has 
combined with their increased representation 
in political leadership to reshape social views on 
balancing work and family life in general and to 
pass more family-friendly labor legislation. 
Conversely, when women and men do not 
have equal chances to be socially and politically 
active and to infl uence laws, politics, and policy 
making, institutions and policies are more likely 
to systematically favor the interests of those with 
more infl uence. Institutional constraints and 
market failures that feed gender inequalities are 
less likely to be addressed and corrected, leading 
to their persistence. As highlighted in the World 
Development Report 2006: Equity and Develop-
ment, an “inequality trap” may thus emerge, 
preventing generations of women from getting 
educated and taking up economic opportuni-
ties on a par with men, reducing their ability to 
make informed choices and to realize their po-
tential as individuals.23
WHAT DOES THIS REPORT DO?
This Report focuses on the economics of gender 
equality and development. It uses economic the-
ory to understand what drives differences in key 
aspects of welfare between men and women—
education and health, access to economic op-
portunities and productive resources, and the 
ability to make effective choices and take ac-
tion. And it uses the same economic lens to 
explore what policy interventions and broader 
societal action can be taken to reduce these 
gender differences and improve development 
outcomes generally. The Report does not limit 
itself to economic outcomes—indeed, it devotes 
roughly equal attention to human endowments, 
economic opportunities, and women’s agency, 
signaling the importance of all three interrelated 
aspects in human welfare. Nor does it ignore the 
central role of social and political institutions, 
whether formal or informal, in determining 
gender outcomes. But in its framing of the issues 
and in the evidence it brings to the case for gen-
der equality, it draws heavily on the economic 
literature on gender. 
We adopt this approach for four reasons. First, 
it provides valuable insights into how key gender 
outcomes emerge and evolve as the development 
process unfolds, as well as how the role and ef-
fectiveness of policy infl uence these outcomes. 
Second, it builds on a tradition of World Bank 
work on the economics of gender (most notably, 
the Engendering Development report24) and on 
the institution’s strongest areas of expertise and 
specialization. Third, there are signifi cant data 
and knowledge gaps that we can help fi ll in this 
area. Fourth, while the Report often arrives at di-
agnoses similar to those of other approaches, it 
provides different insights into the policy levers 
that can be used in support of gender equality.
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Drawing on past and recent work on gender 
and development within the World Bank26 and 
elsewhere, the Report posits that gender out-
comes can be understood through the responses 
of households to the functioning and structure 
of markets and institutions, both formal and in-
formal. Families decide how many children to 
have and when, how much to spend on educa-
tion and health for daughters and sons, how to 
allocate different tasks (inside and outside the 
household), and other matters that infl uence 
gender outcomes. 
The Report focuses largely on inequalities 
affecting women, dwelling on ones likely to be 
reproduced and passed on to the next genera-
tion. But it also focuses on inequalities affecting 
men, while recognizing that most of these male 
inequalities affect fewer realms of welfare.
We adopt an empirical approach, prefer-
ring rigorous and evidence-based analysis and 
highlighting causality where feasible. For this, 
we draw on a large and growing body of quan-
titative gender research, complemented by new 
analysis, particularly on time use, domestic 
violence, mortality risks, and inputs into agri-
culture and entrepreneurship. We also draw on 
new qualitative fi eld research with more than 
4,000 men and women in 98 communities from 
19 developing countries, exploring how gender 
affects their everyday lives and their aspirations, 
education, job choices, decision making, and 
other aspects of well-being (box 3).25
A global report like this one cannot provide 
in-depth analysis of specifi c country circum-
stances. Nor can it cover all relevant dimensions 
of gender equality. Instead, it proposes a con-
ceptual framework to explain gender inequal-
ity and recommend public action, which can 
be adapted as necessary to specifi c countries, 
issues, and sectors. It then illustrates the use of 
this framework by focusing on aspects of gen-
der equality where there has been most progress 
worldwide (education, fertility, life expectancy, 
labor force participation, and the extension of 
legal rights) and where there has been little or 
very slow change (excess female mortality, seg-
regation in economic activity, gaps in earnings, 
responsibility for house and care work, asset 
ownership, and women’s agency in private and 
public spheres). 
To inform this Report the World Bank conducted new fi eld research in 19 coun-
tries in all regions to gain a fi rst-hand look at how men and women experience 
gender in their everyday lives. 
Women and men from all age groups, incomes, and locations see educa-
tion, the ownership of assets, access to economic opportunities, and 
opportunities to earn an income as the keys to improving their well-being and 
that of their families. In 500 focus groups, researchers identifi ed women’s and 
men’s roles and responsibilities in private and public spheres—with women’s 
tasks being largely associated with family care and home production, and 
men’s with income generation and decision making. But diff erences across 
generations clearly show that these roles are being redefi ned in a world that 
off ers new opportunities and demands for both men and women.
The fi ndings also show that old problems persist in new settings even as 
new challenges are emerging. Many groups face pervasive disadvantages—for 
them, change remains an aspiration for future generations but not a reality in 
their everyday lives.
Source: World Bank 2011.
Note: The exercise was conducted with men and women of diff erent age groups in 98 communities (about 
4,000 individuals) in Latin America (Dominican Republic and Peru), Europe and Central Asia (Moldova, Po-
land, and Serbia), Africa (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Sudan, South Africa, and Tanzania), South Asia (Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, and India), the Middle East (West Bank and Gaza and the Republic of Yemen), East Asia (Indonesia 
and Vietnam), and the Pacifi c Islands (Fiji and Papua New Guinea).
BOX 3  How women and men define gender in the
 21st century
I believe that a woman must be educated and must work in order to prove herself in 
society and to be a better mother.
Young woman in Rafah city, West Bank and Gaza
Women should work. Why should I stay at home if I can work outside? I should 
also earn income and my people and myself should enjoy the money I can make. 
Those days where our mothers were to ask for money from our fathers, even for 
simple things like underwear are gone: we need our own money and this means 
that we should work.
Young woman in Bukoba municipality, Tanzania
“
”
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(box 4). Voice and bargaining power of house-
hold members are defi ned by a range of factors, 
including their ownership of and control over 
resources, their ability to leave the household 
(exit options), and social norms. In this way, 
household decision making, markets, formal 
institutions, and informal institutions combine 
and interact to determine gender-related out-
comes (fi gure 1). 
The benefi ts of economic development (the 
combination of higher incomes and better ser-
vice delivery institutions) on gender outcomes 
can be seen clearly through this framework as 
emerging from the workings of households, 
markets, and institutions and their interactions. 
These impacts are illustrated in fi gure 1 by the 
“growth” arrow that turns the gears in the di-
rection of greater gender equality. The impact of 
more gender equality on growth is in turn cap-
tured by the “gender equality” arrow that fl ows 
back into higher growth.
WHERE HAS THERE BEEN THE MOST 
PROGRESS IN GENDER EQUALITY? 
For women and girls in developing countries, 
much has changed for the better in the past 
quarter century. Take female life expectancy at 
birth. It increased dramatically in developing 
countries (by 20 to 25 years in most regions in 
the past 50 years) to reach 71 years globally in 
2007 (compared with 67 for men), and women 
now outlive men in every region of the world. 
The changes were much faster than when to-
day’s rich countries were poorer. It took more 
than 100 years for the number of children born 
to a woman in the United States to decline from 
6 to 3; the same decline took just over 35 years 
in India and less than 20 in Iran (fi gure 2). The 
same patterns can be seen in primary education. 
It took the United States 40 years (from 1870 
until 1910) to increase enrollments among girls 
aged 6 to 12 years from 57 percent to 88 percent; 
Morocco achieved a similar increase for this age 
group in just over a decade (from 58 percent in 
1997 to 88 percent in 2008).
Girls’ education
Progress in closing gender gaps in education has 
been steady and sustained at all levels—primary, 
secondary, and tertiary. In many countries, and 
especially for higher education, these gaps are 
They make these choices on the basis of the 
preferences, incentives, and constraints of dif-
ferent family members, and in relation to their 
relative voice and bargaining power. Preferences 
are shaped by gender roles, social norms, and 
social networks (which we group under the label 
informal institutions). Incentives are largely in-
fl uenced by markets (including the markets for 
labor, credit, land, and goods), which determine 
the returns to household decisions and invest-
ments. Constraints arise from the interplay of 
formal institutions (comprising all that pertain 
to the functioning of the state) and markets but 
also refl ect the infl uence of informal institutions 
Markets—a variety of arrangements that allow buyers and sellers to exchange 
(the rights over) any type of goods and services subject to a set of rules. Markets 
allow for any item that is exchanged to be evaluated and priced. Markets can be 
infl uenced and shaped by formal and informal institutions.
Formal institutions—all aspects that pertain to the functioning of the state, 
including laws, regulatory frameworks, and mechanisms for the delivery of ser-
vices that the state provides (such as judicial services, police services, basic infra-
structure, health, and education).
Informal social institutions—the mechanisms, rules, and procedures that shape 
social interactions but do not pertain to the functioning of the state. In this 
Report, the focus is on gender roles, beliefs, social norms, and social networks. 
Gender roles provide guides to normative behaviors for each sex within certain 
social contexts. Roles gain power as they are learned through socialization, elab-
orated in cultural products, and enacted in daily life. The repeated experience of 
performing gender roles aff ects widely shared beliefs about men’s and women’s 
attributes and one’s own sense of identity. Social norms refer to patterns of 
behavior that fl ow from socially shared beliefs and are enforced by informal social 
sanctions. These can aff ect household bargaining in many ways: they set limits 
on what can be bargained about; they can be a determinant of or constraint to 
bargaining power; they can aff ect how bargaining is conducted; and they them-
selves can be subject to bargaining and can change. Social networks refer to the 
system of social relationships and bonds of cooperation for mutual benefi t that 
shape one’s opportunities, information, social norms, and perceptions.
BOX 4  What do we mean by markets, formal institutions, 
and informal social institutions?
Sources: Agarwal 1994, 1997; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gätcher 2002; Kabeer 1999; Sen 1990. 
“
”
I think women should go out as well to look 
for a job because men are failing to get jobs; 
for women it is easier because they have more 
options.
Young man in rural Ngonyameni,
South Africa
 Overview 9
now reversing, with boys and young men at a 
relative disadvantage. Two-thirds of all coun-
tries have reached gender parity in primary 
education enrollments, while in over one-third, 
girls signifi cantly outnumber boys in secondary 
education (fi gure 3). Even in regions with the 
largest remaining gender gaps—South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (particularly West Africa)—
there have been considerable gains. And in a 
striking reversal of historical patterns, more 
women than men now attend universities, with 
women’s tertiary enrollment across the globe 
having risen more than sevenfold since 1970 
(fourfold for men). Yet while boy disadvantage 
is slowly emerging in some places, girl disadvan-
tage where it exists tends to emerge earlier in life 
and is deeper.
Women’s market work
Women’s labor force participation has grown 
in the past 30 years as expanding economic op-
portunities have drawn many female workers 
F I G U R E  1  Gender outcomes result from interactions between households, markets, and institutions
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F I G U R E  2  Across the world, women 
are having fewer children
Source: www.gapminder.org
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tures change so that activities in which men 
no longer have an advantage become more 
prominent. This shift opens new opportunities 
for women’s employment, and households re-
spond to these signals by educating daughters. 
Richer countries can also invest in more ac-
cessible education systems by building schools 
and hiring teachers. When combined with bet-
ter incentive and accountability systems, these 
inputs help deliver better and cheaper services, 
lowering the costs of access to households and 
increasing their use. Where all these factors 
have worked together, the gaps have closed rap-
idly, as in Morocco. 
But even if bottlenecks appear in any one 
of these channels—pro-boy preferences within 
households or inadequacies in the provision of 
education or slow growth or limits on women’s 
employment opportunities—the other channels 
still have allowed progress in educating girls. Pol-
icies targeted to getting children to school, such 
as the conditional cash transfers used in more 
than 30 countries worldwide (many explicitly 
targeting girls, as in Bangladesh and Cambodia), 
have also helped. These forces are illustrated in 
fi gure 4 by the (green) gears representing house-
holds, formal institutions, and markets all mov-
ing in ways that narrow educational gender gaps 
(“oiled” by supportive policies).
into the market. Between 1980 and 2008, the 
gender gap in participation narrowed from 32 
percentage points to 26 percentage points. By 
2008, women represented more than 40 percent 
of the global labor force. Large increases in par-
ticipation in countries that started with very low 
rates (mainly in Latin America and the Carib-
bean and to a lesser extent in the Middle East 
and North Africa) combined with small declines 
in countries that started with very high rates 
(mainly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia) 
mean that rates have converged across regions, 
although signifi cant differences remain. Female 
labor force participation is lowest in the Mid-
dle East and Northern Africa (26 percent) and 
South Asia (35 percent) and highest in East Asia 
and the Pacifi c (64 percent) and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (61 percent).
What explains progress?
Where gaps have closed quickly, it has been a 
result of how markets and institutions have 
functioned and evolved, how growth has played 
out, and how all these factors have interacted 
through household decisions. For education, 
consider each in turn. Higher incomes allow 
families that had previously only sent their sons 
to school to now send their daughters as well. 
As countries get richer, their economic struc-
F I G U R E  3   Gender parity in enrollments at lower levels has been achieved in much of the world, but tertiary 
enrollments are very low and favor women
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Development Indicators.
Note: The 45° line in each fi gure above shows gender parity in enrollments. Any point above the 45° line implies that more women are enrolled relative to men.
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has increased sharply over time. So, at every level 
of per capita income, more women are now en-
gaged in economic activity outside the home 
than ever before.
There are two main reasons why gains in 
some domains of gender equality in many de-
veloping countries came faster than they did for 
today’s rich countries when they were at com-
parable incomes. First, the incomes of many 
developing countries have grown faster. Since 
1950, 13 developing countries have grown at 
an average of 7 percent a year for more than 25 
years or longer—a pace unprecedented before 
the latter half of the 20th century.28 Second, the 
various domains of gender outcomes are inter-
related. So, improvements in one have spurred 
advances in others. The decline in fertility that 
has come with higher incomes has helped lower 
the number of deaths associated with maternal 
mortality. And bearing fewer children has given 
women more time to invest in acquiring hu-
man capital and to participate in the economy. 
Forward-looking parents have responded to the 
The interactions between households, mar-
kets and institutions can also explain the pattern 
and pace of female labor force participation. A 
woman’s decision to work outside the home re-
sponds both to changes in her own wages and 
to changes in her household income. As low-
income countries grow richer, women partici-
pate less in market work because their household 
incomes also rise. Over time, their education lev-
els also increase as formal institutions respond. 
Rising incomes also lead to later marriage and 
childbearing and lower fertility. These factors 
all bring women back into the labor force. In 10 
Latin American countries, almost two-thirds of 
the increase in women’s labor force participa-
tion in the past two decades can be attributed 
to more education and to changes in family 
formation (later marriage and lower fertility).27 
These different impacts of income growth and 
rising women’s wages lead to a U-shaped pat-
tern of female labor force participation across 
countries (fi gure 5). But notably, since 1980, the 
female participation rate at each level of income 
F I G U R E  4  Using the framework to explain progress in education
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from educating girls and from women working 
become evident. Consider the notable advances 
in gender equality in two very different coun-
tries: Bangladesh and Colombia. 
• In the four decades since Bangladesh gained 
independence, the average number of chil-
dren a woman will have during her lifetime 
fell from almost 7 to just over 2. School en-
rollment among girls rose from a third in 
1991 to 56 percent in 2005. And just in the 
latter part of the 1990s, labor force participa-
tion for young women more than doubled. 
• In Colombia, the average number of children 
a woman will bear dropped from 3.2 to 2.4 
between the mid-1980s and 2005. Women 
also reversed the education gap and now 
have higher completion rates than men for 
primary, secondary, and even tertiary educa-
tion. And the country has the steepest in-
crease in women’s labor force participation 
in the region, giving it one of the highest par-
ticipation rates in Latin America. Women 
there are well represented in managerial po-
sitions and in fi nance—the glass ceilings no-
toriously hard to break through even in many 
rich countries.
The problem of severely disadvantaged 
populations
The combined forces of markets, service deliv-
ery institutions, and income growth that have 
contributed to closing gender gaps in education, 
fertility, and labor force participation for many 
women have not worked for everyone. For poor 
women and for women in very poor places, 
sizable gender gaps remain. And these gaps are 
even worse where poverty combines with other 
factors of exclusion—such as ethnicity, caste, 
remoteness, race, disability, or sexual orienta-
tion. Even in education, where gaps have nar-
rowed in most countries, girls’ enrollment in 
primary and secondary school has improved 
little in many Sub-Saharan countries and 
some parts of South Asia. School enrollments 
for girls in Mali are comparable to those in 
the United States in 1810, and the situation 
in Ethiopia and Pakistan is not much better 
(fi gure 6). And in many countries, gender dis-
parities remain large only for those who are 
poor. In both India and Pakistan, while boys 
and girls from the top income quantile (fi fth) 
participate in school at similar rates, there is a 
expanded employment opportunities by in-
creasing their educational investments in their 
daughters. These better educated girls are more 
likely to work when they become older, have 
fewer children, and exercise more voice in their 
households—feeding the cycle of change. So, 
the progress in fertility, the gains in education, 
the gains in women’s agency, and the shifts of 
women to market work are not only related but 
also mutually reinforcing. Public policies have 
themselves played a role, because the big push 
for universal education of the past decade has 
helped get all children to school.
The main lesson: when market signals, for-
mal institutions, and income growth all come 
together to support investments in women, gen-
der equality can and does improve very quickly. 
And these improvements can occur even when 
informal institutions, such as social norms 
about what is “appropriate” for girls and boys 
or women and men, may themselves take time 
to adapt. This is not to say that social norms 
have not been important in determining these 
outcomes. The differences across countries and 
among regions within countries both in clos-
ing gender gaps in educational attainment and 
levels of women’s labor force participation high-
light their infl uence. But the fast pace of change 
in education and even in labor force participa-
tion almost everywhere shows how these norms 
adapt quite quickly as the economic returns 
F I G U R E  5   Female labor force participation has increased over 
time at all income levels
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations based on International Labor Organization 2010 (130 countries).
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ity for house and care work, gaps in asset owner-
ship, and constraints to women’s agency in both 
the private and public spheres. Progress in these 
domains is diffi cult to see, despite greater pros-
perity in many parts of the world. Indeed, many 
of these gender disparities remain salient even 
among the richest countries.
Gender disparities persist in these “sticky” 
domains for three main reasons. First, there 
may only be a single institutional or policy 
“fi x,” which can be diffi cult and easily blocked. 
We illustrate this problem with excess female 
mortality. Second, disparities persist when mul-
tiple reinforcing constraints combine to block 
progress. We use disparities in the economic 
sphere (the persistence of gender earnings gaps 
and gender segregation in employment) and in 
agency (differences in societal voice and house-
hold decision making) to illustrate this prob-
lem. Third, gender differences are particularly 
persistent when rooted in deeply entrenched 
gender roles and social norms—such as those 
gender gap of almost fi ve years in the bottom 
income quantile (fi gure 7).
Beyond the poor, gender gaps remain par-
ticularly large for groups for whom ethnicity, 
geographical distance, and other factors (such 
as disability or sexual orientation) compound 
gender inequality. Almost two-thirds of out-of-
school girls globally belong to ethnic minority 
groups in their own countries.29 The illiteracy 
rate among indigenous women in Guatemala 
stands at 60 percent, 20 points above indige-
nous men and twice the rate of nonindigenous 
women.30
For these severely disadvantaged groups—
which can be pockets of disadvantage or en-
tire swaths of countries or regions—none of 
the forces that favor educating girls and young 
women are working. So, the growth in aggregate 
income may not be broad-based enough to ben-
efi t poor households. Market signals are muted 
because economic opportunities for women do 
not expand much or because other barriers—
such as exclusion caused by ethnicity, race, or 
caste—get in the way of accessing those oppor-
tunities. And service delivery is often riddled 
with problems because poverty, distance, and 
discrimination mean that these groups do not 
see an expansion of schools and teachers. This 
does not mean that the channels that have fa-
vored girls’ education elsewhere will not work 
for these groups. It means that efforts need to 
be redoubled to ensure that the essential build-
ing blocks for progress (broad-based income 
growth, expanding employment opportunities 
for women, and effective service delivery) are 
in place. And these efforts may need to be com-
bined with complementary interventions that 
address specifi c disadvantages that compound 
gender inequality (chapter 7).
WHERE HAVE GENDER INEQUALITIES 
PERSISTED AND WHY?
By contrast to areas that have seen good prog-
ress, change has come slowly or not at all for 
many women and girls in many other dimen-
sions of gender equality. Health disadvantages 
that show up in the excess relative mortality of 
girls and women fall into this category. So do 
other persistent gender disparities, including 
segregation in economic activity, gender gaps in 
earnings, male-female differences in responsibil-
F I G U R E  6   Low-income countries lag behind in realizing 
progress in female school enrollment
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on U.S. Census and the International Income Distribution 
Database (I2D2).
Note:  Values between 1760 and 1840 are based on female school enrollment trending between 1850 
and 2000.
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below the age of 60. About two-fi fths of them 
are never born, one-fi fth goes missing in infancy 
and childhood, and the remaining two-fi fths do 
so between the ages of 15 and 59 (table 1).
Growth does not make the problem disap-
pear. Between 1990 and 2008, the number of 
missing girls at birth and excess female mortal-
ity after birth did not change much; declines in 
infancy and childhood were offset by dramatic 
increases in Sub-Saharan Africa in the repro-
ductive ages. Part of the increase is because 
populations increased. But, unlike Asia, where 
the population-adjusted missing women fell 
in every country (dramatically in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam), most Sub-Saharan 
countries saw little change in the new millen-
nium. And in the countries hardest hit by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, things got much worse.
The Report’s analysis helps explain these 
patterns. Depending on the period in the life 
cycle, girls and women are missing for dif-
ferent reasons. Missing girls at birth refl ect 
about who is responsible for care and house-
work in the home, and what is “acceptable” for 
women and men to study, do, and aspire to. 
And these gaps tend to be reproduced across 
generations. Consider each in turn.
Higher mortality of girls and women
The rate at which girls and women die relative to 
men is higher in low- and middle-income coun-
tries than in high-income countries. To quantify 
this excess female mortality (“missing” girls and 
women) and identify the ages at which it occurs, 
this Report estimated the number of excess fe-
male deaths at every age and for every country 
in 1990, 2000, and 2008.31 Excess female deaths 
in a given year represent women who would not 
have died in the previous year if they had lived 
in a high-income country, after accounting for 
the overall health environment of the country 
they live in. Globally, excess female mortality 
after birth and “missing” girls at birth account 
every year for an estimated 3.9 million women 
F I G U R E  7  Female disadvantage within countries is more marked at low incomes
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on EdAttain.
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South Asia. High maternal mortality is the main 
contributor to excess female mortality in the re-
productive years. In Afghanistan, Chad, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and 
Somalia, at least 1 of every 25 women will die 
from complications of childbirth or pregnancy. 
And a much larger fraction will suffer long-term 
health consequences from giving birth.33
Progress in reducing maternal mortality has 
not been commensurate with income growth. 
In India, despite stellar economic growth in re-
cent years, maternal mortality is almost six times 
the rate in Sri Lanka. In the past two decades, 
only 90 countries experienced a decline of 40 
percent or more in the maternal mortality ra-
tio, while 23 countries showed an increase. The 
main problem is, again, that households are be-
ing asked to make many decisions in the face of 
bad options—a result of multiple service deliv-
ery failures. In many parts of the world, this sit-
uation is reinforced by social norms that infl u-
ence household behavior and make it diffi cult 
overt discrimination in the household, result-
ing from the combination of strong preferences 
for sons combined with declining fertility and 
the spread of technologies that allow parents to 
know the sex before birth.32 This is a particular 
issue in China and North India (although now 
spreading to other parts of India), but it is also 
visible in parts of the Caucasus and the Western 
Balkans.
Missing girls during infancy and early child-
hood cannot be explained by a preference for 
sons alone, although discrimination against girls 
may contribute to it. It is a result not so much of 
discrimination as of poor institutions that force 
households to choose among many bad options, 
particularly regarding water and sanitation. 
Markets and households cannot compensate for 
these poor services.
Missing women in the reproductive ages re-
fl ect two main factors. First, stubbornly high 
rates of maternal mortality persist, especially in 
much of Sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from the World Health Organization 2010 and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aff airs 2009.
Note: Totals do not necessarily add up due to rounding.
TA B L E  1  Almost 4 million missing women each year
 Excess female deaths in the world, by age and region, 1990 and 2008
 (thousands)
East Asia and Pacific (excluding China)
China
India
Sub-Saharan Africa
High HIV-prevalence countries
Low HIV-prevalence countries
South Asia (excluding India)
Middle East and North Africa
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Total
girls at birth girls under 5 girls 5–14 women 15–49 women 50–59
   1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008  1990 2008  1990  2008
Total
women
under 60
 1990 2008
 890 1,092 259 71 21 5 208 56 92 30 1,470 1,254
 265 257 428 251 94 45 388 228 81 75 1,255 856
 42 53 183 203 61 77 302 751 50 99 639 1,182
 0 0 6 39 5 18 38 328 4 31 53 416
 42 53 177 163 57 59 264 423 46 68 586 766
 0 1 99 72 32 20 176 161 37 51 346 305
 3 4 14 7 14 9 137 113 48 46 216 179
 5 6 13 7 4 1 43 24 15 15 80 52
 7 14 3 1 0 0 12 4 4 3 27 23
 0 0 11 5 3 1 20 10 17 17 51 33
 1,212 1,427 1,010 617 230 158 1,286 1,347 343 334 4,082 3,882
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in the quality of institutions—in the provi-
sion of clean water, sanitation, and maternal 
health care. Because there is only a single point 
of entry—through better institutions—for ad-
dressing female mortality, solving the problem is 
hard—much harder than getting girls to school. 
But for any basic notions of human justice, the 
global development community must make ad-
dressing this problem a priority. 
Gender segregation in economic activity 
and earnings gaps
Although women have entered the labor force 
in large numbers across much of the developing 
world in the past quarter century, this increased 
participation has not translated into equal em-
ployment opportunities or equal earnings for 
men and women. Women and men tend to 
work in very different parts of the “economic 
space,” with little change over time, even in 
high-income countries. In almost all countries, 
women are more likely than men to engage in 
low-productivity activities. They are also more 
likely to be in wage or unpaid family employ-
ment or work in the informal wage sector. In 
agriculture, especially in Africa, women operate 
smaller plots of land and farm less remunerative 
crops. As entrepreneurs, they tend to manage 
smaller fi rms and concentrate in less-profi table 
sectors. And in formal employment, they con-
centrate in “female” occupations and sectors 
(fi gure 8). These patterns of gender segregation 
in economic activity change with economic de-
velopment but do not disappear.
As a result of these differences in where 
women and men work, gender gaps in earn-
ings and productivity persist across all forms of 
economic activity—in agriculture, in wage em-
ployment, and in entrepreneurship (map 1). In 
almost all countries, women in manufacturing 
earn less than men. In agriculture, farms oper-
ated by women on average have lower yields 
than those operated by men, even for men and 
women in the same households and for men 
and women cultivating the same crops.34 Fe-
male entrepreneurs are also less productive than 
male entrepreneurs.35 In urban areas in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the value added per worker 
is lower in fi rms managed by women than in 
those managed by men.36 For fi rms operating in 
rural Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Sri 
for women to get maternal health care quickly 
enough even where it is available. And high fer-
tility, partly refl ecting low incomes, compounds 
the problem in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Second, the impacts of the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic on the mortality of women in many East-
ern and Southern African countries have been 
dramatic. The reason for the greater prevalence 
of HIV/AIDS among women relative to men is 
their greater susceptibility and the greater like-
lihood that their sexual partners are older and 
thus more likely than younger men to have HIV. 
In addition, countries that have had a low-lying 
civil confl ict (such as Democratic Republic of 
Congo) have also seen an increase in the num-
ber of “missing” women. This is in contrast to 
other countries that have had outright wars—
like Eritrea, where men who went “missing” in 
the years of war increased. 
An examination of the historical experience 
of northern and western European countries 
and the United States reveals that similar pat-
terns of excess female mortality in infancy and 
the reproductive years existed there but disap-
peared between 1900 and 1950. These reductions 
occurred primarily because of improvements 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on International Labour Organization 2010 (77 countries).
Note: Totals do not necessarily add due to rounding.
F I G U R E  8   Women and men work in different sectors
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disproportionate responsibility for housework 
and care, while men are responsible mostly for 
market work (fi gure 10). When all activities are 
added up, women typically work more hours 
than men, with consequences for their leisure 
and well-being. And everywhere they devote 
more time each day to care and housework 
than their male partners: differences range 
from one to three hours more for housework, 
two to ten times the time for care (of children, 
elderly, and the sick), and one to four hours 
less for market activities. Even as women take 
up a bigger share of market work, they remain 
largely responsible for care and housework. 
And these patterns are only accentuated after 
marriage and childbearing. 
A second factor driving segregation in em-
ployment and earnings gaps is differences in 
human and physical endowments (including 
access to assets and credit). Despite increases in 
women’s education, there are still differences in 
human capital between women and men. These 
include a gap in years of schooling among older 
Lanka, the differences in profi tability are signifi -
cant between female-owned and male-owned 
businesses.37 
So, what explains this persistent gender seg-
regation in economic activity and the resulting 
gaps in earnings? The Report argues that gender 
differences in time use, in access to assets and 
credit, and in treatment by markets and formal 
institutions (including the legal and regula-
tory framework) all play a role in constraining 
women’s opportunities. These constraints are 
shown in fi gure 9 as wedges blocking progress 
toward greater gender equality. Income growth 
has some infl uence in shifting these patterns but 
does not eliminate them. The mutually reinforc-
ing interactions between these different factors 
make the problem particularly diffi cult to break. 
Consider each in turn.
The differing amounts of time that men and 
women allocate to care and related household 
work are one factor driving segregation and 
the consequent earnings gaps. In most coun-
tries, irrespective of income, women bear a 
M A P  1  Earnings gaps between women and men (female earnings relative to $1 of male earnings)
Sources: Data for Benin come from Kinkingninhoun-Mêdagbé and others 2010; for Malawi from Gilbert, Sakala, and Benson 2002; for Nigeria from Oladeebo and Fajuyigbe 2007; for 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Sri Lanka from Costa and Rijkers 2011; and for Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, India, and Mexico from LABORSTA, International Labour Organization.
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large. Data for 16 countries in fi ve developing 
regions indicate female-headed households are 
less likely to own and less likely to farm land.38 
More generally, where evidence is available 
for all farmers, women seldom own the land 
they farm. For example, in Brazil, women own 
as little as 11 percent of land. And their land-
holdings are systematically smaller than those 
owned by men. In Kenya, women account for 5 
percent of registered landholders nationally.39 
And in Ghana, the mean value of men’s land-
holdings is three times that of women’s land-
holdings.40 Similarly large gaps are observed in 
use of fertilizers and improved seed varieties in 
agriculture, and in access to and use of credit 
among entrepreneurs. 
Third, market failures and institutional con-
straints also play a role. Labor markets often do 
not work well for women, especially if their pres-
ence is limited in some sectors or occupations. 
When few women are employed, employers may 
hold discriminatory beliefs about women’s pro-
ductivity or suitability as workers—these beliefs 
cohorts as well as differences in what women 
and men choose to study in younger cohorts—
differences that affect employment segregation, 
especially in countries where most young people 
go to college. In agriculture and entrepreneur-
ship, large and signifi cant gender disparities in 
access to inputs (including land and credit) and 
in asset ownership are at the root of the gender 
productivity gap. Indeed, yield differences for 
female and male farmers disappear altogether 
when access to productive inputs is taken into 
account (fi gure 11). Differences in access to in-
puts may be further compounded by differences 
in the availability of “market time,” as noted 
above, which can make the same investment 
less productive for women than for men. Jointly, 
these constraints mean that women entrepre-
neurs and farmers are often restricted to busi-
nesses and activities that are less profi table and 
less likely to expand.
How big are gender differences in access to 
assets (especially land), credit, and other in-
puts? A variety of data sources suggests they are 
F I G U R E  9  Explaining persistent segregation and earnings gaps
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measures, prevent women from entering some 
sectors or occupations. 
In sum, whether women are farmers, en-
trepreneurs, or workers, many are caught in a 
productivity trap: working hard on an uneven 
playing fi eld with unequal access to productive 
inputs. This trap imposes signifi cant costs on 
women’s welfare and economic opportunities 
can persist if there are no mechanisms in place 
to correct them. Access to information about 
jobs, and support for promotions and advance-
ment, often occur in gendered networks, hurt-
ing women trying to enter a male-dominated 
fi eld (or equally hurting men trying to enter a 
female-dominated one, such as nursing). And 
sometimes, legal barriers, framed as protective 
F I G U R E  10   Across the world, women spend more hours per day on care and 
housework than men
Source: Berniell and Sanchez-Páramo 2011.
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of married women in India are not involved in 
spending decisions, even about their own in-
comes. Even in an upper-middle-income coun-
try like Turkey, more than a quarter of married 
women in the lowest income quantile lack con-
trol over their earned income.41 Women’s ability 
to own, control, and dispose of property still dif-
fers from that of men—sometimes legally, often 
in practice. And again, these patterns change 
only slowly as countries grow richer.
A clear manifestation of the lack of agency 
is domestic violence. Violence is the opposite 
of freedom—an extreme form of coercion that 
by defi nition negates agency. Women are at far 
greater risk of violence by an intimate partner or 
someone they know than from violence by other 
people. And women are more likely than men to 
be killed, seriously injured, or victims of sexual 
violence by intimate partners.42 The prevalence 
of domestic violence varies greatly across coun-
tries, with no clear relationship to incomes; 
while incidence tends to rise with socioeconomic 
deprivation, violence knows no boundaries. In 
some middle-income nations, such as Brazil 
(Sao Paolo and Pernambuco region) and Serbia 
(Belgrade), women report that the incidence 
of physical violence by intimate partners is as 
high as 25 percent.43 In Peru (Cusco), almost 50 
percent of women are victims of severe physical 
violence during their lifetime, and in Ethiopia 
(Butajira), 54 percent of women reported being 
subject to physical or sexual abuse by an inti-
mate partner in the past 12 months. 44
Multiple factors are at work behind these 
large gaps in women’s voice. In society, low 
representation can be self-perpetuating, with 
women unable to convey their ability to lead. 
So, in politics, voters will not be able to judge 
accurately the capacity of a woman leader. And 
women’s entry may be limited by societal beliefs 
that being engaged in politics is a masculine 
activity or that women are less effective leaders 
than men—beliefs that are hard to break until 
a critical mass of women rises to political lead-
ership. Different responsibilities for care work 
also mean that women lack the fl exibility or the 
time to invest as heavily as men in participating 
in political institutions. The lack of networks for 
women also makes it more diffi cult for them to 
ascend to positions of authority in political par-
ties or labor unions. 
In the household, two important determi-
nants of a woman’s voice are her income and 
today—and serious disincentives to invest in the 
women of tomorrow. 
Less voice in societal and household 
decision making
In much of the world, women have less input 
than men in decision making in their house-
holds, in their communities, and in their soci-
eties. Consider women’s underrepresentation in 
formal politics, especially in its upper reaches. 
Fewer than one-fi fth of all cabinet positions is 
held by women. And women’s lack of represen-
tation extends to the judiciary and labor unions. 
These patterns do not change much as countries 
get richer. The share of women parliamentari-
ans increased only from 10 percent to 17 percent 
between 1995 and 2009. 
Whether and how much voice a woman has 
in household decision making over patterns of 
spending, including spending on children, are 
important markers of her agency. As many as a 
third of married women in Malawi and a fi fth 
Source: Alene and others 2008; Gilbert, Sakala, and Benson 2002; Kinkingninhoun-Mêdagbé and others 
2010; Moock 1976; Oladeebo and Fajuyigbe 2007; Saito, Mekonnen, and Spurling 1994; Vargas Hill and 
Vigneri 2009.
F I G U R E  11   Gender differences in agricultural productivity 
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pro-male bias in India and Ethiopia but not in 
Peru and Vietnam. 
A growing body of research also suggests that 
attitudes about women in the family and the 
workplace are transmitted across generations. 
When women do not work outside the home, 
their daughters are also less likely to do so as 
adults, and their sons are less likely to marry 
women who work outside the home.48 Young 
men and young women also tend to study in 
very different fi elds—with women favoring 
education and the humanities, while men fa-
vor engineering, agriculture, and sciences—in 
ways that are unrelated to abilities (chapter 3) 
yet repeat themselves over generations and do 
not go away as incomes rise. Evidence also sug-
gests that domestic violence witnessed as a child 
is repeated in adulthood.49 Women in Haiti who 
had witnessed domestic violence were more 
likely to report being the victims of physical or 
sexual violence.50 The pattern is similar in Cam-
bodia and Mexico. 51 And men in South Africa 
who reported witnessing violence between their 
parents were signifi cantly more likely to report 
perpetrating physical violence themselves.52
Norms may be learned in the household, but 
they are often reinforced by market signals and 
institutions, which are gender biased in many 
aspects. For example, gender differences in the 
responsibility for house and care work, as just 
discussed, are rooted in gender roles but strength-
ened by discrimination in labor markets and by 
a lack of child-care services. At the root of gen-
dered patterns of what men and women study is 
a combination of factors that feed into household 
decisions (norms about what is appropriate for 
girls and boys), institutions (gendered education 
systems), and markets (gendered networks and 
occupational segregation). For domestic violence, 
empirical work fi nds signifi cant explanatory 
power at the individual, household, and commu-
nity levels, reinforced by social perceptions and 
institutional failures (including a lack of protec-
tive laws and services or their poor enforcement 
and delivery).53 
What can we learn from the persistence 
of all these gender gaps?
Markets and institutions (formal and informal) 
can work against greater gender equality—
in ways that are often mutually reinforcing. 
Sometimes service delivery institutions fail, as 
for young girls and women during childbirth. 
her control over household assets. Economic 
growth can improve the material conditions for 
exercising agency, with women generally having 
more voice in wealthier households. But higher 
household incomes alone are not enough to 
eliminate the lower capacity of women to ex-
ercise agency. What matters are a woman’s own 
income and assets as well as her ability to leave 
the household, all of which increase her bargain-
ing power and ability to infl uence household 
choices. In India, owning property substantially 
enhances women’s voice in the household on 
various matters and reduces her risk of domes-
tic violence.45 Similarly, as women’s shares in 
household earnings increase in Colombia and 
South Africa, so does their control over key 
household decisions. There is also evidence of a 
relationship between women’s assets, earnings, 
and shares of household income, and the inci-
dence of domestic violence.46 
But if women’s earnings are limited by mal-
functioning markets or other gender-differenti-
ated barriers to economic opportunities and as-
set ownership, women’s voice in the household 
will remain muted. Reinforcing these market 
and legal infl uences are social norms dictating 
that men, not women, make the major decisions 
in households.
Reproducing gender inequality across 
generations
Perhaps the “stickiest” aspect of gender out-
comes is the way patterns of gender inequal-
ity are reproduced over time. Part of this 
persistence is rooted in slow-moving social 
norms and how they affect what happens in 
the household. Women and men internalize 
social norms and expectations in ways that af-
fect not only their own aspirations, behaviors, 
and preferences but also those of their chil-
dren. The Young Lives study looked at educa-
tional aspirations and noncognitive skills of 
boys and girls at ages 8, 12, and 15 for 12,000 
children in Ethiopia, Andhra Pradesh in India, 
Peru, and Vietnam.47 Parental aspirations for 
the education of their children were biased to-
ward boys in Ethiopia and India by the age of 
12 and toward girls in Peru and Vietnam. By 
the age of 15, these biases had been transmit-
ted to children, with clearly higher educational 
aspirations among boys in Ethiopia and India, 
and among girls in Vietnam. And by age 15, 
measures of agency or effi cacy showed a strong 
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other domains of gender equality, such as occu-
pational segregation and many manifestations 
of women’s agency, income growth and better 
service delivery are far less effective in unlocking 
the often multiple and reinforcing constraints 
that underlie persistent gender gaps. 
The new forces of globalization can reduce 
many of these gaps. First, trade openness and 
the diffusion of new information and com-
munication technologies have translated into 
more jobs and stronger connections to markets 
for women, increasing their access to economic 
opportunities and contributing to their eco-
nomic empowerment. Second, urbanization 
and greater access to information have allowed 
many in developing countries to learn about life 
and mores in other parts of the world, including 
the role of women, possibly affecting attitudes 
and behaviors. Third, the incentives for public 
action for gender equality are stronger than ever 
because the rising global consensus on the in-
trinsic importance of women’s economic, social, 
and political empowerment means that gen-
der inequality hurts a country’s international 
standing. But this potential of globalization 
will not be realized without effective domestic 
public action to close remaining gender gaps in 
endowments, agency, and access to economic 
opportunities.
So, what should governments in developing 
countries do to foster greater gender equality? 
What areas of gender inequality should they 
focus on? Should they start with interventions 
in education and health, or should they focus 
on access to economic opportunities or agency? 
What combination of policies should they im-
plement, and in what sequence? At fi rst blush, 
these questions can appear overwhelming be-
cause of the multiplicity of priority areas and 
the number of available policy instruments. 
This Report shows how better analysis can help 
reduce the complexity of policy choice and de-
sign in several ways. 
The starting point is to determine which as-
pects of gender inequality should be of highest 
priority for policy going forward. Three criteria 
matter in this regard: 
• First, which gender gaps are most signifi cant 
for enhancing welfare and sustaining devel-
opment? So, where are the likely payoffs for 
development from addressing gender dis-
parities likely to be the largest? 
Other times markets do not work well, with 
results that are worse for women, as illustrated 
by evidence of discrimination in both labor and 
credit markets. Often reinforcing these mar-
ket failures, however, are formal institutions 
that treat women and men differently. Laws 
and regulations can constrain women’s agency 
and opportunities more than those of men, as 
when women and men have different owner-
ship rights, or when restrictions are placed on 
hours and sectors of work for women but not 
for men. Where credit and labor markets already 
discriminate, such unequal laws and regulations 
can accentuate the problem. Unequal treatment 
may also manifest itself more indirectly through 
biased service delivery, as is the case for agricul-
ture extension services. Here, institutional bias 
and market structure (with women underrepre-
sented in nonfood crops that are often the target 
of extension services) reinforce and even deepen 
inequalities. 
All institutions (formal and informal) have 
considerable inertia. They tend to refl ect the in-
terests of those who wield more power and in-
fl uence, and they are diffi cult to change without 
some form of collective agency or voice.54 Social 
norms can be especially slow to change: norms 
that may have served a purpose at one point in 
time, but are no longer useful, may endure sim-
ply because of custom or because a social pen-
alty is associated with being the fi rst to break the 
norm, or because the norm benefi ts a dominant 
group in society (in this case, men). The norm’s 
persistence can perpetuate gender inequalities 
long after its original rationale has disappeared. 
In sum, gender-differentiated market fail-
ures, institutional constraints, and persistent 
social norms often combine to reinforce gender 
inequalities and make improving gender equal-
ity much more complex. When there are multi-
ple constraints, they all need to be addressed. 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
Nothing is automatic about the growth and 
development process that delivers greater gen-
der equality on all fronts. Part of the reason is 
that higher incomes and better delivery of ser-
vices by the state help reduce gender gaps only 
in some domains. And even in these domains, 
the improvements do not reach all women. In 
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Policies to reduce gender gaps in 
human capital endowments 
(health and education)
Addressing gender gaps in human capital en-
dowments—excess female mortality at specifi c 
periods of the life cycle and pockets of gender 
disadvantage in education—requires fi xing the 
institutions that deliver public services. Providing 
basic services in a timely manner to expectant 
mothers and improving the availability of clean 
water and sanitation to households will go a long 
way to closing the gender gaps in excess mortal-
ity. Education services need to focus on improv-
ing access for the signifi cant population groups 
that are currently disadvantaged by poverty, eth-
nicity, caste, race, or geography. Such a focus will 
help address the “gender inequality traps” that 
affect the poor and excluded in society. 
These solutions can come from either the 
demand or the supply side, but they cannot be 
gender blind. On the contrary, they must factor 
in explicitly, both for design and implementa-
tion, the drivers of gender inequality that cause 
the gender gaps in health and education out-
comes to persist. And they must bring into the 
process of policy design and implementation 
the voices of those that the policy is trying to 
reach—excluded women and girls, and the men 
and boys who live with them. 
Reducing excess female mortality
The main determinants of excess female mor-
tality in different periods of the life cycle have 
little to do with how quickly countries grow. 
They result from household preferences and 
from failures in the ways that markets and in-
stitutions function. The entry points for policy 
are dictated by which of these infl uences is most 
binding in each period.
Skewed sex ratios at birth is a problem in a 
few parts of the world, including China, parts of 
India, and parts of the Caucasus and the Western 
Balkans. The underlying cause is son preference 
among households, which has been exacerbated 
in some of these places by rapid income growth. 
Higher incomes have increased access to ultra-
sound technologies that assist in sex selection at 
birth. So, policies need to work on two fronts. 
First, laws need to be enacted and enforced to 
deal with the abuse of sex selection technologies, as 
has been done in China and India. But experi-
ence shows that enforcement is diffi cult, if not 
• Second, which of these gaps persist even as 
countries get richer? So, where do higher 
 incomes by themselves do little to reduce 
 disparities? 
• Third, for which of these priority areas has 
there been insuffi cient or misplaced atten-
tion? So, where would a reorientation of pol-
icies yield the greatest benefi ts?
Applying these criteria, we conclude that four 
areas should be of the highest priority for policy 
makers: 
• Reducing gender gaps in human capital en-
dowments (addressing excess female mortal-
ity and eliminating pockets of gender disad-
vantage in education where they persist)
• Closing earnings and productivity gaps be-
tween women and men
• Shrinking gender differences in voice 
• Limiting the reproduction of gender inequality 
over time, whether it is through endowments, 
economic opportunities, or agency 
Obviously, not all these priorities apply to all 
countries. And specifi c country characteristics 
will dictate how corrective policies will need to 
be customized. 
Our analysis also emphasizes that, in choos-
ing and designing policies, it is necessary to tar-
get the determinants of the gender gaps of con-
cern, not the outcomes. The framework in Part 
2 of the Report helps highlight these underlying 
causes, and shows how they emerge from the 
workings of markets and institutions and their 
interactions with each other and with house-
holds. In other words, the framework identifi es 
what problem needs to be solved and whether 
interventions should target markets, formal in-
stitutions, informal institutions, or some com-
bination of the three. 
Having identifi ed the underlying causes of 
the gender gap of concern, the Report draws on 
the experience with policy interventions across 
a broad range of countries to provide guid-
ance on specifi c interventions that could work 
in different settings. It also looks at the political 
economy of reforms and emphasizes that policy 
design and implementation must be attuned 
to countries’ institutional, social, political, and 
cultural environments and to the societal actors 
involved.
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effi ciently while ensuring that services remain 
accessible and affordable for poor people. 
The solution will depend on the setting, but a 
few elements are critical. 
• Appropriate regulations that recognize the 
rationale for government intervention.
• An adequate structure of incentives for pro-
viders to make them more accountable to 
policy makers. 
• Measures to strengthen accountability of 
both providers and policy makers to service 
users. 
In urban areas, providing clean water will 
require an emphasis on improving the struc-
ture of contracts and, in some circumstances, 
greater involvement of the private sector. In 
Manila, such reforms yielded large impacts: wa-
ter supply coverage expanded from 67 percent 
in 1997 to 99 percent in 2009 and brought ef-
fi ciency gains through lower water losses and 
operating costs. In low-income settings, where 
fi nancing options and the capacity of public in-
stitutions may be more limited, charging small 
amounts for services, relying on independent 
providers, and fi nding ways of making provid-
ers more accountable to users can help, even in 
smaller urban areas—this was the path followed 
by Cambodia. In rural areas, local governments 
can improve community systems, as Uganda has 
done by collecting an additional small tax and 
placing it in a fund administered by the district 
council to pay for major water repairs.
For sanitation in urban settings, there usu-
ally is enough demand for improvements so 
long as individuals and communities can cap-
ture the benefi ts of investing in the facilities. So, 
the solution is to strengthen property rights and 
recognize informal settlements, thus stimulating 
demand while ensuring that communities have 
access to independent providers. In rural areas 
and less dense urban settings, the priority for 
improving sanitation is to change behavior, raise 
awareness, and boost demand, through commu-
nity peer pressure and information campaigns 
as in some communities in Cambodia, Indone-
sia, and Vietnam by appealing to people’s sense 
of community responsibility.
Increasing the coverage of piped water and 
sanitation is expensive, so signifi cant funding—
likely external—will be needed in poor coun-
tries. A recent analysis of infrastructure funding 
impossible, to achieve without imposing dra-
conian restrictions that are not feasible in most 
societies and that raise other ethical concerns. 
And the diffi culty in enforcing such restrictions 
is exacerbated because these problems are worse 
among the wealthy in these societies. 
A second, and more promising, approach is 
to enhance household perceptions of the value of 
daughters. Expanding economic opportunities 
for young women, including those in the labor 
market, is one way of doing this, and it can work 
in conjunction with the process of develop-
ment to reverse son preference. Just look at the 
Republic of Korea, one of the few cases where 
excess female mortality at birth was reversed in 
a short period.55 And the process can be comple-
mented by providing fi nancial incentives to par-
ents to have daughters (such as the “Apni Beti 
Apni Dhan” program in some Indian states) and 
supporting media campaigns to change societal 
ideas about gender equality.
In infancy and early childhood, excess 
mortality of girls is not rooted in households 
or markets—although both can worsen it. It 
is rooted in the failure of institutions to pro-
vide clean water, sanitation, waste disposal, and 
drainage. Countries with high female mortality 
in infancy are those where the burden of infec-
tious diseases remains high. Today’s rich coun-
tries eliminated their excess female mortality of 
young girls by improving access to clean water 
and sanitation in the early part of the 20th cen-
tury. And developing countries that have ex-
perienced large drops in excess girl mortality 
during the past two decades, like Bangladesh, 
China, and Vietnam, have done the same. So, 
for the “missing” girls in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to “reappear,” countries must invest in similar 
systems and provide adequate water, sanita-
tion, and waste disposal services to their whole 
population and not just to the better-off. While 
these services will benefi t all young children, 
young girls will benefi t more due to the reduc-
tion in infectious diseases. 
How exactly should countries do this? If the 
experience of today’s rich countries is a guide, 
part of the solution is to provide clean water at 
the point of use through piped delivery. Other so-
lutions, like water treatment at the source, are 
less effective in reducing diarrhea morbidity 
because of the potential for recontamination.56 
The problem is then to design an institutional 
framework that expands access to clean water 
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vices need special attention. One way to help is 
to provide poor women with cash transfers con-
ditional on their seeking maternal care. An ex-
ample is India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, where 
such transfers increased the uptake of assisted 
deliveries in the presence of a skilled attendant 
by around 36 percent.60 
Fourth, efforts to reduce maternal mortality 
need to go beyond improving health systems 
and services and work across sectors. The suc-
cesses of Malaysia and Sri Lanka in addressing 
maternal mortality early in their development 
illustrate this point (box 5). Fairly small invest-
ments in infrastructure (rural roads) and in 
women’s education, combined with training 
maternal health providers and building hospi-
tals dramatically reduced maternal mortality.61
Fifth, it is essential that the political profi le of 
the problem be raised. Turkey illustrates what is 
possible in this regard. Turkey’s maternal mor-
tality rate in 2000 was 70 per 100,000 live births. 
A new government capitalized on the political 
needs for Sub-Saharan Africa concluded that 
additional spending on clean water and sani-
tation would need to be about one and a half 
times current levels—over $11 billion annu-
ally—to improve access signifi cantly.57 How-
ever, as documented in chapter 3, the return to 
these investments taking account of mortality 
declines is very large.
In the reproductive years, maternal mortal-
ity remains especially high in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica and parts of Asia. The main reason is a fail-
ure of the institutions that deliver medical care 
and services to expectant mothers. While norms 
that delay women from getting prompt medi-
cal help during childbirth and high fertility may 
be contributing factors in some places, solving 
the problem, as with providing clean water and 
sanitation, requires fi xing the institutions that 
deliver these services. 
This fi x will require providing more resources 
to frontline service providers and ensuring that the 
entire system of maternal care works:
First, the quality of the people in deliver-
ing the chain of services needs to be upgraded. 
While additional health workers, especially 
skilled birth attendants, will be a continuing 
need, coverage can be increased in underserved 
areas by drawing in community-level providers 
and the private sector. 
Second, those providing maternal health ser-
vices have to be more responsive to expectant 
mothers. One way is to make service providers 
more accountable to them. Getting information 
to users—for example, on service standards, 
quality of services and policies to improve 
them—can help but needs to be combined with 
some way for users to act on that information. 
In Uganda, community-based monitoring im-
proved both the quality and quantity of primary 
health care services.58 Another route to account-
ability is to ensure that citizens are able to hold 
their political representatives responsible for the 
failures; the politicians, in turn, need to exercise 
more effective control over the service provid-
ers. The power of this mechanism is evident in 
Peru, where improving maternal health required 
extending coverage, giving the right incentives 
to service providers, and having citizens’ voices 
loud enough to be heard by policy makers.59 
Professional attention for deliveries rose from 58 
percent of births in 2000 to 71 percent in 2004. 
Third, the fi nancial constraints that poor 
women face in accessing maternal health ser-
Improving the delivery of maternal care is hard, but it can be done—even at 
relatively low incomes, as Sri Lanka and Malaysia show. From more than 2,000 
per 100,000 births in the 1930s, the maternal mortality ratio in Sri Lanka fell to 
about 1,000 by 1947, and then halved to less than 500 in the next three years. By 
1996, it had fallen to 24. In Malaysia, it halved from 534 over the seven years from 
1950 to 1957. Then, with a halving every decade or so, it came down to 19 by 
1997.
To overcome the range of institutional obstacles that hampers the eff ective 
workings of health systems, Sri Lanka and Malaysia adopted integrated and 
phased approaches. And they did this with modest total public expenditures 
on health—1.8 percent of gross domestic product, on average, since the 1950s. 
Health programs in both countries exploited synergistic interactions of health 
care with basic education, water and sanitation, malaria control, and integrated 
rural development—including building rural roads, which helped deal with 
obstetric emergencies. Financial, geographic, and cultural barriers to maternal 
care were addressed by ensuring a front line of competent, professional mid-
wives widely available in rural areas, providing them with a steady supply of 
drugs and equipment, linking them to back-up services, and improving com-
munication and transportation. Simultaneously, facilities were strengthened to 
provide obstetric care and deal with complications. Better organizational man-
agement improved the supervision and accountability of providers. Area-
specifi c mortality data were provided through monitoring systems so that 
empowered communities could hold political leaders accountable, and 
national and subnational actors were forced to recognize the unacceptability 
of every maternal death. Finally, both countries were strongly committed to 
improving the status of women: women gained voting rights before or soon 
after national independence, and female education received special attention. 
BOX 5  Reducing maternal mortality—What works? 
Look at Malaysia and Sri Lanka
Source: Pathmanathan and others 2003.
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concentrated in lower productivity activities, 
self-employment, and the informal sector. Even 
in the formal wage sector, they cluster in certain 
occupations and industries, usually lower pay-
ing. These differences remain even as countries 
get richer. 
Three factors drive these patterns. First, 
women and men have very different responsi-
bilities for care and housework, and as a result 
very different patterns of time use, which im-
pinge directly on choices of employment and 
economic activity. Second, women and men 
face differential access to productive inputs and 
often differential treatment by markets and in-
stitutions. Third, these mutually reinforcing 
constraints can generate a “female productivity 
trap.” Policies thus need to target these underly-
ing factors. Because multiple factors may be at 
play more often than not, effective policy inter-
ventions may need to target several of them—
either simultaneously or sequentially.
Releasing women’s time
Gender differences in access to economic op-
portunities are driven in part by differences in 
time use that result from deep-rooted norms for 
the distribution of responsibility for care and 
housework. Addressing these binding norms 
and releasing women’s time means paying more 
attention to three types of policies: child care and 
parental leave policies; improvements in infra-
structure services; and policies that reduce trans-
action costs associated with accessing markets. 
Policies such as subsidies to or public provi-
sion of child care can compensate women for 
the costs they incur within the home from 
engaging in market work. Child care can be 
provided either directly by the state (including 
local governments) or through the private sec-
tor, possibly with public subsidies and regula-
tion. Among developing countries, child-care 
policies have been used in some middle-income 
Latin American countries. Examples include 
publicly provided or subsidized day care such 
as Estancias Infantiles in Mexico, Hogares Co-
munitarios in Colombia, and similar programs 
in Argentina and Brazil. The evidence from 
these countries as well as from rich countries 
(mainly in northern and western Europe) that 
have similar schemes is that they increase the 
number of hours worked by women as well as 
lead them to work more in formal employment. 
In lower-income countries, child-care solutions 
support that brought it to power and, in 2003, 
undertook a Health Transformation Program, 
emphasizing institutional reform, client respon-
siveness, and a focus on underserved areas. The 
budget allocated to primary health care and pre-
vention in underserved areas rose by 58 percent, 
air ambulances were put in service for remote 
populations, the health workforce was redis-
tributed for better coverage in poor areas, and 
conditional cash transfers encouraged pregnant 
mothers to use prebirth hostels and deliver in 
public hospitals. By 2009, the maternal mortal-
ity rate had fallen to 19.8.62
Providing education to severely 
disadvantaged populations
Even as gender gaps in educational enroll-
ment shrink nationally, they remain for poor 
people and for those disadvantaged by other 
circumstances—remoteness, ethnicity, caste, 
race, or disability. To reach these groups, pol-
icy makers can build on experience and evi-
dence from Cambodia, Colombia, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Turkey. A 
range of options includes remedies for both sup-
ply (such as building more schools in remote ar-
eas and recruiting local teachers) and demand 
(such as cash transfers conditioned on girls’ school 
attendance). A key to designing cost-effective 
interventions is the availability and the cost of 
collecting information about local character-
istics and conditions. Where relatively little is 
known, less locally customized policies, such as 
cash transfers conditioned on sending daugh-
ters to school, may be more effective in reducing 
gender disparities. The transfers have had posi-
tive impacts on enrollments in both middle-
income and lower-income settings, especially 
for increasing enrollments among groups with 
low enrollments to start (such as pockets of 
severely disadvantaged populations).63 Having 
gained wide political acceptance because of their 
effi cacy, such policies are being implemented in 
more than 30 countries.
Policies to improve women’s economic 
opportunities
Across the world, women and men access eco-
nomic opportunities—whether in wage em-
ployment, agriculture, or in entrepreneurship—
in fundamentally different ways. Women tend 
to occupy very different parts of the economic 
space from men and are disproportionately 
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working outside the home, making it easier to 
manage the multiple burdens of house, care, 
and market work. And information and com-
munication technologies can help reduce both 
the time and mobility constraints that women 
face in accessing markets and participating in 
market work. Mobile banking programs, such 
as M-PESA in Kenya, are allowing women to 
process small fi nancial and banking transac-
tions more effectively and promoting savings, 
which is especially benefi cial to small women 
entrepreneurs. In India, a program run by an 
NGO, the Foundation of Occupational Devel-
opment, organized groups of women to focus 
on marketing, provided them with access to 
cell phones and the Internet, thus helping them 
market their products directly and increase their 
profi t margins.64
Closing gaps in access to assets and inputs
Female farmers and entrepreneurs have less ac-
cess to land than their male counterparts. Simi-
larly, both the demand for and use of credit are 
lower among female farmers and entrepreneurs 
than among their male counterparts. These dif-
ferences are rooted in failures of markets and in-
stitutions and in their interactions with house-
hold responses. For example, accessing credit 
often requires collateral, preferably land or im-
mobile assets. Women are thus at a disadvantage 
because they have lower or less secure access to 
land and are disproportionately employed in the 
service sector where capitalization is lower and 
output is often intangible. These forces may be 
further reinforced by  gender-based preferences 
in the households that can lead to unequal re-
source allocations (of land, for example) to male 
and female members. 
Policies need to focus on these underlying 
determinants of differential access—leveling 
the institutional playing fi eld by strengthening 
women’s ownership rights, correcting biases in 
service delivery institutions, and improving the 
functioning of credit markets.
Strengthening women’s land and ownership 
rights can help female farmers and entrepreneurs. 
The main constraint that needs to be addressed 
is the restriction on women’s ability to own and 
inherit assets and to control resources. Experi-
ence from India and Mexico shows that equal-
izing provisions of inheritance laws between 
women and men increases asset ownership by 
women. Discriminatory land laws, which lie 
are particularly needed for women employed 
in the informal sector and rural women. In In-
dia, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
Mobile Creches is experimenting with differ-
ent models for providing child-care services for 
women employed in the rural informal sector 
and on public works programs. Similar efforts 
have been undertaken in the Indian state of 
 Gujarat by the Self Employed Women’s Asso-
ciation, which has set up day-care centers for 
the 0–6-year-old children of its members. Other 
options for publicly provided day care are ei-
ther to lengthen the school day (particularly 
at grades where attendance is only for half of a 
day) or to lower the age at which children enter 
the school system.
Parental leave policies have been tried mainly 
in rich countries—and these typically take the 
form of maternity leave. While these policies 
have increased women’s labor force participa-
tion in these countries, their applicability in de-
veloping countries may be more limited. First, 
they can be used only in the formal sector, which 
typically represents only a fraction of employ-
ment in emerging and low-income economies. 
Second, they can actually make it less attractive 
for employers to hire women of child-bearing 
age unless the maternity leave is publicly fi -
nanced. Policies that provide both paternity and 
maternity leave and make the former mandatory 
(as in Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) have the 
advantage of not being biased against women 
while also helping to shift the underlying norms 
about care. But this approach may be fi nancially 
beyond the fi scal capacity of many developing 
economies.
Improvements in infrastructure services—
especially water and electricity—can help free 
up women’s time spent on domestic and care 
work. Electrifi cation in rural South Africa, for 
instance, has increased women’s labor force par-
ticipation by about 9 percent; in Bangladesh, it 
has led to more leisure time for women. In Paki-
stan, putting water sources closer to the home 
was associated with increased time allocated to 
market work. Other studies show no impact 
on market work but noticeable impacts on lei-
sure time, which also increase women’s welfare 
(chapter 7).
Interventions can also focus on reducing the 
(time) transaction costs associated with access to 
markets. Better and more effective transport op-
tions can reduce the time costs associated with 
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such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and 
FINCA in Peru. Microcredit has now evolved 
beyond group lending to such schemes as Banco 
Sol in Bolivia and Bank Rakyat Indonesia that 
offer larger individual loans and rely on repay-
ment incentives rather than peer monitoring. 
Lack of access to formal credit can also be sur-
mounted through fi nancial innovation and by 
adapting a credit model that addresses the needs 
of small businesses, as Access Bank in Nigeria, 
DFCU in Uganda, and Sero Lease and Finance 
in Tanzania have done. Recognizing that women 
are less likely to have established credit records 
than men, and lower asset bases on which to 
draw for collateral, these large commercial 
banks partnered with the International Finance 
Corporation to develop new instruments to 
support and extend credit services to female-
owned businesses and female entrepreneurs. In-
terventions included developing new products 
such as loans that are collateralized with equip-
ment or based on cash fl ow as well as training 
for the staff of fi nancial institutions and strate-
gic support to help banks increase their number 
of female clients. Initial experience with these 
interventions shows an increase in the shares of 
female clients using fi nancial services and taking 
out larger loans with better-than-average repay-
ment (chapter 7).
Addressing discrimination in labor markets
In wage employment, the underrepresentation 
of women in certain sectors or occupations can 
feed discriminatory beliefs among employers 
(or reinforce preexisting beliefs) that women are 
not suitable workers or good candidates for em-
ployment. The importance of networks (often 
gendered) in job search and professional pro-
motion can further reinforce women’s exclusion 
from certain jobs, positions, sectors, or occupa-
tions. Breaking this information problem and 
expanding networks can be addressed through 
three main types of policies: active labor market 
policies; affi rmative action programs; and group 
formation and mentoring interventions. 
Active labor market policies combine training, 
placement, and other support to enable women 
to enter or reenter the workforce. Although 
these policies are not typically motivated by the 
goal of narrowing gender wage gaps, evidence 
from Argentina, Colombia, and Peru indicates 
that they can increase women’s employment 
and earnings in the formal sector by allowing 
at the root of agricultural productivity gaps in 
many countries, also need to be reformed to 
provide, at least, for joint ownership in marriage, 
increasing women’s ability to use land in access-
ing economic opportunities. An even better way 
to secure married women’s land rights (espe-
cially in the case of divorce or death of a spouse) 
is mandatory joint land titling. In two regions 
in Ethiopia where land certifi cation involved the 
issuance of joint titles to both spouses, women’s 
names appeared on more than 80 percent of all 
titles, four times the 20 percent in the region 
where the certifi cate was issued only in the name 
of the household head.65
Correcting biases in service delivery institu-
tions such as the workings of government land 
distribution and registration schemes and agri-
cultural extension agencies can improve wom-
en’s access to economic opportunity in many 
countries. Redressing these biases requires ac-
tions on several fronts. First, service providers 
need to target women explicitly and addition-
ally. For example, land redistribution programs 
that target the head of the household will not 
serve women well. Instead, governments can put 
in place mandatory joint titling on redistributed 
land that is coupled with gender sensitization 
policies and more female representation on local 
land boards. Second, women can be given some 
power within the service delivery organization, 
including in setting priorities. For agricultural 
extension, for example, women could be put 
in decision-making positions at the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Third, technology can be used 
to expand the reach of services, as was done in 
Kenya for agricultural extension through the 
use of call centers. Fourth, improved monitor-
ing can make the problem visible. Finally, the 
female users of the service should be provided 
information on the level of service they are due. 
This step can be aided by building the collective 
element of demand—for example, supporting 
women’s farmer organizations.
Improving the functioning of credit markets by 
addressing the information problems caused by 
lack of experience with women borrowers can 
help address productivity gaps between women 
and men in agriculture and entrepreneurship. 
Microcredit schemes have been the most com-
mon way of addressing these problems, by help-
ing women access small-scale credit and build a 
track record of borrower performance. Typically, 
these take the form of group lending schemes 
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rules, careful monitoring of impacts, and cred-
ible sanctions for noncompliance are essential.66 
Where such programs have been implemented, 
the effect has clearly been to redistribute wage 
employment from men to women. And, while 
the economic effi ciency of such policies is still de-
bated, the most comprehensive evidence (from 
long experience in the United States) points to 
little or no adverse effi ciency effects.67 This ex-
perience and that in other countries also show 
that any potential negative effi ciency impacts 
can be addressed by ensuring that the affi rma-
tive action programs are temporary and are re-
moved once women’s representation reaches the 
participants to better communicate their abili-
ties to employers. A similar program currently 
under implementation and evaluation in Jordan 
shows promising signs of success (box 6). 
Affi rmative action is another way to over-
come information failures. The goal is to push 
women’s participation in wage employment to 
a “critical threshold” (often argued to be about 
30 percent), where information failures and 
networks no longer bind. Experience (mainly 
from rich countries) shows that affi rmative ac-
tion works best if it is mandatory. Affi rmative 
action also can be implemented through public 
sector employment and contracting, but clear 
Despite growing education levels, labor force par-
ticipation rates for women in the Middle East and 
North Africa remain very low. In Jordan, only 17
percent of 20- to 45-year-old women work, com-
pared with 77 percent of men. This labor force 
 participation gap also holds among the more 
 educated; among community college graduates 
it starts immediately on graduation. These low 
employment rates make it diffi  cult for new gradu-
ates seeking to enter the labor market. With few 
women employed, young women lack role models 
to follow into employment as well as the network 
connections to help them fi nd jobs. Employers, 
lacking experience with working women, may be 
reluctant to hire women if they believe women are 
less committed to staying employed.
The Jordan New Opportunities for Women 
(Jordan NOW) program is a pilot to rigorously eval-
uate the eff ectiveness of two policies: short-term 
wage subsidies, and employability skills training.
Short-term wage subsidies give fi rms an incen-
tive to take a chance on hiring young female grad-
uates and an opportunity to overcome stereotypes 
by directly observing young women working for 
them. The subsidies can also give young women 
more confi dence to search for work and to 
approach employers. In the pilot, each voucher 
has a value equal to the minimum wage for six 
months.
Employability skills training augments the 
technical skills that graduates learn in community 
college with the practical skills to fi nd and suc-
ceed in employment. Many employers say recent 
graduates lack these interpersonal skills and other 
basic job skills. In the pilot, students received 45 
hours of instruction in team building, communica-
tions, presentations, business writing, customer 
BOX 6 Catalyzing female employment in Jordan
service, re sume writing, interviewing, and positive 
thinking.
There appears to be strong demand for these 
policies. Despite low employment rates, the major-
ity of recent female graduates want to work: 93 per-
cent say they plan to work after they graduate, and 
91 percent say they would like to work outside the 
house after they are married. Of those invited to 
attend the training courses, 62 percent completed 
them, with unmarried women more likely to attend. 
Those who began the courses gave them positive 
reviews, claiming the courses had given them much 
more confi dence to begin searching for jobs. Four 
months into the wage subsidy program, about a 
third of those using vouchers had found a job.
Early results from a midline evaluation suggest 
that job vouchers have signifi cant employment 
eff ects: employment rates among graduates who 
received vouchers alone or vouchers plus training 
are between 55 to 57 percent compared with 17 to 
19 percent among those who received training 
alone or received neither training nor vouchers. In 
all groups, employment eff ects are higher for 
unmarried women. Financial empowerment (mea-
sured as the proportion of women who have their 
own money and can decide how to use it) also 
increased signifi cantly for all who received either 
vouchers or training or both. Follow-up surveys 
will determine whether these employment eff ects 
of job vouchers are sustained in the longer term 
and will also focus on other measures of empower-
ment and changes in attitudes. The surveys will 
also allow further investigation of the link between 
marriage and work, given the early fi ndings that 
married women are less likely to attend the train-
ing, less likely to use the vouchers, and less likely to 
be employed.
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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Because these constraints resemble the ones 
that limit women’s prospects in labor markets, 
the policy solutions are similar. Quotas and 
other types of affi rmative action have promoted 
women’s political representation at various lev-
els of politics. Such measures range from vol-
untary commitments by political parties to in-
clude women candidates on their electoral lists 
to specifying shares of legislative seats reserved 
for women. Which option is best for a country 
depends on its political system. For example, 
reserving individual seats for women will not 
work in proportional representation systems, 
whereas voluntary party quotas may work when 
parties have strong leadership and internal dis-
cipline. Whatever the system, its design and en-
forcement are critical. In Spain, where positions 
on the ballot for the Senate were in alphabetical 
order, parties tended to choose women with last 
names that landed lower in the ballot and who 
thus were less likely to win a seat. 70
Broader tensions also need to be acknowl-
edged and taken into account if quotas are used 
to increase women’s political representation. 
Mandatory quotas involve the state circum-
scribing part of the democratic process, so this 
distortion has to be balanced against the need to 
redress persistent inequalities. One option, taken 
by local governments in India, is to implement 
quotas on a rolling basis—with a different set of 
seats chosen for reservation in different elections 
over time. And as with all affi rmative action, it 
helps to specify a clear goal or time period up 
front. The structure of the reservation also mat-
ters. Designating particular seats for women 
runs the risk of creating “token” women’s seats.
Quotas have increased female representa-
tion. In Mexico, candidate quotas increased the 
share of women in parliament from 16 percent 
to more than 22 percent. Reserved seats in Mo-
rocco increased the proportion of women in 
parliament from less than 1 percent to almost 11 
percent. Quotas in local governments in India 
also showed that such measures can change un-
derlying beliefs among voters about the effi cacy 
of women politicians, even in a short period, 
and increase the proportion of women elected 
to these positions even after the quotas are no 
longer in place.71
Affi rmative action in the political realm 
needs to be complemented by measures that 
increase women’s voice in other societal institu-
tions, such as trade unions, corporations, the ju-
needed critical mass. In the absence of explicit 
affi rmative action policies, female employment 
in the public sector in fairly large numbers can 
have a demonstration effect. In rich countries, 
public sector growth has been important in in-
tegrating women into the labor markets.68
Supporting the creation of women’s networks 
can be effective where gendered networks hinder 
women workers, farmers, or entrepreneurs. Such 
interventions work best when they combine the 
building of social capital and networks with the 
provision of training, information, and mentor-
ing. One example is the Jordan NOW program 
described in box 6. Another, more established 
example, is the Self Employed Women’s Asso-
ciation in India, which has evolved into an ef-
fective organization representing the interests of 
a large number of informal sector workers and 
entrepreneurs, providing extensive information, 
support, and training services to its members. 
Removing discriminatory treatment in la-
bor laws and regulations can promote women’s 
economic opportunities. Among these laws and 
regulations, the priority should be to revisit 
the limits (including outright bans) on part-
time work in many countries. Because women 
provide a disproportionate share of household 
and care work, such restrictions end up limit-
ing work options for women much more than 
for men. Relaxing these prohibitions would 
give women more opportunities for paid em-
ployment. In Argentina, removing the ban on 
part-time contracts in the formal sector led to 
a signifi cant shift of women with children from 
part-time work in the informal sector to part-
time contracts in the formal sector.69
Policies to shrink differences in voice
Increasing women’s societal voice 
Women generally have less voice than men 
both in society and in households. At the soci-
etal level, income growth does little to reduce 
these gaps. Norms that dictate that politics is for 
men; beliefs that women make worse leaders, 
which are fed in part by the low participation 
of women in politics; norms around care and 
housework, which limit the time available to 
women to participate in formal political institu-
tions; and the gendered networks within politics 
that work against women all matter more than 
income growth. 
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work, and jobs requiring higher skills.72 Mo-
rocco also reformed its family laws in the 1990s, 
and in 2004 the new Family Code completely 
eliminated references to the husband as the head 
of the household.
Greater effort is also needed to make these 
rights more effective and justice systems more 
responsive to women’s needs. Interventions are 
needed on both the supply side and the de-
mand side. Greater capacity of the institutions 
that apply the laws, more accountability in the 
justice system to promote predictable outcomes 
in line with the law, and procedures to promote 
women’s access to justice and women’s repre-
sentation in judicial institutions are critical on 
the supply side. Also important are mechanisms 
for the implementation of laws. Evidence from 
Ethiopia illustrates how the procedures around 
mandatory joint land titling helped promote 
women’s rights over land. Women’s demand for 
enforcement of their rights can be promoted by 
broadening literacy, increasing the accessibility 
of legal aid services, and reducing costs of legal 
procedures. And data have to be collected and 
made public so that the problems of women’s 
access to justice are made more visible. 
Reducing domestic violence
Reducing domestic violence requires action 
on multiple fronts. The goal is to prevent vio-
lence before it happens. The fi rst step is to en-
act laws that defi ne different types of violence 
against women, prescribe mandates and duties 
for enforcement and investigation, raise societal 
awareness, and signal a government’s commit-
ment. These laws must be put in place in coun-
tries that lack them, especially in the Middle 
East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa. And countries with such laws on 
the books need to make them more specifi c and 
actionable. 
A second step is to shift norms and behaviors 
around domestic violence to emphasize preven-
tion. Education and awareness programs, such 
as Soul City in South Africa, can change norms 
about domestic violence among both men and 
women. Increasing women’s bargaining power 
in their households—by improving women’s 
economic opportunities and enhancing their 
control over resources and their ability to leave 
marriages—also can change behavior. But in-
creasing women’s bargaining power can also 
risk increasing the likelihood of violence in the 
diciary, and professional associations. This can 
be done through quotas as well as by mentoring 
schemes, women’s networks, and skills develop-
ment in these realms targeted to women. Collec-
tive action by women’s groups can be particu-
larly effective in this, as with the Self Employed 
Women’s Association in India. More generally, 
because women tend to be better represented 
in less formal organizations, laws and regula-
tions should ensure a level playing fi eld for such 
 organizations.
Increasing women’s voice within households
The muted voice of women within their house-
holds refl ects the combined infl uence of their 
more limited access to economic opportunities, 
the nature of social norms, the legal framework, 
and the enforcement of laws. Key determinants 
of control over household resources are ac-
cess to economic opportunities and the legal 
framework—particularly rights over property 
and those that determine access to assets. For 
domestic violence, social norms and the content 
and enforcement of laws are important. And for 
fertility, norms, bargaining power, and service 
delivery are critical. 
Increasing control over household resources
Thus, the most promising policies to increase 
women’s voice in households center on reform-
ing the legal framework so that women are not 
disadvantaged in controlling household assets 
and expanding their economic opportunities. 
For the legal framework, land laws and aspects 
of family law that govern marriage, divorce, 
and disposal of property are particularly im-
portant. A cross-cutting issue applies to the 
many countries where multiple legal systems 
exist. Reconciling these systems, which may in-
clude customary and religious law, is a priority, 
especially to ensure that all laws are consistent 
with a country’s constitution. Kenya made such 
changes in its recent constitutional reforms.
Although reforms in these areas are po-
litically and socially complex and depend very 
much on country context, experience shows that 
change is possible. Ethiopia reformed its family 
law in 2000 by eliminating the husband’s ability 
to deny permission for his wife to work outside 
the home and requiring both spouses to agree in 
administering family property. The fi rst phase 
of these changes shifted women’s economic ac-
tivities toward work outside the home, full-time 
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contraception. Contraception uptake is higher 
when husbands are included in family planning 
education, as was shown in Bangladesh74 and in 
Ethiopia. 75 
The second is increasing the quality of fam-
ily planning services. Improvements in this re-
gard need to focus on three areas. First, a suf-
fi cient range of contraceptive options needs to 
be available. Second, adequate information on 
the available options, their side effects, and the 
advantages and limitations of different methods 
needs to be given to women so they can make 
an informed decision. Third, services need to 
be provided in a manner that protects the in-
dividual’s or the couple’s privacy. This will re-
quire training health care providers in protocols 
designed specifi cally for family planning. Recent 
experience in Zambia shows that very different 
outcomes regarding fertility and contraception 
can result depending on whether women are ap-
proached individually and in private or together 
with their partners.
Policies to prevent the reproduction of 
gender inequality across generations
The reproduction of specifi c gender inequali-
ties across generations gives rise to “gender in-
equality traps,” which are likely to most affect 
the poor and excluded in society. Women’s lack 
of political voice means that the market and in-
stitutional failures feeding gender inequality are 
unlikely to be corrected. Income growth alone 
does little to address the processes that underlie 
these persistent gaps. The previous sections dealt 
with policies to address three of these gaps that 
reproduce over generations—reaching pockets 
of remaining disadvantage in education, in-
creasing women’s voice and participation in so-
cietal institutions, and increasing women’s voice 
within households. Here, we address measures 
to address the gender inequalities in human 
capital, opportunities, and aspirations that are 
set early in life. 
Decisions in adolescence can shape skill ac-
quisition, health outcomes, and economic op-
portunities. Adolescence is also a period when 
one’s lifelong aspirations are molded, and when 
social norms and perceptions start to bind for 
boys and girls. Horizons for girls often shrink, 
especially for poor girls or girls in rural areas 
where distance and norms for mobility can 
be a signifi cant constraint. Empowering ado-
lescents to make better choices for themselves 
short term. So, specifi c mitigation measures may 
be needed. 
Third, when violence does occur, victims 
need timely and effective assistance ranging 
from the police and judiciary to health and 
social services, as with support integrated in 
Malaysia’s one-stop crisis centers at govern-
ment hospitals. Service providers—police and 
judiciary, health, and social services—need to 
target women explicitly and additionally. Tar-
geting women also requires bringing services 
closer to women to deal with time and mobility 
constraints—for example, by providing com-
munity paralegals and mobile legal aid clinics 
that enable women to use the justice system. 
In many contexts, bringing services closer to 
individuals (demand) can be combined with 
increasing the awareness of service delivery or-
ganizations, particularly management, about 
gender issues (supply). PEKKA Women’s Le-
gal Empowerment in Indonesia trains village 
paralegals, with a focus on domestic violence 
and family law. Another way of improving 
women’s access to justice is to increase the share 
of women in the judicial and police forces re-
sponsible for addressing domestic violence. 
The Indian state of Tamil Nadu introduced 
188 all-women police units to cover both rural 
and urban areas and to focus on crimes against 
women. These units increased women’s com-
fort in approaching the police, including mak-
ing reports of domestic abuse.73
Increasing control over fertility
Increasing women’s control over their fertility 
requires actions in several areas. Availability of 
family planning services is still limited in parts 
of the world. In some cases the underserved 
population covers entire countries, but more 
often these women live in specifi c geographic 
areas within countries —usually rural areas—or 
are poor. For these groups, improved delivery of 
family planning services is a priority.
Control over fertility decisions—the num-
ber and spacing of children—goes beyond is-
sues related to provision of reproductive health 
services, so two other policy areas need to be 
addressed. The fi rst is to boost women’s ability 
within the household to voice their preferences re-
garding number and spacing of children. As dis-
cussed earlier, access to economic opportunities, 
control over assets, and appropriate laws help. So 
does educating men on the benefi ts and use of 
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and reported sexual behavior in boys.83 For 
adolescents, the promotion of contraception, 
when combined with education interventions 
and skill building, and appropriately targeted 
to cultural and social settings, can be effective 
in reducing unintended pregnancies.84 Such a 
program for adolescent girls in Uganda resulted 
in a signifi cant increase in condom use and a 
lower number of children among participants.85 
Sometimes, economic empowerment alone can 
have a marked impact. A recent evaluation of a 
youth job training program in the Dominican 
Republic that included life skills training plus an 
apprenticeship showed a signifi cant reduction 
in pregnancies among participants.86
Exposure to female role models whose posi-
tions of leadership or power contradict stereo-
types of women’s role can reduce the intergener-
ational transmission of gender norms. A study of 
political reservation for women in India showed 
that teenage girls who have repeated exposure to 
women leaders are more likely to express aspira-
tions that challenge traditional norms, such as 
a desire to marry later, have fewer children, and 
obtain jobs requiring higher education.87 In-
creased economic opportunities for young girls 
can also change their own and their communi-
ties’ perceptions of gender roles for adolescent 
girls. A study of a program in Delhi that linked 
communities to recruiters for high-paying tele-
phone work found that these communities were 
more likely to have lower expectations of dowry 
and to fi nd it acceptable for women to live alone 
before marriage and to work before and after 
marriage or childbirth.88
Making other policies “gender-smart”
Understanding how gender factors into the 
workings of households, markets, and institu-
tions can matter for policies even when improv-
ing gender equality is not the main objective. 
Why? Because gender-differentiated failures in 
markets, gender biases in institutions, and the 
way gender relations play out in the household 
all affect (and sometimes constrain) the behav-
ior of both men and women. These changes in 
behavior can affect how men and women re-
spond to policies. Failing to take them into ac-
count can thus mean the policy will have unin-
tended consequences or simply not work.
Take relations within the household. They 
clearly affect how the household responds to 
policy—sometimes with unintended conse-
can make a big difference to their lives, to their 
families, to their communities, and, as future 
workers and citizens, to society more broadly. 
Interventions need to build human and social 
capital; facilitate the transition from school to 
work; and increase their aspirations and agency. 
Efforts to infl uence and reduce risky behavior 
are also important. 
Scholarships and conditional cash trans-
fers can increase school attendance and reduce 
dropout rates for adolescents, especially girls. 
These positive impacts are well documented 
in Latin America in countries such as Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Nicaragua.76 More 
recently, evidence from Africa is beginning to 
show similar results. In Malawi, fairly small 
cash transfers to girls increased enrollment and 
reduced dropout rates.77 Moreover, while these 
transfers were aimed at education, they had 
benefi ts in other realms, such as reducing HIV 
infections. Other tools can also be brought to 
bear to help girls stay in school. Providing them 
with information on the returns to schooling 
is one such tool: for example, in Madagascar, 
information on earnings for primary school 
completers provided to boys and girls as well as 
their parents increased attendance rates by 3.5 
percentage points.78 In the Dominican Republic, 
a similar effort to provide accurate information 
on actual returns to education to boys also had 
a positive impact.79 Other evidence suggests that 
incentives (prospects for winning a scholarship 
or direct payments for performance) can affect 
children’s own perception of their abilities and 
can improve test scores.80 
Vocational training targeted specifi cally to 
youth increased both the likelihood of employ-
ment and the earnings for young women in 
Colombia and Peru.81 In Kenya, providing in-
formation to young girls about the relative re-
turns to vocational training in male or female-
dominated industries increased girls’ enrollment 
in trade school courses that prepared them for 
typically male-dominated trades that yielded 
higher returns.82 The Adolescent Girls Initiative 
aims to evaluate a range of these interventions, 
including skills training and mentoring, in a 
number of low- and middle-income countries 
(box 7).
Health education programs have proved to be 
effective in reducing risky behaviors. A program 
in rural Tanzania substantially improved sexual 
knowledge, attitudes, condom use in both sexes, 
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of these issues for mothers and families (Co-
lombia, Peru), or even dedicated social workers 
(Chile). 
So, how can considerations of gender in-
equalities and their underlying determinants 
be integrated into broader policy and program 
design? The analytical framework in this Report 
provides a guide. First, what happens inside the 
household shapes the impact of policies. An ex-
ample comes from Papua New Guinea. Gender 
roles in harvesting oil palm have men climbing 
the trees and harvesting the fruits, while women 
collect the fruit that has fallen on the ground. 
quences. For example, many conditional cash 
transfer programs initially targeted women be-
cause—cognizant of how women were likely to 
spend money differently from men—it seemed 
a way to get more of the transfer spent on chil-
dren’s endowments. But the transfers changed 
bargaining power within the household and, in 
some cases such as Mexico, resulted in short-
term increases in domestic violence. While this 
effect can disappear or change in nature in the 
longer term, a number of later transfer pro-
grams included conditions to discourage do-
mestic violence (Brazil), training and awareness 
The Adolescent Girls Initiative, a public-private 
partnership, promotes the transition of adoles-
cent girls from school to productive employment 
through innovative interventions that are tested 
and then scaled up or replicated if successful.a 
Under way in Afghanistan, Jordan, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Liberia, Nepal, and South 
Sudan (and soon in Rwanda), the initiative targets 
about 20,000 adolescent girls and young women 
ages 16–24. 
Interventions range from business develop-
ment skills training and services to technical and 
vocational training, targeting skills in high demand. 
In all projects, girls receive life-skills training to 
address the most important barriers to their eco-
nomic independence. Each country intervention is 
tailored to the local context and specifi c needs of 
adolescent girls. Because the evidence on what 
works is thin, rigorous impact evaluation is a part 
of the initiative. 
The skills training aims to equip girls with tech-
nical skills with proven demand in the local labor 
market. In all pilots, training providers are asked to 
conduct market assessments before selecting 
trades for which training is developed and off ered. 
While the focus is on matching skills to the mar-
ket, the results in many cases challenge norms for 
 gender-appropriate occupations. 
In Liberia, participating young women are 
off ered six months of training for jobs in house 
painting, professional driving, and security guard 
services. In Nepal, they are off ered three months 
of occupational skills training followed by a man-
datory skills test and three-month job placement. 
The focus is on identifying nonstereotypical 
BOX 7  Intervening early to overcome future labor market 
failures—The Adolescent Girls Initiative
a. Current donors to the Adolescent Girls Initiative include the Nike Foundation, a main partner of the initiative, as well as the governments of 
Australia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The Bank’s Gender Action Plan also supports the initiative’s country projects. 
Pledges to the initiative stand at $22 million.
trades attractive to women, with some trained as 
electricians, masons, and mobile phone repair 
technicians.
Lessons from implementation highlight girls’ 
distinctive social capital needs, which must be 
addressed to facilitate the uptake of economic 
opportunities among often vulnerable and iso-
lated young females. Trainers in the Liberia pilot 
formed girls into teams of three or four, who made 
public commitments to support one another, both 
inside and outside the classroom, throughout the 
training. The positive peer pressure helped keep 
attendance rates high, with almost 95 percent 
completing the training, and addressed the vari-
ety of educational levels among participants.
Another promising innovation from the Libe-
ria pilot was a formal savings account at a local 
bank for all participating girls, with an initial 
deposit of $5. The savings accounts not only 
enabled the girls to practice their fi nancial literacy 
skills beyond the classroom but built trust with 
formal fi nancial institutions, and girls expressed 
satisfaction with being connected to the modern 
economy for the fi rst time. 
Job fairs were organized to market the pro-
gram to potential employers interested in placing 
girls in internships or jobs. Private sector human 
resource and career development specialists met 
with trainees individually to impart their knowl-
edge about the industry, coach them on profes-
sionalism in the workplace, and give constructive 
feedback on the skills demonstrated. These one-
on-one meetings off ered girls the opportunity to 
build networks and to tap into industry-specifi c 
information crucial for new job entrants.
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
REFORMS FOR GENDER EQUALITY
Well-designed public policies to address specifi c 
market failures and institutional or normative 
constraints can support signifi cant advances in 
gender equality. But the choice of policies and 
their implementation does not occur in a vac-
uum. Policies must be attuned to countries’ in-
stitutional, social, and political environment and 
to the societal actors involved. It is important to 
understand how reforms actually take place and 
what factors allow them to be sustained so that 
they produce change.
Two characteristics of gender reform pro-
cesses are worth noting. First, as with all reforms, 
they redistribute resources and power between 
groups in society, including between men and 
women. Even when policies to advance gender 
equality are well chosen and enhance economic 
effi ciency, some groups may lose as a result. 
Second, such reforms often confront power-
ful societal norms and beliefs regarding gender 
roles. Each of these features means there will 
likely be opposition, and managing this push-
back is the key to successful reforms.
A range of countries—rich and develop-
ing—show that several aspects of the political 
economy of reforms are especially relevant to 
gender equality. First, reforms are most likely to 
succeed when support for them is broad-based. 
It is essential, then, to build coalitions that mo-
bilize around the reforms. These coalitions can 
include nonstate actors such as political parties, 
trade unions, civic organizations and associa-
tions, and the private sector. Women’s groups in 
particular have been a driving force for greater 
gender equality in labor legislation and family 
law. For instance, women workers in the infor-
mal sector have challenged their employers and 
sometimes the state through such organiza-
tions as the Self Employed Women’s Association 
in India and Nijera Kori in Bangladesh. These 
groups have provided voice for women and cre-
ated space for public action to counter the resis-
tance to reform.
Women and men are partners in improving 
gender equality. While most initiatives that call 
on men to support gender equality are still small, 
signs point to broader engagement in many areas 
and growing male support for women’s rights 
in many developing countries. For instance, the 
Rwanda Men’s Resource Center engages men 
The oil palm industry came to the realization 
that 60–70 percent of the fruit on the ground 
was not being collected. They tried multiple 
initiatives designed to deal with constraints 
women faced, including giving the women spe-
cial nets to use, and timing the collection to 
deal with women’s care duties. None of these 
worked. Finally, the Mama Lus Frut scheme was 
introduced whereby women received their own 
harvest record cards and were paid directly into 
their personal bank accounts. Yields increased 
signifi cantly, as did female participation in oil 
palm harvesting.
Second, many non-gender-focused policies 
and programs can benefi t from taking into ac-
count women’s underrepresentation in markets, 
sectors, or occupations, a situation that can cause 
information problems not only for women but 
also for those who seek to employ them, lend to 
them, or provide them with services. One exam-
ple of how to take women’s underrepresentation 
into account is Ecuador’s program to expand 
credit bureau databases to include microfi nance. 
This intervention will help microfi nance insti-
tutions make better lending decisions, indepen-
dent of to whom they are lending. And because 
microfi nance clients are predominantly women, 
it will also help them access a broader range of 
fi nancial services.
Third, policy design should seek to level the 
playing fi eld for women and men, especially 
where laws and regulations treat them dif-
ferently and where systems enforce laws and 
regulations differentially, even when nomi-
nally equal. Looking for and fi xing this type of 
discrimination when revising laws and regula-
tions or enforcement mechanisms can provide 
an opportunity to improve gender equality as a 
secondary benefi t. Take the case of taxes, which 
can explicitly discriminate against women 
when women face different rates for the same 
income as men. For example, in Morocco, 
the tax allowance for children is allocated to 
men, so men face a lower tax burden. Women 
receive this allowance only if they prove that 
their husband and children depend fi nancially 
on them. This design is neither effi cient not 
gender equitable.
When these considerations are factored into 
general policy design, the policies are more 
likely to reach their intended objectives, and it 
becomes easier for policy makers to tweak them 
to improve gender equality in the process.
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such “incremental” reforms may not be enough 
to overcome the path dependence and institu-
tional rigidities that result in persistent gender 
inequality. Bold government action with “trans-
formative” reforms may be necessary to alter 
social dynamics and move to a more equitable 
equilibrium. In choosing between incremen-
tal and transformative policies as part of gen-
der reforms, the challenge for policy makers is 
to balance the pace of change with the risks of 
reversal. Incremental policies will bring about 
change only slowly. But transformative policies 
can risk a backlash. A way forward is to be se-
lective in implementing transformative policies 
and ensure that adequate attention is paid to 
their implementation. 
A GLOBAL AGENDA FOR GREATER 
GENDER EQUALITY
Domestic action is central to reducing inequali-
ties. Global action—by governments, people 
and organizations in developed and developing 
countries, and by international institutions—
cannot substitute for equitable and effi cient 
domestic policies and institutions. But it can 
enhance the scope for and impact of domestic 
policies. And it can infl uence whether global 
integration and the opportunities it brings—
through information, mobility, and technolo-
gy—lead to greater gender equality and better 
lives for all women, or just for some.
Global action should focus on areas where 
gender gaps are most signifi cant both intrinsi-
cally and in terms of their potential develop-
ment payoff—and where growth alone cannot 
solve the issues. In other words, international 
action should focus on complementing country 
efforts along the four priority areas identifi ed in 
this Report:
• Reducing excess female mortality and closing 
education gaps where they remain 
• Improving access to economic opportunities 
for women 
• Increasing women’s voice and agency in the 
household and in society 
• Limiting the reproduction of gender inequal-
ity across generations 
In addition, there is one cross-cutting prior-
ity: supporting evidence-based public action 
and boys in combating gender-based violence. 
In surveys of male attitudes toward gender 
equality in Brazil, Chile, Croatia, and Mexico, 
adult men overwhelmingly express the view that 
“men do not lose out when women’s rights are 
promoted.”89 Even in India, where men in this 
survey were less supportive of gender equality 
overall, their support for some policies, such as 
quotas in universities and places in government, 
was strong.
Second, fi rms—big and small—can articulate 
a compelling business case for gender equality. In 
a fast-changing global economy, the demand for 
skills has swelled, encouraging fi rms to expand 
their talent pool. Businesses have sought not 
only to attract and recruit female talent but also 
to retain it through measures to facilitate work-
life balance. Firms know that a diversity of opin-
ions can enrich decision making and stimulate 
ingenuity. And gender equality per se has grown 
to be a desirable trait that customers and inves-
tors look for. Corporate social responsibility is 
an avenue for fi rms to enhance competitiveness 
through product differentiation and capture the 
loyalty of women’s growing market power.
Third, shocks and exogenous changes can 
present policy makers with windows of oppor-
tunity to launch reforms that can improve gen-
der outcomes. Such windows sometimes stem 
from unpredictable circumstances, such as a 
national disaster. In 1998 the disaster that fol-
lowed Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua facilitated 
a dialogue on domestic violence. A national 
campaign and the enactment of legislation fol-
lowed. Other windows come from shifts in the 
political or economic landscape. The changes in 
Spain during the democratic transition in the 
late 1970s were particularly dramatic for fam-
ily law and reproductive rights. And still oth-
ers emerge from the advocacy of transnational 
agencies and role modeling in the global agenda. 
For example, the monitoring and advocacy by 
Colombian local women’s groups in CEDAW 
informed the expansion of reproductive health 
guarantees in the Colombian Constitution, ad-
opted in 1990, and facilitated greater access to 
contraception.
Finally, there are multiple paths to reform. 
Often governments follow societal cues in pacing 
and pushing reforms. When policy formulation 
and implementation follow cues from ongoing 
shifts in markets and social norms, convergence 
and alignment can fuel sustainable change. But 
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and across borders. Such partnerships could 
be built among those in the international de-
velopment community around funding issues, 
with academia and think tanks for the purpose 
of experimentation and learning, and, more 
broadly, with the private sector to promote ac-
cess to economic opportunities. Together, these 
partnerships could support countries in lever-
aging the resources and information needed to 
successfully promote gender equality in today’s 
globalized world.
The relative importance of these activi-
ties will obviously vary across countries. Table 
2 provides a bird’s eye view of the proposed 
agenda for global action (described in more de-
tail in chapter 9). Areas marked with a check are 
those where new or additional action is needed 
or where a refocus of existing initiatives is called 
for. Of course, there are also important ongoing 
efforts in the areas not marked with checks—for 
instance, innovation around the delivery models 
for the prevention of HIV/AIDS, or partnerships 
focused on adolescents. In these latter areas, the 
focus should be on sustaining ongoing efforts and 
partnerships, and meeting prior commitments.
Finally, the framework and analysis presented 
in the Report provide four general principles for 
policy and program design, which can enhance 
the impact and effectiveness of global action 
across all priority areas. These principles are: 
• Comprehensive gender diagnostics as a pre-
condition for policy and program design. Gen-
der disparities persist for multiple reasons: 
there may be a single institutional or policy 
“fi x” that is diffi cult and easily blocked; there 
may be multiple reinforcing constraints in 
markets, formal institutions, and households 
that combine to block progress; or they may 
be deeply rooted in gender roles or social 
norms that evolve only slowly. Effective pol-
icy design requires a good understanding of 
which of these situations prevails in a partic-
ular context, and of where and what the 
binding constraints are. To be useful, this di-
agnostic must drill down into what happens 
in households, markets, and formal institu-
tions, their interactions, and how they are 
shaped by social norms.
• Targeting determinants versus targeting out-
comes. In choosing and designing policies, 
it is necessary to target the market and in-
stitutional constraints that generate existing 
through better data, better knowledge genera-
tion and sharing, and better learning.
The motivation for an agenda for global ac-
tion is threefold. First, progress on some fronts 
requires channeling more resources from rich 
to developing countries (for example, to cre-
ate greater equity in human endowments or to 
tackle the root causes of excess female mortal-
ity around the world). Second, effective action 
sometimes hinges on the production of a pub-
lic good, such as the generation of new (global) 
information or knowledge. And third, when the 
impact of a particular policy cuts across borders, 
coordination among a large number of coun-
tries and institutions can enhance its effective-
ness, not least by building momentum and pres-
sure for action at the domestic level.
Based on these criteria, initiatives included 
in the proposed agenda for global action can be 
grouped into three types of activities:
Providing fi nancial support. Improvements 
in the delivery of clean water and sanitation or 
better health services, such as the ones needed 
to bring down excess female mortality among 
girls and mothers in the developing world, will 
require signifi cant resources—often beyond the 
means of individual governments, particularly 
those of relatively poor countries. The interna-
tional development community can fi nancially 
support countries willing and able to undertake 
such reforms in a coordinated manner through 
specifi c initiatives or funding facilities to ensure 
maximum impact and minimize duplication.
Fostering innovation and learning. While a 
great deal has been learned about what works 
and what does not when it comes to promot-
ing greater gender equality, the truth remains 
that progress is often held back by the lack of 
data or adequate solutions to the most “sticky” 
problems. That is the case, for instance, regard-
ing gender differences in time use patterns and 
the norms around care they stem from. The de-
velopment community could promote innova-
tion and learning through experimentation and 
evaluation in ways that pay attention to results 
and process, as well as to context, and thus facili-
tate a scaling-up of successful experiences.
Leveraging effective partnerships. As chapter 
8 makes clear, successful reform often requires 
coalitions or partnerships that can act within 
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tures, and as a result so do household and 
individual behaviors. This implies that the 
same policy can have very different results 
depending on the contexts—or, as the dis-
cussion in chapter 8 makes clear, that there 
are multiple paths to reform.
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G
ender refers to socially constructed 
and learned female and male roles, 
behaviors, and expectations. All cul-
tures interpret and translate the bio-
logical differences between men and women 
into beliefs about what behaviors and activities 
are appropriate for each gender as well as their 
rights, resources, and power. For example, most 
societies give the primary responsibility for the 
care of infants and young children to women 
and girls, and that for military service and na-
tional security to men. Gender thus shapes one’s 
life chances and one’s role in the home, in soci-
ety, and in the economy.
Played out over the life cycles of individuals, 
gender can translate into inequalities—in hu-
man capital, economic opportunities, citizen-
ship, and political participation. It determines 
the way households allocate resources to sons 
and daughters, through decisions about boys’ 
or girls’ education or about where they work, 
with sons typically working on the farm and in 
other market work while daughters work in the 
home and care-giving activities. By the time girls 
and boys become adults and form households, 
women typically have fewer years of education 
than men (although this is changing rapidly), 
work longer hours but fewer in the labor force, 
earn lower wages, and have less say in their com-
munities and societies.
GENDER EQUALITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: WHY DO THE 
LINKS MATTER?
Why do these gender differences matter for de-
velopment, and how do they evolve as countries 
develop? We argue in this Report that the links 
between gender equality and development go 
both ways and that each direction of this re-
lationship matters for policy making. Higher 
incomes and improved service delivery—both 
essential elements of broad-based economic de-
velopment—contribute to greater gender equal-
ity. That is why the rise in global prosperity in 
the past quarter century has seen the unprece-
dented narrowing of gender gaps on many edu-
cation and health outcomes as well as in labor 
market opportunities. More women than men 
now attend universities across the world. And 
women make up over 40 percent of the world’s 
labor force.
But not all gender gaps have shrunk or are 
shrinking with rising incomes. Poor girls and 
those who live in remote areas or belong to ex-
cluded groups are far less likely to attend pri-
mary and secondary school than boys in the 
same circumstances. Compared with their high-
income counterparts, women and girls in low- 
and  middle-income countries die at higher rates 
relative to men, especially in the critical years 
of infancy and early childhood, and in their 
reproductive years. Women continue to clus-
ter in sectors and occupations characterized as 
“female”—many of them lower paying. Women 
are more likely to be the victims of violence at 
home and to suffer more severe injuries. And al-
most everywhere, the representation of women 
in politics and in senior managerial positions in 
business remains far lower than that of men.
Understanding which of these gaps respond 
to economic development and why they do so is 
relevant to policy because it helps shine the light 
on the gender gaps that need attention. The dis-
parities between women and men or girls and 
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The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) estimates that equalizing access to pro-
ductive resources for female and male farmers 
could increase agricultural output in develop-
ing countries by as much as 2.5 to 4 percent.1 
Eliminating barriers preventing women from 
entering certain sectors or occupations would 
have similar positive effects, increasing output 
per worker by 13 to 25 percent.2 
These gains are large in the 21st century’s 
integrated and competitive world, where even 
modest improvements in the effi ciency of re-
source use can have signifi cant effects on growth. 
In a world of open trade, gender inequality has 
become more costly because it diminishes a 
country’s ability to compete internationally—
particularly if the country specializes in export-
ing goods and services that men and women 
workers are equally well suited to produce.3 
Industries that rely more on female labor ex-
pand more in countries where women are more 
equal.4 In a globalized world, then, countries 
that reduce gender-based inequalities, especially 
in secondary and tertiary education and in eco-
nomic participation, will have a clear advantage 
over those that delay action.
The rapid aging of the world’s population 
implies that fewer workers will be supporting 
growing numbers of elderly in the decades to 
come, unless labor force participation increases 
signifi cantly among groups that participate less 
today—mainly women. For instance, in Europe 
an anticipated shortfall of 24 million workers 
by 2040 could be reduced to 3 million if female 
participation rates rise to those of men.5 Nor is 
the problem limited to rich countries. In devel-
oping countries and regions with rapidly aging 
demographic structures, like China or Eastern 
Europe, encouraging women to enter and re-
main in the labor force can dampen the impact 
of shrinking working-age populations. 
Women’s endowments, opportunities, and 
agency shape those of the next generation
Women’s economic empowerment and greater 
control over resources also increase investments 
in children’s health, education, and nutrition, 
boosting future economic growth. Evidence 
from a range of countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mexico, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom, among others) shows that 
increasing the share of household income that 
women control, either through their own earn-
boys that shrink as countries get richer—differ-
ences in access to education, for example—need 
less policy attention through a gender lens than 
those that are more persistent, such as differ-
ences in wages, agricultural productivity, and 
societal voice.
The reverse relationship—from gender equal-
ity to development—also matters for policy 
for two reasons. First, gender equality matters 
in its own right, because the ability to live the 
life of one’s own choosing and be spared from 
absolute deprivation is a basic human right, 
to be enjoyed by everyone, whether one is male 
or female. Because development is a process 
of expanding freedoms equally for all people, 
gender equality is a core objective in itself. 
Just as lower income poverty or greater access 
to justice is part of development, so too is the 
narrowing of gaps in well-being between males 
and females. 
Second, greater gender equality can enhance 
economic effi ciency and improve other devel-
opment outcomes. Evidence from a (slowly) 
growing set of microeconomic studies points to 
three main channels for greater gender equality 
to promote growth:
• Reducing barriers to more effi cient alloca-
tion of women’s skills and talents can gener-
ate large (and growing) productivity gains. 
• Improving women’s endowments, opportu-
nities, and agency can shape more positive 
outcomes for the next generation.
• Increasing women’s individual and collective 
agency produces better outcomes, institu-
tions, and policy choices. 
Misallocating women’s skills and talent 
comes at a large (and rising) economic cost
Gender equality can have large impacts on pro-
ductivity, especially with women now represent-
ing larger shares of the world’s workforce and 
university graduates. For countries to be per-
forming at their potential, the skills and talents 
of these women should be applied to activities 
that make the best use of those abilities. But this 
is not always the case. Women’s labor is too of-
ten underused or misallocated—because they 
face discrimination in markets or societal insti-
tutions that prevents them from having access 
to productive inputs and credit, entering certain 
occupations, and earning the same incomes as 
men. The consequence: economic losses.
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the provision of public goods (both female-
preferred goods such as water and sanitation, 
and male-preferred goods such as irrigation 
and schools). It also reduced corruption and 
increased reported crimes against women along 
with arrests for those crimes.11 
Several studies have also examined the 
relationship between gender equality and 
economic growth at an aggregate level us-
ing cross-country data. Because the links be-
tween growth and gender equality go in both 
directions, the results of this work are more 
diffi cult to interpret than those of microeco-
nomic studies (box 0.1). But combined, the 
two strands of research provide considerable 
evidence that gender equality and growth are 
correlated and that gender equality matters 
for many aspects of growth. Even so, as we ar-
gue in the box, more careful work is needed, 
especially microeconomic analysis that can 
establish causal relationships between gender 
equality and growth and, in so doing, high-
light the channels for policy to reduce gender 
gaps and increase economic growth. 
WHAT DOES THIS REPORT DO?
This World Development Report focuses on the 
economics of gender equality and development. 
It uses an economic lens to understand what un-
derlies and drives differences between men and 
women in key determinants of welfare—in hu-
man capital endowments such as education and 
health, in access to economic opportunities and 
productive resources, and in the ability to make 
choices and take action, or agency. It uses the 
same approach to explore which policy inter-
ventions and broader societal action can reduce 
these gender differences and improve outcomes. 
The Report does not limit itself to economic 
outcomes, however—indeed, it devotes roughly 
equal attention to human capital endowments, 
to economic opportunities, and to agency, sig-
naling that all three are important and interre-
lated in determining welfare. Nor does it ignore 
the central role of social and political institu-
tions, whether formal or informal, in determin-
ing gender outcomes. 
In examining gender gaps and their pat-
terns across countries and over time, we adopt 
a strongly empirical approach, preferring rigor-
ous and evidence-based analysis, and highlight-
ings or cash transfers, changes spending in ways 
that benefi t children.6 
Improvements in women’s health and edu-
cation also benefi t the next generation. Better 
nutritional status and higher education levels of 
mothers are associated with better child health 
outcomes—from immunization rates to nutri-
tion to child mortality.7 And mothers’ school-
ing is positively linked to children’s educational 
attainment across a broad set of countries. In 
Pakistan, children whose mothers have even a 
single year of education spend one extra hour 
studying at home every day and receive higher 
test scores.8
Women’s lack of agency—evident in domes-
tic violence—has consequences for their chil-
dren’s cognitive behavior and health as adults. 
Medical research from developed countries has 
established a link between exposure to domes-
tic violence in childhood and health problems 
in adulthood. Numerous studies also document 
how witnessing violence between one’s parents 
as a child increases the likelihood that women 
experience violence from their own partners as 
adults, and that men perpetrate violence against 
their partners.9
Increasing women’s individual and 
collective agency produces better 
outcomes, institutions, and policy choices
Across countries and cultures, men and women 
differ in agency—that is, their ability to make 
choices that lead to desired outcomes—with 
women usually at a disadvantage. When women 
and men do not have equal chances to be socially 
and politically active—and to infl uence laws, 
politics, and policy making—institutions and 
policies are more likely to systematically favor 
the interests of those with more infl uence. So, 
the institutional constraints and market failures 
that feed gender inequalities are less likely to be 
addressed and corrected, perpetuating gender 
inequality over generations.
Women’s collective agency can be trans-
formative for society as a whole. Empowering 
women as political and social actors can change 
policy choices and make institutions more rep-
resentative of a range of voices. Female suffrage 
in the United States led policy makers to turn 
their attention to child and maternal health 
and helped lower infant mortality by 8–15 per-
cent.10 In India, giving power to women at the 
local level (through political quotas) increased 
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ing, and other aspects of well-being (see box 3 in 
the overview for details).12 
A global report like this one cannot attempt 
to provide in-depth analysis of specifi c country 
circumstances. Nor can it cover all relevant di-
mensions of gender equality. Instead, the Report 
proposes a conceptual framework to explain 
gender inequality and recommend public poli-
cies, which can be adapted as necessary to spe-
cifi c countries, issues, and sectors. Building on 
earlier Bank work on gender and development 
(most notably on Engendering Development), 
ing causality where feasible. For this, we draw on 
a large and growing body of quantitative gen-
der research, complemented by new analysis—
particularly on time use; domestic violence; 
mortality risks; and earnings and productivity 
in labor markets, agriculture, and entrepreneur-
ship. We also draw on new qualitative fi eld re-
search, which involved more than 4,000 men 
and women in 98 communities from 19 de-
veloping countries (map 0.1), exploring how 
gender affects their daily lives as well as their as-
pirations, education, job choices, decision mak-
B OX  0.1   Problems with estimating the effect of gender equality on growth
One thing is clear. Income and gender equality are positively corre-
lated. Box fi gure 0.1 shows this correlation for one measure, the 
World Economic Forum’s Index of Economic Participation and 
Opportunity, which measures male-female diff erences in labor force 
participation, wages, income, political participation, and number of 
technical workers.
What is not clear is whether this correlation is capturing the 
eff ect of growth on gender equality or the eff ect of gender equal-
ity on growth. In reality, it is probably capturing some of both, but 
we cannot tell which relationship matters more from cross-country 
data.a
1.  There are good reasons for the relationship to go in both directions. 
First, with changes in technology (changing with economic 
development), the relative return to manual skills has declined as 
that for cognitive skills has increased. Second, the better service 
delivery that accompanies economic development can increase 
gender equality, as in education (chapter 3). 
2.  Other things are going on that could drive changes in both gender 
equality and growth. Consider investments to improve health. 
Studies of deworming and nutrition interventions show that 
they benefi t girls more than boys. Each intervention improves 
gender equality and human capital, each of which is indepen-
dently important for growth. Now consider institutional change: 
institutions can boost growth, and some kinds of institutions can 
improve gender equality. Suppose that a country is improving its 
legal system by expanding the reach and effi  ciency of the courts 
and police. That expansion will contribute to growth (as con-
tracts are better enforced) and could contribute to gender equal-
ity (by making it easier for women to use justice systems). In the 
data, we observe a correlation between gender equality and 
growth, but this relationship is not causal—the underlying cause 
is a change in institutions. So the correlation between gender 
quality and growth may actually be capturing the relationship 
with a third factor that is causing changes in both gender equal-
ity and growth. 
3.  The relationship is not robust. Empirical work shows that the cor-
relation between gender equality and growth is quite sensitive to 
time periods and countries. Work on the relationship between 
female education and growth, for example, shows that results are 
quite sensitive to how the analysis is done. Indeed, changes in 
how this relationship is measured can cause the eff ect of female 
education on growth to change from negative to positive.
In sum, the relationship between gender equality and growth is 
not only complex—it clearly goes in both directions. Broad-brush, 
cross-country studies cannot tell the magnitude of this relationship, 
nor can they provide signifi cant insights into what drives this rela-
tionship. Careful microeconomic work (some exists, but more is 
needed) can provide more defi nitive evidence—both on the impor-
tance of gender equality for growth and on where policy interven-
tions are needed.
Sources: Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn forthcoming; Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 2004; Maluccio and others 2009; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005; Qian 2008.
a. For a more detailed discussion of these reasons, see Bandiera and Natraj 2011 and Cuberes and Teignier 2011.
Sources: World Development Indicators and World Economic Forum 2010.
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NAVIGATING THIS REPORT: 
A ROADMAP
The Report has nine chapters in three parts. 
Part 1—Taking stock of gender equality—presents 
the facts that will then provide the foundation 
for the rest of the Report. It combines existing 
and new data to document changes in key di-
mensions of gender equality over the past quar-
ter century and across regions and countries. Its 
main message is that very rapid and, in some 
cases, unprecedented progress has been made in 
some dimensions of gender equality (chapter 1), 
but that it has not reached all women or been 
uniform across all dimensions of gender equal-
ity (chapter 2).
The contrast between the patterns and trends 
described in the fi rst two chapters of the Report 
prompts one to ask what explains the progress 
or lack of it. Part 2—What has driven progress? 
What impedes it?—constitutes the analytical core 
of the Report. It presents the conceptual frame-
work and uses it to examine the factors that have 
fostered change and the constraints that have 
slowed progress. The analysis focuses on gender 
differences in education and health (chapter 3), 
agency (chapter 4), and access to economic op-
the framework posits that gender outcomes can 
be understood through the responses of house-
holds to the functioning and structure of mar-
kets and institutions, both formal and informal. 
The Report then illustrates the use of this frame-
work by focusing on aspects of gender equality 
where there has been most progress worldwide 
(education, life expectancy, labor force par-
ticipation, and the extension of legal rights to 
women) and those where there has been little or 
very slow change (excess female mortality, seg-
regation in economic activity, gaps in earnings, 
responsibility for house and care work, asset 
ownership, and women’s agency in the private 
and public spheres).
This empirical approach helps establish the 
link between analysis and policy choice. It em-
phasizes that the design of policies targeted at 
reducing specifi c gender gaps needs to take into 
account what happens in the household, as well 
as the functioning and structure of markets 
and formal and informal institutions—and the 
interactions between all of them. Through the 
analysis of alternative policies, it shows that, 
when these aspects are not considered, the in-
tended results of policy interventions can be 
muted or even contrary to what is expected.
M A P  0.1  Economies where qualitative assessments were conducted
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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10. Miller 2008.
11. Beaman and others, forthcoming; Chattopadhyay 
and Dufl o 2004; Iyer and others 2010.
12. World Bank 2011.
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Taking stock of gender equality 
PART I
omen’s lives have improved greatly over the past de-
cades. Enjoying ever higher education, women have 
greater control over their life choices. They use those 
choices to participate more in the labor force; have fewer children; 
diversify their time beyond housework and child care; and shape 
their communities, economies, and societies. And the pace of 
change for many women in the developing world has accelerated. 
But progress has not been uniform. A vast chasm persists to-
day in more than one way. There are women in every region of 
the world for whom life has not changed much. They still battle 
many of the issues that women before them had to face. Some 
girls still cannot go to school on a par with boys. They may not 
inherit assets from their parents. And they have lower legal and 
social status. Even in Sweden and the United States, change is still 
hard to come by in many facets of life and the economy. Women 
are paid less and are still employed disproportionately in nurs-
ing and teaching, for example, while men dominate engineering 
and construction. Only 28 chief executive offi cers of the Fortune 
1000 companies are women.
Why so much progress in some areas and so little in others? 
Part 1 provides a factual foundation for the rest of the Report by 
assembling existing and new data to map out patterns and trends 
in gender equality over time and across regions and countries. It 
takes stock of the changes in gender outcomes across the world 
in recent decades. Many of these changes have occurred because 
of the wave of global prosperity that has swept across much of 
the developing world. Yet this prosperity has not worked for 
many women around the world, and in some respects not at all. 
The focus here is on three key domains of gender equality: 
the accumulation of endowments, the use of those endowments 
to take up economic opportunities and generate incomes, and the 
application of those endowments to take actions (agency) affect-
ing individual and household well-being. 
Endowments encompass education, health, land, and other 
assets such as fi nancial resources that women and men accu-
mulate during their lifetimes. Many, such as basic education, are 
amassed at early stages in life, refl ecting mostly the decisions of 
parents. Others, such as material assets, are acquired later through 
such mechanisms as productive labor and inheritance rights. 
Access to economic opportunities determines how endow-
ments and time generate income and consumption—key dimen-
sions of well-being. Decisions about time allocations between 
home and workplace, productive activity, and leisure take place 
in the household. They depend on the value placed on women’s 
potential contribution to the well-being of the household in 
relation to other household members—and on views of gen-
der roles and women’s preferences and needs. 
Agency is the process by which women and men make 
choices and translate them into desired outcomes. It has many 
dimensions. This Report focuses on fi ve outcomes closely as-
sociated with women’s ability to make choices: control over 
resources, decision making over family formation, control 
over movement, freedom from violence, and the ability to 
have a voice in society.
In these three domains, shortfalls of choice are refl ected in 
shortfalls of welfare. These three domains matter in and of 
themselves. But they are also closely interlinked. Agency al-
lows women to build their endowments. Endowments shape 
access to economic opportunities and incomes. The ability of 
women to access economic opportunities and earn income 
can infl uence their agency. And so on.
Chapter 1 documents the unprecedented gains women 
have made in rights, in human capital endowments, and in 
access to economic opportunities. Most countries today have 
explicit guarantees in their constitutions for the equality of all 
citizens and for nondiscrimination between men and women. 
Not only have things changed for the better; changes are also 
happening much faster than when today’s rich countries were 
much poorer. 
Chapter 2, by contrast, shows that things have not changed 
for all women or in all aspects of gender equality. First, for poor 
women and for women in poor places, sizable gender gaps re-
main, even in education enrollments and fertility, where global 
progress has been great. For the wealthiest people across coun-
tries, there is little gender disadvantage, but it is large for severely 
disadvantaged populations at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion. Ethnicity, distance, disability, or sexual orientation, among 
other factors, further compound gender inequality. Second, in 
some domains of gender equality there has been very little—or 
very slow—change, even as countries get richer. These “sticky” 
domains include excess female mortality in key periods of the 
life cycle and occupational differences in the economic sphere. 
In many areas of women’s agency, including political voice and 
representation, differences between men and women remain en-
trenched, even in very rich countries and despite nearly a century 
of women’s activism. Third, systemic shocks, such as droughts 
or economic downturns, adversely affect males and females, 
and their precise impacts depend on the context and the shock.
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espite the hardships many women 
endure in their daily lives, things 
have changed for the better—and at 
a speed that would not have been 
expected even two decades ago. In four major 
areas—women’s rights, education, health, and 
labor force outcomes—the gains in the second 
half of the 20th century were large and fast in 
many parts of the world. Improvements that 
took 100 years in wealthier countries took just 
40 years in some low- and middle-income coun-
tries. Change has also been accelerating, with 
gender equality gains in every decade building 
on gains from the decade before.
TIMES ARE CHANGING?
This chapter traces where progress has been 
made on gender equality and how. It starts with 
the evolution of women’s rights and the fi ght 
for equality under the law. Equality of rights 
matters because a lack of rights can constrain 
the choices available to women in many aspects 
of life. Achieving them in today’s high-income 
countries took considerable time. In contrast, 
gains under the law have occurred much faster 
in the developing countries, aided by a rising 
global consensus supporting formal rights and 
guarantees of equality for women.
In tandem with these gains in formal rights, 
low- and middle-income countries have seen 
unprecedented gains in outcomes for women, 
both in absolute terms and relative to men. More 
women are literate and educated than ever be-
fore, and the education gap with men has shrunk 
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dramatically. For younger cohorts, the gender 
gap in primary education enrollments has prac-
tically disappeared, and the gains in second-
ary and higher education have been enormous. 
Women are living longer and healthier lives in 
much of the world, in part because lower fer-
tility has reduced their risk in childbirth. And 
they are participating more than ever in market 
work. Economic growth has driven much of the 
progress, through higher household incomes, 
better service delivery, and new labor market op-
portunities for women. But it has not been the 
only factor—the association between economic 
growth and better outcomes for women has been 
neither automatic nor uniform across countries.
Changes in one domain of gender equality 
have fostered change in others, infl uencing the 
next generation, reinforcing the whole process. 
For example, the expansion of economic op-
portunities for women in service industries in 
Bangladesh and India has boosted school en-
rollments for girls, which feeds into higher labor 
force participation and better educational out-
comes for the next generation.1 
This is not to say that all problems have been 
solved or that progress was easy. Indeed, chapter 
“
”
Let our daughters go to school and 
let them get good jobs. The moment 
they will be independent from men in 
thinking and earning, then they will 
have very good lives.
Adult woman, Tanzania
 A wave of progress 57
with progress monitored independently by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women. 
Despite being known in the 1980s as the 
“Cinderella treaty” for its vagueness of language 
and weak monitoring and sanctions, CEDAW 
has promoted legislative and administrative 
change.2 In 1998, it infl uenced Turkey’s domes-
tic violence act (Law No. 4320 Family Protection 
Law). Turkey’s Constitutional Court also an-
nulled requirements that husbands give permis-
sion for a wife’s professional activities, making 
extensive references to CEDAW.3 Australia’s Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 draws on CEDAW to 
prohibit discrimination in public life on the ba-
sis of sex, marital status, pregnancy, or potential 
pregnancy. 
In 2003, the African Union adopted the Pro-
tocol to the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
Better known as the Maputo Protocol, it asserts 
women’s rights to take part in the political pro-
cess, to enjoy social and political equality with 
men, and to control their reproductive health. 
Article 5 refers to the “elimination of harmful 
practices,” including ending polygamous mar-
riage and female genital cutting. Of 53 African 
countries, 46 signed the protocol, and by Febru-
ary 2011, 30 countries had ratifi ed it.4 
Under the auspices of the Organization of 
American States, all Latin American coun-
tries signed in 1994 the Belém do Pará Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Pun-
ishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women. Since then, 28 nations have enacted 
laws with sanctions against domestic abuse.
These different international legal frame-
works refl ect the rising global consensus on 
equal rights for men and women—a consensus 
that did not emerge overnight but rather evolved 
from a long, slow struggle for equal rights for 
women that started in the advanced economies 
as early as the 18th century and continued in de-
veloping countries in the second half of the 20th 
century, reinforced by the emphasis on gender 
equality in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) (box 1.1).
Equal rights in the advanced 
economies—A long time coming
Women’s circumstances in the 18th century were 
very different than they are today. In 1789, the 
French revolution asserted that men are “born 
2 looks at countries and population groups with 
continuing gender disadvantages as well as at 
the many facets of life where gender imbalances 
remain serious, even crippling. Delineating the 
areas of change provides a foundation for un-
derstanding the constraints to gender equal-
ity—especially where they remain pervasive and 
deep. And this understanding can help in setting 
priorities for policy and public action. 
RISING GLOBAL CONSENSUS 
FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS
The past three decades have seen great progress 
in securing women’s formal rights and consti-
tutional guarantees of equality. The Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women (CEDAW), which the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted in 
1979, established a comprehensive framework 
for the advancement of women. Ten years later, 
almost 100 nations across all continents had rat-
ifi ed this international bill of rights for women. 
And today, the number of signatories has almost 
doubled, to 187 countries.
More than 30 years in the making, CEDAW 
is the most widely supported international hu-
man rights treaty and the primary international 
vehicle for monitoring and advocating gender 
equality. Defi ning what constitutes discrimina-
tion against women and setting an agenda for na-
tional action, CEDAW is particularly concerned 
with civil rights, the legal status of women, re-
productive roles and rights, and the impact of 
cultural factors on gender relations and on bar-
riers to the advancement of women. It is the only 
human rights treaty to explicitly address deci-
sions about family planning and family forma-
tion. Countries ratifying CEDAW are required to 
ensure that domestic legislation complies with it, 
I know that [women] have many 
rights: I can remember the right to 
education, the prohibition of the 
excision, and the prohibition to forced 
marriage.
 Adult woman, Burkina Faso
“
”
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The march toward equal property and suf-
frage rights has been slow and long. Only in 
1857 did the British Parliament pass the Matri-
monial Causes Act, allowing married women to 
inherit property and take court action on their 
own behalf. And not until 1882 did the Married 
Women’s Property Act recognize a husband and 
a wife as two separate legal entities, conferring 
to wives the right to buy, own, and sell property 
separately. Suffrage was not universal until 1928, 
when, as a result of the Representation of the 
People Act, women over age 21 received the vote 
on equal terms as men. The story is similar in 
Scandinavia: Norway, for example, provided full 
economic rights to women in 1888 and suffrage 
rights in 1913. 
In the United States, New York was the fi rst 
state to pass, in 1848, a Married Women’s Prop-
erty Act. Wives’ rights to earnings and property 
gradually spread to other states over the follow-
ing half century. Political voice was longer in 
coming. A proposed constitutional amendment 
guaranteeing women’s right to vote was intro-
duced in the U.S. Senate in 1878, but it did not 
receive a full vote until 1887, only to be voted 
down. Three more decades elapsed before the 
19th amendment to the constitution guarantee-
ing universal suffrage was ratifi ed in 1920.
The struggle against discrimination in other 
domains, such as labor and family law, picked 
up momentum in the second half of the 20th 
century.
 In the United States, until the passage of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, women could 
legally be passed over for promotions in the 
workplace. Married women needed the consent 
of their husbands to obtain a loan. And marital 
rape was not recognized as a criminal act.5 Until 
the 1980s, female fl ight attendants were required 
to be single when they were hired and could be 
fi red if they married. 
In Germany in the early 1950s, women 
could be dismissed from the civil service when 
they married. And through 1977, they offi cially 
needed their husbands’ permission to work. 
Until reunifi cation with East Germany in 1990, 
children of single mothers were assigned a legal 
guardian.6
Japan’s Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1985 obliged employers merely to endeavor 
to treat men and women equally during job 
recruitment, assignment, and promotion. The 
mandate for equal treatment came about in 
and remain free and equal in rights” universally, 
but the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen did not include women, and a year 
later, the National Assembly chose not to extend 
civil and political rights to women. The legal 
system in the British colonies, based on English 
common law, is another case. As Sir William 
Blackstone summarized in his Commentaries on 
the Laws of England in 1765:
By marriage, the husband and wife are 
one person in law: that is, the very being 
or legal existence of the woman is sus-
pended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that 
of the husband; under whose wing, pro-
tection, and cover, she performs every-
 thing; and is therefore called in our 
law-french a femme-couvert. For this rea-
son, a man cannot grant anything to his 
wife, or enter into covenant with her: for 
the grant would be to suppose her separate 
existence.
The 2010 MDG Summit concluded with a global action plan to achieve the 
eight MDGs by 2015. It also adopted a resolution calling for action to ensure 
gender parity in education and health, economic opportunities, and decision 
making at all levels through gender mainstreaming in the formulation and 
implementation of development policies. The resolution and the action plan 
refl ect the belief of the international development community that gender 
equality and women’s empowerment are development objectives in their own 
right (MDG 3), as well as critical channels for the achievement of the other 
MDGs. Gender equality and women’s empowerment help to promote universal 
primary education (MDG 2), reduce under-fi ve mortality (MDG 4), improve 
maternal mortality (MDG 5), and reduce the likelihood of contracting HIV/AIDS 
(MDG 6). 
The 2010 resolution also stresses that achieving the MDGs will require coor-
dinated interventions that target women and other vulnerable groups across 
sectors:
• Taking action to improve the number and active participation of women 
in all political and economic decision-making processes, including invest-
ing in women’s leadership in local decision-making structures and creating 
an even playing fi eld for men and women in political and government 
institutions
• Expanding access to fi nancial services for the poor, especially women
• Investing in infrastructure and labor-saving technologies, especially in rural 
areas, that benefi t women and girls by reducing their domestic burdens
• Promoting and protecting women’s equal access to housing, property, and 
land, including rights to inheritance.
B OX  1.1  Gender and the Millennium Development Goals 
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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natory legal provisions. In 2005, the Kenyan 
Court of Appeal held that there was no reason-
able basis for drawing a distinction between 
sons and daughters in determining inheritance. 
In 2001, the Tanzanian High Court held that a 
widow is entitled to administer the estate on be-
half of her children. In both cases, principles of 
equality and nondiscrimination prevailed.
BETTER OUTCOMES FOR 
WOMEN IN MANY DOMAINS
The march for women’s rights has gone hand in 
hand with better outcomes for many women—
both in absolute terms and relative to men. Dur-
ing the past quarter century, sustained growth in 
many countries has reduced disparities on some 
dimensions of gender equality. And the pace of 
change in these outcomes has been much faster 
in today’s low- and middle-income countries 
than it was in high-income countries. That can be 
seen in indicators as varied as fertility, female ed-
ucation and literacy, and female labor force par-
ticipation. In most countries where broad-based 
income growth has combined with better insti-
tutions for service delivery and more economic 
opportunities for women, the improvements in 
these indicators have been dramatic—and in 
some cases at rates never before witnessed. 
Moreover, they occurred along some dimen-
sions even in the face of social turmoil or sig-
nifi cant institutional challenges. Consider Ban-
gladesh, Colombia, and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.
Starting from a low base, the Bangladesh 
economy has almost tripled since 1980. The 
Bangladesh constitution, adopted in 1972, guar-
anteed equal rights to all citizens, regardless of 
gender, religion, or other social divisions, and 
reserved 15 parliamentary seats for women, 
later increased to 30. In 1975, the government 
reserved 10 percent of public jobs for women 
and created a special Ministry of Women’s Af-
fairs. Outcomes for women also improved dra-
matically on various fronts: 
•  From 1971 to 2009, the total fertility rate—
the number of children a woman is expected 
to have through her reproductive years—de-
clined from 6.9 children to 2.3.
•  Between 1991 and 2005, the number of girls 
in school increased from 1.1 million to 4 mil-
1997. The fi rst domestic violence law was passed 
in 2001.
Progress  has been faster in low- and 
middle-income countries
Progress has been most notable for political 
rights, tied to a change in the concept of citi-
zenship. National franchise movements gave 
shape to a more inclusive paradigm of the 
nation-state in the fi rst half of the 20th cen-
tury. Until then, citizenship had long been con-
strued as “male.” Extending suffrage in already 
established nation-states involved local social 
movements and social networks redefi ning citi-
zenship only after a lengthy renegotiation of do-
mestic political power. In contrast, new nations 
emerged into a “new world order.” National and 
international organizations embraced a gender-
neutral model of citizenship, with women fully 
accepted as persons capable of autonomous 
decisions.7 Only three countries that became 
independent in the 1900s (Austria, Ireland, and 
Libya) extended suffrage to men before women. 
But Switzerland did not break with tradition 
and extend the franchise to women until 1971. 
Among the latest countries to give women the 
right to vote, Bhutan changed the practice of 
casting one vote per household and adopted 
women’s full suffrage in 2008. Today, only Saudi 
Arabia restricts the franchise to men and re-
moving this restriction for municipal elections 
is under consideration.
Similar progress has been made in women’s 
rights beyond full suffrage. In the Philippines, 
sweeping legislative changes in the 1980s and 
1990s recognized gender equality across a wide 
array of domains. The 1987 constitution rein-
forced earlier constitutions by giving added 
emphasis to the notion of gender equality. The 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 
assured equal rights to ownership of land. And 
a 1989 act amended the Labor Code to protect 
women from discrimination in hiring and pay. 
Similarly, in 2004, Morocco overhauled its fam-
ily code to promote greater equality between 
women and men in multiple spheres.
The ratifi cation of CEDAW and other inter-
national treaties established a comprehensive 
framework to promote equality for women. 
These treaties spurred further progress toward 
securing formal rights in other domains of 
women’s lives, in large part by facilitating new 
legislation or promoting the repeal of discrimi-
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The Islamic Republic of Iran’s economy has 
almost doubled since 1980. And human devel-
opment outcomes among Iranian women have 
consistently improved along some key dimen-
sions in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution:
• From 1979 to 2009, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran saw the world’s fastest decline in fertil-
ity—from 6.9 children to 1.8 (below replace-
ment).
• The female-to-male ratio in primary school 
is the world’s highest, with 1.2 girls enrolled 
for every boy. The number of women in sec-
ondary school as a percentage of the eligible 
age group more than doubled from 30 per-
cent to 81 percent, and in 2009, more than 
half of all Iranian university students, 68 per-
cent of the students in science, and 28 per-
cent in engineering were women.
• Women make up 30 percent of the Iranian 
labor force today, with the percentage of eco-
nomically active women having increased 
from 20 percent in 1986 to 31 percent in 
2008.
Each of these three societies has faced some 
circumstances commonly viewed as constrain-
ing gender equality. Yet in all of them, income 
growth, better institutions for service delivery, 
and new market opportunities for women have 
contributed to greater gender equality in health, 
education, and labor market outcomes even as 
women in these countries continue to face sig-
nifi cant challenges in other aspects of their lives.
More girls in school
More women are literate than ever before. Be-
tween 1950 and 2010, the average schooling for 
women over age 15 in low-income countries in-
creased from 1.5 years to 6.5. Compare that with 
an increase from 2.6 years to 7.6 for men—and 
with current averages in adult high-income pop-
ulations of 10.9 years for women and 11.2 years 
for men.9 Because the adult population includes 
older people who do not increase their educa-
lion. Female enrollment climbed from 33 per-
cent of the total to 56 percent, with somewhat 
smaller increases among girls from the poor-
est two quintiles. 
•  The labor force participation of young wom-
en (ages 20–24) increased almost two and a 
half times over 1995–2000. Although overall 
labor force participation remains low, the 
 expansion of employment opportunities for 
young women (linked to the growth of the 
garment industry, health services, and social 
work) has increased girls’ school enrollment 
and lifted social restrictions on female mobil-
ity, allowing for a visible feminization of pub-
lic spaces (chapter 6).8
The economy of Colombia, an upper-middle- 
income country in Latin America, has expanded 
over one and a half times since 1980. Following 
upheavals and a recession in 1999, it stabilized 
after 2002. Colombia has also long been beset by 
violence and the illegal drug trade. One remark-
able feature is the improvement in women’s sta-
tus in the past 25 years:
• From 1986 to 2005, the total fertility rate 
dropped from 3.2 children to 2.4.
• Women reversed the education gap and now 
have higher completion rates than men for 
primary, secondary, and even tertiary educa-
tion. The last is particularly striking given 
that in 1984 almost twice as many men rela-
tive to women were college educated. 
• In 1980, the labor force participation of Co-
lombian females in the 13 largest cities was 
the second lowest in the region (above only 
Costa Rica), but by 2004, it was the second 
highest, next to Uruguay. Remarkably, the 
largest increases were among women with 
children ages 0–6—women least likely to 
work in most countries. And the representa-
tion of women is high in managerial posi-
tions and in fi nance—the glass ceilings noto-
riously hard to break in many advanced 
economies.
Child marriages have stopped. Girls are being sent to school. Even the poorest of us are 
sending our daughters to school.
Adult man, India 
“ ”
 A wave of progress 61
boys were in the minority in a wide range of na-
tions including Bangladesh, Brazil, Honduras, 
Lesotho, Malaysia, Mongolia, and South Africa.
Tertiary enrollment growth is stronger for 
women than for men across the world. The 
number of male tertiary students globally more 
than quadrupled, from 17.7 million to 77.8 
million between 1970 and 2008, but the num-
ber of female tertiary students rose more than 
sevenfold, from 10.8 million to 80.9 million, 
overtaking men. Female tertiary enrollment 
rates in 2008 lagged behind in only 36 develop-
ing countries of 96 with data (see fi gure 1.1). 
In Tunisia, 59 percent of the 351,000 students 
enrolled in university in 2008 were women. As 
chapter 6 shows, this increase in female enroll-
ment is consistent with an increasing demand 
for “brain” rather than “brawn” jobs in a glo-
balizing world.
Although boys are more likely than girls to 
be enrolled in primary school, girls make better 
progress—lower repetition and lower dropout 
rates—than boys in all developing regions.10 
According to international standardized stu-
dent achievement tests, girls tend to outperform 
boys in language skills, while boys tend to have 
a smaller advantage over girls in mathematics. 
tion, these rising averages refl ect even greater 
changes among young cohorts. In the United 
States, it took 40 years, from 1870 to 1910, for 
the share of 6–12-year-old girls in school to in-
crease from 57 percent to 88 percent. Morocco 
did the same in 11 years from 1997 to 2008.
These younger cohorts in all world regions 
have experienced steady and sustained improve-
ment toward greater gender equality in primary 
education. In the past decade, female enroll-
ments have grown faster than male enrollments 
in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Gender parity has been 
reached in 117 of 173 countries with data (fi g-
ure 1.1). Even in regions with the largest gender 
gaps—South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (par-
ticularly West Africa)—gains have been con-
siderable. In 2008, in Sub-Saharan Africa, there 
were about 91 girls for every 100 boys in primary 
school, up from 85 girls in 1999; in South Asia, 
the ratio was 95 girls for every 100 boys.
The patterns are similar in secondary edu-
cation, with one notable difference. In roughly 
one-third of developing countries (45), girls 
outnumbered boys in secondary education in 
2008 (see fi gure 1.1). Although the female gen-
der gap tends to be higher in poorer countries, 
F I G U R E  1.1   Gender parity in enrollments at lower levels has been achieved in much of the world, and 
tertiary enrollments now favor women
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Development Indicators.
Note: The 45° line in each fi gure above shows gender parity in enrollments. Any point above the 45° line implies that more women are enrolled relative to men.
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Gender now explains very little of the re-
maining inequality in school enrollment (fi gure 
1.2). In a large number of countries, a decompo-
sition of school enrollments suggests that wealth 
is the constraining factor for most, and in only 
a very limited number will a narrow focus on 
gender (rather than poverty) reduce inequalities 
further (chapter 3).16 
Healthier lives
The second half of the 20th century also saw 
large improvements in men’s and women’s 
health. Life expectancy at birth most clearly re-
fl ects improvements in health in populations 
across the world. The average number of years 
women could expect to live rose from 54 (51 for 
men) in 1960 to 71 (67 for men) in 2008. This 
period also saw the world’s fastest ever decline 
in fertility—from an average of about 5 births 
per woman in 1960 to 2.5 in 2008, lowering 
the number of deaths associated with maternal 
mortality. And bearing fewer children has given 
women more time to invest in acquiring human 
capital and to participate in market work. 
In most world regions, life expectancy for 
both men and women has consistently risen, 
with women on average living longer than men. 
The gap between male and female life expec-
tancy, while still rising in some regions, stabilized 
in others. On average, life expectancy at birth for 
females in low-income countries rose from 48 
years in 1960 to 69 years in 2008, and for males, 
from 46 years to 65. Mirroring the worldwide in-
crease in life expectancy, every region except Sub-
Saharan Africa added between 20 and 25 years 
of life between 1960 and today (fi gure 1.3). And 
since 1980, every region has had a female advan-
tage in life expectancy.
But there have been notable reversals. In 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, women’s ad-
vantage in life expectancy increased partly be-
cause of a sharp increase in male mortality, 
with the differences apparently increasing over 
time (see fi gure 1.3 for Ukraine). In some Sub-
Saharan countries, the ravaging effects of AIDS, 
especially for women, are evident. Since 1990, 
gains in female life expectancy relative to men 
have shrunk (see fi gure 1.3 for Botswana).
Increases in female life expectancy have been 
driven in part by a signifi cant decline in the risk 
of mortality during one of the most dangerous 
periods in a woman’s life—the early reproductive 
years and the experience of childbirth. First, the 
The 2009 Program for International Student 
 Assessment shows that 15-year-old girls in all 
participating countries performed better than 
boys in a reading test.
Economic growth has lowered the barriers 
to school entry for millions of boys and girls 
throughout the world and reduced gender in-
equality in schooling, particularly as countries 
move from lower to middle and higher in-
comes.11 First, as countries prosper economi-
cally, the supply of services by government or 
other service providers increases. Second, rising 
incomes erode the need for families to differen-
tiate educational investments across children, 
on the basis of gender, birth order, or any other 
reason, as they face less stringent budgets.12 
Because more girls than boys had been out of 
school, overall improvements in enrollments 
tend to reduce gender differences. Third, as 
growth opens new employment opportunities 
for women in sectors that demand a certain level 
of skills, such as light manufacturing or services, 
incentives for parents to invest in their daugh-
ters’ education increases, because that education 
now yields a greater return. 
Eliminating school fees has had a similar ef-
fect in increasing overall enrollments and reduc-
ing gender differences. The free primary educa-
tion programs across Sub-Saharan Africa have 
had an overwhelming response. In their fi rst 
year, student enrollments climbed 68 percent in 
Malawi and Uganda and 22 percent in Kenya.13 
States have also mandated and enforced par-
ticipation in schooling through compulsory ed-
ucation laws. Mass education systems expanded 
quickly after World War II, and universal edu-
cation laws can now be found in almost all na-
tions.14 Such laws, usually combined with large 
infrastructure and human resource investments 
to enhance service delivery, have brought more 
children into school throughout the world. In 
1997, Turkey sought to increase educational 
opportunities for children ages 11–13 years, 
particularly rural girls, by expanding manda-
tory education from fi ve years to eight. With the 
launch of the Basic Education Program, enroll-
ments jumped by 1.5 million children. Net en-
rollment rates, on the decline between 1991 and 
1997, then rose from 86 percent in 1997 to 96 
percent in 2002. Gains for rural girls were par-
ticularly impressive, jumping 160 percent in the 
program’s fi rst year alone in the nine provinces 
(of 81) with the greatest gender disparity.15 
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States more than 100 years took India 40 (fi gure 
1.4). Similarly, in Morocco, the fertility rate fell 
from 4 children per woman to 2.5 between 1992 
and 2004. 
On various other aspects of health status and 
health care, differences by sex are small. In many 
low-income countries, the proportion of chil-
dren stunted, wasted, or underweight remains 
high, but girls are no worse off than boys. In fact, 
data from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
show that boys are at a slight disadvantage.18 In 
Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, and Vietnam, men’s and 
women’s heights are increasing at almost identi-
cal rates, while in Ghana women’s heights have 
increased more rapidly than those of men.19 In 
many countries, children’s and adults’ anthro-
pometric outcomes do not allow them to reach 
their full potential, but an individual’s sex is not 
the main culprit. North Indian states are a no-
table exception; women have grown taller at a 
much slower rate than men, and girls’ anthro-
pometric outcomes remain worse than boys—
both in levels and in changes over time.20 
risk of death per birth declined. During 1990–
2008, 147 countries experienced declines in the 
maternal mortality ratio, 90 with a decline of 40 
percent or more.17 The Middle East and North 
Africa had the largest decline (59 percent), fol-
lowed by East Asia and Pacifi c (56 percent) and 
South Asia (53 percent). Second, the exposure to 
the risk of death was lower because of dramatic 
declines in fertility rates all over the world. With 
women choosing to have fewer children, the 
lifetime risk of death from maternal causes de-
clined, even where the risk of death during each 
birth changed little. 
In most developing countries, fertility rates 
fell sharply in a fairly short period. These de-
clines were much faster than earlier declines in 
today’s rich countries. In the United States, fer-
tility rates fell gradually in the 1800s through 
1940, increased during the baby boom, and 
then leveled off at just above replacement. In 
India, fertility was high and stable through 1960 
and then sharply declined from 6 births per 
woman to 2.3 by 2009. What took the United 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys.
Note: The measure of inequality refers to the percentage of total opportunities that must be reallocated to ensure that all the circumstances groups have the same average cover-
age rate. Low inequality is between 0.3 percent and 2.1 percent, moderate inequality is between 2.3 percent and 6.4 percent, and high inequality is between 6.5 percent and 
26.7 percent. Results are sorted by size of gender contribution to total inequality.
F I G U R E  1.2   Gender explains little of the inequality in education participation for children 
12–15 years old
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Similarly, there is little evidence of systematic 
gender discrimination in the use of health ser-
vices or in health spending. Out-of-pocket 
spending on health in the 1990s was higher for 
women than for men in Brazil, the Dominican 
Republic, Paraguay, and Peru.21 Evidence from 
South Africa reveals the same pro-female pat-
tern,22 as does that for lower income countries. 
In the Arab Republic of Egypt, more was spent 
per capita on outpatient services for females (68 
Egyptian pounds a year) than on male health 
care (58).23 The gender difference in amounts 
spent on inpatient services also favored females 
but much less. In Ghana, females absorbed more 
of a health subsidy than males did (56 percent 
of overall health spending in 1992). Evidence 
from India, Indonesia, and Kenya tells a similar 
story.24
For preventive health services such as vacci-
nation, poverty rather than gender appears to be 
the major constraining factor (fi gure 1.5).25 As 
with education enrollments, a decomposition 
F I G U R E  1.3  Women are living longer than men
80
70
60
50
40
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Middle East and North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
80
70
60
50
40
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
80
70
60
50
40
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
lif
e 
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
 a
t b
irt
h
lif
e 
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
 a
t b
irt
h
lif
e 
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
 a
t b
irt
h
women,
Botswana
men,
Botswana
women men women men women men
years years years
80
Europe and Central AsiaEast Asia and Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean
70
60
50
40
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
lif
e 
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
 a
t b
irt
h
80
70
60
50
40
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
lif
e 
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
 a
t b
irt
h
80
70
60
50
40
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
lif
e 
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
 a
t b
irt
h
women, Ukraine
men, Ukraine
women men women men women men
years years years
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Development Indicators.
F I G U R E  1.4   What took the United 
States 100 years took 
India 40 and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 10
Source: http://www.gapminder.org.
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Asia and the Pacifi c, Europe and Central Asia, 
and Latin America and the Caribbean, while 
more than 60 percent of women remain eco-
nomically inactive in South Asia and the Mid-
dle East and North Africa.
Labor force participation increased markedly 
for women with more education, but declined 
among women ages 15–24, who have remained 
in school longer, slowing the growth in overall 
participation since 1990. 
Around the world, for very poor countries, 
female labor force participation is high, refl ect-
ing a large labor-intensive agricultural sector 
and signifi cant numbers of poor households.27 
In this situation, women are willing to enter 
the labor force even at fairly low wages because 
unearned incomes are also low. As per capita 
incomes rise, unearned income rises (through 
higher male wages and earnings), and these 
higher incomes are typically associated with 
women withdrawing from the labor market. 
Social barriers against women entering the paid 
labor force also regain prominence, and their 
participation rates fall. But as countries con-
tinue to develop, further increases in women’s 
suggests that only a handful of countries have 
high inequality in measles vaccinations (other 
vaccines are even more universal) and where 
gender is a major contributing circumstance.
More women participate in market work
Female labor force participation has grown since 
1960, dramatically in some regions. Expanding 
economic opportunities have drawn large num-
bers of new female workers into the market. Be-
tween 1980 and 2008, the global rate of female 
labor force participation increased from 50.2 
to 51.8 percent while the male rate fell slightly 
from 82.0 to 77.7 percent. So the gender gap 
narrowed from 32 percentage points in 1980 to 
26 percentage points in 2008 (fi gure 1.6).26
Driving the convergence across countries 
are large increases in participation in coun-
tries that started with very low rates (primarily 
in Latin American and the Caribbean and in 
the Middle East and North Africa) combined 
with small declines in countries that started 
with very high rates (primarily in Eastern Eu-
rope and Central Asia). Participation rates now 
exceed 50 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, East 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys.
Note: The measure of inequality refers to the percentage of total opportunities that must be reallocated to ensure that all the circumstances groups have the same average cover-
age rate. Low inequality is between 1.0 percent and 3.2 percent, moderate inequality is between 3.4 percent and 5.2 percent, and high inequality is between 5.2 percent and 
22.0 percent. Results are sorted by size of gender contribution to total inequality.
F I G U R E  1.5   Gender explains little of the inequality in use of preventive health services
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estimated on the basis of data from 130 coun-
tries around 1980 and 2008, highlights these 
two features (fi gure 1.7). First, there is a clear 
U-shape relationship across countries at differ-
ent incomes for both periods. Second, the par-
ticipation rate associated with each level of de-
velopment increases over time—the U-shaped 
curve moves upward as time passes. So at each 
level of income, more women were participating 
in market work in 2008 than in 1980.
Changes in education and family struc-
ture have also driven women’s employment 
over time. Delays in the timing of marriage 
and childbearing as well as lower fertility have 
brought more women into the labor market, 
ranging from as little as 7 percent in Bolivia 
to about 30 percent in Argentina and Colom-
bia, and contributing an average of 21 percent 
overall to the rise in female labor force par-
ticipation across 10 Latin American countries. 
An additional 42 percent of the rise in female 
labor force participation in Latin America can 
be attributed to more education—in Panama, 
education accounts for as much as 81 percent. 
Urbanization, household technology, and the 
sectoral structure of the economy appear to 
matter much less in bringing women into the 
labor force.28 
CHANGE BEGETS CHANGE
A notable transformation has taken place 
around the world with impressive gains in 
women’s rights, educational attainment, health 
outcomes, and labor force participation. Positive 
feedback loops between gains in these different 
areas explain why change has been so quick in 
the developing world. 
Improvements in one area (higher educa-
tion) can drive changes in other areas (such as 
lower fertility and higher labor force participa-
tion). Similarly, better labor opportunities can 
in turn induce more investments in education 
and in women’s health for the next generation, 
while equal rights can underpin progress on all 
fronts. Conversely, a lack of improvement in, say, 
rights can hold back improvements in women’s 
access to market work, and failures to redress 
gender gaps can impair a whole range of health 
outcomes for women. Understanding these 
feedback loops is important for policy design. 
So is understanding the constraints to progress, 
and whether they are rooted in what happens in 
education and wages move them back into the 
labor market.
The relationship between economic devel-
opment and female labor force participation, 
F I G U R E  1.6   The gender gap in labor force participation 
narrowed between 1980 and 2008
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F I G U R E  1.7   Across countries, at every income level, female 
labor force participation increased between 
1980 and 2008
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on International Labour Organization 2010. 
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Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the 
link comes from declines in maternal mortal-
ity. Life expectancy rose sharply in Sri Lanka 
between 1946 and 1953 as a result of declines 
in maternal mortality ratios, from 180 per 1,000 
live births to 50. Given that women had 5 chil-
dren on average, 1 in 10 women died giving 
birth before these declines—a huge risk. Using 
variation in the timing of the declines in differ-
ent parts of the country, one study shows that 
the overall declines in maternal mortality ra-
tio boosted female life expectancy by 1.5 years, 
female literacy by 1 percentage point, and female 
education by 0.17 years.32
Given that a reduction in the maternal mor-
tality ratio also reduces maternal morbidity, it 
increases the ability of women to participate in 
the labor force. Evidence from the United States 
shows that in 1920 one in six women suffered 
from a long-term disability incurred in child-
birth. A sharp decline in maternal mortality 
resulting from the discovery of sulfa drugs in 
1936 (and their immediate widespread use) 
went hand in hand with dramatic improve-
ments in health for women after childbirth. 
Improvements in the conditions of childbirth 
were the biggest force behind the rise in married 
women’s labor force participation in the United 
States between 1920 and 1950.33
Who would have thought that the fastest 
way to increase female labor force participa-
tion in the United States at the beginning of 
the 20th century would be to reduce maternal 
mortality? Households, markets, social norms, 
and formal institutions are inextricably con-
nected, and the key is to fi nd ways to stimulate 
progress in all domains. For reducing mater-
nal mortality, chapter 3 shows that income or 
household actions are less powerful than effec-
tive institutions—and public investments are 
critical.
households, in how markets operate, or in insti-
tutions (formal and informal).
New labor market opportunities can 
spur investments in education and health 
for girls
How much parents invest in their children’s 
education is partly determined by the returns to 
that education. Early studies showed that new 
agricultural technologies that favored women’s 
production increased girls’ enrollment.29 A new 
generation of studies extends these insights in a 
globalizing economy. 
For instance, the rise of outsourcing in In-
dia offers new opportunities for women in the 
wage sector and increases parental investments 
in girls’ education.30 Recruitment services that 
informed families about new employment op-
portunities for Indian women increased the 
chances of girls ages 5–15 years to be in school 
by 3 to 5 percentage points but had no effect on 
boys.31 The girls also had higher body mass in-
dex (a measure of health) and were 10 percent 
more likely to be employed in wage work. Per-
ceived improvements in the likelihood of a job 
triggered investments in human capital for girls 
even when there were no changes in other po-
tential limiting factors, such as poverty, cost, or 
distance to school. Evidence of greater returns 
was enough to stimulate greater human capital 
accumulation.
It has often been posited that cultural and 
social norms (or “informal institutions” in the 
Report’s framework) “hold back” human capi-
tal investments. So, many policy efforts try to 
change the status quo by trying to nudge norms. 
The results here present an alternative route—
expand economic opportunities, and human 
capital investments in girls will increase. Mar-
kets can affect private household decisions, even 
with slow-moving social norms.
Investing in the future 
A similar consideration—linking parental in-
vestments in education and returns down the 
line—underpins the relationship between health 
and schooling. At its starkest, lowering the risk 
of death should lead to greater human capital 
accumulation during childhood. Put simply, the 
longer you get a payout from your investment, 
the more attractive it is to make that investment. 
If the risk of dying from childbirth is high, par-
ents factor in this risk and reduce investments 
in daughters. 
What are your hopes for your daughter’s future? 
She must be bright and intelligent, educated, 
and look after this community. For my sons, 
they must be educated to take ownership of land, 
build permanent houses, and develop 
this community.
Adult woman, Papua New Guinea 
“
”
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have voted on the measure in their cloak 
rooms, it would have been killed as em-
phatically as it was fi nally passed out in 
the open. 34
Growth in public spending led to the scal-
ing up of intensive door-to-door hygiene cam-
paigns and to a sharp decline in child mortality 
by 8 to 15 percent. Roughly 20,000 child deaths 
were averted every year because women won the 
right to vote. A variant of these broad results 
has also been documented in Switzerland, with 
the additional twist that women seem to have 
become more supportive of health and welfare 
expenditures over time than men.35 For Europe, 
the results suggest that female suffrage increased 
spending on health, education, and welfare ex-
penditures over time.36
Intergenerational cycles
The links across sectors also play out over time. 
Recent studies show that, in England and the 
United States, more maternal education leads to 
a host of better outcomes for children—better 
education and better health. For children ages 
7–8, an additional year of mother’s schooling 
increases the child’s performance on a standard-
Choosing differently
 Recent fi ndings suggest that women’s rights and 
agency play a role seeing that those public invest-
ments are made. In a world where women care 
about different things from men (and women 
do appear to care for children more than men 
do), it may be that when women have more 
voice, they can drive institutional investments 
in a way that favors children. So, when women 
have more rights in the political arena, does the 
nature of public investment change? Yes. 
Recall that in the United States women won 
voting rights state by state over the 19th century 
until they were federally mandated by constitu-
tional amendment in 1920. Public health spend-
ing increased dramatically as women won the 
right to vote. The Sheppard-Towner Maternity 
and Infancy Protection Act of 1921 provided 
federal funding for maternity and child care. 
According to one observer, 
Indeed, fear of being punished at the polls 
by American women, not conviction of the 
bill’s necessity, seems to have motivated 
Congress to vote for it. As one senator ad-
mitted to a reporter from the Ladies Home 
Journal, if the members of Congress could 
F I G U R E  1.8   Who agrees that a 
university education 
is more important for a 
boy than for a girl?
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Values Surveys, 
1994–99 and 2005–07 waves.
Note: The 45° line in the fi gure above shows parity in the values on 
the vertical and horizontal axis.
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F I G U R E  1.9   Who agrees that when 
jobs are scarce, men 
should have more right to 
a job than women?
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Values Surveys, 
1994–99 and 2005–07 waves.
Note: The 45° line in the fi gure above shows parity in the values on 
the vertical and horizontal axis.
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mains of gender equality. Progress has 
been slow and limited for women in 
very poor countries, for those who are poor, 
even amid greater wealth, and for those who face 
other forms of exclusion because of their caste, 
disability, location, ethnicity, or sexual orienta-
tion. Whether for comparisons between men 
and women in the same country, or absolute 
comparisons of women across countries, the 
progress in some domains is tempered by the so-
bering realities that many women face in others.
Consider the likelihood of women dying dur-
ing childbirth in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is 
still comparable to the rate in Northern Europe 
during the 19th century. Or the difference in 
school enrollments in Nigeria, where a wealthy 
urban child averages around 10 years of school-
ing, while poor rural Hausa girls average less 
than 6 months.1 Or the fact that women remain 
severely disadvantaged in their control over re-
sources and assets in the household. Or that the 
earnings differentials between men and women 
have not changed much. Or that women’s rep-
resentation in policy making remains far lower 
than men’s. Or that domestic violence contin-
ues to exact a heavy toll on women around the 
world—regardless of individual or country in-
come, women continue to be the primary vic-
tims of violence at home and to suffer more 
severe injuries. 
Where is progress absent?
• Severely disadvantaged populations. Across 
and within countries, gender gaps widen at 
lower incomes, and, in the poorest economies, 
gender gaps are larger. The benefi ts of eco-
The persistence of gender inequality
2CHAPTER
We are not educated. We don’t
know anything and do not know 
how we can be able to change 
our life and obtain power and 
freedom.
Adult woman, rural Afghanistan
“
”
There is no such thing as equality between men and women in this community, 
maybe in towns and urban areas, but not here! A man is always above 
the woman. 
Adult man, rural South Africa
Women just started entering society, so the man is still trying to maintain 
his control. 
Adult man, West Bank and Gaza
“
”
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school. The Republic of Yemen has one of the 
world’s largest gender disparities in net enroll-
ment rates, and progress has been diffi cult to 
sustain.2 School enrollments for girls 5–19 years 
old in Mali are equivalent to those in the United 
States around 1810 (fi gure 2.1). 
Gender disparities have also lingered among 
groups that have not benefi ted from growth 
within countries: income poverty widens gen-
der gaps. While the educational attainment of 
nomic growth have not accrued equally to all 
men and all women for some parts of society. 
Household poverty can mute the impact of 
national development, and the differences are 
often compounded by other means of social 
exclusion, such as geography and ethnicity. 
• “Sticky” domains. Improvements in some do-
mains of gender equality—such as those re-
lated to occupational differences or partici-
pation in policy making—are bound by 
constraints that do not shift with economic 
growth and development. Gender disparities 
endure even in high-income economies de-
spite the large gains in women’s civil and 
 economic rights in the past century. These 
outcomes are the result of slow-moving in-
stitutional dynamics and deep structural fac-
tors that growth alone cannot address. 
• Reversals. External shocks—sometimes eco-
nomic, sometimes political, sometimes insti-
tutional—can erase hard-earned gains. In 
some instances, improvements in gender 
equality have been reversed in the face of un-
expected shocks that revealed or worsened 
institutional or market failures. The shocks 
affect both males and females, but multiple 
factors shape their impact on gender differen-
tials—among them, the source and type of 
shock, economic and institutional structures, 
and social norms. Even when shocks do not 
have differential gender impacts, the absolute 
welfare losses for both men (and boys) and 
women (and girls) can be substantial. In par-
ticular, adverse circumstances early in life, as 
in the critical fi rst three years, can have irre-
versible long-term effects. 
SEVERELY DISADVANTAGED 
POPULATIONS 
While much of the world has reduced gender 
gaps in health and education, conditions for 
women in some low-income countries have not 
improved much. In many South Asian and Sub-
Saharan countries, girls’ enrollments in primary 
and secondary education have progressed little. 
In Eritrea, the female primary net enrollment 
rate rose from a very low base of 16 percent in 
1990 to just 36 percent in 2008. In Afghanistan, 
Chad, and the Central African Republic, there 
are fewer than 70 girls per 100 boys in primary 
Money. And someone who would 
convince my dad to let me continue 
my education. . . . If I had enough 
money, I would enroll somewhere as a 
part-time student. You have to pay for 
every exam.
Young woman, Serbia 
“
”
F I G U R E  2.1   Female enrollments remain strikingly low in some 
countries
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tends to be small—as in Uzbekistan or Viet-
nam—gender differences also tend to be small.
The disadvantage for girls tends to be more 
pronounced and to emerge earlier than for boys. 
A girl in the poorest fi fth of the population in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo studies three 
fewer years than a poor boy. And a cumulative 
gender bias against girls builds over the edu-
cational life cycle. In 2008, there were only 66 
female tertiary students for every 100 male stu-
dents in Sub-Saharan Africa and 76 in South 
Asia.3 Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region 
where growth in male tertiary enrollment has 
outpaced female enrollment growth, especially 
for doctoral degrees.
The gaps between rich and poor are the same 
in health. Lower fertility rates imply that fewer 
women are exposed to the risk of childbirth, 
and reductions in parity (the number of times 
a woman has given birth) and the age-structure 
of births have accounted for a sizable fraction 
of declines in the lifetime risk of death from 
maternal causes.4 Although fertility rates have 
wealthy boys and girls is very similar, gender 
inequalities are intensifi ed among the poor. In 
India, the median boy and girl ages 15–19 in the 
wealthiest fi fth of the population reach grade 10, 
but the median boy in the bottom fi fth reaches 
only grade 6, and the median girl only grade 1. 
Across countries there is little gender disadvan-
tage for the wealthiest: households in the top in-
come quintile tend to achieve full gender parity 
in education. 
Poor girls face a signifi cant schooling dis-
advantage in much of Africa and South Asia, a 
disadvantage that increases at lower incomes, as 
in Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
The Gambia, and Togo (fi gure 2.2). Yet the 
opposite can be observed elsewhere—in Ban-
gladesh, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, the 
Philippines, and the República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela, girls at low levels of wealth tend to 
stay longer in school than boys (fi gure 2.3). Re-
gardless of whether the gender gap favors boys 
or girls at low household incomes, in countries 
where the difference between rich and poor 
F I G U R E  2.2   In some countries, female disadvantage augments at lower incomes …
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on EdAttain.
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ethnic minorities are poorer and less urban than 
the general population. An estimated two-thirds 
of girls out of school globally belong to ethnic 
minorities in their countries.6 In Guatemala, the 
illiteracy rate among indigenous women stands 
at 60 percent, 20 percentage points above indig-
enous males and twice that of nonindigenous fe-
males.7 For ethnic minorities in Vietnam, more 
than 60 percent of childbirths take place with-
out prenatal care, twice the rate for the majority 
Kinh. More urban ethnic minority groups and 
groups not concentrated in poor regions tend to 
experience smaller differences with the major-
ity populations. In China, rural ethnic minority 
groups have less access to education and health 
than the more urban Han, Hui, and Manchu, 
but the school enrollment and health insurance 
gaps narrow in urban areas.8
Other factors of exclusion, such as caste, dis-
ability, or sexual orientation, also tend to com-
pound disadvantages in ways that affect devel-
opment outcomes. More research is needed to 
better understand these links. 
dropped dramatically in all regions since 1960, 
they have been rising in many Sub-Saharan 
countries. In Nigeria, the total fertility rate rose 
from 4.7 children in 1999 to 5.7 in 2008.5 
As in education, household wealth makes a 
difference. In all countries, fertility rates for the 
poor are higher than for the rich (fi gure 2.4). 
Yet at low fertility (typically in richer coun-
tries), the differences between the bottom and 
the top quintiles tend to be small—on the order 
of 0.5 to 1 live birth. At higher fertility (usually 
in poor countries), the differences widen. In 
Zambia, the average fertility of a woman in the 
poorest quintile is 8.5 children (the highest in 
the world), but for a woman in the richest fi fth, 
it is just over 3.
In addition to household wealth, ethnicity 
and geography are important for understand-
ing and addressing gender inequality. Even in 
countries that have grown rapidly, poor and 
ethnic minority women tend to benefi t far less 
than their richer and ethnic majority counter-
parts. So, wide gender disparities endure. Many 
F I G U R E  2.3   … yet in others, at low levels of wealth girls stay longer in school than boys
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on EdAttain.
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control over resources, women’s political voice, 
or the incidence of domestic violence. 
In some cases, individual preferences, mar-
ket failures, institutional constraints, and so-
cial norms continue to reinforce gender gaps 
despite economic progress. Income growth 
may also have unexpected adverse effects on 
gender equality through new gendered prefer-
ences. In other cases, development outcomes 
have not always refl ected extensive formal 
gains in securing equal rights. Despite notable 
improvement in expanding legal guarantees to 
women and men alike, slow implementation 
has impeded a move into gender parity. Social 
norms continue to bind to varying degrees in 
all nations, and a chasm remains between the-
ory and practice. 
Economic growth can even temporarily ag-
gravate gender differentials in some countries. 
In China, new opportunities for rural industrial 
wage work led families initially to favor the ju-
nior secondary education of males, considerably 
widening the gender gap in the 1980s.9 But as 
the economy continued to grow, girls rapidly 
caught up with boys in the 1990s. Sub-Saharan 
Africa is in the midst of a signifi cant expansion 
of secondary education. As in China, more Af-
rican boys than girls attended secondary school 
between 1999 and 2008, deepening the gender 
gaps. In 2008, there were 79 girls for every 100 
boys, down from 83 girls per 100 boys in 1999. 
Indeed, girls face signifi cant barriers to second-
ary school entry, but enrollment rates tend to be 
low all around. 
In some cases, these gaps work against boys. 
Everywhere in the world, repetition and, to a 
lesser extent, dropout rates are higher among 
boys than among girls. Some upper-middle-
income and advanced economies are concerned 
about male underachievement in education—
girls outperforming boys academically. In the 
United States and Israel, girls obtain better grades 
in all major school subjects, including math and 
science.10 In France, women are the majority in 
enrollments at the elite Grandes Ecoles de Com-
merce (business schools).11 Male underperfor-
mance in higher education usually is not rooted 
in social exclusion, but men can also be subject 
to cultural norms that steer them away from 
academic achievement. Identifying education as 
primarily a “female” endeavor means that young 
men in several Caribbean nations, such as Dom-
inica and Jamaica, withdraw from school.12 
“STICKY” DOMAINS, DESPITE 
ECONOMIC PROGRESS
In two areas, income growth has brought only 
modest and gradual progress toward gender 
equality in most developing countries: female 
mortality and access to economic opportunities. 
And gender gaps have not narrowed in women’s 
F I G U R E  2.4   At low incomes, fertility rates remain high—And 
the poorer the country, the larger the gap between 
rich and poor 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys.
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in China, India, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
other countries—notably some post-transi-
tion economies—excess male mortality has 
become serious.
Over the past three decades, some aspects 
of the problem remained the same, while oth-
ers changed dramatically. Skewed sex ratios at 
birth were identifi ed in the early 1990s,14 and 
as prenatal sex determination spreads and fer-
tility declines, the problem has become worse. 
Excess female mortality is slowly shifting from 
early childhood in South Asia to adulthood in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, declining in all low-income 
countries except in Sub-Saharan Africa (see 
chapter 3).
Missing girls at birth and excess 
female mortality
Sex ratios at birth and mortality across coun-
tries in 1990, 2000, and 2008 reveal continuing 
disadvantages for women in many low- and 
middle-income countries (and disadvantages 
for men in some regions for specifi c reasons). 
First, the problem of skewed sex-ratios at 
birth in China and India (and in some coun-
tries in the Caucasus and the Western Bal-
kans) remains unresolved (table 2.1). Popula-
tion estimates suggest that an additional 1.4 
million girls would have been born (mostly in 
China and India) if sex ratios at birth in these 
countries resembled those found worldwide. 
Second, compared with developed economies, 
the rate at which women die relative to men in 
low- and middle-income countries is higher 
in many regions of the world.13 Overall, miss-
ing girls at birth and excess female mortality 
under age 60 totaled an estimated 3.9 million 
women in 2008—85 percent of them were 
East Asia and Pacific (excluding China)
China
India
Sub-Saharan Africa
High HIV-prevalence countries
Low HIV-prevalence countries
South Asia (excluding India)
Middle East and North Africa
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Total
girls at birth girls under 5 girls 5–14 women 15–49 women 50–59
   1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008  1990 2008  1990  2008
Total
women
under 60
 1990 2008
 890 1,092 259 71 21 5 208 56 92 30 1,470 1,254
 265 257 428 251 94 45 388 228 81 75 1,255 856
 42 53 183 203 61 77 302 751 50 99 639 1,182
 0 0 6 39 5 18 38 328 4 31 53 416
 42 53 177 163 57 59 264 423 46 68 586 766
 0 1 99 72 32 20 176 161 37 51 346 305
 3 4 14 7 14 9 137 113 48 46 216 179
 5 6 13 7 4 1 43 24 15 15 80 52
 7 14 3 1 0 0 12 4 4 3 27 23
 0 0 11 5 3 1 20 10 17 17 51 33
 1,212 1,427 1,010 617 230 158 1,286 1,347 343 334 4,082 3,882
TA B L E  2.1   Missing girls at birth increased between 1990 and 2008 in India and China, as did excess 
female mortality in adulthood in Sub-Saharan Africa
 Excess female deaths in the world, by age and region, 1990 and 2008
 (thousands)
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Health Organization 2010 and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aff airs 2009.
Note: Totals do not necessarily add up because of rounding.
My sister gave birth when she was 14 
and died.
Young woman, the Republic of Yemen
“ ”
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tries, with only 1,900 maternal deaths.17 One of 
every 10 women in Afghanistan and 1 of every 
14 in Somalia and Chad die from maternal 
causes, and a much larger fraction suffer long-
term health issues stemming from complica-
tions during and after childbirth.
Progress in maternal mortality has not kept 
up with GDP growth. During 2000–08, the econ-
omies of Chad and Tanzania grew at impressive 
annual rates of 9.4 percent and 7 percent, but 
maternal mortality declined by a mere 8 percent 
(to 1,200 per 100,000 live births) in Chad and 
by 14 percent (to 790) in Tanzania. South Africa 
grew at a modest 4 percent annually during the 
same period, and maternal mortality increased
by 8 percent to 410 per 100,000 births—a mani-
festation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Since 1990, 
both India and Equatorial Guinea had declines 
of 41 percent in their maternal mortality ratios, 
which fell to similar levels in 2008, but the two 
countries had radically different growth trajec-
tories—a mere 3 percent a year in Equatorial 
Guinea compared with a solid 8 percent in In-
dia. Driving the high maternal mortality rates 
in many countries are poor obstetric health ser-
vices and high fertility rates. Income growth and 
changes in household behavior alone appear 
insuffi cient to reduce maternal mortality; pub-
lic investments are key to improving maternal 
health care services.
The disadvantage against unborn girls is 
widespread in many parts of Asia and in some 
countries in the Caucasus (such as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan), where the intersection of a prefer-
ence for sons, declining fertility, and new tech-
nology increases the missing girls at birth. In 
China and India, sex ratios at birth point to a 
heavily skewed pattern in favor of boys. Where 
parents continue to favor sons over daughters, 
a gender bias in sex-selective abortions, female 
infanticide, and neglect is believed to account 
for millions of missing girls at birth. In 2008 
alone, an estimated 1 million girls in China and 
250,000 girls in India were missing at birth.18
The abuse of new technologies for sex-selective 
abortions—such as cheap mobile ultrasound 
clinics—accounted for much of this shortfall, 
despite laws against such practices in many 
nations, such as India and China.19 Economic 
prosperity will continue to increase amniocen-
tesis and ultrasound services throughout the de-
veloping world, possibly enabling the diffusion 
of sex-selective abortions where son-preferences 
exist.20
What accounts for these patterns? Chapter 3 
provides a deeper discussion, but two issues are 
highlighted here: maternal mortality and the 
preference for sons. The female disadvantage in 
mortality during the reproductive ages is in part 
driven by the risk of death in pregnancy and 
childbirth and associated long-term disabilities.15
Although maternal mortality ratios have fallen 
by 34 percent since 1990, they remain high in 
many parts of the world: Sub-Saharan Africa had 
the highest ratio in 2008 at 640 maternal deaths 
per 100,000 live births, followed by South Asia 
(280), Oceania (230), and Southeast Asia (160).16
Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, and Indonesia 
have maternal mortality ratios comparable to 
Sweden’s around 1900, and Afghanistan’s is simi-
lar to Sweden’s in the 17th century (fi gure 2.5). 
These high mortality ratios translate into 
large absolute numbers of maternal deaths, es-
pecially where fertility rates remain high. In 
2008, there were 63,000 maternal deaths in India 
and 203,000 (more than half of the total) in Sub-
Saharan Africa, in stark contrast to rich coun-
F I G U R E  2.5   Maternal mortality in many developing countries 
is similar to that in Sweden before 1900
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Health Organization and others 2010.
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formal businesses, often out of their homes. Of 
industrial homeworkers in some developing 
countries, such as Chile and Thailand, 80 per-
cent are women.24 Because of the nature of these 
businesses, female owners are concentrated in 
the smallest fi rms—smaller in employees, sales, 
costs, and the value of physical capital. They also 
have lower profi ts than male-owned fi rms. In 
Latin America, average profi ts are between 15 
and 20 percent of a standard deviation lower for 
female than for male-owned fi rms.25
Third, even within the formal and informal 
sectors, women and men choose very different 
jobs (fi gure 2.7). Women are more likely to be 
in communal and public services, retail services, 
and trade. Men are overrepresented in danger-
ous professions—such as mining, construction, 
transport, and heavy manufacturing—with high 
occupational injury rates in poor and rich coun-
tries alike. The burdens of defense and maintain-
ing public order also fall heavily on men. These 
patterns are similar across countries and regions, 
and, if anything, they are accentuated at higher 
incomes.
These preferences do not appear to change 
easily. Even among later children of South and 
Southeast Asian immigrants in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, the 
share of male births remains unusually high.21
This does not imply that change is impos-
sible: The Republic of Korea’s male-female sex 
ratio under age fi ve was once the highest in 
Asia, but it peaked in the mid-1990s and then 
reversed—a link to societal shifts in normative 
values stemming from industrialization and 
urbanization.22 
In a smaller set of countries, there are also 
missing men. In Eritrea in the 1990s, a large 
number of young men went missing due to con-
fl ict. In some countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, violence may have contributed to ex-
cess deaths among young males. In Eastern Eu-
rope and Central Asia, a much larger number of 
men are missing in middle age, and this excess 
male mortality has been linked to the preva-
lence of types of conduct deemed more socially 
acceptable among men, such as alcohol use and 
other risky behavior. 
Men and women are not paid the 
same daily wages. If men get Nu 200, 
then women get only Nu 150 for 
doing the same work. It is not fair or 
just.
Adult woman, Bhutan 
“
”
F I G U R E  2.6   Women are more likely 
than men to work in the 
informal sector 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on International Labour 
Organization 2010. 
Note: Most recent year available between 1999 and 2006.
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Different work, less pay
Men and women work in different industries 
and occupations in developed and developing 
nations. But as chapter 1 showed, although more 
women are working outside the home in almost 
all countries, they are clustered into selected 
parts of the “economic space,” with little change 
over time, even in high-income countries. Three 
markers of the segregated workspace are partic-
ularly striking. First, women are more likely to 
engage in low productivity activities than men 
and to work in the informal sector (fi gure 2.6). 
Women are more likely to be wage workers and 
unpaid family workers than men, to have less 
mobility between the formal and informal sec-
tors, and to transition more between the infor-
mal sector and being out of the labor force.23
Second, among the self-employed, women 
outside agriculture tend to operate small in-
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Housework and care are still a 
woman’s domain
One domain where gender differences appear to 
be particularly persistent is the allocation of time 
to housework and care. Over time and across 
countries, irrespective of income, women bear 
disproportionate responsibility for housework 
and care, while men are mostly responsible for 
market work. These differences, deeply rooted 
in gender roles, reduce women’s leisure, wel-
fare, and well-being. An immediate outcome of 
these different domestic responsibilities is that 
men and women have very different patterns 
of time use and different amounts of leisure. 
These patterns have implications for women’s 
ability to invest in education (chapter 3), their 
agency (chapter 4), and their ability to take up 
economic opportunities (chapter 5), and to 
participate more broadly in economic, political, 
and social life (chapters 4 and 6). 
In six countries—with widely different in-
comes, economic structures, and social norms—
the patterns are remarkably similar (fi gure 2.8). 
Everywhere, women devote 1 to 3 hours more a 
day to housework than men; 2 to 10 times the 
amount of time a day to care (of children, el-
derly, and the sick), and 1 to 4 hours less a day to 
market activities. These are averages for all men 
and women, and the differences are accentuated 
with family formation. As chapter 5 describes, 
marriage signifi cantly increases the time de-
voted to housework for women but not for men. 
Children signifi cantly increase the time spent on 
care by both men and women but more so for 
women.
Time use for women and men converge as 
income and education increase, mainly because 
women become more like men (increasing their 
hours devoted to market work and decreasing the 
Such gender-differentiated patterns con-
tribute to the persistence of sizable gender gaps 
in earnings. Differences in average wages by 
gender range from 20 percent in Mozambique 
and Pakistan to more than 80 percent in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Jordan, Latvia, and the Slovak Repub-
lic. The gaps are slowly diminishing, partly be-
cause of improvements in education among 
women relative to men, differences in the con-
centration of women in some sectors and oc-
cupations, and shifts in work experience pat-
terns and career interruptions linked to greater 
control over fertility.26
F I G U R E  2.7   Women and men work in different sectors (and 
different occupations)
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from LABORSTA Labor Statistics Database, International 
Labour Organization. 
Note: Totals do not necessarily add up due to rounding.
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Women need more free time, women are more tired than men. . . . They take care of the 
house, of the children. While men, they are the entire day at work and don’t have to 
take care of the house. And if the woman has a job also, then she gets even more tired.
Adult woman, Moldova
These days, for a woman to be rated as a ‘good wife’ one has to be a superwoman, 
working very hard both at home and in the offi  ce, fulfi lling every demand of your 
family members as if we don’t have any right to enjoy.
Adult woman, Bhutan
“
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income or family spending refl ects their con-
trol over their own lives and their immediate 
environment. Second, trends in domestic vio-
lence capture intrahousehold gender dynamics 
and asymmetric power relations between men 
and women. Third, patterns in political voice 
can measure inclusiveness in decision making, 
exercise of leadership, and access to power. 
hours to housework and care), not because men 
take up more housework and care (chapter 5).
Less voice and less power
Some dimensions of gender equality where 
progress has been slowest fall in the domain of 
women’s agency. Consider three aspects. First, 
women’s ability to make decisions about earned 
F I G U R E  2.8   Across the world, women spend more hours each day on housework 
and care than men … and men spend more time in market activities
Source: Berniell and Sánchez-Páramo 2011.
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in some developing countries, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, are not involved 
in household decisions about spending their 
personal earned income. As many as 34 percent 
of married women in Malawi and 28 percent of 
women in the Democratic Republic of Congo are 
not involved in decisions about spending their 
earnings. And 18 percent of married women in 
India and 14 percent in Nepal are largely silent 
on how their earned money is spent.27 
Husbands have more control over their 
wives’ earning at lower incomes. In Turkey, only 
2 percent of married women in the richest fi fth 
of the population have no control over earned 
cash income, a proportion that swells to 28 per-
cent in the poorest fi fth. In Malawi, 13 percent 
of married women in the richest fi fth have no 
control, compared with 46 percent in the poor-
est fi fth (fi gure 2.9).
Less control over resources and spending is 
partly a refl ection of large differences between 
men and women in the assets they own. Assets 
are typically inherited, acquired at marriage, or 
accumulated over the lifetime through earnings 
and saving. As shown above and explored fur-
ther in chapter 5, women typically earn less than 
men, particularly when aggregated over the life 
cycle. This disparity directly affects their ability 
to save, irrespective of male-female differences 
in savings behavior. And as chapter 4 explores, 
inheritance and property rights often apply dif-
ferently to men and women so that gender dis-
parities in access to physical capital and assets 
remain large and signifi cant. Land makes up the 
largest share of household assets, particularly 
for the poorest and rural households.28 Women 
own as little as 11 percent of land in Brazil and 
27 percent in Paraguay. And their holdings are 
smaller than those of men. In Kenya, as little as 5 
percent of registered landholders are women.29 
In Ghana, the mean size of men’s landholdings 
was three times that of women’s.30 
In many countries, land ownership remains 
restricted to men only, both by tradition and by 
law. In most African countries and about half 
of Asian countries, customary and statutory 
Less control over resources
Many women have no say over household fi -
nances, even their own earnings. The Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys show that women 
F I G U R E  2.9   Who controls women’s own income? 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys.
women in richest quintile
all women, average
women in poorest quintile
Ukraine
Colombia
Honduras
Moldova
Peru
Haiti
Niger
Indonesia
Bolivia
Benin
Morocco
Madagascar
Philippines
Swaziland
Cambodia
Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville)
Dominican Republic
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Zimbabwe
Armenia
Ghana
Chad
Azerbaijan
Mali
Guinea
Kenya
Cameroon
Lesotho
Turkey
Namibia
Bangladesh
Nepal
Uganda
Nigeria
India
Mozambique
Zambia
Rwanda
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Malawi
0 5 10 15 20 25
% of women not involved in decisions about their own income
30 35 40 45










































Some working women don’t even know how much they get paid for their job because 
their husbands cash their salary for them.
Adult man, West Bank and Gaza
“ ”
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food and 59 percent for arguing with their hus-
bands (fi gure 2.10).
The prevalence of domestic violence varies 
greatly across rich and poor countries. Physical 
laws disadvantage women in land ownership. 
According to customary law in some parts of 
Africa, women cannot acquire land titles with-
out a husband’s authorization.31 Marriage is the 
most common avenue for women to gain ac-
cess to land. But husbands usually own it, while 
wives only have claim to its use. While property 
rights for women have slowly begun to improve 
in some countries, legislation has often proved 
insuffi cient to change observed practices. 
More vulnerable to violence at home
Physical, sexual, and psychological violence 
against women is endemic across the world. 
A fl agrant violation of basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, violence can take 
many forms. International statistics are not al-
ways comparable, yet incontrovertible evidence 
shows that violence against women is a global 
concern.32 
Women are at far greater risk than men of 
violence by an intimate partner or somebody 
they know than from violence by other people. 
According to South African data, for example, 
teachers were the most common perpetrators 
of the rape of girls under age 15 (one-third of 
cases).33 About 50 percent of female homicides 
in South Africa were perpetuated by an intimate 
partner. The mortality rate from intimate part-
ner violence there is estimated at 8.8 per 100,000 
women.34 Overall, women are more likely than 
men to be killed, seriously injured, or victims of 
sexual violence from intimate partners.35 
The number of countries with laws regulat-
ing intimate partner violence has risen. In 2006, 
60 countries had specifi c legislation to address 
domestic violence, up from 45 in 2003, and 89 
had some form of legal provision. Many of these 
are higher-income countries; most developing 
countries with laws against intimate partner vi-
olence are in Southeast Asia and Latin America. 
Yet in many nations, violence against women 
is perceived as acceptable or justifi able. On aver-
age, 29 percent of women in countries with data 
concurred that wife beating was justifi ed for ar-
guing with the husband, 25 percent for refusing 
to have sex, and 21 percent for burning food. In 
Guinea, 60 percent of women found it permis-
sible to be beaten for refusing to have sex with 
their spouses. In Ethiopia, 81 percent of women 
say that it is justifi ed for a husband to beat his 
wife for at least one of the reasons listed in the 
Demographic and Health Surveys; 61 percent 
reported violence to be appropriate for burning 
I think that women are now a problem: they 
get money and they no longer listen to us. 
So, if you want to continue being a man in the 
house, you need to bring the discipline. You 
must beat her up, and if any child intervenes, 
you also beat them. Then they all fear and 
respect you.
Adult man, Tanzania
“
”
F I G U R E  2.10  Perceptions in many nations are that wife-
 beating is justifi able
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys.
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Men can also be victims. Domestic violence 
against them is more circumscribed than against 
women, in incidence, nature, and severity. Ac-
cording to the National Crime Victimization 
Survey in the United States, intimate partner 
violence affected 4.1 females per 1,000—more 
than half a million women—and 0.9 males per 
1,000—117,000 men—in 2009. So men were a 
fi fth as likely to be victims of domestic abuse 
as women. In England and Wales, about two 
in fi ve domestic violence victims between 2004 
and 2009 were men. Based on data from the 
British Crime Survey, about 4.0 percent of men 
(4.8 percent of women) reported suffering part-
ner abuse in the past 12 months, an estimated 
600,000 male victims.38 
Less likely to hold political offi ce
Few nations have legal restrictions for women to 
run for public offi ce, yet the number of women 
holding parliamentary seats is very low, and 
progress in the last 15 years has been slow. In 
1995, women accounted for about 10 percent 
of members of the lower or single houses of na-
tional parliaments, and in 2009, 17 percent.39 In 
Africa and most of Asia, the number of female 
parliamentarians more than doubled. Also dur-
ing the last 15 years, the number of countries 
with at least 30 percent women as parliamen-
tarians rose from 5 to 23—including 7 from 
Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Argentina, Cuba, 
Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
Rwanda’s parliament has 56 percent women, up 
from 17 percent in 1995. East Asia registered the 
least progress, and the number of women par-
liamentarians in particular is low in the Pacifi c 
Islands. 
Although men and women are equally likely 
to exercise their political voice by voting, men 
are often perceived to be superior in exercising 
political power. Responses to the World Values 
Surveys over several years point to a general 
positive evolution of views on gender equality 
in politics in the last decade (fi gure 2.12). But 
people continue to view men as “better” politi-
cal and economic leaders than women. 
And men have better chances than women of 
winning an election. The likelihood of a female 
candidate winning a parliamentary seat over a 
man is estimated to be 0.87 (with 1 signifying 
that men and women are equally likely to suc-
ceed in an electoral contest), with considerable 
variation across countries. Women have greater 
or sexual abuse by an intimate partner within 
the last 12 months was most prevalent in Ethio-
pia (Butajira) and Peru (Cusco), involving 54 
and 34 percent of women respectively. At the 
other extreme, Japan (Yokohama) and Serbia 
(Belgrade) are below the 4 percent mark (fi g-
ure 2.11). In many instances, the violence can 
be grave. In Peru (Cusco), almost 50 percent of 
women are victims of severe physical violence 
during their lifetime.36 And even with low in-
cidence, the numbers are unacceptably high. A 
3 percent domestic abuse incidence rate for Po-
land is equivalent to 534,000 women in one year, 
or 1,463 new women a day.37 
Domestic violence knows no boundaries, 
but incidence rates tend to rise with socioeco-
nomic deprivation. Reported across all eco-
nomic groupings, it is usually most prevalent 
among economically disadvantaged women. 
Women’s low social and economic status can be 
both a cause and a consequence of domestic vi-
olence. Low educational attainment, economic 
duress, and substance abuse are among the many 
compounding factors for abusive behavior.
F I G U R E  2.11  There is great 
heterogeneity in rates 
of domestic violence 
reported across nations
Source: World Health Organization 2005.
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percent in 1998. Higher female participation in 
cabinet positions can be observed in every re-
gion, especially in Western Europe, Southern 
Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
In 1998, women occupied more than 20 percent 
of ministerial posts in only 13 countries, but 63 
countries 10 years later. In 2008, Chile, Finland, 
France, Grenada, Norway, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland had cabinets with 
more than 40 percent female ministers.41 
REVERSALS
The gender disadvantages discussed in this 
chapter form the backbone for the analysis 
in the remainder of the report—and the poli-
cies advanced to mitigate them. In contrast to 
these facets of gender relations, where there is 
often a clear pathway for analysis, the gendered 
impact of external shocks, which can gener-
ate large losses in welfare and well-being, de-
pends on many specifi c circumstances. In some 
cases, men or boys are worse affected; in others, 
women and girls. The impact of shocks can be 
temporary, with large losses in welfare after the 
shock followed by subsequent catch-up.42 But 
some shocks, especially when they hit early in 
life (as in the critical fi rst three years) can also 
have irreversible consequences. Outlined here is 
the multifaceted nature of external shocks and 
their impacts. The message: protection against 
shocks should be a key part of any development 
policy, and whether a gendered lens is appropri-
ate depends on context.
Whether the source is fi nancial, political, or 
natural (box 2.1), shocks and hazards can affect 
men and women differently, a function of their 
distinct social roles and status. First, market fail-
ures, institutional constraints, and social norms 
can amplify or mute gender differences in the 
impact of shocks. The mechanisms that produce 
these outcomes are multiple. For example, the 
higher mortality rates for girls and women in 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami have been re-
lated to their more limited mobility caused by 
restrictive clothing and caring for small chil-
dren.43 Second, those failures, constraints, and 
norms can amplify or mute gender differences in 
the vulnerability to shocks. The fact that women 
tend to own and control fewer assets than men, 
for example, can make them more vulnerable to 
expected income shocks. 
chances of prevailing over men in Africa. In con-
trast, in Asia and high-income countries, wom-
en’s chances drop considerably. Women are least 
likely to win elections in the Pacifi c Islands and 
Latin America and the Caribbean.40
Quotas and reservations have helped expand 
female parliamentary representation. Ninety 
countries have some quota mechanism for par-
liamentary representation, whether in seat reser-
vation, candidate quota legislation, or voluntary 
political party quotas. Sixteen countries, all in 
Africa and Asia, explicitly reserve parliamentary 
seats for women. In others, such as Finland, there 
has been little change. For instance, 38.5 percent 
of newly elected members of parliament in Fin-
land in 1991 were women, and by 2011, this 
share had increased marginally to 42.5 percent.
Women’s participation in cabinets, regard-
less of the structure and size, has also lagged. 
The proportion of women among ministers 
was on average 17 percent in 2008, up from 8 
F I G U R E  2.12  Men are perceived as 
better political leaders 
than women
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Values Surveys, 
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economic contraction is 7.4 deaths per 1,000 for 
girls, fi ve times the 1.5 for boys.45 With proper 
nourishment, older children and adults can usu-
ally compensate for nutritional defi cits during a 
shock.
In contrast, the impact of economic crises 
on associated risky behavior, morbidity, and 
mortality tends to be greater for men. The sud-
den political and economic transformation in 
Eastern Europe fueled a sharp and unexpected 
drop in male life expectancy. In many countries 
in the region, particularly the Russian Federa-
tion, men bear a greater share of the burden of 
ill health. Premature male mortality has been 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the unmar-
ried population. Women outlive men by nine 
years on average—a gap larger than in the rest 
of world. The rise in male mortality is partly 
related to increased risky behavior, including 
smoking and alcoholism.46 In Russia, a recent 
survey shows that 19 percent of men, but only 
1 percent of women, were classifi ed as problem 
drinkers.47 Stress owing to the absence of eco-
nomic activities (challenging traditional gender 
roles of men as breadwinners) and weak family 
or social support networks are linked to the de-
clines in male health.48
When families experience an income shock, 
girls’ education suffers more than boys’ in some 
countries but not in others. Girls in Turkey were 
more likely than boys to drop out of school in 
response to lower household budgets.49 And in 
Indonesia, girls were more likely to be pulled out 
in response to crop losses.50 Vulnerability to ex-
ternal shocks is particularly important because 
interruptions in schooling can increase the risk 
of dropping out, and lags and delays in school 
progression can have a permanent impact on 
overall grade attainment. In Ethiopia, girls ages 
7−14 are 69 percentage points more likely to be 
in school if they attended school in the previ-
ous period, and boys 21 percentage points more 
likely.51
But boys may also be pulled out of school 
during an economic shock, usually to bolster 
household fi nances. When low-skilled work op-
portunities are available, boys more than girls 
are very likely to be used to complement dwin-
dling family income. While Ethiopian boys have 
generally enjoyed greater access to schooling, 
in times of economic crisis they have also been 
the fi rst to be withdrawn from school to work.52 
And in Côte d’Ivoire, while enrollments of both 
Two areas where shocks can generate signifi -
cant reversals are in education and health out-
comes and in access to economic opportunities. 
Reversals in education and health
The health of infant girls tends to fare worse 
as a result of negative income shocks. Under-
nutrition during gestation or infancy and de-
clines in health-care-seeking behavior increase 
mortality and morbidity risks in later life. In 
India, the mortality of girls rises signifi cantly as 
a result of macroeconomic crises, but boys ap-
pear to be better protected.44 A study of 59 de-
veloping countries suggests similar results. The 
average increase in infant mortality during an 
Climate change results in more frequent droughts and fl oods and more vari-
able rainfall. A rising fraction of the world population is aff ected by climatic 
shocks and natural disasters as a result of their greater frequencies and larger 
numbers of people in disaster-prone areas. Cold days, cold nights, and frosts 
have become less frequent, while the frequency and intensity of heat waves 
have increased. Both fl oods and droughts are occurring more often. The interi-
ors of continents have tended to dry out despite an overall increase in total 
precipitation. Globally, precipitation has increased, with the water cycle sped 
up by warmer temperatures, even as the Sahel and Mediterranean regions have 
more frequent and more intense droughts. Heavy rainfall and fl oods have 
become more common, and there is evidence that the intensity of storms and 
tropical cyclones has increased.
Women appear more vulnerable in the face of natural disasters, with the 
impacts strongly linked to poverty. A recent study of 141 countries found that 
more women than men die from natural hazards. Where the socioeconomic 
status of women is high, men and women die in roughly equal numbers during 
and after natural hazards, whereas more women than men die (or die at a 
younger age) where the socioeconomic status of women is low. Women and 
children are more likely to die than men during disasters. The largest numbers 
of fatalities during the Asian Tsunami were women and children under age 15. 
By contrast, 54 percent of those who died in Nicaragua as a direct result from 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998 were male.
Erratic weather can also aff ect agricultural productivity, which can reduce 
the income and food of households. The reductions in food availability may not 
aff ect all household members equally. And temperature and precipitation fl uc-
tuations may aff ect the prevalence of vector-borne, water-borne, and water-
washed diseases, as well as determine heat or cold stress. 
Men and women may be aff ected diff erently by changing weather. House-
hold evidence from rural India and Mexico suggests that this may be indeed 
the case, but the impact and direction depend on the climatic shock and envi-
ronmental context. In some locations in Mexico, rural girls can have lower 
height-for-age than boys after a positive rainfall shock or a negative tempera-
ture shock. Yet girls in high-altitude areas have higher height-for-age than boys 
as a result of warmer weather.
B OX  2.1  The many faces of climate change
Sources: Jacoby, Safi r, and Skoufi as 2011; Neumayer and Plümper 2007; Skoufi as, Vinha, and Conroy 2011; 
World Bank 2009.
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bor force, while younger, more educated women 
from wealthier households often exit the labor 
market in response to economic crises. The im-
pact of crises on women’s labor force participa-
tion has often been the strongest in the informal 
or unregulated sectors of the economy, which 
more readily absorb additional women in petty 
commerce or domestic service.58
The direction of labor market impacts and 
their gender differences depend on the nature 
of the macroeconomic shock. Export-oriented 
industries, such as light manufacturing, were 
the initial casualties in the most recent fi nancial 
crisis. Higher female participation rates in these 
fi elds led to strong fi rst-round negative em-
ployment effects for women. But lower female 
participation rates in sectors that shrank in the 
crisis, such as construction, or industries depen-
dent on external demand, such as tourism, im-
plied that the aggregate employment effects for 
women relative to men were muted once these 
second-round effects are taken into account. 
In Latvia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Ukraine, 
men tended to lose their jobs more than women. 
The sectors most affected by the crisis in those 
countries—such as construction and manufac-
turing—tend to be male-dominated. 
Similarly, during the Asian crisis of 1997, 
female employment was not the hardest hit. 
Women in East Asian nations were dispropor-
tionately employed in fi rms more resilient to the 
crisis.59 But the gender earnings gap increased, 
particularly in larger fi rms. In other words, 
women’s smaller net employment impact came 
at the expense of a larger reduction in their 
earnings.
“STICKY” GETS “STICKIER”
Chapter 1 noted that changes are intercon-
nected. Progress in one dimension of gender 
equality can multiply the effects on another 
dimension. The same applies to an absence of 
change. A lack of progress in one dimension 
can compound the negative effects in another 
dimension. Gender differences can thus endure, 
bound together by many layers of constraints 
that reinforce one other. Breaking this impasse 
requires action on various strands of this web of 
persistent inequality. 
Maternal education is inversely correlated 
with infant and child mortality in developing 
boys and girls fell in response to drought, boys’ 
enrollments fell more (chapter 3).
Income shocks may have mixed effects in 
relation to endowment accumulation. In some 
instances (mainly in middle- and high-income 
economies), income shocks can actually bring 
boys and girls back into school. Wage reductions 
or poor labor market conditions in a crisis lower 
the opportunity cost of schooling, inducing 
households to keep their children in school—es-
pecially boys who are more likely to be engaged 
in wage labor. In Nicaragua, the school participa-
tion of rural boys increased 15 percentage points 
after a sudden drop in coffee prices around 
2000–02.53 In Argentina, the deterioration in 
employment rates during the deep 1998–2002 
fi nancial crisis also increased the probability of 
boys attending school.54
Reversals in access to economic 
opportunities
Shocks can bring about reversals in economic 
opportunities for both men and women. 
Women tend to hold more precarious jobs, op-
erate smaller and less capitalized fi rms, and be 
engaged in more vulnerable economic activities 
than men, suggesting that they would be more 
likely to be affected by economic shocks. But the 
evidence does not support this oft-held view. 
In the recent fi nancial crisis, there were no 
common patterns by gender and no evidence 
that women were more affected than men.55 Ev-
idence from 41 middle-income countries sug-
gests that the main impact was on the quality 
of employment (number of hours worked and 
wages), rather than on the number of jobs.56 
Gender impacts vary signifi cantly by country 
and defy simple generalizations.57 
Both labor market entry (added workers) 
and exit (discouraged workers) during crises 
might operate simultaneously, affecting differ-
ent groups of women differently. Women from 
low-income households typically enter the la-
The fi nancial situation in Moldova 
is very bad. I think that women 
should stay home and take care of 
the family.
Adult man, Moldova
“
”
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The clustering of men and women in differ-
ent occupations and sectors begins earlier, in the 
educational system. While female participation 
is increasing across all fi elds of study as more 
women enter tertiary education, segregation by 
area of specialization remains. Male bias is most 
marked in engineering, manufacturing, and 
construction. In about two-thirds of the world’s 
countries, men also outnumber women in sci-
ence. But in nine-tenths of the world, women 
outnumber men in education; humanities and 
arts; social sciences, business, and law; and 
health and welfare. 
Educational segregation by specialization 
does not go away—and even appears to in-
crease—with economic development. Cam-
bodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mo-
rocco, and Namibia are among the countries 
with the least gender segregation by study areas, 
though men are more likely to obtain a tertiary 
degree. Among Organisation for Economic 
 Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries, Turkey has the least gender segregation in 
tertiary fi elds of study, while Croatia, Finland, 
Japan, and Lithuania have the most. In Norway 
and Denmark, women make up two-thirds of 
tertiary enrollments, but only a third of science 
students is female.68
These are just several examples, among 
many, of how constraints in one aspect of gen-
der equality can hold back progress on other di-
mensions, causing gender inequality to persist. 
This persistence comes with large economic, 
social, and political costs. Part 2 of the Report 
analyzes the foundations of these persistent gen-
der disparities, rooting them in the interactions 
between households, markets, and formal and 
informal institutions. 
NOTES
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countries. In Mozambique, low maternal educa-
tion is a strong predictor of low health service 
use and child malnutrition.60 And stunted chil-
dren—before 24 months of age—have poorer 
psychomotor skills and lower cognitive achieve-
ment. Undernourished boys and girls are also 
less likely to be enrolled in school or enter school 
late, sustaining the cycle of deprivation.61 
Poor health of girls and women spills over 
into the next generation. Both contemporary 
and childhood health of the mother matter 
for the health of the next generation. Maternal 
well-being—measured through short stature, 
low body mass index, and anemia—affects 
size at birth, survival, and child growth. So un-
derinvesting in the health of girls and women 
contributes to child mortality and intergenera-
tional cycles of poor health among survivors.62 
Girls who are born small and do not catch up 
in growth fail to attain the height predicted by 
their genetic potential. Their reduced uterine 
and ovarian size implies lower birth weights for 
their offspring, engendering a new intergenera-
tional cycle of deprivation.63 
Lack of property ownership and control mat-
ters for women’s agency. Assets are an important 
element to boost voice and bargaining power 
in household decision making, access to capi-
tal, and overall economic independence. Nepali 
women who do not own land have less say in 
household decision making than women with 
land.64 In Colombia, a lack of property or so-
cial assets constrains women in negotiating for 
the right to work, controlling their own income, 
moving freely, and contesting domestic abuse.65 
In Kerala, India, women’s independent owner-
ship of immovable property is a signifi cant pre-
dictor of long-term physical and psychological 
domestic violence, over and above the effects 
of other factors. The odds of being beaten if a 
woman owns both a house and land are a twen-
tieth of those when she owns neither.66
Cash employment is also strongly associated 
with women’s empowerment. Not earning a 
cash income is most consistently associated with 
married women not making decisions—on top-
ics such as their health care, large household 
purchases, purchases for daily needs, and visits 
to family or friends. Higher household wealth 
by itself does not consistently enhance the likeli-
hood that women will make decisions alone or 
jointly in most countries.67 
 The persistence of gender inequality 89
63. Ibañez and others 2000.
64. Allendorf 2007.
65. Friedemann-Sánchez 2006.
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S P R E A D  1   Women’s pathways to empowerment: Do all roads lead to Rome?
What gives women power? Conversations with almost 2,000 women across 19 countries show that they depend on a combination of 
factors to feel empowered.1 “Increased confi dence to man-
age the house independently,” “more communication with 
neighbors and community members,” the ability to “go out 
of house to do marketing, shopping, and other household 
work such as paying electricity and water bills,” “increased 
control of fi nancial transactions in and outside the house,” 
and “husband’s support and permission to go outside of the 
house” were the main answers of women in Bhubane-
swar, India, when asked to describe what it meant to be 
powerful and free. Similarly, rural women from Paro, 
Bhutan, associated gains in power with education, 
spouse’s and family members’ support, and hard work—
but also with education programs for women who have 
missed school and with role models such as elected fe-
male community leaders who “have helped women think 
better” and female small business owners who have pros-
pered and boosted the confi dence of the women in their 
community. 
The characteristics of a powerful woman that come 
up most often are related to generating and managing 
income, followed closely by acquiring an education, and 
then by personal traits and access to social networks 
(spread fi gure 1.1).
It is also clear that no single factor can explain changes 
in empowerment. Any one factor may be present for 
many women with different levels of power and may 
even determine gains or losses in power, depending on 
other factors operating in women’s lives. For example, 
changes in marital and family conditions create oppor-
tunities for some women when “the husband supports his 
wife” (Papua New Guinea), or if they “get a good and un-
derstanding husband who can allow her to do business and 
engage in educational activities” (Tanzania). And even a 
divorce can be positive. “Divorce can free a woman from 
a lot of strains and she’ll become stronger,” recognized 
women in West Bank and Gaza. But for other women 
the same process can have the opposite effect: “a woman 
can fall [can lose power] if she loses her husband, her chil-
dren, or the support of her parents” (Burkina Faso). “If you 
have three children and your husband dies, a single income 
would not be suffi cient” (Peru). “[A] divorce when the man 
leaves the wife it’s even worse than death for her” (Poland).
Women’s pathways to empowerment are determined 
by different combinations of factors. To trace such path-
ways, women in each country were asked to place 100 
representative women from their community on differ-
ent steps on a fi ctional “ladder of power and freedom”—
with the top step for women with the most power and the 
bottom for those with the least. They were also asked to 
repeat this ranking to refl ect where the women would 
have been on the ladder 10 years ago. In 79 percent of 
cases, women saw a dramatic upward movement in the 
past 10 years (almost 20 percentage points larger than 
men’s perception of their gains in power in the same pe-
riod). But that was not so in all cases. A community in 
rural South Africa saw 80 percent of its women as being 
at the bottom of the ladder, “All of us here are struggling, 
so we have little power, and we are not free to do what we 
want to do because we do not have money,” explained one 
woman. They mentioned not having savings and having 
diffi culty purchasing basic goods, “What can they possibly 
save, because whatever little money they have they spend on 
food. It is very diffi cult to think about savings if you hardly 
get money and you are always hungry because the little you 
might get you want it to make your children happy at least 
for that day,” said another woman. They also pointed to 
S P R E A D  F I G U R E  1.1   Main factors in moving 
up the ladder
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the daunting number of people suffering from HIV/
AIDS. A powerless woman “is often sick, her health is un-
stable, and she cannot even access health facilities because 
the clinic is very far and she does not have money for trans-
port,” and “her husband is likely to be sick.”
In the Dominican Republic’s capital city, Santo Do-
mingo, women reported fast upward movement on 
their ladders thanks to two factors: “now women study 
more and work more.” In Afghanistan’s Jabal Saraj, where 
women placed 60 of the 100 women on the top step, 
twice the number of 10 years before, a larger combina-
tion of conditions was identifi ed: “In the past, women 
did just home chores like cooking at home and warming 
the oven, but now there are possibilities such as gas and 
electricity.” “Now some women have jobs out of the house 
and most of the girls are going to school.” And women have 
“participated in election as candidates for provincial coun-
cil and others.”
Each community had its own stories to explain 
changes in women’s power, but many elements were the 
same from community to community. To understand 
the main commonalities and combinations of factors 
driving female empowerment, a comparative qualitative 
analysis combining dimensions of agency with the struc-
ture of opportunities in the community and the national 
human development level was conducted.2 The variables 
included:
• Dimensions of agency. Women’s control over assets, 
control over family formation, freedom from domes-
tic violence, freedom of physical mobility, and bridg-
ing social capital—from community networks to 
family support and friends. 
• Specifi c characteristics of the community environment 
or structure of opportunities. Informal institutions 
(level of pressure to conform to gender norms and 
positive/negative vision of gender norms); formal in-
stitutions (presence of services in the community 
such as transport, schools, health, electricity, and wa-
ter); and economic opportunities for women and 
markets (availability of jobs and share of women 
working in the community).
• General national context for human development—
measured by the country’s score on the United Na-
tions Development Programme’s Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI).
Various combinations of these factors were tested 
to distinguish the necessary conditions for women’s 
empowerment in each case, the common explanations 
across countries and cultures, and the factors that were 
suffi cient by themselves to explain gains in power and 
freedom in relation to other constraints and barriers that 
women were facing. 
A higher national HDI or a low prevalence of domes-
tic violence was suffi cient to explain women’s empower-
ment gains in half the communities across all countries. 
Either factor by itself counters negative conditions, such 
as restricted mobility or lack of jobs.
For rural women, participation in social networks—
organizations and networks for women in the commu-
nity, their relevance in the community, and the presence 
of female leaders—was a key factor. Higher social capital 
and network presence countered obstacles like domestic 
violence in 25 percent of the communities. Social capital 
is the only factor that allows women to feel empowered 
even when facing high levels of domestic violence in their 
communities. In its absence, women have to increase 
their agency on many aspects—freedom of movement, 
control over family formation, and control of assets—to 
counter the disempowering force of domestic violence. 
Restrictions in any of the other agency conditions are less 
binding if domestic violence incidence is low.
Urban women depend as much on the local structure 
of opportunities—availability of jobs for women and 
a dynamic labor market—as they do on social capital. 
In fact, when both come together, lack of control over 
family formation or high incidence of domestic violence 
becomes less of an obstacle. When social capital is not 
strong, the relevance of the local structure of oppor-
tunities increases, but it needs to be paired with other 
positive gains in agency such as increased control over 
assets or freedom of movement and of violence threats 
for women to move up their power ladder. 
These different combinations show that pathways 
may vary, but some combinations drive women’s gains 
faster and better. The effect of any factor is likely to de-
pend on the confi guration of other factors—the role of 
economic opportunities will depend on each woman’s 
ability to move freely as well as on asset ownership and 
social capital. 
What do these pathways look like? Two examples 
from two communities:
“A woman who is powerful is called omukazi [powerful 
woman]. I think most of us here are powerful women,” says 
Joyce in Bukoba, Tanzania, after acknowledging that the 
lives of women in her community have prospered, “Yes, 
women have always moved up. I was married, and I really 
suffered with my husband. When I left him, it is when I 
started doing my things and I am now very fi ne: I can get 
what I want; I can do what I want; I take my children to 
school” (spread fi gure 1.2).
For women in Bukoba, social capital has been the key 
element. The community has a good array of organiza-
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by their husband every day and they are there. When you 
talk to them, they say they are married and they cannot 
separate. These women will never climb the ladder; they 
will stay at the bottom.”
In rural Dhamar in the Republic of Yemen, women 
also see themselves moving up despite low economic 
participation and education in their community (spread 
fi gure 1.3). Like the Bukoba women, their pathway in-
cludes social capital—in this case in the shape of informal 
networks—as well as some gains in education, all in an 
environment with too few opportunities and some mo-
bility restrictions. “Men can fi nish their education; men 
have the freedom to go out and to learn [but] women visit 
each other in their free time and chat,” said Fatima and 
Ghalya when comparing their happiness with men’s. In 
their community, a powerful woman would have many 
acquaintances and friends, while a woman with little 
power “is the woman who doesn’t have infl uence among 
Dhamar’s women.”
Women in Dhamar see two factors as the most press-
ing: having an education, and being able to move more 
freely. Having freedom means having the ability to move 
within the village. But most women cannot travel out-
side the village without appropriate companionship: 
“A woman cannot work outside the village unless she has 
Mahram (male legal guardian) with her.” Gaining mobil-
ity will allow them to fi nish their education and those 
who dropped out of school to resume it. “If there is 
tions helping women, and 33 percent of the local council 
members are female. Women recognize the value of their 
networks: “We have these self-help groups, we meet there 
and talk about so many things that happen in our lives. You 
get advice from your fellow woman on how to deal with 
men who disturb you in your family or how to do business.” 
“Once you get the right group and listen to what they say, 
you get up.” Friends also have a central role: “These are the 
people you count on as woman. They will give you advice. 
They form part of the groups you belong to. And when you 
have quarrels with your husband, they will be the fi rst ones 
to come and assist. If you have small children, they will al-
ways keep an eye on your children.”
But social capital is not enough to increase women’s 
empowerment. It needs to be combined with a good 
structure of opportunities and services, which women in 
Bukoba also seem to have: “You can go to the factory and 
ask for different kinds of jobs, such as sweeping, cleaning 
dishes or the compound, and even becoming their agent to 
buy and bring fi sh to the factory.” Favorable laws are also 
in place: “It is easy because the law is clear. No one loses as 
such: you want to divorce, you divide the property, and each 
one goes his or her way.”
Women in Bukoba also recognize the barriers that 
prevent other women in the community from gaining 
power and freedom: “The moment you know that you can 
do things by yourself and not depend on a man is the mo-
ment you begin going up. I see some women being beaten 
S P R E A D  F I G U R E  1.2   Ladder shares now and 
10 years ago in Bukoba, 
Tanzania (urban)
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations, based on “Defi ning Gender in the 21st 
Century: A Multi-Country Assessment” (dataset).
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tries. For further information, the assessment methodology 
can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr2012.
2.  Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA). For 
references, see Ragin (2008) and Ragin (2000). The tech-
nique allows for testing models of different pathways to 
achieve an end, in this case, the levels of empowerment 
reported by the women in the various community groups. 
Given the nature of qualitative data—textual and repre-
sentative of individuals’ voices, perceptions, and experi-
ences—comparing across countries and communities is 
done by measuring different degrees in the cases that fi t 
each model (membership degrees).
REFERENCES
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transportation, they will let me learn, and I can become a 
teacher,” says a young woman. Job aspirations are linked 
to mobility restrictions: “Work opportunities are limited 
inside the village except teaching, and recruitment for men 
in agricultural work.” Although these Yemeni women 
experience many diffi culties, they nonetheless see im-
provements in their power and freedom over the previ-
ous generations.
NOTES
1.  The study economies include Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina 
Faso, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Libe-
ria, Moldova, North Sudan, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Po-
land, Serbia, South Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam, West Bank 
and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. The focus groups in-
cluded male adults, female adults, male youth, female youth, 
male adolescents, and female adolescents; the adolescent 
groups were conducted only in a subset of 8 of the 19 coun-
What has driven progress? 
What impedes it?  
PART II
art 2 of this World Development Report explains why 
progress toward gender equality has been made in 
some areas but not in others. For this purpose, we use 
a conceptual framework positing that households, markets, 
and institutions (both formal and informal) and the interac-
tions among them shape the relationship between economic 
development and gender equality and that, in doing so, they 
ultimately determine gender outcomes (see overview box 4). 
This framework builds on earlier work within the World Bank 
and elsewhere.
We apply this framework to analyze the evolution of gender 
differences in endowments (chapter 3), agency (chapter 4), and 
access to economic opportunities (chapter 5) as well as the im-
pact of globalization on gender equality, with a focus on access 
to economic opportunities (chapter 6).
This empirical approach helps establish the link between 
analysis and policy choices. It emphasizes that the design of 
 policies to reduce specifi c gender gaps needs to take into account 
what happens in the household, in the functioning and structure 
of markets, and in formal and informal institutions as well as in 
the interactions between all of them. When these aspects are not 
considered, the intended results of policy interventions can be 
muted or even contrary to expectations.
EXPLAINING THE FRAMEWORK 
The proposed framework builds on three premises. First, the 
household is not a unitary block with a common set of pref-
erences and goals. Instead, it is made up of different members 
with their own preferences, needs, and objectives, as well as dif-
ferent abilities to infl uence decision making in the household. 
Second, markets and institutions affect the relationship between 
economic development and gender equality both directly and 
indirectly (through their impact on household decisions). Third, 
markets and institutions are not static but are shaped and con-
ditioned by society (understood as the sum of individuals and 
households). And it is precisely this process that allows markets 
and institutions, including social norms and values, to evolve 
over time in response to policy interventions or exogenous 
changes brought about by, say, globalization.
Building on these three ideas, the framework captures how 
households make decisions, how they interact with markets and 
institutions to determine gender outcomes, and how policy 
can affect these interactions and ultimately gender outcomes.
Understanding how households make decisions
Households make decisions about how many children to have 
and when to have them, how much to spend on education 
and health for daughters and sons, how to allocate different 
tasks (inside and outside the household), and other matters 
that determine gender outcomes. These choices are made on 
the basis of the preferences, decision-making (or bargaining) 
power, and incentives and constraints of different household 
members.
Preferences can be innate or shaped by gender roles, so-
cial norms, and social networks (grouped under the label 
in formal institutions). And they may be shared by or dif-
fer across individuals within the household. For instance, 
evaluations of transfer programs, such as pensions and con-
ditional cash transfers, show that spending decisions differ 
depending on whether money is given to women or men 
within the household, suggesting differences in men’s and 
women’s preferences.1
Bargaining capacity is determined by two distinct sources 
of individual power: economic and social. Economic bargain-
ing power depends primarily on the wealth and assets each 
individual controls and his or her contribution to total house-
hold income, while social bargaining power results primarily 
from formal and informal institutions. For instance, a wom-
an’s capacity to decide how to allocate her time across various 
activities in and outside the household may be weakened by 
her lack of asset ownership (low economic bargaining power) 
or by strong social proscriptions against female work outside 
the home (low social bargaining power).
In addition, economic and social bargaining power is in-
fl uenced by an individual’s capacity to take advantage of op-
portunities outside the household and to bear the costs of 
leaving the household (“exit”). For example, where custody of 
children in the case of divorce is based primarily on fi nancial 
capacity to care for the children, women’s capacity (and will-
ingness) to use the threat of exit as a bargaining tool may be 
limited by their own incomes and assets. 
Finally, incentives and constraints are largely infl uenced 
by markets and institutions. Markets determine the returns 
to household decisions and investments and thus provide 
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But markets and institutions can also dampen the impacts 
of growth for many gender outcomes, which means that some 
gender biases do not disappear with economic development—
the “sticky domains” discussed in Part 1. Persistent differences 
in the jobs that men and women perform provide a good ex-
ample. These differences are rooted in the ways markets and 
institutions work and channel men and women into different 
segments of the economic space. These mutually reinforcing 
market and institutional barriers, including those related to 
gender roles and norms, mute the impact of economic devel-
opment on the incentives and constraints for women’s access 
to economic opportunities.
What about the impact of gender equality on economic de-
velopment? As argued in this Report, greater gender equality 
enhances economic effi ciency and improves other develop-
ment outcomes through three main channels: productivity 
gains associated with better use of existing resources, im-
provements in outcomes for the next generation, and more 
representative institutions and policy making. When aligned, 
households, markets, and institutions can support and 
strengthen these positive links. For example, well-functioning 
and affordable education and health systems can ease restric-
tions on access to human capital among women—especially 
where distance and mobility are factors and where the private 
sector can step in to fi ll gaps in public sector provision. Simi-
larly, if labor markets work well, educated women will enter 
the labor force and contribute their talents and skills.
But in some cases, market and institutional constraints can 
lead to ineffi cient gender outcomes both in the household and 
outside it, impeding economic development. For instance, in-
secure land property rights among female farmers in Africa 
lead to lower than optimal use of fertilizer and other produc-
tive inputs and shorter than optimal fallowing times, reducing 
agricultural productivity. And when employment segregation 
excludes women from management positions, the average tal-
ent of managers is lower, reducing technology adoption and 
innovation.
We refer to these situations as market failures and institu-
tional constraints. Market failures occur with discrimination, 
information problems, or limitations in the type and nature 
of contracts available.2 Institutional constraints, by contrast, 
arise from legal restrictions, customary practices, social norms, 
or other formal or informal institutional arrangements that 
result in failures to determine and enforce rights. Correcting 
these market failures and institutional constraints can yield 
substantial productivity gains and broader economic benefi ts. 
And in a more competitive and integrated world, even modest 
improvements in how effi ciently resources are used can have 
signifi cant effects on a country’s competitiveness and growth.
These ideas are illustrated in our framework graph by the 
interconnected gears representing markets, formal and infor-
mal institutions, and households (fi gure P2.1). Propelled by 
economic growth, the gears representing markets and insti-
incentives for the allocation of limited resources to compet-
ing ends. For instance, the returns to education in the labor 
market—both in better employment opportunities and higher 
wages—will infl uence decisions to send a girl or boy to school. 
Similarly, the level of female wages will infl uence whether 
women will devote more time to market work, at the expense of 
housework and care.
Constraints arise from markets, institutions, and their inter-
play. Discrimination against women in the labor market, for ex-
ample, limits the number and types of jobs that women can take 
on. And traditional norms for women’s role in the economic 
sphere may reinforce the discrimination. Similarly, the availabil-
ity of an adequate school can affect the decision to send girls 
(and boys) to school.
Understanding the relationship between economic 
development and gender equality
The relationship between gender equality and economic de-
velopment (the combination of higher incomes and better 
service delivery) is a two-way relationship. In the framework 
here, households, markets, and institutions and their interac-
tions shape this relationship and ultimately determine gender 
outcomes. 
Start with the impact of economic development on gender 
equality. Higher incomes and better service delivery can increase 
gender equality, acting through markets and institutions in ways 
that affect household decisions. Education and health provide a 
good illustration. 
• First, to the extent that aggregate economic growth translates 
into higher household incomes, constraints on access to edu-
cation and some health services are relaxed. So, fewer house-
holds will have to choose between girls and boys and women 
and men in providing or accessing these services. 
• Second, the changes in market structures and signals that 
typically accompany growth (such as the expansion of man-
ufacturing and service activities) and encourage the greater 
participation of women in the wage labor market also work 
to reduce these gaps by placing a greater value on girls’ edu-
cation and by empowering women in household decision 
making. 
• Third, economic development means the improved delivery 
of public services such as health and education. And these in-
stitutional improvements lower their costs to households, al-
lowing them to use more of them—for males and females—
with attendant improvements in gender outcomes. 
The combination of higher incomes, higher returns to hu-
man capital investments, and better access to services strength-
ens the incentives for and lowers the constraints to investing in 
girls and women’s human capital and is then likely to lead to 
a reduction in gender gaps in educational attainment and in 
health outcomes such as life expectancy.
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also command higher returns, increase their productivity, or 
both—and ultimately earn a higher income.
An individual or a household has little capacity to change 
the way markets and social institutions function, but soci-
ety does (as the sum of individuals and households). And it 
is precisely this capacity that allows markets and institutions 
to evolve over time as a result of collective action, policy in-
terventions, or outside changes brought about by, say, expo-
sure to norms, values, and practices in other societies through 
global integration.
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
The four chapters in Part 2 use this framework to address two 
questions. What explains progress or the lack of progress in 
closing gender gaps in endowments, agency, and access to 
economic opportunities? And how has globalization affected 
gender equality? The answers to these questions point to the 
role for policies and their likely impacts.
Applying this framework produces important insights. 
Progress has come fastest in areas where market and insti-
tutional forces have aligned to provide strong incentives 
for households and societies to invest equally in men and 
tutions turn, moving the household gear. The combined move-
ment of these gears ultimately triggers the turning of the gear 
representing gender outcomes, thus increasing gender equality. 
One can also imagine the movement going in the opposite di-
rection—that is, with the gender equality gear moving those rep-
resenting households, markets, and institutions and ultimately 
generating higher economic growth. In this setting, market and 
institutional constraints can be thought of as wedges that prevent 
one or more gears from turning, thereby weakening both direc-
tions of the two-way relationship between economic growth and 
gender equality. Throughout the Report we use the color green 
to indicate when markets, formal, and informal institutions are 
functioning to strengthen the relationships between economic 
development and gender equality, and the color red to indicate 
when they are acting as constraints on these links.
Although we have described the framework as a snapshot at 
one point in time, we also use it to look at changes over time. 
Allocation decisions and agency formation in the household 
take place in a dynamic context, with outcomes today affecting 
both decision making and returns in the future. For example, as 
individuals work and earn income, they can accumulate assets, 
affecting their bargaining power and thus future household al-
location decisions. In addition, greater access to assets may mean 
that the household or some individuals in the household can 
F I G U R E  P 2.1  Gender outcomes result from interactions between households, markets, and institutions 
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generational reproduction of gender inequality. In these areas, 
progress has been slow and often unresponsive to economic 
development alone.
So, in these areas, the role of policy is twofold. It can 
strengthen the relationship between gender equality and eco-
nomic growth, and it can address the market failures and in-
stitutional constraints that stall progress. The fi rst idea is illus-
trated by the drops of oil that ease the turning of the market 
and institutions gears. The second is equivalent to removing 
wedges that stop some gears from moving. A more detailed 
discussion of the rationale for and role of public action is in 
Part 3.
NOTES
1.  Dufl o 2003; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997.
2.  Information problems include information asymmetries and ex-
ternalities. With information asymmetries, market participants 
are unable to gather or have differential access to necessary in-
formation. Externalities imply that the behavior of some mar-
ket participants affects the outcomes of others in the same—or 
other—market.
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women—reversing any previous disadvantages that girls and 
women may have faced. In these cases, progress has been pro-
pelled by forces acting through various points of entry—
markets, formal institutions, and informal institutions. This pro-
cess has been aided where economic growth has been sustained 
and broad-based, as in education, where gender gaps have closed 
very rapidly (chapter 3).
In contrast, progress has stalled—even with economic 
growth—where market and institutional constraints reinforce 
inequalities between women and men in endowments, agency, 
and access to economic opportunities. This situation can arise 
when constraints in one of the three spheres through which eco-
nomic development affects households—markets, formal insti-
tutions, and informal institutions—are particularly binding, or 
when constraints in all three spheres are mutually reinforcing. 
In the fi rst case, there is a single entry point for policy action 
in that the most binding constraint has to be removed for im-
provements in gender outcomes to occur, as illustrated by the 
discussion of excess female mortality in chapter 3. In the second 
case, improvements in gender equality will require coordinated 
interventions in a number of spheres, as illustrated by the dis-
cussion of women’s agency and access to economic opportuni-
ties in chapters 4 and 5.
Against this background, globalization has operated through 
markets and institutions to lift some of the constraints to gen-
der equality in human capital, agency, and access to economic 
opportunities. But the women most affected by existing con-
straints risk being left behind in the absence of public action 
(chapter 6).
Based on the analysis in chapters 3–6, four priority areas for 
public action are identifi ed: reducing gender gaps in human 
capital, promoting women’s access to economic opportunities, 
closing gender gaps in voice and agency, and limiting the inter-
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nvestments in health and education—
human capital endowments—shape the 
ability of men and women to reach their 
full potential in society. The right mix of 
such investments allows people to live longer, 
healthier, and more productive lives. System-
atic differences in investments between males 
and females, independent of their underlying 
causes, adversely affect individual outcomes in 
childhood and adulthood and those of the next 
generation. Left uncorrected, these differences 
translate into large costs for societies.
Where do gender differences arise in human 
capital endowments, how are they reduced, 
and when do they persist? Global comparisons 
of participation in education and mortality risks 
among women and men show that progress has 
been tremendous where lifting a single bar-
rier is suffi cient—for households, markets, or 
 institutions.
Consider the increasing participation of 
women at all educational levels. Gaps in primary 
enrollments have closed, and in secondary and 
tertiary enrollments, new gaps are emerging—
for boys. College enrollments increased sevenfold 
for women over the past three decades, fourfold 
for men. The reason is that interventions tar-
geted at any one of households or markets or in-
stitutions have all increased enrollments. Where 
all three drivers have come together, change has 
accelerated. Conversely, where all three have not 
changed, progress has stalled. Further reducing 
girls’ disadvantages in educational participation 
requires sharpening the focus on severely disad-
vantaged populations, for whom all the drivers of 
progress are missing.
Overall, progress has been slower where 
multi ple barriers among households, markets, 
and institutions need to be lifted at once or 
where there is only a single effective point of en-
try for progress. Consider each in turn.
Although girls participate equally (or more) 
at all education levels, the educational streams 
they choose are remarkably different and stable 
across countries at very different incomes. Men 
continue to study engineering while women 
continue to learn how to be teachers. While part 
of the problem lies in the educational system, 
these patterns are reinforced by gender norms 
in households and markets. Some gender norms 
relate to care in the household (overwhelmingly 
provided by women) and its implications for 
the kinds of jobs that women choose. Others 
have to do with the continuing “stickiness” in 
employers’ attitudes toward family formation 
and childbearing. Equal gender participation in 
different fi elds of studies requires simultaneous 
changes among households, markets, and insti-
tutions. That has not happened so far.
Things can also get stuck where there is only 
one point of entry: households or markets or 
institutions.
Health disadvantages for women fall in this 
category. Consider girls missing at birth (a defi -
cit of female births relative to male ones) and 
excess female mortality after birth (women and 
girls who would not have died in the previous 
year had they been living in a high-income 
country after accounting for the overall mortal-
ity of the country they live in). 
Globally, girls missing at birth and deaths 
from excess female mortality after birth add up 
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women, which arise from poor institutions, 
excess male mortality is often tied to behavior 
deemed more socially acceptable among men, 
such as smoking, heavy drinking, and engaging 
in risky activities.
Understanding both sorts of mortality risks 
and what can be done about them is critical 
for any notion of human justice. Solving excess 
female mortality requires institutional changes; 
solving missing girls at birth and excess male 
mortality delves fundamentally into social norms 
and household behavior—both of which are 
more diffi cult to understand and tackle. 
ENDOWMENTS MATTER
Education and health investments have a huge 
impact on the ability of individuals—whether 
men or women—to function and reach their 
potential in society. For both boys and girls, 
childhood investments in health affect outcomes 
throughout the course of life. Low birth weights 
and childhood exposure to disease have been 
linked to lower cognitive development, school-
ing attainment, and learning in adolescence. 
Less healthy children are at an elevated risk of 
becoming less healthy adults.2 Poorer health 
outcomes in adulthood in turn affect economic 
outcomes, refl ected in health-related absences 
from the labor force and lower work hours and 
earnings.3 
to 6 million women a year, 3.9 million below the 
age of 60. Of the 6 million, one-fi fth is never 
born, one-tenth dies in early childhood, one-
fi fth in the reproductive years, and two-fi fths at 
older ages. Because those who died in the earlier 
ages also had the longest to live, they account for 
the bulk of lost women years around the world. 
The problem is not getting any better. In 1990, 
missing girls and excess female mortality below 
the age of 60 accounted for 4 million women a 
year; in 2008, the number was 3.9 million, fueled 
by a near doubling in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike 
Asia, where population-adjusted excess female 
mortality fell in every country (dramatically in 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Vietnam), most Sub-
Saharan African countries saw little change in the 
new millennium. And in the countries hardest 
hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, things got worse. 
In South Africa, excess female deaths increased 
from (virtually) zero between the ages of 10 and 
50 in 1990 to 74,000 every year by 2008.
Comparisons with Europe, where excess fe-
male mortality existed during the early 20th 
century but disappeared by 1950, suggest that 
the patterns today refl ect a combination of overt 
discrimination before birth, and poor institu-
tions combined with the burden of HIV/AIDS 
after birth. More than 1.3 million girls are not 
born in China and India every year because of 
overt discrimination and the spread of ultra-
sound technologies that allow households to 
determine the sex of the fetus before birth. In-
formal institutions that generate a preference 
for sons are the primary bottleneck.
After birth, overt discrimination plays a 
smaller role. Instead, poor institutions of public 
health and service delivery exact a heavy burden 
on girls and women. In parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, HIV/AIDS risks have compounded the 
problem. But where countries have improved 
basic institutions of public health and service 
delivery, excess female mortality has declined. 
Even in countries where historical studies iden-
tifi ed discrimination against girls (like Bangla-
desh), better public health measures improved 
life-chances for both boys and girls, but more so 
for girls.1
Clearly, excess female mortality is not a prob-
lem in all countries. In the Russian Federation 
and some other post-transition countries, mor-
tality risks have increased for both sexes—but 
particularly for men. In these contexts, there is 
excess male mortality relative to high-income 
countries today. Unlike mortality risks among 
. . . [we want] sons. Everybody does. They can work 
and earn. Girls have to marry.
Adolescent girls, rural India
In-laws decide how many children to have. If the 
fi rst child is a girl, then they will ask to have more 
children until a son is born.
Young woman, urban India
“
”
Educated women do not sit around 
and wait for men to provide for them. 
They do not need a man to buy things 
for them.
Young woman, urban South Africa
“
”
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run implications for society. If more boys than 
girls are born, eventually many men will be un-
able to fi nd wives. Recent research suggests that 
such a “marriage squeeze” is already well under 
way in China and India.12
These basic themes—educating girls and 
women, improving health outcomes in child-
hood, lowering the risks of giving birth, and ad-
dressing skewed sex ratios at birth (the latter two 
leading to excess female mortality and missing 
girls at birth)—play out consistently in the rest 
of the chapter. The focus throughout is twofold: 
fi rst, separating the problems that will likely 
diminish with income growth from those that 
will remain “sticky,” and, second, understanding 
how and where policy can be effective through 
the framework of this Report—the interactions 
between households, markets, and institutions.
EDUCATION
A decade into the new millennium, there are 
many reasons to feel optimistic about the state 
of women’s education around the world. Prog-
ress has been remarkable, and many of the gaps 
salient in the 20th century have closed. Today, 
girls and boys around the world participate 
equally in primary and secondary education. In 
tertiary education, a clear bias is emerging that 
favors women—with enrollments increasing 
faster for women than for men.
These gains have been possible because, for 
enrollments, lifting single barriers, whether stem-
ming from households, markets, or institutions, 
has been suffi cient. These multiple entry points 
have allowed policies to circumvent bottlenecks 
arising from adverse preferences, low returns to 
female education, or poor institutions.
But the optimism has to be tempered on 
three fronts. First, in some countries and in 
Similarly, as chapter 5 shows, investments in 
education determine women’s ability to earn 
higher wages and to own and operate produc-
tive farms and fi rms. On average, differences in 
education explain a signifi cant fraction of the 
variation in wages and incomes among adults. 
In both high- and low-income countries, gen-
der differences in education have contributed 
signifi cantly to the productivity and wage gap 
between men and women.
Health and education investments in women 
are also special in three ways. First, in their roles 
as mothers, educated women pass on the ben-
efi ts of higher education to their children. Chil-
dren born to more educated mothers are less 
likely to die in infancy and more likely to have 
higher birth weights and be immunized.4 Evi-
dence from the United States suggests that some 
of the pathways linking maternal education to 
child health include lower parity, higher use of 
prenatal care, and lower smoking rates.5 In Tai-
wan, China, the increase in schooling associated 
with the education reform of 1968 saved almost 
1 infant life for every 1,000 live births, reducing 
infant mortality by about 11 percent.6 In Paki-
stan, even a single year of maternal education 
leads to children studying an additional hour at 
home and to higher test scores.7 
Second, women face particular risks during 
pregnancy and childbirth: 1 of every 11 women 
in Afghanistan and 1 of every 29 in Angola 
dies during childbirth.8 Compare that with 1 of 
 every 11,400 in Sweden. As this chapter shows, 
maternal mortality and excess female mortality 
in the reproductive ages are closely linked. But 
high maternal mortality rates also have implica-
tions for educational investments and the ability 
of women to participate in society. As the risk 
of dying in childbirth declines, educational in-
vestments increase (and more so for girls).9 In 
Sri Lanka, reductions in the maternal mortality 
ratio increased female literacy by 1 percentage 
point.10 And because reductions in maternal 
mortality ratios also reduce maternal morbid-
ity (in the United States in 1920, one of every 
six women suffered from a long-term disability 
stemming from giving birth), improvements in 
the conditions of childbirth can drive increases 
in the labor force participation rate of married 
women.11
Third, overt discrimination that leads to 
male-biased sex ratios at birth can have long-
It is good to go to school because as a 
woman if you are an educated person, 
then men won’t take advantage of 
you. So it is important that you go to 
school.
Young woman, urban Liberia
“
”
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The good news
Most countries around the world have at-
tained gender parity in primary education, 
with an equal number of boys and girls in 
school. Among children currently not attend-
ing primary school, 53 percent are girls, with a 
concentration of gender disadvantage in some 
African countries, including Benin, Chad, Niger, 
and Togo. But, even in these countries, progress 
has been substantial: in Sub-Saharan Africa the 
number of girls for every 100 boys in primary 
school increased from 85 in 1999 to 91 in 2008.
Moving from primary to tertiary enrollment 
shows three patterns (fi gure 3.1). First, most 
children participate in primary schooling, but 
secondary enrollments range from very low to 
very high across countries; again, some coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa stand out for their 
particularly low rates of participation. In ter-
tiary education, low participation is the norm 
in developing countries. Therefore, increases in 
secondary (and tertiary) enrollment for both 
boys and girls are necessary in several countries. 
Second, at low overall levels of secondary enroll-
ment, girls are less likely to be in school, while 
at high levels the pattern reverses with the bias 
some populations within countries girls are 
still the last to enroll and the fi rst to drop out 
in diffi cult times. These severely disadvantaged 
populations face a host of different problems, 
and the “best” solution to their problems will be 
context specifi c. Second, children in low-income 
countries learn far less than their high-income 
counterparts. Low learning affects both boys 
and girls, and gender differences are small. In a 
globalizing world, poor skills will dramatically 
affect the future outcomes of all children. 
Third, women and men continue to choose 
very different fi elds of study in secondary and 
tertiary education. These patterns of stream di-
vergence are similar across poor and rich coun-
tries, suggesting that increases in enrollments 
and learning are necessary, but not suffi cient, 
to even the playing fi eld in later life. The fi elds 
of study that men and women choose feed into 
their occupational choices, which in turn affect 
the wages they earn throughout their adult lives. 
There has been less success in addressing stream 
divergence because many barriers need to be 
lifted at the same time—households, markets, 
and institutions need to change simultaneously, 
through complex polices that act on multiple 
fronts.
F I G U R E  3.1   Gender parity in enrollments at lower levels has been achieved in much of the world, but tertiary 
enrollments are very low and favor women
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Development Indicators.
Note: The 45° line in each fi gure above shows gender parity in enrollments. Any point above the 45° line implies that more women are enrolled relative to men.
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all the rich, but only 50 percent of the poor, are 
enrolled, and enrollment is no different for boys 
and girls. In Country B, all rich and poor boys, 
but only 50 percent of rich and poor girls, are in 
school. Both countries have equal total inequal-
ity in the educational system, but the patterns 
are very different. Decomposing total inequality 
in these countries would show that inequality is 
generated entirely by wealth (with all differences 
across wealth groups) in Country A but entirely 
by gender in Country B.
Repeating this exercise across many coun-
tries represented in the Demographic and 
Health Surveys shows that in most of them, the 
situation is similar to Country A—with differ-
ences in wealth accounting for most educational 
inequality—not to Country B (fi gure 3.2). Pov-
erty rather than gender feeds overall educational 
inequalities in most of the world. In fact, even 
in countries with high total inequality (coun-
tries where the differences in school enrollment 
between advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
are high), gender accounts for at most 38 per-
now against boys. The number of countries with 
girls disadvantaged in secondary education is 
similar to the number with boys disadvantaged. 
Third, in tertiary education, girls are more likely 
to participate than boys—a difference that in-
creases with overall participation rates. Between 
1970 and 2008, the number of female tertiary 
students increased more than sevenfold (from 
10.8 million to 80.9 million), compared with a 
fourfold increase among males.
While these results are positive, they illus-
trate disparities by gender only. An alternative 
question is whether there are other dimensions 
of disadvantage, and if so, what is the relative 
weight of gender versus (say) poverty in the 
production of inequality in schooling partici-
pation? Decomposing overall inequality in the 
educational system into four components—
location, parental education, wealth, and gen-
der—helps answer this question.13 
Suppose that in two countries there is an equal 
number of rich and poor households with boys 
and girls in every income group. In Country A, 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic Health Surveys in various countries during 2002–10.
Note: The measure of inequality refers to the percentage of total opportunities that must be reallocated to ensure that all possible combinations of circumstances have the same 
average enrollment. Low inequality is between 0.3 percent and 2.1 percent, moderate inequality is between 2.3 percent and 6.4 percent, and high inequality is between 6.5 per-
cent and 26.7 percent. Results are sorted by size of gender contribution to total inequality. 
F I G U R E  3.2   In most countries with moderate or high total inequality in educational outcomes, less than 
one-fi fth of inequality stems from gender
 Inequality in school attendance among children 12–15 years old
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stitutional constraints or increasing household 
incomes is suffi cient to increase female partici-
pation in education (fi gure 3.3). When all three 
have happened simultaneously, change has been 
even faster. Take each in turn.
Changing returns. Starting from the early 1980s, 
empirical evidence emerged that when returns 
to women’s education increased, so did parental 
investments in the schooling of girls. These early 
studies showed that changes in the agriculture 
technology that increased the returns to female 
education also led parents to invest more in girls’ 
schooling. A new generation of work brings to-
gether globalization and returns to education in 
the context of changing technologies. 
The rise of outsourcing in India is offer-
ing new work opportunities—particularly for 
women. The opening of a new information-
technology-enabled service (ITES) center, for 
example, increased the number of children 
 enrolled in a primary school by 5.7 percent, 
cent of overall inequality; in contrast, poverty 
frequently accounts for 50 percent or more of 
the total. Almost all countries where gender in-
equality is a problem, and where total inequality 
is high, are in Africa—with India and Turkey the 
only exceptions.
This basic description of progress on educa-
tion shows that change has come to every coun-
try and region, and that in most countries, the 
remaining inequalities are concentrated around 
poverty and other circumstances (notably, rural 
or urban residence) rather than gender. A global 
focus on inequality would thus imply that, in 
most contexts, redistributive efforts should now 
be directed to poverty.
What explains the progress?
One key message of this Report is that progress 
has come in areas where lifting a single bar-
rier is suffi cient. Consistent with this message, 
studies now show that increasing the returns to 
educational investment in girls or removing in-
F I G U R E  3.3  What explains progress in school enrollments?
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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time to evolve. But even where returns have been 
low, changes in the structure of formal institu-
tions have increased educational attainment. 
These pathways are perhaps best illustrated by 
looking at changes in the price of schooling—
where the costs incurred could be direct (fees 
and uniforms), indirect (distance to school), or 
result from forgone opportunities (wages that 
children could earn outside school).
Reductions in schooling fees erode the need 
for families to differentiate educational invest-
ments across children. The free primary edu-
cation programs launched across Sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, increased student enroll-
ments 68 percent in the fi rst year in Malawi and 
Uganda and 22 percent in Kenya. The aboli-
tion of education levies contributed to bring-
ing more girls relative to boys into school and 
reducing the existing gender gap in primary 
education in Malawi (fi gure 3.4). In Lesotho, 
the government launched a similar program 
phased in yearly beginning in the fi rst grade, 
and participation jumped 75 percent (see fi gure 
3.4).16 In contrast to Malawi, boys in Lesotho 
have been historically less likely than girls to 
be enrolled in primary school, particularly in 
the higher grades. Free primary education sup-
ported a signifi cant infl ux of overage boys into 
the educational system.
Reductions in the distance to school have 
also helped. In Pakistan, adult women who grew 
with the increase driven primarily by higher 
enrollments in English-language schools.14 This 
increased enrollment was equally large for boys 
and girls, refl ecting very local information mar-
kets on the returns to education.
Similarly, business process outsourcing 
(BPO) opportunities affect education of 
 women.15 In randomly selected villages in In-
dia, three years of BPO recruiting services were 
provided to women primarily to increase aware-
ness and information about the employment 
opportunities. Given that the intervention was 
at the level of the village, the study found large 
effects—three years later, girls ages 5–15 in the 
villages that received the intervention were 3–5 
percentage points more likely to be in school, 
had a higher body mass index (a measure of 
health), and were 10 percent more likely to be 
employed in wage work. Human capital invest-
ments for boys did not change. The interven-
tion did not change either structures within the 
household (for instance, the bargaining power 
of the mother) or the way schools functioned. 
Information about market returns alone suf-
fi ced to increase female enrollment and improve 
outcomes for girls.
Changing institutional constraints. If female en-
rollment responded only to increasing returns, 
progress would have been slower—returns can 
be notoriously slow to move and can take a long 
F I G U R E  3.4  Free primary education reduced gender gaps in enrollments
Source: WDR 2012 team based on Edstats. 
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Changing household constraints. Higher and 
more stable sources of household income have 
helped bring girls into school even when returns 
and salient institutional features remained un-
changed. Household income has been tied to 
greater enrollments for children—more so for 
girls—and increases in maternal income have a 
greater impact on girls’ schooling than increases 
in paternal income.27 When households face 
a sudden drop in income, perhaps because of 
poor harvests, they immediately reduce invest-
ments in schooling. Whether these reductions 
affect boys more than girls depends on the un-
derlying labor market conditions.
In villages affected by droughts in Côte 
d’Ivoire in 1986 and 1987, school enrollment fell 
14 percentage points for boys and 11 percentage 
points for girls.28 During the same period, en-
rollment increased 5 percentage points for boys 
and 10 percentage points for girls in villages not 
affected by droughts. Girls in primary and sec-
ondary schools in Turkey were more likely than 
boys to drop out in the face of household bud-
get constraints.29 Similar results are found in 
countries ranging from Ethiopia (1996–2000) 
to Indonesia (1993).30 In higher-income coun-
tries, by contrast, a reduction in job opportuni-
ties for school-age children brought about by 
economic contractions may support investments 
in schooling, as work opportunities for children 
dry up.31 Typical results from Latin America—
notably Argentina, Mexico, and Nicaragua—all 
show that reductions in labor market opportu-
nities increased enrollments in school for boys 
relative to girls.32 
Unsurprisingly, programs that provide in-
come to households and help them weather 
economic downturns keep children in school. 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence on this 
front comes from studies of conditional cash 
transfers—cash given to households only if their 
children attend school for a minimum number 
of days. Giving the household the ability to pro-
tect educational investments in children when 
times are bad is precisely one of the roles these 
transfers were intended to play, and the evidence 
shows that they work.33
The bad news
Despite signifi cant progress, gender disparities 
in education have not been entirely erased. Girls 
in many regions of the world continue to face 
severe disadvantages in primary and second-
ary school enrollment, and across the board, 
up in a village with a school by the time they 
were seven years old reported higher primary 
schooling than those whose villages received a 
school after they were seven or those whose vil-
lages never received a school.17 In Afghan com-
munities randomly selected to receive a school, 
enrollment of girls increased by 15 percentage 
points more than that of boys—over and above 
a 50 percent increase in attendance for both 
sexes.18 After six months, the girls in the villages 
with such schools also reported far higher test 
scores.
The price of schooling also refl ects opportu-
nity costs stemming from forgone child labor, 
either in the formal labor market or at home 
in household chores. Higher children’s employ-
ment tends to be associated with lower school 
attendance.19 Employment rates for 14–16-year-
old boys and girls in urban Brazil increased as la-
bor markets improved, and children were more 
likely to leave school as local labor market con-
ditions became more favorable.20 For Ethiopia, 
an increase of 10 percentage points in the adult 
employment rate generated a 10–25 percentage 
point increase in the probability of fi nding em-
ployment for youth ages 10–24.21 This effect was 
stronger for youth who never attended school. 
On average, boys are more likely to engage in 
agricultural or other paid or unpaid productive 
work: the opportunity cost of education is of-
ten higher for males than females, leading more 
boys out of education and into nondomestic 
child labor.22
The fl ip side of greater male involvement in 
the formal labor market is that girls bear a larger 
share of domestic labor. Households rely heavily 
on children, especially girls, for natural resource 
collection and caring for family members. Ma-
lawian girls ages 6–14 spend 21 hours a week on 
domestic work, while boys spend 13½ hours; 
in rural Benin, girls spend 1 hour a day collect-
ing water compared with 25 minutes for boys.23 
In the Arab Republic of Egypt, a 10 percentage 
point increase in the probability of domestic 
work—measured by household access to piped 
water, piped sewerage, and garbage collection—
reduces the marginal probability of girls’ school-
ing by 6 percentage points.24 In Peru, in-house 
water supply has a signifi cant impact on the 
grade-for-age of girls but not of boys.25 And in 
Kenya, simulation models suggest that reducing 
the distance to a source of water by 2 kilometers 
would increase overall enrollment and attain-
ment twice as much for girls as for boys.26
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adults surveyed had completed primary edu-
cation. There were very few schools, and grade 
fi ve completion was low; often more children 
were out of school than in school. Attendance 
rates varied among these villages, ranging from 
10 percent to 60 percent for girls. Many out-of-
school girls were caring for siblings or working 
in the fi elds. While most members of these com-
munities suffered from hunger and malnutri-
tion, girls were particularly disadvantaged—the 
last to eat, they did not receive nutritious food, 
such as meat.36
Of 945,000 children ages 6–14 not studying at 
any school in Turkey in 2006, 194,000 said they 
could not afford school expenses, while 22,000 
had to work and thus could not study. Among 
these children, thousands are seasonal workers. 
At the crucial 14–15 age range, when children 
typically transition from primary to second-
ary school, children in advantaged groups (in 
households with fewer children living in urban 
areas of better-off regions) had 100 percent en-
rollment compared with 10 percent for those in 
disadvantaged groups (in households with more 
children, living in worse-off regions). 
In recent years, Jamaican boys have under-
achieved in school, starting in the early years 
and increasing in secondary and tertiary edu-
cation. With declines in boys’ participation in 
secondary schooling, the gender parity ratio in 
secondary education in 2008 was 1.04 in favor 
of girls, with boys twice as likely as girls to re-
peat a grade. Apart from technical vocational 
subjects and physics, girls outperform boys in 
the Caribbean Secondary Education Certifi cate 
examinations, with 30 percent of girls passing 
fi ve or more subjects compared with only 16 
percent of boys.37 A recent program identifi es 
four key challenges in boys’ development38: low 
self-esteem among young boys, violence and a 
lack of discipline, masculine identities that drive 
boys and young men away from better academic 
performance, and limited opportunities for jobs 
after graduation. 
As a region, Sub-Saharan Africa stands out 
in the low participation of females in schooling. 
The disadvantage has narrowed dramatically 
between 1990 and 2008, with the ratio of female 
to-male primary completion increasing from 
0.78 to 0.91. Yet girls remain at a signifi cant 
disadvantage in Central and West Africa, where 
only 8 girls complete primary school for every 
10 boys.39 Take Burkina Faso. Estimates suggest 
children in low-income countries learn little in 
school. As countries grow richer, the problems 
of enrollment and learning become less salient, 
but girls and boys continue to choose very dif-
ferent fi elds of study in secondary and tertiary 
education. These choices have repercussions for 
the occupations they choose and the wages they 
earn. Consider each in turn.
Severely disadvantaged populations in 
primary and secondary enrollment
In specifi c regions, missing economic drivers 
of female education combined with other area-
specifi c ecologies—such as poor safety, scattered 
populations, and linguistic differences—give 
rise to gender disadvantages, which mostly, but 
not always, work against girls. These ecologies 
are likely very different, and policies that fi nely 
target local problems will vary across severely 
disadvantaged populations. Six examples clarify 
the problem for different populations.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are two of the few 
countries where female enrollment remains low 
even at the primary level. It is widely believed 
that this is because households discriminate 
against girls in their schooling decisions. Yet, 
new evidence suggests that families are as eager 
to send their girls to school as boys when the 
school is close by, but are more reluctant to en-
roll their girls in schools that are farther from 
their houses. In Pakistan, a half-kilometer in-
crease in the distance to school decreased female 
enrollment by 20 percentage points.34 Among 
families living next to a school, girls are as likely 
as boys to go to school in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Part of the “distance penalty” for girls 
could refl ect safety concerns in crossing settle-
ment boundaries within the same village.35 In 
this severely disadvantaged population, solving 
the problem of distance to school for female 
enrollment, rather than tackling any innate dis-
crimination at the household level, will yield 
large dividends. 
The population in the highlands of northeast 
Cambodia is scattered in remote and small vil-
lages. Lack of access to land, religious suppres-
sion, and limited learning and use of Khmer 
(the national language) all marginalize these 
communities and de facto restrict access to edu-
cation. The indigenous Kreung and Tampuen 
communities in 2001 had high child mortality 
(twice the national average for children under 
fi ve) and low literacy rates—only 5 of 1,970 
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(through satellite schooling facilities) and Af-
ghanistan (through community schools) helps 
reduce the costs of travel and again brings girls 
into school.45 A comparison of the character-
istics of children in and out of school in Sub-
 Saharan Africa suggests that in 11 countries out-
of-school children are very similar to enrolled 
children and that policies that have been effec-
tive in expanding enrollments in the past will 
bring these children in.46
The precise policy to be followed depends on 
the context and how much is known about it. 
For instance, fi nancial transfers to households 
conditional on school attendance bring girls in. 
But if the purpose of the transfer is purely to 
increase educational participation (these trans-
fers also benefi t poor households directly), they 
are expensive tools, because transfers also reach 
households that would have sent their children 
to school even without the added incentive—in 
most of these countries, the cost of the trans-
fer per additional child enrolled is close to the 
country’s per capita GDP. But numerous condi -
tional cash transfer programs are producing 
 results across countries, suggesting that if  spe-
cifi c policies are hard to design, a uniform 
 “second-best” solution—conditional transfers 
to households—could work just as well but cost 
more. The problems of severely disadvantaged 
populations for education could, in part, be 
solved by getting more money to households—
provided that adequate educational facilities 
 exist. 
Poor learning for girls and boys
In addition to the problems of severely disad-
vantaged populations, a second issue, common 
to many low-income countries, is poor learn-
ing. Children in low-income countries typi-
cally learn less and more slowly relative to their 
high-income counterparts. Although there are 
small differences across boys and girls (where 
these exist, boys tend to do better at mathemat-
ics and girls at reading), the gender difference 
is dominated by the difference across countries 
(fi gure 3.5).
To see how big these differences are, look at 
the raw numbers. Only 27 percent of children 
ages 10 and 11 in India can read a simple pas-
sage, do a simple division problem, tell the time, 
and handle money. This low learning is not an 
Indian problem; it recurs in nearly all low- and 
middle-income countries. For the developing 
that three-fi fths of the population live on less 
than $1 a day and more than four-fi fths live in 
rural areas, many surviving on subsistence agri-
cultural activities. Of every 1,000 children born, 
207 will die before age fi ve—the ninth-highest 
child mortality rate in the world. Schooling—at 
a net enrollment rate of 42 percent for boys and 
29 percent for girls—is among the lowest in the 
world. Not only are schools distant and diffi cult 
to access, there often is insuffi cient room for 
children who do enroll, and high out-of-pocket 
expenses further discourage participation.40
The problems in these six severely disad-
vantaged populations are very different—from 
distance in Pakistan and Afghanistan, to poor 
economic opportunities in Cambodia, to high 
costs and low income in Turkey, to violence and 
masculine identities in Jamaica, to low physi-
cal access and overall poverty in Burkina Faso. 
One way forward is to develop context-specifi c 
strategies that address the specifi c issues. Com-
munity schools in Afghanistan have reduced the 
distances girls must travel, and in villages where 
these schools have been built, female disadvan-
tages in enrollment have vanished.41 Turkey has 
conducted large campaigns to promote the en-
rollment of girls in school, some targeting dis-
advantaged regions, such as “Father, send me 
to school” and “Girls, off to school.” Similarly, 
Jamaica is involving fathers in schooling and 
making the curriculum more boy-friendly, and 
a school-feeding program in Burkina Faso has 
increased boys’ and girls’ enrollment by 5–6 per-
centage points.42
But in each of these regions, alleviating insti-
tutional or household constraints also helps—
whether by increasing supply through more 
school construction or by increasing demand 
through easing households’ fi nancial constraints. 
Pakistan, Turkey, Cambodia, and Jamaica all 
have programs that give cash to households if 
they send their children (in some cases, specifi -
cally girls) to school, and these have increased 
enrollments for targeted children. The increases 
have been fairly large: 10 percentage points for 
primary-age girls in Pakistan, 11 percentage 
points for secondary-age girls in Turkey, 30 to 
43 percentage points for girls transitioning from 
primary to secondary schools in Cambodia, and 
0.5 days a month in Jamaica.43 Preliminary re-
sults from a fi nancial transfer pilot in Burkina 
Faso suggest similar results.44 Similarly, school 
construction in countries like Burkina Faso 
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F I G U R E  3.5   Cross-country differences in mean scores on the 2009 PISA dwarf gender differences 
within countries
Source: WDR 2012 team based on Edstats. 
Note:  The highest level is 6. In mathematics, at level 1, students answer clearly defi ned questions involving familiar contexts; at level 3, students execute clearly defi ned procedures; 
at level 5, students develop and work with models for complex situations. In literacy, at level 1 students are capable of completing only the least complex reading tasks; at level 4, 
students demonstrate an accurate understanding of long or complex texts whose content or form may be unfamiliar; at level 6, students make multiple inferences, comparisons, 
and contrasts, which are both detailed and precise.
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A REFLEX (Research into Employment and 
Professional Flexibility) study uncovers similar 
patterns. For example, Italian men and women 
are equally represented in about half the fi elds 
of study, but large gender disparities exist in the 
other half.48 Women are more likely to obtain a 
degree in education and humanities, and men 
in engineering, architecture, and agricultural 
and veterinary science. The gender distribution 
of graduates in social sciences, business, law, sci-
ence and mathematics, health, and social ser-
vices corresponds to that of the population of 
tertiary graduates. 
The sharp divergence in fi elds of study does 
not refl ect the capabilities of men and women 
in different subjects. There is no systematic evi-
dence of large gender differences in average or 
subject-related ability at the secondary level. 
Test scores from standardized secondary school 
graduation tests are similar for men and women 
in Indonesia but are slightly higher for women 
with a college education in both Indonesia and 
Italy.49 What matters instead is stronger sorting 
on ability among men, combined with signifi cant 
gender differences in attitudes. In the REFLEX 
study, male top performers on the secondary 
graduation tests were 10 percent more likely to 
choose a male-dominated fi eld than other males, 
while the impact of test scores on choice was in-
signifi cant for female-dominated and neutral 
fi elds and among female top performers. More-
over, “choosing a demanding/prestigious fi eld 
countries as a whole, 21.3 percent of 15-year-old 
children tested by the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) could not achieve 
level 1 profi ciency in mathematics—the most 
basic skills. In Argentina, the fi gure was 64 per-
cent, in Brazil 72.5 percent, in Indonesia 65 per-
cent, and in Thailand 53 percent. In a globalizing 
world, the top performers also matter. Just over 
13 percent of children in developed countries 
perform at competency level 5 or above. Com-
pare that with 1 percent or less in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Indonesia. Clearly, fi xing poor learn-
ing is imperative for both boys and girls.
The problem of stream divergence
As countries grow richer and systems of service 
delivery improve, enrollment defi cits for se-
verely disadvantaged populations and the over-
arching issue of poor learning may become less 
of a problem. But the playing fi eld will still not 
be level for women and men. Signifi cant and 
persistent gaps remain in the fi elds of study that 
women and men choose as part of their formal 
education, and the patterns of these choices are 
very similar in rich and poor countries.
As with enrollment and learning, these 
choices matter because, as chapter 5 shows, they 
translate into gender differences in employment 
and ultimately into differences in productivity 
and earnings: gender differences in occupation 
and sector of employment account for 10–50 
percent of the observed wage gap in 33 low- and 
middle-income countries (of 53 with data). As 
countries grow richer, gender disparities may 
shift from enrollments and learning to segrega-
tion in fi elds of study. So, policy attention may 
have to shift accordingly. 
These gender differences in education tra-
jectories emerge early and grow larger as young 
men and women acquire more education. At 
the secondary level, women are more likely 
than men to choose general education and less 
likely to choose vocational education. In 63 per-
cent of countries (109 of 172), the fraction of 
women enrolled in general secondary educa-
tion is higher than that of women enrolled in 
vocational secondary education.47 At the ter-
tiary level, these differences magnify. Across the 
world, women are overrepresented in education 
and health; equally represented in social sci-
ences, business, and law; and underrepresented 
in engineering, manufacturing, construction, 
and science (table 3.1).
TA B L E  3.1   Gender segregation in fi eld of study: In most countries, 
women dominate health and education studies and 
men dominate engineering and sciences
Fraction of countries where the
fi eld of study is
Number of
countries
Field of study
Female 
dominated
%
Male 
dominated
%
Neutral
%
Agriculture  3  74 22 89
Education 84  6 10 97
Engineering, manufacturing, 
and construction  0 100  0 97
Health and welfare 82   4 13 97
Arts and humanities 55   6 39 96
Science 13  68 20 96
Services 21  59 21 87
Social sciences; business 
and law 23  16 61 97
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from UNESCO Institute for Satistics.
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even when she brings home all the income—as 
in Ghana (see fi gure 5.10 in chapter 5). Reduc-
ing the time allocated to care at home will go 
only so far if schooling reinforces gender norms 
about what girls should study and parental as-
pirations feed into how much children want to 
study and what they want be when they “grow 
up.” And unless fi rms are willing to experiment 
with hiring women in male-dominated occu-
pations and vice-versa, shifting the allocation 
of tasks at home or changing the fi eld of study 
is not going to help (it may even hurt). The 
school system needs to say that it is acceptable 
for a man to be a nurse and a woman to be an 
engineer. Firms need to be willing to hire male 
nurses and female engineers. And tasks at home 
need to be allocated according to individuals’ 
time constraints and capabilities, not gender 
norms. Unless all three happen simultaneously, 
change will be hard.
From education to health
Despite dramatic improvements in educational 
participation, much remains to be done for se-
verely disadvantaged populations around the 
world. Poor learning affects both boys and girls 
and hampers the future ability of young popula-
tions to participate in an increasingly globalized 
world where, as chapter 6 shows, jobs are shifting 
from those based on “brawn” to jobs based on 
“brain.” And girls and boys systematically choose 
different fi elds of study in all countries; these are 
choices that shape later life employment choices 
and hence wages. The framework of households, 
markets, and institutions helps illustrate that 
progress has been rapid where improvements in 
any one has helped circumvent potential bottle-
necks in another; progress has been slower where 
all three need to move together.
Health issues, by contrast, are different. 
First, unlike education, where biological differ-
ences may play a smaller role, women and men 
are intrinsically different physically and in the 
health risks they face. Given the same inputs, 
girls and boys may achieve similar educational 
outcomes, but because of biological differences, 
the same health inputs may result in very dif-
ferent health outcomes. Any analysis of health 
issues needs to account for these fundamental 
differences. Second, health outcomes refl ect a 
type of irreversibility that is different from that 
in education outcomes. True, health and edu-
cation investments during childhood and their 
of study” signifi cantly increased the probability 
of enrolling in a male-dominated fi eld for men 
but not for women, and it decreased the prob-
ability of enrolling in a female-dominated fi eld 
for both. Countries pay a heavy cost when the 
average quality of every fi eld is reduced because 
of the mismatch between training and ability.
Stream divergence is diffi cult to address 
precisely because it requires policies that act 
on households, markets, and institutions 
simultaneously.
Part of the problem lies in the educational 
system, which generates expectations about 
what girls and boys are “supposed” to study. For 
example, some English subject textbooks cur-
rently in use in Australia and Hong Kong SAR, 
China, tend to depict women in a limited range 
of social roles and present stereotyped images 
of women as weaker and operating primarily in 
domestic domains.50 
Part of the problem lies with informal in-
stitutions that infl uence household aspirations. 
The Young Lives study looked at educational 
aspirations and noncognitive skills of boys and 
girls at ages 8, 12, and 15 for 12,000 children 
across Ethiopia, Andhra Pradesh in India, Peru, 
and Vietnam. Parental aspirations for the educa-
tion of their children were biased toward boys 
in Ethiopia and India by the age of 12 and to-
ward girls in Peru and Vietnam. By the age of 
15, these biases had been transmitted to chil-
dren, with clearly higher educational aspirations 
shown among boys in Ethiopia and India and 
among girls in Vietnam. Also by age 15, mea-
sures of agency or effi cacy showed a strong male 
bias in India and Ethiopia but not in Peru or 
Vietnam. Asked “when you are about 20 years 
old, what job would you like to be doing,” 31 
percent of girls and 11 percent of boys in India 
chose “teacher,” whereas 35 percent of boys and 
9 percent of girls wanted to enroll in university. 
In Peru, 21 percent of boys (5 percent of girls) 
wanted to be engineers, while in Vietnam there 
were few notable differences.51
Part of the problem lies with markets and 
fi rms that have been unwilling to experiment 
with new forms of fl exible production and em-
ployment that support family formation and 
childbearing, even in countries where other 
gender differences are notably smaller. Reduc-
ing stereotypes in education can go only so far if 
there is no maternal leave down the line and the 
woman has to do 90 percent of the housework, 
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many Sub-Saharan African countries the pat-
tern is reversed, and differences are increasing, 
as are overall adult mortality risks for both 
sexes. Worsening female mortality rates are 
particularly notable in the HIV/AIDS-affl icted 
countries, but even in Central and West Africa, 
where HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are lower, 
mortality risks are getting worse. Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only region in the world where rel-
ative mortality risks are worsening for women. 
Fourth, male mortality risks have increased in 
many post-transition countries, refl ecting par-
ticular types of behavior and health risks that 
appear to have worsened over the last three 
 decades.
The fi ndings—interpreted within the frame-
work of households, markets, and institutions—
yield sharp policy conclusions. Depending 
where they are in the life cycle, women and men 
face disadvantages for different reasons. Miss-
ing girls at birth arise from household discrimi-
nation. Any solution to this problem has to 
come through household decision-making pro-
cesses. These processes can be manipulated 
through markets and institutions, but markets 
and institutions alone will not do the trick. Af-
ter birth, although discrimination remains sa-
lient in some countries, in many other countries 
high female mortality refl ects poorly perform-
ing institutions of service delivery. Improving 
institutions is the key to reducing female mor-
tality. Even in populations with discrimination, 
better institutions can help reduce the adverse 
impacts of differential treatment. High male 
mortality usually refl ects types of behavior that 
are socially deemed more acceptable among 
men. Because there is a single point of entry for 
each of these problems, solving them will be 
hard. But for any notion of human justice, it is 
imperative. 
The facts on dying and death in 
low-income countries
Some issues that this chapter highlights are bet-
ter known than others: skewed sex ratios at birth 
in North India and China, high female mortal-
ity in infancy and early childhood in South 
Asia, and rising male mortality in some post-
transition countries have all received attention 
in the past decade. Less well known is that excess 
female mortality is a continuing phenomenon 
beyond childhood and a growing problem in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Simple comparisons of 
timing will irreversibly affect cognitive develop-
ment and learning outcomes throughout the 
course of life. But a teacher absent from school 
on any given day harms learning in a completely 
different way from a doctor who happens to 
be absent from a facility at the time a woman 
goes into labor, a situation that can turn life-
threatening within minutes. So, formal service 
delivery institutions will naturally play a larger 
role in health, and for some health issues, they 
will be the primary bottleneck. 
HEALTH
Gender disadvantages in health can arise in both 
sickness and death. Yet because women and men 
are biologically different, ascribing gender differ-
ences in mortality and morbidity to biological 
differences is fraught with conceptual dangers. If 
women live longer than men (which they do in 
most countries52), is it because they are biologi-
cally stronger or because there is discrimination 
against men? Further, biological differences may 
still be malleable: a biological predisposition 
may be easy to fi x, much like a pair of glasses will 
fi x genetically poor eyesight. But when men and 
women are biologically susceptible to different 
diseases (breast or prostate cancer), how can we 
judge whether one is more crippling than the 
other? Cutting across the conceptual issues are 
poor data: in many countries, the information 
on morbidity is sparse and of uneven quality. 
More troubling, regions with good data may 
be precisely those where gender differences are 
smaller, leading to misplaced policy priorities. 
To present a global picture, this chapter 
adopts a reductionist approach, focused entirely 
on sex ratios at birth and mortality after birth. 
If the disadvantages thus uncovered are small, 
it would be a mistake to argue that gender dis-
advantages in health are small—they could well 
emerge in comparisons of morbidity. But four 
fi ndings suggest that mortality disadvantages 
are not small. 
First, the well-known problem of skewed 
sex ratios at birth in some countries remains 
unresolved. Second, compared with developed 
economies, the rates at which women die rela-
tive to men are systematically higher in many 
low- and middle-income countries around 
the world. Third, while men die more than 
women at all ages in developed economies, in 
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Saharan Africa and other countries, although 
the rate of decline has been slower in the 
former. 
• Adult mortality rates in other countries have 
remained roughly stable over the past 25 
years, but in Sub-Saharan Africa, they dou-
bled between 1980 and 2000.
• A large portion of this increase in Sub-
Saharan Africa is attributable to HIV/AIDS, 
with adult mortality rates in high HIV-
prevalence countries reaching more than half 
the levels seen in the years of the genocides in 
Rwanda and Cambodia—but on a sustained 
and rising basis. 
• Particularly surprising is the fact that adult 
mortality did not decrease, and actually in-
creased, in several countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa with low HIV/AIDS prevalence, par-
ticularly those in Central and West Africa.
Figure 3.7 uses World Health Organization 
(WHO) estimates for all countries between 
1990 and 2008, to show how the relative rates 
of adult mortality for women and men have 
changed over this period. Countries below the 
solid maroon line saw a worsening of rela-
tive mortality risks for women, and those to 
the right of the dashed black line saw a wors-
ening of adult mortality (so countries in the 
lower right quadrant, for instance, saw a wors-
ening of both). Although the numbers are 
not strictly comparable to those in fi gure 3.6 
(partly because of different time periods, and 
partly because of the measure of adult mortal-
ity), the broad story remains similar (also see 
box 3.1).
In most countries, adult mortality risks de-
clined. In the HIV-affected Sub-Saharan African 
countries (those with a prevalence above 5 per-
cent in 2008), mortality risks are getting worse, 
and relatively more women are dying than men. 
Surprisingly, a large number of African coun-
tries saw very small improvements in mortality, 
with greater improvements for men; over this 
period, almost no country in Africa saw rela-
tive declines in mortality risks for women. In 
contrast, the majority of countries around the 
world experienced declines in adult mortality 
and relative improvements for women. Less sur-
prisingly, the other main country grouping that 
stands out prominently in fi gure 3.7 consists of 
some Eastern Europe and Central Asian coun-
male and female mortality risks over time help 
make that point. 
Of every 1,000 adults between the ages of 
15 and 60 in the rich countries, somewhere 
between 56 (Iceland) and 107 (United States) 
men and women will die each year.53 In India, 
that number rises to 213 (in China to 113). In 
Central and West Africa, adult mortality rates 
are higher, routinely exceeding 300 and in many 
countries 400. Compare that with confl ict coun-
tries like Iraq (285) and Afghanistan (479). And 
in HIV/AIDS-affected countries, the numbers 
rise to between 481 (Malawi) and 772 (Zimba-
bwe). In their mortality risks, these countries are 
worse than Afghanistan (and far worse than Iraq 
or Pakistan).
Comparisons over time highlight the dra-
matic difference between Sub-Saharan Africa 
and other regions of the world (fi gure 3.6). Here 
are the patterns54:
• Infant and early childhood mortality (under-
fi ve mortality) has declined in both Sub-
F I G U R E  3.6   Adult and child mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: de Walque and Filmer 2011. Adult mortality rates are based on sibling rosters from 83 Demographic 
and Health Surveys collected over time from 46 countries, and are estimated between 1975 and the most 
current period, typically 2000; they show the likelihood of dying in every fi ve-year period of the data.
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tries, where again mortality risks have gotten 
worse, but more so for males.55
In 2008, the 14 countries with the highest 
adult mortality risk for women (in descend-
ing order) were Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Zambia, South Africa, Malawi, the Central Af-
rican Republic, Mozambique, Tanzania, Chad, 
Uganda, Cameroon, Burundi, and Nigeria. Af-
ghanistan comes in at number 15, and Pakistan 
at number 64. For child mortality (under fi ve, 
per 1,000 births), the worst places for girls (in 
descending order) were Afghanistan, Angola, 
Chad, Somalia, Mali, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea-
Bissau, the Central African Republic, Burkina 
Faso, Niger, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, and 
Liberia. 
This basic description highlights the ap-
proach in the rest of the chapter. We will show 
that the focus on female mortality is slowly 
shifting from childhood to adulthood and 
from South Asia to Sub-Saharan Africa, while 
the problem of missing girls at birth remains 
rooted in India and China. To do so, the argu-
ment triangulates by looking at every country 
over time, by examining the historical context 
F I G U R E  3.7   Adult mortality: Over time and by sex
Source: World Health Organization 2010.
Note: Adult mortality is expressed as the probability of death between the ages of 15 and 60. The sex ratio 
of mortality is male adult mortality divided by female adult mortality. 
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BOX 3.1  Adult mortality risks: Who are the outliers?
a. Somanathan and Hafez 2010.
Several countries in fi gure 3.7 highlight particular 
stories, help motivate the analysis in the remainder 
of this chapter, and remind us why any particular 
summary of the data can be problematic, requiring 
country-by-country analysis. 
In Eritrea and Liberia the cessation of confl icts 
around 1990 reduced mortality risks for men (and 
somewhat for women). The drop in male mortality 
rates, however, worsened the relative mortality risk 
for women. A good thing for both men and women, 
this shows how a misinterpretation can be avoided 
by comparing mortality with a single reference for 
all countries, instead of within countries and over 
time (as the fi gure implicitly does). 
Iraq and Jamaica saw large increases in relative 
male mortality risks. In both countries, crime and 
violence are taking men’s lives and increasing over-
all mortality risks. The link between confl ict, violent 
crime, and male mortality is taken up in the chap-
ter’s discussion of male mortality and specifi c issues 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Between 1990 and 2008, overall mortality risks 
declined dramatically in Maldives, especially for 
women, who benefi ted from the country’s focus 
on maternal mortality and safe motherhood. The 
chapter highlights the fundamental role of mater-
nal mortality and related health issues in contribut-
ing to female mortality in the adult population.
Tonga saw large increases in relative female 
mortality risks. The problems that this chapter 
focuses on are absent in Tonga: It has high immu-
nization rates among children, very few infant 
deaths, and no maternal deaths in 2008. But Tonga 
also has severe problems with noncommunicable 
diseases and one of the world’s highest diabetes 
rates: 75 percent of women are obese relative to 
56  percent of men. Heart attacks accounted for 
48 percent of all deaths in 2006. Although the chap-
ter only touches on morbidity and mortality caused 
by noncommunicable diseases, Tonga reminds us 
that the problems today may well be diff erent from 
those tomorrow and that every region will have 
its own specifi cs that a global report cannot ade-
quately address.a
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periods in a woman’s life after birth. But because 
women under 60 years also have the longest to 
live, they account for 81 percent of the annual 
years lost around the world to excess female mor-
tality. Excess male mortality accounts for 1 mil-
lion men a year, primarily concentrated in some 
post-transition countries (more than half) and 
some Latin American countries. Because of the 
greater life-years lost to mortality before 60 and 
because of greater sensitivity to the choice of the 
reference group in the older years (see technical 
annex), the focus of this chapter is on mortality 
risks below age 60, particularly in the three criti-
cal periods for women—at birth, in infancy and 
early childhood, and in the reproductive years.
While missing girls at birth are indeed con-
centrated in India and China, consistent with 
the earlier discussion, excess female mortality 
after birth is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
only region where the numbers are going up 
over time (table 3.2 and map 3.1). These three 
population groupings—China (with a popula-
tion of 1.3 billion), India (1.15 billion), and Sub-
Saharan Africa (0.8 billion)—together account 
for 87 percent of the world’s missing girls and 
excess female mortality.
But the age profi les are very different. In 
China, most excess female mortality is at birth. 
In India, missing girls at birth and excess female 
mortality in early childhood and in the repro-
ductive years each account for roughly a third. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, excess female mortality 
in the reproductive years accounts for 78 per-
cent in the HIV/AIDS countries and 55 percent 
in the low-HIV countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the only region in the world where the numbers 
increased between 1990 and 2008—both abso-
lutely (from 0.6 million a year to 1.1 million) 
and as a fraction of the female population.
At the outset, we rule out one explanation 
for excess female mortality and missing girls 
at birth—lack of income growth (fi gure 3.8). 
There is a strong relationship between income 
and excess female mortality—Sweden, unsur-
prisingly, has lower excess female mortality than 
Cameroon, but there is little or no relationship 
between the change in excess female mortality 
between 1990 and 2008 and economic growth 
in the same period. Some countries that have 
grown (Angola and South Africa) have seen little 
change or a worsening in excess female mortal-
ity; others with less growth (Nepal) have seen a 
dramatic decline. The lack of a relationship be-
of the now-rich countries, and by ensuring that 
the facts and interpretations are robust to alter-
native data sources. At the end, “stress-testing” 
yields robust conclusions that point to the need 
for fundamental institutional reform, better 
provision of public goods such as clean water 
and sanitation, and a continuation of the war 
against HIV/AIDS.
Missing girls at birth and excess female 
mortality post-birth
Ideally, analysis of mortality risks by sex and age 
would look at the relative age-mortality profi les 
of women and men across countries and over 
time. But that is hard to do because it requires 
comparing different age-mortality functions, 
especially diffi cult when mortality risks across 
comparison groups cross (perhaps multiple 
times) at different ages. To summarize this com-
plex data in a readily understandable manner, 
the chapter computes two measures.
Missing girls at birth are estimated through 
comparisons of the sex ratio at birth in coun-
tries around the world with those in compa-
rable populations with no discrimination.56 
It also computes excess female (male) mortality 
by comparing the mortality risks of women rel-
ative to men in every country and every age with 
those seen in developed economies today—the 
“reference population.”57
This excess mortality measure is computed 
for all countries around the world at three points 
in time—1990, 2000, and 2008. To understand 
what may drive these mortality risks, the same 
measure is computed for 13 developed coun-
tries historically—in some cases going back to 
1800. Changes in the relative mortality profi le 
by age for developed countries affect the com-
putation of excess mortality in other countries. 
So, to better interpret patterns across countries 
and over time, the chapter always maintains the 
same “reference” for all computations. Assump-
tions built into this particular summary of the 
mortality data are discussed in the technical an-
nex to this chapter. 
These two computations suggest that miss-
ing girls at birth and excess female mortality af-
ter birth add up to more than 6 million women 
a year. Of these, 23 percent are never born, 10 
percent are missing in early childhood (under 
fi ve years), 21 percent in the reproductive years 
(15–49 years), and 38 percent in the age 60 and 
older group. These are the three most dangerous 
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A deadly combination of three factors led to 
increasing numbers of unborn girls in the late 
20th century (fi gure 3.9). First, fertility started 
dropping as female education and the returns to 
it in the labor force increased; in China, the one-
child policy reduced fertility. Second, ultrasound 
became widely available (allowing for prenatal 
sex determination), starting from big cities and 
moving to small towns and rural areas. Third, 
the preference for sons remained unchanged—
families now want two children, but they want 
at least one son.
tween gender disadvantages in mortality and in-
come growth is consistent with a large literature 
that comes to the same conclusion.58
To examine why there are missing girls at birth 
and excess female and male mortality and what 
can be done about it, we need alternative expla-
nations. Given the age-grouping of disadvan-
tage around birth, infancy, and the reproductive 
years, each of which may have different causes, 
the chapter develops the arguments in turn.
Girls missing at birth—The India-China 
problem
The problem of many missing girls was fi rst 
documented, separately, by Coale, Das Gupta, 
and Sen.59 Subsequent studies confi rm the geo-
graphical variation within India and China—in 
India initially in the northern belt but gradually 
spreading south, and in China a gradual spread-
ing inland from the eastern coast.60
East Asia and Pacific (excluding China)
China
India
Sub-Saharan Africa
High HIV-prevalence countries
Low HIV-prevalence countries
South Asia (excluding India)
Middle East and North Africa
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Total
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TA B L E  3.2   Skewed sex ratios at birth and excess female mortality persist across the world, leading 
to females missing at birth and excess female mortality during childhood and the 
reproductive years
 Missing girls at birth and excess female deaths (in thousands)
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from the World Health Organization 2010 and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aff airs 2009.
Note: Totals do not necessarily add up due to rounding. 
The fi rstborn must be male. After that 
it’s all the same.
Young man, rural Serbia
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M A P  3.1  In China and India, the number of girls missing at birth remains high, and parts of Africa 
experienced large increases in excess female mortality during 1990–2008
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from World Health Organization 2010 and United Nations Department of Social and Economic Aff airs 2009.
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even when the fi rst child is a boy, but when the 
fi rst child is a girl, the second child is much more 
likely to be a boy. This phenomenon has been 
demonstrated in China, the Republic of Korea, 
and India; for India, it is particularly strong for 
educated Hindu women in northern India.61 In 
addition, antenatal investments, like inoculation 
against tetanus, were higher when women were 
pregnant with boys rather than girls—and even 
higher when the fi rst child was female.62
These last results hold not only for north-
ern India but also for Bangladesh, China, and 
Pakistan, suggesting that forms of disadvantage 
against unborn girls may be widespread across 
South and East Asia.63 And they may be very 
hard to change: as in their own countries, Chi-
nese and Indians living in the United States show 
To see how these factors play out, think of 
an earlier time when every household had four 
children. In this scenario, if the fi rst child was a 
girl, the likelihood would still be high that one 
of the remaining children would be a boy. But if 
households had only two children, and the fi rst 
one was a girl, there was an even chance of hav-
ing yet another girl—rather than the son they 
wanted. As ultrasound became available, so did 
the “solution”—if the unborn child was a girl, 
the parents could abort the child and try again.
Unfortunately, this is precisely what the data 
indicate. In the absence of sex-selective abor-
tion, the odds are even that the second child will 
be a boy or a girl independent of the sex of the 
fi rst. The data show, however, that the probabil-
ity of the second child being a boy or a girl is 
Sons would ensure continuation of their family, would take care of parents at old age 
and perform funeral rites when parents die.
Young woman, rural India
“ ”
F I G U R E  3.8   Income growth did not reduce excess female mortality during 1990–2008 in low- and middle-
income countries
Did income growth reduce excess female mortality during
1990−2008 in low- and middle-income countries?
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ilies with one son. If the fi rst child is a daughter, 
the family will have another child, stopping if it 
is a son and carrying on if it is a daughter. The 
result? Girls will disproportionately have many 
more siblings than boys.66 
One result of son preference is that girl chil-
dren receive less nutrition than boys in northern 
India (but not worldwide, as nutritional dif-
ferences show). Given the repercussions of son 
preference on the different number of siblings 
for boys and girls, could it be that some share of 
the female disadvantage stems from the number 
of siblings rather than from overt discrimina-
tion? As it turns out, once family size is appro-
priately controlled for, there is no female disad-
vantage in nutrition. That is, the entire observed 
difference in nutrition between boys and girls is 
attributable to the difference in the numbers of 
their siblings. Gender disadvantage in the un-
born child—manifest in fertility behavior—has 
no further impacts on the nutritional outcomes 
of the born child once fertility behavior is con-
trolled for.
In a similar fashion, families may wait less 
time to have a second child following the birth 
of a girl than the birth of a boy. The desire to have 
very similar patterns of sex selection in fi rst and 
second births.64 
Not only does son preference affect the gen-
der composition of birth, it may also affect the 
way children already born are treated. One argu-
ment demonstrates the nuanced links between 
son preference and gender disadvantages for al-
ready born children.65
Take again the simple framework of son pref-
erence and instead of fi xing fertility, let fertility 
itself be a matter of choice. In some families, the 
fi rst child will be a son. If their “stopping” rule is 
the birth of a son, these will be single-child fam-
F I G U R E  3.9   Why are so many girls missing at birth?
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Lhamo was told that if she gave birth to a 
daughter again, he was going to leave her once 
and for all. Lhamo was soon conceived with her 
third child. He would often beat her, but she was 
still willing to take the chance of giving Dorji a 
son so that their lives would come back to 
normalcy.
Adult woman, Bhutan
“
”
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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impact of kinship structures on the value placed 
on girls has also been advanced as the dominant 
hypothesis for why excess female mortality is 
seen in some societies but not others.72
Is such discrimination against girls a wide-
spread pattern linked to excess female mortality 
in early childhood? Perhaps, as was discovered 
in Bangladesh in the early 1970s and India in 
the 1980s, girls are less likely to be vaccinated, 
less likely to be given medical care, and less likely 
to receive nutrition at home.73 But a compari-
son of countries around the world shows two 
things. First, these differences are small or non-
existent to begin with (in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
for instance, it is the boys who suffer nutritional 
deprivation). Second, there is little association 
between excess mortality among girls and disad-
vantages in vaccination, differential use of med-
ical care, or differences in childhood nutrition 
as measured through the heights and weights of 
boys and girls (fi gure 3.10). Nor is there any as-
sociation with female labor force participation. 
These patterns too refl ect similar fi ndings in the 
previous literature.74
Even if households treat boys and girls simi-
larly, it could be the case that health care pro-
viders might discriminate against girls. To as-
sess this possibility, researchers observed more 
than 30,000 interactions between doctors and 
patients in seven countries around the world—
Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, India, Mozambique, 
Paraguay, Rwanda, and Uganda—and recorded 
the time spent, questions asked, and examina-
tions completed, all markers of medical care 
that correlate with overall quality of care. Sur-
prisingly, the main fi nding was that girls and 
boys are treated very similarly once they are 
taken to health care facilities. There were no 
differences between boys and girls (or between 
women and men) (fi gure 3.11). In all seven 
countries, doctors spent the same time, asked 
the same questions, and completed the same 
number of examinations regardless of the sex 
of the patient.75
If neither households nor providers discrim-
inate against girls, what is the source of excess 
female mortality in early childhood? Historical 
forensics provide the key to this puzzle. In the 
early 20th century, European countries faced 
the same patterns—no girls missing at birth but 
high excess mortality among girls in early child-
hood. Between 1900 and 1930, the excess mortal-
ity vanished in almost all of them (fi gure 3.12). 
a son following the birth of a girl may result in 
disadvantages for the born female, if the mother 
reduces breast-feeding to increase fertility and 
hasten conception.67 The fundamental insight 
from these fi ndings is that preferences over the 
unborn child drive gender disadvantage—po-
tentially manifest in children already born.
The intersection between son preference, 
declining fertility, and new technologies has 
added to the number of girls missing at birth 
and may well disadvantage children already 
born through the number of siblings and the 
timing of births. Changes in informal institu-
tions and, through them, household behavior 
are key to resolving this problem. And it can be 
done. Korea, where the male-to-female ratio at 
birth fi rst increased sharply and then declined, 
suggests that broad normative changes across 
society brought about by industrialization and 
urbanization can ulti mately return sex ratios at 
birth to normal ranges.68
Excess female mortality in early childhood
What causes excess mortality among girls dur-
ing infancy and early childhood? One possible 
explanation that has received a lot of attention 
is discrimination by parents toward girls. Cer-
tainly, in parts of the world like Afghanistan, 
China, northern India, and Pakistan, such dis-
crimination is a serious problem. Studies have 
shown delays in seeking medical care and lower 
expenditures for girls, and in the 1990s, even in a 
period of sharp economic growth, anthropomet-
ric outcomes for boys improved faster than for 
girls.69 An economic rationale for such discrimi-
nation is a link to the structure of returns—for 
instance, in districts within India, where the soil 
is amenable to higher female labor use in agri-
culture, excess mortality among females is lower 
than the average in India.70 Higher women’s 
wages are associated with greater female mobil-
ity and authority, while higher male wages have 
the opposite effect.71 Beyond economics, the 
Nowadays, men and women are equal. 
But according to tradition, we still 
prefer having a son to carry on the 
family line.
Young man, rural Vietnam
“
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domestic hygiene practices. In the United States, 
clean water and sanitation accounted for the en-
tire decline in infant mortality during this time 
and in the disappearance of excess female mor-
tality in infancy.76
Epidemiological changes caused by these 
public health investments explain both declining 
infant mortality and the disappearance of excess 
female mortality in infancy and early childhood. 
Between the early 1900s and 1930, the share of 
infectious diseases as a cause of death declined, 
increasing the share of perinatal and congenital 
factors.77 Although girls were (and are) more 
robust than boys for both infectious diseases 
and perinatal conditions, they are even more ro-
bust than boys for perinatal conditions relative 
to infectious diseases. Boys always had a disad-
vantage in mortality, and as infectious diseases 
declined, their disadvantage increased. Today, a 
high burden of infectious disease in countries 
where poor public health systems do not pro-
vide clean water, sanitation, waste disposal and 
drainage, is part of the reason for higher relative 
female mortality risks in early childhood com-
pared with the rich countries.
If this institutional-biological hypothesis 
were true today, one would expect to see less 
excess female mortality in countries with lower 
infant mortality. And that is indeed the case: the 
relationship between excess mortality for girls 
and overall infant mortality is exactly the same 
in 2000 as it was in 1900 for the European coun-
tries (see fi gure 3.12). Bangladesh, China, and 
Vietnam, which have managed to reduce overall 
infant mortality through clean water and better 
sanitation, have also reduced the excess female 
mortality in infancy and early childhood. But in 
much of West Africa, there has been less focus 
on clean water and sanitation: between 1990 
and 2005, the fraction of urban households with 
piped water actually declined from 50 percent to 
39 percent in 32 African countries. Not surpris-
ingly, countries like Burkina Faso and Nigeria 
This sharp decline—after virtually no change 
during the entire 19th century—was coinciden-
tal with large investments in public health, nota-
bly clean water and sanitation (broadly defi ned 
to include waste disposal, drainage, toilets, and 
vector control), along with outreach to improve 
F I G U R E  3.10  There is little or no gender disadvantage in 
vaccination rates, nutrition outcomes, or use of 
health services when a child falls sick
Source: Staff  calculations based on data from the World Health Organization 2010; United Nations, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Aff airs, Population Division 2009; World Development Indicators 2009; and 
Demographic Health Surveys 1985–2008. 
Note: Data for vaccination coverage and health service use were pooled over the years 1990–2008.
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services that governments in most European 
countries provided in the early part of the 20th 
century. Reducing the burden of infectious dis-
eases will produce declines in child mortality, 
more for girls than boys.
have seen a much slower decline in early child-
hood excess female mortality.
Bringing down mortality risks for boys and 
girls in low-income countries today is largely a 
question of providing the basic public health 
F I G U R E  3.11  Men and women, boys and girls, are treated the same when they visit health facilities
  Average period of time spent with practitioner at each visit and questions asked and examinations 
conducted by practitioner
Source: Ali and others 2011.
Note: There were no signifi cant diff erences between boys (men) and girls (women) conditional on disease.
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Excess mortality in adulthood—Women
Excess female mortality also affects women ages 
15–60, particularly women in their reproductive 
years (ages 15–49) who live in low- and middle-
income countries. In this age group, excess female 
mortality has declined in absolute numbers and 
as a proportion of population in every region of 
the world except Sub-Saharan Africa, which di-
vides into two regions: the HIV/AIDS–affected 
countries, where excess female mortality has 
increased even as a fraction of population; and 
those countries, mainly in Central and Western 
Africa, where HIV/AIDS is less of a problem 
and where excess female mortality has declined, 
albeit slowly. Two mechanisms drive excess 
mortality in the reproductive years—maternal 
mortality and morbidity related to childbirth, 
and HIV/AIDS. Maternal mortality is funda-
mentally different from excess female mortality 
at other ages in that, to reduce it, societies must 
focus on an intrinsically female condition and 
specifi cally on improving the maternal health-
care system. Throughout this Report, “maternal 
mortality” implies not only death during child-
birth but also concurrent morbidities brought 
on by the experience of pregnancy and child-
birth. These include severe anemia (and its rela-
tionship with malaria) and obstetric fi stula.78
As in early childhood, adult women in some 
populations around the world experience sig-
nifi cant discrimination in health expenditures 
and health-seeking behavior. But, again as with 
early childhood, this discrimination does not 
appear to be systematic. In countries ranging 
from India to Egypt to South Africa, a small bias 
favors women in overall health expenditure and 
sometimes in use of the health system (chap-
ter 1). Clinical observations of practice in seven 
countries were also unable to uncover differ-
ences in the way men and women were treated 
by health providers (see fi gure 3.11). While these 
fi ndings could still be consistent with discrimi-
nation, due to biological differences and differ-
ent health needs, they also suggest that evidence 
of such discrimination will be diffi cult to fi nd. 
In contrast, the two issues discussed next—
maternal mortality and HIV/AIDs—have very 
clear and obvious pathways to women’s health, 
particularly to their mortality.
Maternal mortality
In high-income countries, there were a total of 
about 1,900 maternal deaths in 2008. In India, 
F I G U R E  3.12  Levels of excess female childhood mortality in 
high-income countries in the early 1900s were 
similar to those of low- and middle-income 
countries today . . . 
Sources: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from World Health Organization 2010; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Aff airs 2009; and Human Mortality Database 2011, Max Planck Insti-
tute for Demographic Research, and University of Califormia, Berkeley.
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a spike downward coinciding with World War I 
and a peak in 1918 with the fl u epidemic) and 
then declined sharply to zero between 1930 and 
1960.82 The late declines are precisely for coun-
tries—Italy, Japan, and Portugal—where mater-
nal mortality rate declines occurred latest.
For all countries in 1990–2008 and for high-
income countries with historical data, the basic 
pattern remains similar with higher maternal 
mortality ratios associated with greater excess 
there were 63,000, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
203,000 (56.7 percent of the global total). One 
of every 14 women in Somalia and Chad will die 
from causes related to childbirth. As a propor-
tion of all births, more women die in childbirth 
in India today than did in Sweden at the begin-
ning of the 1900s—and in Liberia today than in 
Sweden in the 17th century.79
Between 1930 and 1960, the maternal mor-
tality ratio—the risk of death for every birth—
fell signifi cantly in developed countries (fi gure 
3.13). The ratio began to drop sharply in the late 
1930s in most countries, driven in part by the 
introduction of sulfa drugs in 1936 and by an in-
crease in the number of institutional births with 
better care.80 The ratios then converged strongly 
across countries in the 1940s and 1950s—most 
countries reached modern levels in the early 
1960s; Italy, Japan, and Portugal reached those 
levels in the mid-1970s. Declines were sharper 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries relative to the 
Nordics, which already had low maternal mor-
tality rates in 1935. 
The United States stands out as the coun-
try with the highest maternal mortality ratio 
for 1900–30, but like the others, sharp declines 
began around the mid-1930s and fell to cur-
rent levels by 1960. These declines were brought 
about largely by simultaneous improvements in 
the medical system at the point of delivery and 
in services to pregnant women, and by shifts in 
expectations of where to deliver––from home to 
hospital.81
The patterns are fully refl ected in changes 
in excess female mortality in the reproductive-
age groups for selected countries (fi gure 3.14). 
For these countries, excess female mortality in 
adulthood remained fairly high until 1930 (with 
Nobody in this village has access to drinking water. People bring water from a spring 
and a water pool that are at a 100–1,000 meter distance from the village. Those also 
dry out during some seasons and the children and especially the girls spend more than 
fi ve hours daily to bring water. . . . 
Between the neighboring villages, sometimes violence occurs over drinking water and 
residential places because there is not enough water for people and they don’t have 
shelters and they make homes for themselves in the desert. And they sometimes fi ght 
each other over this.
Adult man, rural Afghanistan
“
”
F I G U R E  3.13  Maternal mortality ratios declined steeply in 
selected countries during 1930–60
Source: Albanesi and Olivetti 2010.
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female mortality in adulthood. Reducing mater-
nal mortality rates is thus critical for reducing 
excess female mortality in adulthood. This can 
be done in one of two ways—reducing fertil-
ity so that women are less exposed to the risk 
of death (including the risk from unsafe abor-
tions) or reducing the maternal mortality ratio 
(the risk of death for every birth).
Take each in turn. When fertility rates are 
high, reductions in the rate will reduce the risk 
of dying from causes related to childbirth. Ma-
ternal mortality risks depend on the age of the 
mother (slightly higher in young ages than the 
average across age groups and then increasing 
in older ages in a “J” shape); parity, or number 
of children borne by a woman (the fi rst preg-
nancy and higher parities increase mortality 
risks to the mother); independent cohort ef-
fects (mothers born in cohorts that smoked 
more, for instance, would have higher risks); 
and time effects (later decades imply better 
medical care). In rich countries, changes in ma-
ternal age and shifting parity distributions ac-
counted for 18 percent of the decline in mater-
nal mortality.83 Studies in a limited number of 
low-income countries (typically subnational) 
report similar estimated reductions of around 
25 percent, using models that eliminate births 
after parity fi ve and those outside the safest 
ages for birth (20 to 39). 84 So, changes in the 
age and parity structure of birth in high fertil-
ity contexts could reduce maternal mortality 
by 20 percent or so.
The studies from low-income countries 
were for periods when total fertility rates 
were high—more than 6 births per woman in 
Bangladesh, for example. Today, fertility rates 
are that high in just six countries—Afghani-
stan, Chad, Niger, Somalia, Timor-Leste, and 
Uganda. Forty countries have fertility rates 
higher than 4, and all but Afghanistan, Gua-
temala, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and 
the Republic of Yemen are in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica. For the most part, however, fertility has 
declined dramatically over the past 30 years 
in most low- and middle-income countries. 
In countries with fertility at 3 or less, further 
shifts in the age and parity distributions may 
not have large impacts on the maternal mor-
tality ratio. Because family planning policies 
account for 10–15 percent of the reductions 
when starting from initially high levels, these 
policies could continue to help in selected 
F I G U R E  3.14  High income countries today had excess 
female mortality at the reproductive ages 
during the fi rst half of the 20th century . . . 
  Excess mortality among women in 13 European 
countries, 1900–2000
Sources: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from World Health Organization 2010; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Aff airs 2009; Human Mortality Database 2011, Max Planck Institute for 
Demographic Research, and University of California, Berkeley; and Albanesi and Olivetti 2010. 
. . . and the excess mortality at all income levels declines with 
reductions in maternal mortality
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Women are biologically 1.2 times more likely 
to acquire the virus because women’s bodies are 
more susceptible to infection than men. Sexu-
ally active young women, whose bodies are still 
developing, may be especially vulnerable. Sexu-
ally transmitted diseases (such as herpes simplex 
virus type 2) that affect men and women differ-
ently also contribute to the greater susceptibility 
of women to HIV infection.90 With respect to 
behavior, women date and marry men who are 
a few years older, which also contributes to a dif-
ferential age-gradient among men and women 
in HIV infection rates.
Without treatment, HIV infection develops 
into AIDS and, after 7–10 years, death. But the 
HIV/AIDS link to excess female mortality in 
 Africa is not relevant for all countries in the 
region, particularly those in Central and West 
Africa. It is concentrated among the set of high-
prevalence countries in Southern Africa and 
parts of East Africa, which bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the burden of AIDS in Africa as 
well as globally (box 3.2).
Not only has HIV/AIDS hit women the hard-
est, but coping with the crisis has had system-
countries but are unlikely to substantially 
reduce the number of women who die from 
childbirth every year.85 The best way to reduce 
the unacceptably high number of women who 
die from childbirth (and related causes) every 
year in low-income countries will likely be re-
gion specifi c and will depend both on fertility 
reductions and specifi c policies to reduce the 
maternal mortality ratio (fi gure 3.15). 
HIV/AIDS
In addition to maternal mortality, the HIV/
AIDS epidemic is contributing to excess female 
mortality in Africa (fi gure 3.16). In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, women account for 60 percent of all 
adult HIV infections,86 with the gender gap in 
prevalence largest for younger adults. The ratio 
of female to male prevalence for 15–24 year olds 
is 2.4 across Sub-Saharan Africa.87 Comparisons 
of age-infection profi les for women and men 
show that after age 34, HIV prevalence rates are 
similar for men and women.88
Biology and behavior have both contributed 
to greater prevalence of HIV among women—
referred to as the “feminization of AIDS.”89 
F I G U R E  3.15  What explains excess mortality among girls and women in the reproductive ages?
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coverage is an extraordinary achievement: as re-
cently as 2003, only a few privileged HIV/AIDS 
patients had access to ART in Africa. And it will 
reduce the number of deaths from HIV/AIDS—
and decrease female mortality rates in adult-
hood. Botswana, Kenya, and Uganda—which 
have high ART coverage rates—experienced a 
reduction in excess female mortality between 
2000 and 2008 (although the levels are still sig-
nifi cantly above those in 1990). In contrast, with 
a high HIV prevalence, large population, and 
slower expansion of ART, South Africa saw a 
steady increase in excess female mortality from 
1990 to 2000 and a further increase to 2008.
Excess mortality in adulthood—Men
In some countries, the analysis illustrates pat-
terns of excess male mortality. In the formerly 
wide impacts on the delivery of health services. 
Prenatal care, care during birth, and children’s 
vaccination rates have suffered where HIV rates 
are the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.91
Encouragingly, these patterns are now chang-
ing, and so will excess female mortality, both as 
life-prolonging treatment becomes available 
and as incidence rates change. As of end-2009, 
an estimated 5.2 million people in low- and 
middle-income countries were receiving anti-
retroviral therapy (ART) and in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, nearly 37 percent of people in need of 
treatment could obtain those life-saving medi-
cines.92 In the countries with the highest preva-
lence, treatment coverage varies: 83 percent in 
Botswana, 48 percent in Malawi, 36 percent in 
South Africa, 43 percent in Uganda, 68 percent 
in Zambia, and 34 percent in Zimbabwe. This 
F I G U R E  3.16  Excess female mortality by age in four countries with high HIV prevalence
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on data from World Health Organization 2010 and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Aff airs 2009.
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Outside situations of warfare, violence re-
mains gendered: men stand charged for 80–90 
percent of all violent crimes in Australia, Europe 
and the United States, and the higher prevalence 
of male criminal behavior translates into higher 
incarceration rates for men.94 More male deaths 
result from homicide than from armed confl ict. 
Of all violent deaths globally in 2000, just un-
der a third were victims of homicide, the vast 
majority among men. Latin America had the 
highest homicide rate (27.5 per 100,000), more 
than three times the rate reported in any other 
region. Mexico, in particular, as a substantial 
transit and production hub for cocaine, mari-
juana, and other illicit drugs, experienced most 
of the region’s drug-related violence.95
socialist countries, in countries and regions with 
high rates of violent crime or periods of war and 
confl ict, and in those experiencing localized epi-
demics of HIV in parts of the male population, 
men die at a signifi cantly higher rate relative to 
men in high-income countries, after accounting 
for overall mortality conditions in their country 
of residence.
First, men are the immediate victims of 
armed confl ict. A study of confl icts in 13 coun-
tries during 1955–2002 found that 81 percent 
of violent war deaths were among males.93 An 
example is Eritrea, where a 30-year war of inde-
pendence ended in 1991. Figure 3.17 illustrates 
the signifi cant excess male mortality that oc-
curred there in the last full year of the war. 
F I G U R E  3.17  In some countries, there is excess male mortality
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Higher male mortality, whether from sub-
stance use, violent crime, or risky sexual behav-
ior, is not a feature of these low- and middle-
income settings alone. These behaviors also 
prevail among men across the industrialized 
world, where women live on average 5 to 10 
years longer than men. This female advantage in 
longevity is not purely genetic (and where ge-
netic factors play a role, they continue to be mal-
leable). Studies show that differences in mortal-
ity are sensitive to environmental factors. Men 
smoke more than women, have poorer diets, 
and internalize stress differently. Improvements 
along any of these dimensions would narrow 
the gender gap in life expectancy.
This fi nding raises a more pertinent question: 
What are the factors that mediate men’s risk-
taking, substance use, and increased health risks? 
Do societies condone these behaviors among 
men, because they refl ect underlying ideals about 
“masculinity” or “manliness,” at least up to a 
certain point? A growing body of literature sug-
gests this might indeed be the case, and at least 
in the high-income countries health systems have 
started to emphasize both “behavior” change and 
institutional improvements. Although policy le-
vers to effect behavioral change are multifaceted 
and diffi cult to pinpoint (after all, they require 
a shift from understanding the body to under-
standing the brain), the success of antismoking 
campaigns in the West suggests that this challenge 
is now being addressed around the world.104
Poor institutions and bad default options
To repeat: missing girls at birth and excess fe-
male mortality below the age of 60 account for 
nearly 3.9 million women a year. Excess male 
mortality, primarily resulting from confl ict and 
risky behavior, also leads to unnecessary deaths. 
There has been little change in the numbers in 
the past three decades, and in several countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, mortality risks are wors-
ening. The solutions for reducing female mor-
tality risks after birth are largely institutional: 
clean water and sanitation for infancy and early 
childhood, and better care for expectant moth-
ers, and reductions in HIV/AIDS and improved 
family planning services in some countries for 
the reproductive years.
Skeptics may question why a century of in-
creased medical knowledge and better medical 
care has not reduced the salience of the institu-
tional provision of clean water and sanitation or 
Most victims of homicide in Latin America 
are young males from low socioeconomic back-
grounds, and rates peak among males between 
the ages of 15 and 24 years.96 In addition to 
its relation with drugs and turf battles among 
competitive cartels, violence in Latin America 
has also been linked to ideals about masculin-
ity that force men to confront others when chal-
lenged. Studies of youth violence in República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela, for example, show the 
importance among males of ‘‘earning’’ respect 
in front of others, and acts of violence are one 
way to achieve this status.97 Excess male mor-
tality in Latin American countries is precisely in 
the 20–40 age group where such behavior be-
comes salient. 
Second, the formerly socialist countries are the 
location of a stark male disadvantage in health. 
In addition to the economic and social upheavals 
the populations of many of these countries en-
dured, they also experienced sharply rising death 
rates—the only region other than Sub-Saharan 
Africa to do so during the last three decades. In 
Russia, male life expectancy at birth declined by 
6.6 years between 1989 and 1994 (from 64.2 to 
57.6 years), and prime age men were hit hardest. 
Studies have identifi ed increased alcohol con-
sumption and psychosocial stress, likely brought 
on by changes in the economic environment and 
weakening social safety nets, as the primary fac-
tors causing the spike in mortality among men.98 
More broadly, deaths and disability rates related 
to alcohol and substance abuse are higher for 
men than for women across the world.99
In Thailand, male mortality in the late 1980s 
rose as the fi rst wave of the HIV epidemic struck 
intravenous drug users, mostly men. Because the 
epidemic diffused into the general heterosexual 
population much later, from commercial sex 
workers to their clients, and then from clients to 
their spouses, the peak in mortality among men 
occurred earlier and reached a higher level than 
among women.100 In addition, proportionately 
more women (53 percent) received antiretrovi-
ral therapy than men, who typically presented 
with a more advanced stage of the disease than 
women.101 Studies note the role of social norms 
that condoned risky sexual behavior among 
men, for whom visits to commercial sex work-
ers before and after marriage, often in the com-
pany of peers, were widely accepted.102 Women, 
by contrast, were expected to be abstinent before 
marriage and faithful afterward.103 
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B OX  3.2  Four Africas
Between 1980 and 2000, school enrollments in most of Sub-
Saharan Africa increased and mortality in early childhood decreased 
(albeit more slowly than in other low-income countries), but mor-
tality risks for adults increased. Data from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys show that the increases were largest among men 
with less than primary education—although mortality increased 
for both men and women and for those with and without primary 
schooling.a Ten years later, after a period of rapid growth in many 
African countries, where do mortality risks stand? And how does 
Sub-Saharan Africa compare with countries in South Asia, such as 
Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, usually thought of as places with 
high gender discrimination? There are now four Africas, each of 
which has a diff erent eff ect on women’s ability to acquire and enjoy 
a healthy life: progressive countries throughout the continent, 
where education levels are high and mortality risks low; the HIV/
AIDS Africa, primarily in the South; confl ict countries like Eritrea and 
Liberia; and, curiously, West and Central Africa.
Progressive Africa. Countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagas-
car, and Togo have largely escaped the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Mortal-
ity rates of children under age fi ve are around 100 per 1,000 live 
births (under 76 in Ghana). Excess female mortality after birth is 
lower, and school enrollments are relatively high. Reductions in fer-
tility rates have decreased exposure to mortality risks during child-
birth; total fertility rates are now between 4 and 5. In health and 
education, these countries look like Pakistan but with somewhat 
higher enrollments at the primary school level. Fertility rates are 
still higher than in India (2.7) and Pakistan (3.9), as are under-fi ve 
mortality rates. 
Confl ict Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced two types of 
confl icts over the past three decades. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
outright war in countries like Eritrea and Liberia claimed the lives of 
many young men. Except for periodic fl are-ups, these are decreas-
ing over time. Yet the eff ects last. In Bargblor Town in Liberia, no one 
has access to electricity, piped water, public stand pipes, or a sew-
age system. There is no public transport, and the nearest hospital 
takes approximately 3½ hours to reach by foot. In an emergency, 
women report having to run or walk to the hospital. Children who 
die in the hospital are carried home to their village to be buried. In 
other countries, widespread civil confl ict continues to extract a 
heavy toll among women. A recent study suggests that in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, 29 of every 1,000 women were raped 
between 2006 and 2007—58 times the annual rate in the United 
States.b Excess female mortality increased between 1980 and 2008. 
Total fertility rates hover between 5 and 6, under-fi ve mortality rates 
are between 150 and 200 per 1,000 live births, and while school 
enrollments have increased in recent years, they are still low.
HIV/AIDS Africa: The third Africa consists of countries with high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence. At the end of 2009, in countries such as 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia, and Zim-
babwe, about one in six to one in four adults between the ages 
of 15 and 49 were living with HIV/AIDS. Mortality risks during early 
childhood, school enrollments, and fertility rates are similar to 
those in India today. In 1990, mortality profi les for men and women 
in Botswana and South Africa were similar to those in high-income 
countries today. But by 2000, mortality risks increased in adult-
hood, more so for women. In 1980, mortality risks were higher for 
more educated men, while women with more schooling and both 
men and women in urban areas had a mortality advantage. By 
2000–04, less educated men and women had higher mortality risks 
than their more educated counterparts, and mortality rates among 
both men and women in rural areas were equal to those of their 
urban counterparts. 
Central and West Africa: The real puzzles in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are the Central and West African countries, including Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, among others (Somalia is very similar 
to these countries). Except Ghana and Senegal, many of these coun-
tries have seen either no change or a worsening of overall mortality 
risks during this time. In these countries, mortality risks for women 
have systematically increased. Women with more than primary 
schooling have seen the greatest increase in the risk of dying, 
although even in 2000, urban and educated women still had lower 
mortality than other groups. Today, Burkina Faso, the Central Afri-
can Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria look very much like 
Afghanistan in their mortality risks, fertility rates, and girls’ school-
ing. In these countries, mortality under the age of fi ve ranges from 
170 to 220 (Afghanistan is higher, at 257), total fertility rates range 
from 4.5 to above 7 (Afghanistan is 6.6), and adult mortality risks are 
virtually the same as those in Afghanistan. Their enrollments in pri-
mary and secondary school also mirror the Afghan data.
These fi ndings are puzzling because the countries in this group 
have little in common. Some are landlocked, some coastal; some 
are anglophone, others francophone; some fast-growing, others 
slow-growing, and some have seen confl ict and some have not. The 
Men are just like us, we all go through this hell 
together.
Adult woman, Liberia
“ ”
The worst abuse happening today is when 
a man infects a woman with HIV/AIDS . . . 
Unprotected sex causes fi ghts between a 
man and a woman, because a woman would 
say she wants to use condom but a man 
would refuse.
Adult woman, South Africa
“
”
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there—that baby is burning with a fever. 
I walked all the way yesterday to a nearby 
town to get a pill. I spent whatever money 
I had earned in the town yesterday and 
trudged back late at night, but the pill has 
made no difference.” I touched the baby’s 
forehead—it was burning and he was suck-
ing at the breast desperately but the mother 
did not seem to have much milk. I asked the 
mother if she had eaten anything. Now the 
others joined in the conversation and said 
that they were waiting for some of the men 
to return. There was no food in the house. 
They would cook something if the men 
managed to earn some rice or some coarse 
grain. Concerned about the baby’s condi-
tion, I asked if they knew about oral rehy-
dration solution. They did not know any-
thing about it—the ANM (Auxiliary Nurse 
Midwife) never came up to the hamlet.. . . .
The Sarpanch (headman) who was ac-
companying me was getting quite defensive. 
He said if these people do not come down, if 
they do not tell us what troubles them, how 
can we help them? I asked the Sarpanch to 
explain to the young mother and the older 
woman sitting next to her how important it 
was for the baby to receive fl uids. In his dia-
lect, he began to explain. “You have some 
salt in the house, don’t you? Well take this 
much sugar, put in this much water and 
boil it and then put a pinch of salt in it and 
squeeze a few drops of lemon. No sugar in 
the house? Yes, but go down to someone 
on the lower hamlet—they may not give 
you sugar if it is for yourself, but if you 
say that it is needed to save the life of the 
better maternal care. Even without clean water, 
parents now know to boil water before giving 
it to children. Even when children get diarrhea, 
most parents know how to treat them. House-
holds can always take pregnant mothers to hos-
pitals. These kinds of private solutions run into 
two problems. First, private actions do not take 
into account the fact that sick children infect 
other children as well. These “externalities” for 
infectious diseases generate well known under-
investments in private behavior. 
Second, while private actions work well when 
there are few key choices to be made, reality can 
be very different. Poor people around the world 
are forced to make many, many choices—most 
of them bad—every time a child falls sick: where 
do they get fi rewood to boil the water, where 
should they get sugar, should they take the child 
to the doctor who could be fi ve hours away, how 
much will the doctor charge, should the mother 
wait for the husband if the child needs to be car-
ried? Each choice can have devastating conse-
quences if things don’t pan out. 
Poor people everywhere have to choose and 
make many decisions about many things that 
richer people take for granted every day. When 
institutions are bad, so are people’s default 
choices—and “free to choose” becomes “forced 
to choose.” Under these circumstances, many ill-
nesses and many life choices create excess female 
mortality.
To illustrate these points, look at this example 
of providing oral rehydration solution to a sick 
child in a poor village:
The tall man pointed to the young woman 
suckling her baby and said, “Look, look 
B OX  3.2  Four Africas (continued) 
one thing they do have in common is that women’s livelihoods, 
already weak, are deteriorating. 
The four Africas highlight the dramatic eff ects of HIV/AIDS and 
confl ict—and the fact that poor institutions and service delivery 
can harm women just as much, or even more, than outright gender 
discrimination. In determining where the international community 
should focus, it is worth pointing out just how little is known about 
the continent, particularly Central and West Africa. Of all papers 
published in the top 202 economics journals between 1985 and 
2004, 149 papers were on Pakistan and 1,093 on India—but there 
were no papers on the Central African Republic, 1 on Chad, 14 on 
Benin, 2 on Guinea Bissau, and 20 on Niger. Only for Burkina Faso 
(47) and Nigeria (148) do the numbers start picking up. Before decid-
ing what to do, the global community should seek to understand 
what is going on.c
a. de Walque and Filmer 2011.
b. Peterman, Palermo, and Bredenkamp 2011; Shannon 2010.
c. Das and others 2009.
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the doctor was called, by the time the doctor 
could be found, by the time the ambulance 
went to fi nd the doctor, by the time the doc-
tor came, by the time the husband went out 
to buy drugs, IV set, drip, and bottle of ether, 
by the time the husband went round to look 
for blood bags all round town, by the time 
the husband found one and by the time the 
husband begged the pharmacist to reduce 
the prices since he had already spent all his 
money on the swabs, dressings, drugs, and 
fl uids, by the time the hematologist was 
called, by the time the hematologist came 
and took blood from the poor tired hus-
band . . . by the time the day and night 
nurses changed duty, by the time the day 
and night doctors changed duty, by the time 
the midwife came again, by the time the 
doctor came, by the time the t’s had been 
properly crossed and all the i’s dotted and 
the husband signed the consent form, the 
woman died. Today the husband wanted to 
sell the drugs and other things they never 
used to be able to carry the body of his wife 
back to their village but he could never trace 
[the body] again in the hospital.” 106
Every step of the way to delivering a baby 
safely is fraught with problems, beginning with 
the recognition of danger signs.107 Even when 
danger signs are recognized, families “are also 
aware that there is not much the medical facil-
ity can do for her when there is no trained doc-
tor or nurse-midwife, when blood shortages 
are regular, and when equipment is frequently 
broken. People do not bother to seek care when 
they know that they probably will not be cured, 
that they are even likely to die in the hospital.”108 
Even the fi rst stage of delay—the detection of 
danger signs—is unlikely in medical facilities. 
For instance, a study of provider knowledge 
of preeclampsia—a life-threatening condition 
of high blood pressure in pregnancy—showed 
that fewer than 25 percent of providers surveyed 
would have referred a textbook case of such a 
condition to a hospital.109 Nor are these prob-
lems restricted to maternal mortality: a study of 
malaria deaths, for instance, showed that 75 per-
cent had received care from health care provid-
ers, and some from multiple sources.110
The returns to solving these problems are 
large. The poorest 40 percent in Africa have lim-
ited access to safe drinking water and are most 
child, they will surely give you a fi stful.” The 
woman nodded. “Where will you get the 
water from?” I asked. Now a new problem 
arose, for the nearest pump was not work-
ing. They were all drinking water from a 
stream nearby that was stagnant and dirty. 
The Sarpanch told the baby’s grandfather 
that the water must be boiled and cooled. 
I was beginning to see the hopelessness of 
the situation. No sugar, no source of clean 
drinking water, and a shortage of fuel. But 
the man who was inebriated again got ag-
gressive, “Whatever you say, we will not go 
to anyone’s door to beg.” The women were 
listening more intently and I thought they 
intended to follow it up. “But do not just 
feed it to him all at once,” I said, “give it in 
small sips.” (How shall I demonstrate that?) 
The woman took a leaf, folded it in a kind 
of spoon and said, “like this?” The Sarpanch 
promised to help by getting a packet of oral 
rehydration solution.105
This is not an isolated story. Take maternal 
mortality. Technically, much maternal mortal-
ity can be reduced if treatment is prompt and 
adequate. Yet that is easier said than done. A 
pathbreaking study from Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Sierra Leone illustrates that even when women 
are taken to hospitals, delays in receiving care 
can lead to devastating outcomes:
Today, Mary, the lady who helps us in the 
house, came late to work. I told her off for 
being late and asked why. She said that one 
of her townswomen . . . had died in the hos-
pital while giving birth to a baby. This was 
her fi fth delivery. She was not from a far off 
village but from Sokoto city itself. She had 
not gone too late to hospital, but rather had 
gone on time. . . . By the time they found a 
vehicle to go to hospital, by the time they 
struggled to get her an admission card, by 
the time she was admitted, by the time her 
fi le was made up, by the time the midwife 
was called, by the time the midwife fi nished 
eating, by the time the midwife came, by the 
time the husband went and bought some 
gloves, by the time the gloves were brought 
to the hospital, by the time the midwife was 
called, by the time the midwife came, by the 
time the midwife examined the woman, by 
the time the bleeding started . . . by the time 
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with: in the United States the social rate of re-
turn for the provision of clean water was 23 to 
1, once the costs of mortality were taken into ac-
count.116 Clean water is known to dramatically 
reduce the burden of infectious diseases; the 
argument here is that it will also dramatically 
reduce the burden of excess mortality in infancy 
and early childhood for girls.
Similarly, to reduce maternal mortality, the 
entire system needs to work. Women need 
 folic acid before their pregnancy, antenatal 
 visits, identifi cation of potentially dangerous 
conditions, institutionalized delivery, and a 
functioning hospital. Again, the myriad choices 
that the current system imposes on households 
(which hospital, where do I get the blood, where 
do I get the medicines, how should I get to the 
doctor?) need to be taken out of the equation. 
These institutional solutions reduce the choices 
that people make and move them from a situ-
ation where they are forced to choose to one 
where they are free to choose.
Of course, there is a question of whether in-
stitutional improvements alone will make a dif-
ference even in regions where discrimination is 
salient, as in parts of South Asia. Although im-
provements in institutions alone may not go all 
the way, they will defi nitely help. That is partly 
because when households have clean water, the 
question of whether to boil the water when a 
boy is sick versus when a girl is sick just does 
not arise. But in addition, the link between 
discrimination and mortality does not require 
households to treat girls and boys in vastly dif-
ferent ways. Tiny differences in the ways that 
boys and girls are treated can lead eventually to 
large disadvantages in mortality—precisely be-
cause, at a certain time, a deadly irreversibility 
sets in. Given that children fall sick 50–70 times 
between birth and age fi ve in a country like In-
dia, actions that keep boys alive 99.997 percent 
of the time and girls 99.992 percent of the time 
when they fall sick can account for the entire 
mortality differential of 11 percent for boys ver-
sus 13 percent for girls in infancy. In contexts 
where discrimination plays out in these small 
disadvantages, institutions could solve most of 
the problems—not by reducing discrimination 
per se, but by making it irrelevant.
How institutions responsible for improving 
public health through clean water, sanitation, 
and maternal care can be—and have been—im-
proved is discussed further in chapter 7.
 
likely to use contaminated water sources.111 
Treatment at the point of use has a large impact 
in reducing diarrhea, with similar impacts for 
hand washing and sanitation (water treatment 
at source is less effective because of recontami-
nation). Increasing the coverage of piped water 
and sanitation in urban Argentina reduced dis-
eases associated with dirty water and resulted in 
an 8 percent decline in child mortality.112 Simi-
larly, access to clean water in the United States 
at the turn of the 20th century led to nearly half 
the dramatic mortality reduction in the coun-
try then, three-quarters of the infant mortality 
reduction, and two-thirds of the child mortal-
ity reduction.113 And the returns are higher for 
girls. A randomized evaluation of water treat-
ment at source showed declines in diarrhea inci-
dence only among girls under age of three.114
These fi ndings have generated debate about 
the relative benefi ts of different types of water 
treatment and the willingness of households to 
pay for clean water. To an outsider, not steeped 
in the nuances of clean water, this debate is far 
removed from the historical choices by today’s 
rich countries. 
Consider a randomized evaluation of water 
treatment in Kenya: households were not willing 
to walk 3.5 minutes more to access clean water.115 
One explanation could be that learning about 
the impacts of clean water is just very hard. Even 
if households fully understood the etiology of 
diarrheal diseases, the small reduction in over-
all disease burden and the lack of an impact on 
nutritional outcomes could make it very diffi -
cult for an individual household to “infer” that 
clean water led to better health outcomes (for 
researchers, this is precisely why the impact of 
any intervention on mortality is impossible to 
detect unless samples are huge—certainly much 
larger than what a household would have access 
to). In addition, it is diffi cult for individuals to 
handle rational calculations when probabilities 
are small and the payoffs are huge. 
An alternative, the historical pattern, is just to 
provide clean water at the point of use through 
piped delivery, ensuring that the particular 
choices households make in uncertain environ-
ments with poor learning and diffi cult evalua-
tive models are irrelevant—whether for how to 
differentially treat males and females, or what 
particular water source to use. Although this 
solution is often deemed to be “too” expensive, 
it is never clear what the expense is compared 
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very similar pattern; in India, relative risks in 
early childhood are signifi cantly lower, but the 
curves move closer until age 50, after which 
they diverge again. In Sub-Saharan Africa, rela-
tive mortality risks are similar in early child-
hood but worsen from age 10 onward and stay 
below India throughout. In Russia, by age 20 
the relative mortality risks for men are signifi -
cantly higher than in the reference countries 
and remain so until age 80.
For excess female mortality, weighting us-
ing the reference group implies that if men and 
women die at the same rate in a country, they 
will receive a higher “weight” between the ages of 
10 and 30—because in the reference countries, 
the differences are the largest here. This weight-
ing matters less at ages where overall mortality 
is low, but becomes important at ages in which 
overall mortality is high. For excess male mor-
tality, it is the opposite. As a consequence:
1. Any change in the reference group mortality 
profi le will change the computations of ex-
cess female mortality. So, throughout the 
analysis, we retain the same reference group 
for all comparisons.
TECHNICAL ANNEX 3.1
Computing the fl ow of missing girls 
at birth and excess female mortality 
after birth
This Report uses two measures: missing girls at 
birth and excess female mortality after birth. 
Missing girls at birth are computed by compar-
ing the sex ratio at birth with the sex ratio in 
comparable populations with no discrimina-
tion—typically, high-income countries, and for 
Sub-Saharan Africa, black populations in the 
United States.117 Excess female mortality is com-
puted by comparing the ratio of male-female 
mortality in every country and at every age with 
the ratio of male-female mortality in high-
income countries at the same age in 2000.118 
This gives the excess female mortality at any 
given age; all ages are then added up, either by 
age categories or over the life course to provide 
the accompanying estimates. The problem of ex-
cess female mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa that 
this measure shows has been discussed in the lit-
erature.119 We discuss the assumptions required 
for this method, and highlight issues that could 
arise.
A natural interpretation of such a compu-
tation of excess female mortality invokes com-
parisons with a “reference” group of countries. 
Another interpretation is that we summarize 
functions of mortality profi les of women and 
men by age into a single number by (a) assum-
ing a functional form summarizing the relative 
risks of men and women at every age and (b) 
weighting each of these relative risks at every 
age. Therefore, we are interested in measures like 
∑wt.h[g(mena), q(womena)] with the summa-
tion over all ages. The fi rst data reduction is the 
functional form, h[g(mena), q(womena]=mena/
womena. The second reduction is that the set of 
weights at every age, wi are the ratios of male to 
female mortalities in high-income countries.
Figure 5A.1 plots relative mortality risks for 
men and women at every age in fi ve contexts—
the “reference” high-income countries; Sub-
Saharan Africa, India, China, and the Russian 
Federation. For the reference high-income 
countries, the rates at which men die relative 
to women are similar in early childhood, in-
crease steeply with a peak at age 20 and then 
level off with a slight hump at 60. Overall mor-
tality rates between 15 and 60 are very low 
in the high-income countries. China follows a 
F I G U R E  3 A .1 Sex ratio of age-specifi c mortality, 2008
Source: Staff  calculations based on data from the World Health Organization 2010; and United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Aff airs, Population Division 2009,
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Any summary of mortality functions will in-
voke assumptions; this particular weighting is 
close to the mortality profi les in many countries 
around the world and fairly robust to different 
“reference” group comparisons until age 60. 
Figure 5A.2 compares alternative computations 
of excess female mortality using alternative 
reference groups of the United States in 2000, 
Japan in 2000, the Netherlands in 2000, and 
Great Britain in 1960. Japan has unusually high 
life expectancies for women; the Netherlands 
has one of the lowest rates of traffi c accidents 
(which kill many young men); and Great Brit-
ain in 1960 represents mortality profi les be-
fore additional deaths for males from smoking 
(the greatest difference in smoking prevalence 
by sex was for the 1900 cohort, and smoking 
results in excess deaths after age 60.)120 Excess 
female mortality is similar using the different 
reference groups until age 60 but diverges quite 
sharply after that.
In addition to the robustness issues, choos-
ing high-income country profi les as the weights 
ensures that the risks in the reference group are 
well understood, so problems that arise with 
the weighting scheme are more transparent. 
Choosing less researched contexts could make 
it harder to understand the consequences of the 
weighting scheme.
Alternative weighting measures include the 
historical mortality profi le in rich countries. 
This literature on “missing women” focuses 
on identifying female mortality solely caused 
by discrimination.121 By comparing mortal-
ity profi les today with historical profi les, the 
literature tries to control for the overall in-
stitutional environment and mortality risks. 
In contrast, this chapter seeks not to rule out 
institutional differences but to rule them in. 
If historical mortality patterns refl ect current 
mortality profi les plus additional deaths due to 
maternal mortality, a measure of discrimina-
tion would try to “control” for high maternal 
mortality. In contrast, we are interested in the 
fraction of female (and male) deaths that could 
be avoided by focusing on maternal mortality. 
There are two reasons for doing so. First, the 
chapter treats all deaths equally. Using histori-
cal mortality will show that there is no problem 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this interpretation 
would be a serious mistake. There may be no 
deaths from discrimination in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but poor institutions combined with 
2. Increases in adult mortality differentials be-
tween men and women could occur due to 
changes in mortality differentials at every age 
(for example, behavioral changes that alter 
the relative risks of mortality at each age) or 
a change in the overall mortality profi le while 
keeping the same ratios (for example, shift-
ing the burden of death from younger to 
older ages). 
3. Selection effects could bias the age-mortality 
profi le, especially in high mortality regions 
or countries. People who survive to a partic-
ular age may be systematically different from 
those who die at an earlier age. Such effects 
imply that chances of survival in the surviv-
ing cohort would be different from those if 
cohort members who died earlier were still 
alive and part of the cohort, leading to selec-
tion biases that affect estimates of excess 
mortality. 
4. Using the ratio as a summary implies that ex-
cess female mortality will increase when male 
mortality declines (as in Eritrea or Liberia). 
The chapter investigates specifi c mortality 
risks and ensures that the highlighted issues 
do not fall in this category, alerting the reader 
when they do.
F I G U R E  3 A .2  Excess female mortality globally at each age in 
2008 using various reference groups
Source: Staff  calculations based on data from the World Health Organization 2010; and United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Aff airs, Population Division 2009,
nu
m
be
r o
f e
xc
es
s 
fe
m
al
e 
de
at
hs
, t
ho
us
an
ds
 
1,000 
600 
800 
400 
0 
0 20 40 
age 
60 80 100 
200 
United States, 2008 
Netherlands, 2008 high-income countries, 2008 
Great Britain, 1960 Japan, 2008 
at age > 60 years, the 
estimates are more sensitive 
to choice of numeraire 
 Education and health: Where do gender differences really matter? 141
new censuses in 2011. Despite improvements in 
the data, in many countries these data are esti-
mates based on surveys and extrapolations. Tri-
angulating with other data sources ensures that 
the results do not depend on any one particular 
method. The chapter presents a global picture. 
Focusing only where the light (data) shines 
could miss bigger problems in the dark. The 
point is not to reify existing data but to empha-
size the geographical and age profi le of mortal-
ity risks, leading to further analysis and better 
data in the future.
HIV/AIDS make the continent one of the most 
dangerous for women around the world. Sec-
ond, improving institutions and service deliv-
ery and tackling global health issues are funda-
mental goals of the global community. 
A fi nal note on the data. This chapter uses 
the member country life tables from the World 
Health Organization for 1990, 2000, and 2008, 
and population projections from the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. The exact numbers presented here will 
change with updates to the life-tables and with 
WHAT WE SEE
Gender gaps in participation in education have shrunk dramatically 
at all levels, although disparities persist in severely disadvantaged 
populations. In addition, men and women continue to study diff er-
ent disciplines, with similar patterns of segregation across poor and 
rich countries. Finally, both boys and girls learn very little in school 
in many lower-income countries.
Male-biased sex ratios at birth persist in China, parts of India, 
and some countries in the Caucasus and the Western Balkans. Mor-
tality risks for girls and women (relative to boys and men) are higher 
in many low- and middle-income countries compared with their 
counterparts in high-income countries. This “excess female mortal-
ity,” although still widespread, has declined in many parts of world. 
The stark exception is Sub-Saharan Africa, where it has increased.
WHY WE SEE THIS
Education
The progress in reducing gender diff erences in education results 
from removal of a single barrier to schooling in households (more 
stable incomes), markets (increasing returns to education), or formal 
institutions (lower costs of schooling). Continued female disadvan-
tage in severely disadvantaged populations stems from an absence 
of economic drivers combined with other forms of social exclusion. 
In contrast, girls’ and boys’ educational paths diverge because of 
multiple barriers that work simultaneously to infl uence choices. 
These barriers are stereotypes within the education system, norms 
governing gender roles in the household that constrain a woman’s 
choice of occupation, and employers’ attitudes toward family for-
mation and childbearing.
Health
Male-biased sex ratios at birth result largely from an interaction of 
overt discrimination expressed in preference for sons, increased use 
of prenatal sex selection, and declining fertility. After birth, however, 
poor institutions of public health and service delivery lead to excess 
female mortality in early childhood and the reproductive ages. In 
parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS risks have compounded the 
problem in the latter period.
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR POLICY
First, in education much remains to be done for severely dis-
advantaged populations, either through developing context-
specifi c strategies or by alleviating institutional bottlenecks (e.g., 
school construction), or household constraints (e.g., conditional 
cash transfers). Second, improving learning outcomes is imperative 
to allow both girls and boys to participate in an increasingly global-
ized world. Third, reducing segregation in fi elds of study, which will 
in turn allow both men and women to develop the skills needed to 
enter their desired occupations, will require simultaneous change 
among households, markets, and institutions.
Changes in informal institutions that in turn change household 
behavior, such as those brought about by industrialization and 
urbanization in Korea, will solve the problem of girls missing at birth. 
Finally, reducing excess female mortality after birth will require fi x-
ing formal institutions: clean water and sanitation for early child-
hood and better maternal care for the reproductive ages, along with 
reductions in HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.
C H A P T E R  S U M M A RY    In reducing gender gaps in education and health, tremendous 
progress has been made where lifting a single barrier—in 
households, markets, or institutions—is suffi cient to improve 
outcomes. Progress has been slower either where multiple barriers 
need to be lifted at the same time or where a single point of entry 
produces bottlenecks.
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E
ven where gender gaps in human capi-
tal and physical assets are narrowed, dif-
ferences in gender outcomes could 
emerge because girls and boys, and later 
women and men, have unequal capacity to exer-
cise agency. By agency we mean an individual’s 
(or group’s) ability to make effective choices and 
to transform those choices into desired outcomes. 
Agency can be understood as the process through 
which women and men use their endowments 
and take advantage of economic opportunities to 
achieve desired outcomes. Thus, agency is key to 
understanding how gender outcomes emerge 
and why they are equal or unequal.
Across all countries women and men differ in 
their ability to make effective choices in a range 
of spheres, with women typically at a disadvan-
tage. This chapter focuses on a selection of out-
comes closely associated with women’s ability 
(or inability) to make choices. These outcomes 
are related and often compound each other; as 
a result, a women’s ability to choose and act at 
any point in time partly refl ects foundations laid 
earlier in her life, often starting in childhood. 
These outcomes, or expressions of agency, are
• Control over resources—measured by wom-
en’s ability to earn and control income and to 
own, use, and dispose of material assets.
• Ability to move freely—measured by wom-
en’s freedom to decide their movements and 
their ability to move outside their homes. 
• Decision making over family formation—
measured by women’s and girls’ ability to de-
cide when and whom to marry, when and 
how many children to have, and when to 
leave a marriage. 
• Freedom from the risk of violence—mea-
sured by the prevalence of domestic violence 
and other forms of sexual, physical, or emo-
tional violence.
• Ability to have a voice in society and infl u-
ence policy—measured by participation and 
representation in formal politics and engage-
ment in collective action and associations. 
In analyzing how economic growth, formal 
institutions, informal institutions, and markets 
interact to enable or constrain women’s agency, 
four core fi ndings emerge.1 First, economic 
growth can improve the material conditions for 
exercising agency—through higher incomes, 
greater access to services, and expanded infra-
structure. But the impact of higher aggregate 
incomes on women’s agency partly hinges on 
women’s ability to earn their own incomes; that 
ability increases their bargaining power within 
the household and their ability to accumulate 
autonomous assets. Economic growth alone will 
not eliminate gender differences in agency.
Second, expanding women’s rights can fos-
ter agency in some realms. But the expansion 
of rights for family formation and control over 
household resources has been limited. And the 
effectiveness of expanding rights in bringing 
about change depends on their applicability—
often linked to multiple legal systems—and 
their enforcement. 
Third, social norms shape women’s agency. 
Along with markets and institutions, they de-
termine the endowments and opportunities 
that women have and whether they can exercise 
the choices to use them. Norms can constrain 
women’s agency when they prevent laws, ser-
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vices, and incomes from benefi ting women and 
men equally. Social norms are particularly bind-
ing when increases in women’s agency would 
 directly shift power balances in the household 
and in society. Reforms in markets and institu-
tions, such as service delivery improvements, in-
formation provision, and creation of networks, 
can reduce the bind of social norms by affecting 
the costs and benefi ts of compliance.
Fourth, women’s collective agency can trans-
form society. Women’s collective agency both 
depends on and determines their individual 
agency. Women’s ability to infl uence their en-
vironment goes beyond formal political chan-
nels, which can be limited by social norms and 
beliefs regarding gender roles and institutional 
structures. Women can infl uence their environ-
ments through their participation in informal 
associations and through collective action, but 
their success depends in part on their individual 
ability to make effective choices.
WOMEN’S AGENCY MATTERS
Women’s agency matters at three levels. It has 
intrinsic relevance for women’s individual well-
being and quality of life. It has instrumental rel-
evance for actions that improve the well-being 
of women and their families. And it is required 
if women are to play an active role in shaping 
institutions, social norms, and the well-being of 
their communities.2
• Women’s ability to infl uence their lives matters 
in and of itself. A person’s ability to make ef-
fective choices and exercise control over one’s 
life is a key dimension of well-being. Women 
and men can contest and alter their condi-
tions only if they are able to aspire to better 
outcomes, make effective choices, and take 
action to improve their lives.
• Women’s ability to infl uence their own lives 
also matters for other aspects of well-being. 
Agency determines women’s ability to build 
their human capital and access economic 
 opportunities. Family formation decisions, 
especially about the timing of marriage and 
childbearing and the number of children, are 
critical for women’s investments in educa-
tion. Indeed, delays in marriage are strongly 
associated with greater education, earnings, 
and health-seeking behavior.3 In Bangladesh, 
women with greater control over health care, 
household purchases, and visits to relatives 
and friends were found to have systematically 
higher nutritional status (even within in-
come groups).4 Physical mobility is also 
 critical for girls’ and women’s access to ser-
vices—including education, health, water, 
and justice—and for the development of so-
cial networks. In Zambia, women who live 
fewer than two hours from health institu-
tions are twice as likely to have an institu-
tional delivery as those who live farther away.5 
In Pakistan, greater physical mobility is asso-
ciated with greater use of contraceptives and 
access to care.6 In the United States, access to 
contraception increased the age at marriage 
and earnings, while in Europe birth control 
rights increased women’s labor force partici-
pation and income.7 
• Women’s exercise of agency improves their 
children’s welfare. Gender differences in pref-
erences are refl ected in different patterns of 
expenditure and consumption within the 
household, with women more strongly fa-
voring investments in children’s human capi-
tal. Women’s control of income and assets 
is important as an instrument for child wel-
fare. In Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, and the United 
Kingdom, women’s greater control over in-
come increases spending on goods that ben-
efi t children.8 In Ghana, the share of assets 
and the share of land owned by women 
are positively associated with higher food ex-
penditures among rural households.9 In Ne-
pal, where mothers have greater ownership 
of land, fewer children are severely under-
weight.10 And in Mexico, the daughters (but 
not the sons) of women with greater control 
over decisions within their households work 
fewer hours in household tasks.11
• Women’s agency also shapes their children’s fu-
ture behavior. What children see and experi-
ence in the home can infl uence lifelong beliefs 
and behaviors. Childhood witnesses to or vic-
tims of domestic violence are more likely to 
later perpetrate or experience domestic vio-
lence as adults—men who had witnessed 
 domestic violence in childhood were two to 
three times more likely than other men to 
perpetrate violence (fi gure 4.1).12 The percep-
tions of children—both girls and boys—of 
what activities or behaviors are acceptable for 
men and women are also often shaped in the 
home. In Japan men raised by full-time work-
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ing mothers are less likely to support the divi-
sion of gender roles, and in the United States 
both women whose mothers worked and the 
wives of men whose mothers worked are sig-
nifi cantly more likely to work.13 Thus, wom-
en’s ability to remain safe from violence and 
to exercise greater economic agency can limit 
the intergenerational transmission of violence 
and promote positive norms on gender roles.
• Women’s collective agency is transformative, 
promoting changes in society and policy. While 
individual women might have limited voice, 
groups of women and girls can exert much 
more pressure. Acting together they can at 
times overcome constraints facing individu-
als. And while an individual woman’s greater 
ability to exercise agency might help her 
reach better outcomes for herself within her 
environment and constraints, it rarely is suf-
fi cient to promote structural changes that 
will reform the environment for other 
women. By contrast, women’s collective voice 
can contribute to changes in laws, policies, 
services, institutions, and social norms that 
eventually will increase women’s individual 
agency. In higher-income countries greater 
female representation has increased the 
prominence of issues more relevant to wom-
en’s lives, including child mortality, mater-
nity leave, child care, and violence against 
women.14 An analysis of changes in gender 
policies in 70 countries highlights the signifi -
cant role of women’s collective movements 
since 1975 in promoting more egalitarian 
family laws and addressing violence against 
women.15 Greater representation in local po-
litical bodies, such as the panchayats in India, 
has also resulted (in some contexts) in greater 
allocations to some infrastructure and other 
services serving women’s and their children’s 
needs—as well as in greater women’s partici-
pation in village meetings, increased report-
ing of crimes against women, and more ar-
rests for such crimes.16 
Overall, progress in outcomes associated 
with women’s agency has been limited. Women 
still control fewer assets, have less autonomous 
income, and have less control over household 
decisions than men. Levels of domestic violence 
remain high across nations, and women have 
limited voice in governments and parliaments. 
The next three sections, following the analytical 
framework, systematically analyze the roles of 
economic growth and markets, formal institu-
tions (laws and services), and social norms in 
infl uencing women’s capacity for agency (fi gure 
4.2). They show how these determinants play 
a role in defi ning women’s agency—and how 
constraints in each of them can be mutually 
 reinforcing.
ECONOMIC GROWTH CAN PROMOTE 
WOMEN’S AGENCY BUT HAS 
LIMITED IMPACT 
Economic growth can promote the exercise 
of women’s agency by removing fi nancial 
constraints, by increasing women’s economic 
opportunities and autonomous income, and 
by expanding services and infrastructure. But 
its overall impact hinges on women’s greater 
access to their own incomes and economic 
 opportunities.
Higher household incomes remove some 
fi nancial constraints to women’s agency
Higher household incomes and assets can re-
duce the need to ration goods or services be-
tween men and women (or boys and girls). For 
example, programs in Colombia, Kenya, and 
Malawi that provided cash transfers or subsidies 
for school expenses increased the age at marriage 
F I G U R E  4.1   Witnessing violence as a child is associated with 
perpetrating violence as an adult
Source: Barker and others 2011.
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expenditure. In South Asia the percentage of 
women who have some role in deciding on vis-
its to  relatives increases from 57 percent for the 
poorest quintile to 71 percent for the richest 
quintile, and the share increases from 80 per-
cent to 92 percent for decisions over their own 
earnings (fi gure 4.4). Similar patterns hold for 
other regions.
Women’s earnings opportunities and own 
assets promote their bargaining power
Another channel for economic growth (and 
higher national incomes) to affect women’s 
agency is through the expansion of earning op-
portunities. Economic growth changes employ-
ment structures in ways that typically open new 
opportunities for women and create new in-
centives for them to join the labor force. When 
higher incomes come mainly through men’s 
greater earnings, the impact on women’s agency 
might be muted or even negative. But higher 
incomes that come through women’s own earn-
for girls and reduced early pregnancy.17 Greater 
household wealth can also reduce the need for 
girls to marry early to reduce the fi nancial strain 
on the household. Throughout the world girls 
and women in richer households marry later on 
average (although there are exceptions for some 
regions or communities) (fi gure 4.3).
Higher household incomes and wealth can 
also release fi nancial constraints on physical mo-
bility. The cost of transportation can be a barrier 
to accessing services and information or em-
ployment opportunities and markets (chapter 5 
discusses the latter in greater depth). In Brazil 
and Burkina Faso about a fourth of the cost of 
receiving health services in a hospital relates to 
transport.18 And data from 36 countries show 
that greater wealth is associated with weaker 
mobility constraints related to infrastructure.19 
Women in wealthier households report 
having greater control over decision making, 
as households enjoy greater discretionary in-
come beyond levels required to cover basic 
F I G U R E  4.2   Limited  progress in women’s agency is explained by mutually reinforcing constraints in 
markets, formal institutions, and informal institutions
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women’s wages explains about a tenth of the 
observed reduction in domestic violence.21 But 
improvements in women’s economic position 
can also challenge social norms on women’s role 
in the household and in society and lead to an 
increase in some forms of domestic violence 
or threats of such violence in the short term, a 
factor that needs to be taken into account when 
designing interventions.22 
Women’s income affects their accumulation 
of physical, human, and fi nancial assets, in-
cluding pensions and insurance. Together with 
inheritance or programs of land redistribu-
tion, a woman’s own income is one of the key 
mechanisms for the accumulation of personal 
assets. And personal assets matter greatly for a 
woman’s ability to exit a marriage, to cope with 
shocks, and to invest and expand her earnings 
and economic opportunities. 
Two important assets are land and pensions. 
Evidence from six countries in Latin America 
suggests that markets were the second most im-
portant channel for land acquisition for women, 
but a much less frequent channel of acquisition 
of land than for men (fi gure 4.5). And in coun-
tries where transfers from the state or commu-
nity are sizable, men more frequently are benefi -
ciaries. An analysis of the factors behind these 
differences points to discrimination in land 
markets and to differences in incomes and ac-
cess to credit.23 
For pensions the patterns of wealth accumu-
lation mirror those observed for labor market 
earnings, with women around the world having 
on average both lower participation in pension 
systems and lower savings. Evidence from the 
United Kingdom and the United States suggests 
that men’s total pension assets are substantially 
larger than women’s, even when the percentages 
of men and women enrolled in a pension sys-
tem are similar. The well-being of many elderly 
women thus depends on their husband’s access 
to savings and pensions and on the rules for 
benefi ts provided to survivors once the pension 
ings increase their voice and bargaining power 
in multiple ways. 
There is also evidence of a relationship be-
tween women’s assets, earnings, and shares of 
household income and the incidence of domes-
tic violence. In Colombia, India, South Africa, 
and Uganda, women’s asset ownership is asso-
ciated with lower risk of domestic violence, at 
least in the medium term.20 And in the United 
States, a reduction in the gap between men and 
F I G U R E  4.3   Richer women marry later
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys 2003–09. 
Note: Sample of girls ages 15–17; wealth measured by quintiles. 
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lic transport services can also improve outcomes 
for women and girls. In rural Guatemala and 
Pakistan, the expansion of rural road networks 
had a strong impact on female mobility and 
holder dies. In most regimes, some mechanisms 
are in place to ensure that survivors receive part 
of the pension held by their deceased spouse, 
but the rules can vary greatly in ways that affect 
women’s agency (box 4.1). 
Access to formal savings instruments helps 
protect assets. And women have more limited 
access to fi nancial services than men do—in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 22 percent of 
women have savings accounts compared with 
28 percent of men (16 percent and 23 percent, 
respectively, for debit/ATM cards) and in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 13 percent of women and 18 
percent of men have bank accounts.24 
Greater economic opportunities for women 
and girls can also promote women’s exercise of 
agency by broadening their networks—from 
mostly kin-related networks—and thus expand-
ing their sources of information and support. 
The increased physical mobility that often comes 
with employment puts women in contact with 
a new set of individuals at work and in other 
places. When women work full time, they are ac-
tively engaged in unions or professional associa-
tions at almost the same rate as men (fi gure 4.6). 
Women make up 44 percent of union members 
(about 50 million workers) in 30 European 
countries.25 In many countries, adolescent girls 
tend to dedicate a signifi cant amount of time to 
unpaid domestic work, while boys focus more 
on paid work or recreational time. As a result, 
girls’ social networks can be thinner than those 
of boys (and can weaken around adolescence).26 
Economic growth also promotes agency 
through expanded infrastructure and 
service provision 
Part of the association between country incomes 
and women’s agency is related to the expansion 
of infrastructure. Indeed, because of their role 
as caregivers, women and girls tend to face im-
portant constraints on their time and physical 
mobility that investments in electricity, water, 
roads, and transportation services can mitigate. 
Investments in electricity networks in rural 
South Africa raised women’s employment by 
almost 10 percentage points in fi ve years. Elec-
tricity freed up time from home production for 
women and expanded the types of market ac-
tivities available to them (service jobs requiring 
power, for example) but had no signifi cant effect 
on male employment.27 The expansion of rural 
road networks and the provision of urban pub-
F I G U R E  4.4   Women’s control is greater in wealthier households 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys 2003–09, 40 countries.
Note: Sample of married women for control over large purchases and visits to relatives and married women 
working for cash for control over own earnings. 
F I G U R E  4.5   Form of acquisition of land by gender in six 
Latin American countries
Source: Deere and León 2003.
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schooling.28 In urban settings, particularly at the 
periphery, the availability, cost, and effi ciency of 
public transport services make a difference. Long 
commutes limit women’s ability to take formal 
or higher paying jobs because they are not com-
patible with their care duties. In Durban, South 
Africa, women in peripheral areas suffer poor 
access to central jobs and to local amenities be-
cause of defi cient transport systems.29 
Higher country incomes are also typically as-
sociated with an increase in the provision and 
quality of public services. Such services can ex-
pand women’s exercise of agency. For example, re-
productive health services can help women (and 
men) make decisions about their own fertility.30 
Indeed, many young men and women surveyed 
for the qualitative study on gender and economic 
choice prepared for this Report said family plan-
ning services were instrumental in shifting de-
cision making about having children from the 
male to the couple.31 Although the availability 
of modern contraceptives has increased signifi -
cantly over the past decades in most countries, 
in line with rising incomes, and these services 
are widely available, constraints remain. The 
main ones, cited by two-thirds of women, were 
health concerns or opposition to contraceptives 
(fi gure 4.7). However, in line with increased ac-
cess, only 8 percent of the women surveyed said 
lack of access and issues of cost were the main 
reasons they did not use contraceptives. The role 
of intrahousehold bargaining over fertility con-
Women have fewer assets in formal pension systems than men do. Even when 
they work, they are less covered because they have lower earnings, work fewer 
hours, and participate less in the formal sector. Data from 25 European coun-
tries show that only in 6 countries is the share of elderly women receiving a 
pension (as a share of total women over retirement age) larger than the equiva-
lent share for men. In other countries the share is as low as 40 percent (Luxem-
bourg) or 60 percent (Austria, Greece, and Malta). In the United States currently, 
women and men have similar coverage rates (around 65 percent), but the 
amounts women have accumulated in their individual accounts are on average 
half that of men. In China, pensions are the primary source of income for 57 
percent of retired  men in urban areas, but for only 35 percent of women, who 
tend to rely more on family support (box fi gure 4.1.1).
On the inheritance of pension rights for spouses, data from 24 countries 
from all regions show that, in most countries, the wife is among the fi rst recipi-
ents, together with her children. In Bolivia, the Philippines, and Togo, the wife’s 
entitlement stops when she remarries, and the daughter’s entitlement similarly 
stops upon her marriage (while sons are usually entitled up to a certain fi xed 
age). The conditional rules suggest that pensions for widows are conceived not 
as entitlements that women have for having provided nonmonetary contribu-
tions to their households, but as mechanisms to replace the main breadwinner 
until they marry another one. 
In recent years, many pension systems have adopted individual accounts, 
reduced the redistributional element of the system, and adopted diff erent 
annuity tables for men and women to refl ect women’s longer life expectancy. 
These reforms leave women with less fi nancial autonomy in their older years.
BOX 4.1  Pensions—Coverage, amounts, and survivor 
benefits are important for women’s autonomy
Sources: ILO 2010; International Social Security Association. Social Security Country Profi les, http://www.issa
.int/Observatory/Country-Profi les; Johnson 1999.
Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics, one percent population sample 
data. 
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their voices, make choices, and accumulate as-
sets in many countries. 
But the power of laws in increasing women’s 
agency can be limited by four factors. First, dis-
crimination persists in many formal statutory 
legal systems, particularly around marriage and 
control over resources. Second, customary laws 
in many countries have large spheres of infl u-
ence, especially in relation to family law. Third, 
the enforcement of rights—and the ability of 
women to seek redress or to demand that their 
rights be enforced—is critical if rights are to have 
an impact on women’s ability to exercise agency. 
Fourth, markets and social norms interact with 
laws, either limiting or enhancing their impacts.
Rights matter for women’s agency
Voting rights for women are now near univer-
sal. Head of household rules in Napoleonic 
codes, the doctrine of couverture in common 
law statutes, and religious or customary law that 
restricted married women’s legal capacity and 
their right to work have been reformed in many 
countries, although a few exceptions persist. 
Changes in other laws can promote women’s 
agency. Indeed, many laws can increase women’s 
trol is illustrated in Zambia, where women used 
contraceptives more frequently when they could 
hide the use from their spouse.32
But in a few countries and for some popu-
lation groups, supply remains a signifi cant 
issue—in Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and the 
Philippines, around 20 percent of women in 
need lacked access. And poverty also constrains 
access. For instance, almost 18 percent of the 
poorest fi fth of women in need lacked access 
to contraception in Benin and Indonesia, com-
pared to only 3 percent of the richest fi fth. Also, 
the transition to sexual maturity can be diffi cult 
to navigate for adolescent girls, who tend to have 
limited knowledge of reproductive health and 
contraception. They also tend to have limited 
bargaining power, and many experience un-
wanted sexual encounters.33 Social norms that 
disapprove or condemn their sexual activity may 
discourage these girls from seeking reproductive 
health services; in some countries, young girls 
must have parental consent before they can re-
ceive such services.34 As a result, about 60 per-
cent of unsafe abortions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are performed on girls and women ages 15–24; 
worldwide, an estimated 25 percent of unsafe 
abortions are performed on girls ages 15–19.35
Even when country incomes and women’s 
agency are associated, the association varies 
greatly across countries and outcomes, suggest-
ing that many aspects of agency are driven by 
other factors. Formal institutions—laws and 
services—can impose or ease constraints on the 
exercise of agency. And prevailing social norms 
and their associated beliefs can promote or re-
strict its expression.
RIGHTS AND THEIR EFFECTIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION SHAPE WOMEN’S 
CHOICES AND VOICES
Among formal institutions, laws formalize 
women’s rights and provide the framework that 
defi nes the environment in which women ex-
ercise agency. Many laws refl ect different treat-
ment of men and women in the past or are the 
formal recognition of unequal social norms and 
practices. So, ensuring that laws treat the two 
sexes equitably can be instrumental in reversing 
the status quo. Acknowledging rights has been a 
critical force behind women’s ability to express 
F I G U R E  4.6   Working outside the home broadens men’s and 
women’s networks (almost) equally
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys 2004–09, 38 countries. 
Note: Sample of men and women working full time.
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legal extension of compulsory schooling by three 
years in 1997 (to age 14) reduced the proportion 
of 16-year-old girls who were married by 45 per-
cent and the percentage of those giving birth by 
age 17 by 36 percent.36 While the share of women 
autonomy even if that was not their intended ob-
jective. For example, laws requiring compulsory 
education have delayed marriages and childbear-
ing, increasing women’s agency. In Turkey, where 
out-of-wedlock birth is not socially accepted, the 
F I G U R E  4.7   In most countries, access to contraceptives is a less signifi cant 
constraint than lack of knowledge and opposition to contraception 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys 2003–09. 
Note: Sample of women who do not want children in next two years, are fecund, and do not use contraception. 
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tion; equal parental rights and rights over chil-
dren; equal personal rights as spouses; and equal 
rights in ownership, acquisition, management, 
and disposition of property.40 
Women now have the legal ability to own 
assets in most countries, but men and women 
still have different ownership rights in at least 
nine countries.41 Women may be restricted in 
acquiring, selling, transferring, or bequeathing 
property, and the consent of a male guardian or 
husband is needed before a woman can make 
any purchase, sale or, transfer of assets. In some 
cases, a woman may control only a portion of 
her personal property. Any breach of these lim-
its could trigger a husband’s right to administer 
a wife’s personal property. In some cases, even 
property registration may require the consent 
of a male guardian. Citizenship laws may pre-
vent women from passing on their nationality to 
foreign husbands or their children. This matters 
because lack of citizenship can limit access to 
state benefi ts such as free education and curtail 
the extent to which national laws apply.
Inheritance is one of the main mechanisms 
for the accumulation of assets. In many coun-
tries, women and girls still have fewer inheri-
tance rights than men and boys. In 21 of the 63 
countries that have data for more than 40 years, 
women have unequal inheritance rights (in the 
absence of wills) (fi gure 4.8). This is particularly 
relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa, where fewer 
than half of widows (or their children) report 
having received any of their late husband’s assets 
(data from 16 countries, see box 4.6). All coun-
tries in the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD), the former 
Soviet Union, and Latin America reformed their 
inheritance laws more than 50 years ago. Non-
OECD countries that have a common law legacy 
or that recognize customary or religious law are 
more likely to exhibit unequal rights for sons 
and daughters. Among majority Muslim coun-
tries, there are important doctrinal differences, 
with some granting greater inheritance shares 
for girls. In Turkey, inheritance rights for boys 
and girls have long been equal in practice as well 
as in law. And in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
girls’ share of inheritance is generally equal to 
boys. In other countries, such as Bangladesh, the 
law provides for unequal inheritance rights, but 
mechanisms exist for families to agree on more 
equitable distributions if they so desire. Finally, 
in a few countries, such as Bhutan, girls inherit 
who eventually marry or the number of children 
they eventually have was not affected, the timing 
matters because early marriage and childbearing 
reduce educational achievements and thus earn-
ings and agency in adult life. 
Laws that increase control over income and 
assets may improve women’s position within 
their own households by strengthening their 
ability to leave marriages (“exit options”) and 
increasing their bargaining power. The improve-
ment in the legal status of girls can also, by in-
creasing their value, induce other changes: in-
vestments in girls’ education may increase, ages 
at marriage may increase, or childbearing may 
be delayed. For example, reforms to inheritance 
laws in India resulted in delays in marriage for 
girls, more education (increasing the number of 
years of schooling by an average of 11–25 per-
cent), and lower dowry payments.37 
Laws that allow or facilitate divorce can also 
increase women’s capacity to choose. For exam-
ple, laws that enable women to seek divorce and 
that provide for equitable fi nancial provisions 
affect the spouses’ work and income transfers 
within households. In countries where women 
receive half the household’s wealth upon divorce, 
women may work fewer hours because they feel 
more sheltered by the prospect of an equitable 
division of marital property.38 In the United 
States, these laws also reduced investments in 
marriage-specifi c capital, such as investments in 
the education of a spouse (although home own-
ership was not affected) because of the increased 
risk of losing the asset upon divorce; domestic 
violence also fell by around 30 percent.39
Progress in areas that regulate relations 
within households has been limited 
Progress in improving laws has been slowest in 
areas that regulate relations within households. 
Many programs and policies seem to stop at the 
household’s doorstep and avoid interfering with 
relations within households. This resistance is 
also refl ected in the reservations that countries 
make when signing up for the Convention to 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. Of the 187 countries that have rati-
fi ed the convention, 29 have not fully endorsed 
article 16, which calls for the elimination of 
discrimination in all matters relating to mar-
riage and family relations, including the right 
to enter marriage; the right to freely choose a 
spouse; equal rights in marriage and its dissolu-
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leaves discretion in the allocation of the other 
half of the estate, which individuals can choose 
to pass on only to their sons, but it does offer 
some protection for girls and widows.44 
Rights in marriage and its dissolution are 
critical for women’s agency 
In many countries, legal systems do not uphold 
equal rights for women at all stages of the life 
cycle. Marriage is a milestone that sometimes 
weakens women’s legal and property rights. In 
some cases the legal capacities and responsibili-
ties women have before marriage are transferred 
to their husbands upon marriage. In some coun-
tries marriage reduces women’s civil capacity—
by preventing them from applying for a pass-
port, entering a contract, or appearing in court 
without their husbands’ permission.
The impact of marriage is also felt in prop-
erty regimes that stipulate the amount of assets 
women can control, both during the marriage 
and in case of divorce. The type of property 
regime can thus shape the bargaining power a 
woman has within her household. A property 
most of their parents’ property, and property 
titles are mostly in women’s names.42
Even when countries reform their laws toward 
more equal treatment of men and women, im-
portant differences can persist. In India, amend-
ments to inheritance legislation that granted 
sons and daughters equal rights in joint family 
property in a few states signifi cantly increased 
daughters’ likelihood to inherit land, but the le-
gal change alone was insuffi cient to fully com-
pensate for females’ underlying disadvantage.43 
Laws are sometimes ignored or weakly enforced 
or may be circumvented through the making 
of wills (for example, when families explicitly 
choose to give more to sons than to daughters). 
Some countries with systems based on religious 
laws limit the discretion individuals have in des-
ignating their heirs (or provide venues for chal-
lenging a will), helping to ensure that women’s 
share of the inheritance is protected. The same 
approach is sometimes found in nonreligious 
codes. In Brazil, wills have to give at least half 
the estate to children and widows, and boys and 
girls must inherit equally. This requirement 
F I G U R E  4.8   Progress on inheritance is faster for daughters than for widows
(percentage of countries with equal, unequal, or customary inheritance)
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Htun and Weldon 2011b, Women Africa database, and World Bank’s Gender Law Library. 
Note: Countries are given equal weight in the calculation of regional percentages. 
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inequalities affecting widows persist. This short-
coming is partly linked to the underlying prem-
ise that male relatives are obliged to look after 
dependent female relatives. But this obligation is 
not always fulfi lled. Lessons from reforming in-
heritance rights for daughters could be extended 
to widows’ rights. Community of property re-
gimes may also help widows where inheritance 
and intestacy laws do not allow for a 50 percent 
share. Citizenship laws should also be a focus for 
reform, because they can also confer rights that 
affect women’s access to benefi ts and property 
for themselves and their families and may be 
more easily changed than personal laws.
Arrangements for the custody of children af-
ter divorce can deter a woman from leaving a 
regime that allows a woman to leave a marriage 
with a signifi cant share of household assets—
lowering the cost of leaving the household and 
hence making the threat of leaving more credi-
ble—might increase her bargaining power, even 
if she never exercises that right. Conversely, a re-
gime that limits women’s control to the assets she 
brings to the marriage—which are often fewer 
than those brought by men45—or to assets she 
acquires herself, limits her bargaining power. 
Countries in Latin America and Africa previ-
ously colonized by France, Belgium, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, or Spain were largely 
shaped by old codes that they inherited and typ-
ically have community of property as a default 
(box 4.2). Countries from the former Soviet bloc 
also usually have default community of prop-
erty regimes. Countries shaped by common or 
by Islamic law, and countries where polygamy is 
formally allowed, typically have separate owner-
ship of property as a default (Turkey, with com-
munity of property as the default, is an excep-
tion among Muslim-majority countries). 
Sixty percent of the adults in the WDR 2012 
qualitative study on gender and economic choice 
reported that divorce is diffi cult, and younger 
adults have only a slightly more positive view.46 
Lack of fairness (for women) in the division of 
assets and custody of children was one of mul-
tiple obstacles to divorce mentioned by both men 
and women surveyed. Opposition by families and 
communities, social isolation, and stigma were 
also identifi ed as key impediments to divorce. 
For many women across the world, widow-
hood is associated with a critical loss in the use 
and control of assets, because their husband’s as-
sets revert to his family, and the widows lose con-
trol and at times the use of the land and house 
(box 4.3). While widows are protected in coun-
tries with community of property regimes, their 
situation under separate ownership regimes is 
weaker. Indeed, default inheritance rights usually 
award less than half of the estate to the widow; 
the usual share in Sub-Saharan African ranges 
from 0 to 30 percent, and customary land is at 
times excluded from the property widows can 
inherit (with exceptions in matrilineal societies).
In many countries, reforms to strengthen the 
rights of widows are less advanced than reforms 
to strengthen the rights of daughters (see fi gure 
4.8). While major reforms affecting women have 
occurred in other areas of family law and land 
laws in Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, and Tunisia, 
“
”
They [divorced women] come to their 
parental home after divorce, but they get 
no alimony or share of the property from the 
husband’s side, nor do they get any share of the 
parental property. . . . In some cases, they are 
forced to remarry an elderly man so that they 
can earn a living by working in their master’s or 
husband’s fi eld.
Adult woman, India
 
When you die, your property is distributed by 
your relatives, and does not go to your wife or 
daughter. If you have a son, all property will 
belong to the son.
Young woman, Afghanistan
[Family law] has assisted us. When you leave 
the man’s home, you divide the property 
and go with something to begin your 
new life.
Adult woman, Tanzania
It can get very litigious because 
now that there are laws stipulating 
individuals’ rights, compensations 
are bigger and people are aware of 
the law.
Adult man, Bhutan
“
”
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Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Htun and Weldon 2011b, Women LEED Africa database, and World Bank Gender Law Library. 
B OX  4.2   Property in marriage (and divorce) 
B OX  M A P  4.2.1   Women in different parts of the world have different control over assets—Which matters in case of divorce or the husband’s 
death
Community of property. This regime typically gives protection to 
the wife in case of divorce, usually splitting marital property equally 
between the spouses. All property acquired during the marriage is 
owned equally between spouses (personal property owned before 
the marriage and property inherited or received as a gift to a spouse 
may remain the property of that spouse). In a universal community 
of property regime, property acquired by the spouses before the 
marriage also becomes joint marital property. This regime implic-
itly recognizes nonmonetized contributions to the household 
(including care, childrearing, household chores, or subsistence 
agriculture), and there is no requirement of proof of contribution. 
Under this regime some countries still give husbands the power to 
administer joint marital property during the marriage, depriving 
women of control (a leftover from the colonial codes). That is the 
case in 10 of the 43 countries surveyed that have had community of 
property as the default regime over the past 50 years—including 8 
Sub-Saharan countries, Chile (the only country of Latin America to 
retain this provision), and the Philippines (which reformed its family 
laws but retained this provision) (box map). France removed its pro-
vision in 1985.
Separate ownership of property. Spouses have ownership of any 
property they acquire during the course of a marriage. This regime 
protects women entrepreneurs, who can keep control of their pro-
ductive assets on divorce. But it tends to penalize most women, 
because, unless legislated for, nonmonetized contributions are not 
recognized upon divorce (and women typically have fewer mone-
tized contributions than men and thus fewer assets of their own 
during marriage). A few countries have added provisions to mar-
riage laws that recognize women’s nonmonetized contributions 
(although in many countries these contributions are assumed to be 
less than men’s).
Of the 35 countries whose laws on separate ownership of prop-
erty were surveyed, only 7 recognized nonmonetary contributions 
(including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Morocco, and Tanzania). Nonmon-
etary contributions have not traditionally been recognized by cus-
tomary or religious law in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Muslim-majority 
countries, the practice of Mehr (dowry given to the bride on mar-
riage) does provide for women who divorce, but the value in some 
cases can be too low to put women on an equal footing. Some 
countries have tried to increase its value, as in Bangladesh, or index 
it to infl ation, as in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where women are 
also classifi ed as priority creditors and their right to Mehr is superior 
to the claims of all other creditors. Some Muslim countries such as 
Morocco and Tunisia allow optional marital regimes of community 
of property, and the latter is the default regime in Turkey. 
Customary regimes. These regimes are the default in only four 
countries in Africa—Botswana, Burundi, Nigeria, and Swaziland. 
They are generally disadvantageous to women, with men tradition-
ally administering marital property and with no recognition of non-
monetized contributions. Husbands usually have control over the 
assets during marriage. In some cases women even lose the prop-
erty they brought into the marriage upon divorce. 
Multiple regimes. In some countries, multiple regimes are available, 
and each couple can select from among them. While women theo-
retically could choose the regime that off ered them the most pro-
tection, most couples opt for the default regime. For instance, fam-
ily law reforms in both Morocco and Tunisia have meant that couples 
can opt out of the separate ownership regime and chose the com-
munity of property regime, but in practice use of that option has 
been limited. Choosing the default marital regime is thus an impor-
tant policy decision. 
Community of property
Community of property (with husband control)
Separation of property and recognition of non-monetary contribution
Separation of property, no recognition of non-monetary contribution
Separation of property no recognition of non-monetary contribution (with husband control)
Customary law & husband control
No data
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B OX  4.3  Widows risk losing their assets but might gain some freedom
Sources: Catell 1997; van de Walle 2011; Velkoff  and Kinsella 1993; World Bank 2011. 
a. WDR 2012 team estimates based on RIGA Survey, data for rural areas. Diff erences were noted in Albania, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Tajikistan, and Vietnam, but were absent in Bolivia, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, and Nicaragua.
Risks of reversals in autonomy appear after the death of a spouse—
a threat that disproportionately aff ects older women, who are 
nearly three times as likely as old men to lose a spouse. Given lon-
ger female life expectancy and the age diff erences between hus-
bands and wives, far more women than men experience the death 
of a spouse at some point in their lives. In Mali many young women 
fi nd themselves widows with few rights, and their children are more 
likely to be undernourished and out of school, suggesting an inter-
generational transmission of poverty stemming from widowhood. 
Moreover, across the world among the elderly who do not live in an 
extended household, more women live alone, and more men live 
with their spouses (box fi gure 4.3.1). Men are also more likely than 
women to remarry. 
Becoming a widow is often associated with signifi cant changes 
in a woman’s life, and participants in the WDR 2012 qualitative study 
on gender and economic choice systematically rank widows very 
low on the scale of power and rights—something that does not 
apply to widowers.
The process for women to accumulate assets is aff ected by pre-
vailing inheritance laws and practices, which in many regions are 
signifi cantly weaker for women.a Evidence from Cambodia, Guyana, 
Haiti, and Vietnam suggests that wives (or their children) inherit the 
majority of assets from their deceased husbands. In contrast, in 16 
Sub-Saharan countries, more than half the widows do not inherit 
any assets from their spouses’ estate, and only a third reported 
inheriting the majority of assets. In 14 of these countries, the major-
ity of assets was inherited by the husband’s children and family (box 
fi gure 4.3.2)—the two exceptions are Rwanda and Swaziland. 
Greater inheritance is generally associated with higher education 
and wealth, indicating that women with higher socioeconomic sta-
tus may be more able to negotiate a favorable asset inheritance. 
This pattern is also found for widow’s ownership of land and live-
stock. In 70 percent of the countries with available data, households 
headed by a widow (with no working-age men present) are less 
likely to own land than male-headed households.
Where women lose access to the marital home or land in the 
husband’s village, they have to return to their parental community 
or fi nd another man to marry. But older widows’ options to remarry 
are limited because men are more likely to marry younger women. 
Indeed, in Mali widows were found to be more likely to enter a 
polygamous union as lower-rank wives, further reducing their 
agency and well-being. 
On a more positive note, widowhood can be associated with 
important gains and growing freedoms. The WDR 2012 qualitative 
study on gender and economic choice suggests this is particularly 
true where the institution of marriage is typically associated with 
social, economic, and physical restrictions. In Afghanistan, widows 
were ranked high on the scale of power and rights because “they 
have power within the house because there is no man. All decisions 
are made by them. They are not rich but they have power and free-
dom within their household.” The discussion suggested that wid-
ows were the only women able to have independent economic 
activities, such as raising sheep. In Indonesia, women noted that 
widows enjoyed the advantage of no longer having to request their 
husband’s permission for their activities. In the Republic of Yemen, 
widows who needed to work to provide for their families had 
greater freedom of mobility than married women and were not 
frowned on for taking jobs.
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Peterman (2010) and Demographic 
and Health Surveys (2005–08).
Note: Sample of ever-widowed women whose husbands had assets.
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B OX  F I G U R E  4.3.1   Elderly women are more likely to live alone and 
elderly men with their spouses 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Table II.7 in United Nations Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Aff airs (2005). 
Note: Sample excludes elderly living in extended households.
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tries. Progress in legislating against violence 
against women has been uneven across regions, 
with greater advances in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, and the 
OECD countries, and more limited advances in 
the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, East Asia and Pacifi c, and South Asia.50 
Many countries restrict women’s ability 
to work outside the home either by requir-
ing consent of the husband or by allowing 
the husband to contest the wife’s working if it 
confl icts with family interests—the case in 23 
of the 117 countries with information for the 
past 50 years. Most restrictions are in countries 
with codes based on colonial-era civil codes and 
customary or religious laws (and usually are 
not found in countries with common law tra-
ditions). Germany, Greece, Spain, and Switzer-
land fi nally removed the last elements of such 
provisions in the late 1970s or early 1980s. In 
practice, however, these laws do not seem to be 
binding in many countries and are not strongly 
associated with lower female labor force par-
ticipation, except in the Middle East and North 
Africa, where both restrictions and low partici-
pation rates prevail. In the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, where female labor force participation is 
high, women have circumvented the restriction 
by using a template marriage contract that gives 
them the right to work outside of the home.
Where marital relations are infl uenced by 
“patrilocal” customs—when the wife moves to 
the husband’s family home—laws may refl ect 
the prevailing social norm. In Nigeria, women’s 
work is not specifi cally restricted under statutory 
law, but customary law and religious law prevail 
for the majority of the population. In rural Ethio-
pia (Amhara and Hadiya), where the family code 
was reformed in 2000 and where fewer women 
are living with their husband’s family, 48 percent 
of women felt they needed their husband’s per-
mission to work—far fewer than the 90 percent 
of women in Northern India (Uttar Pradesh) and 
Nigeria (Maguzawa and Hausa) and 75 percent 
in Southern India (Tamil Nadu). In the Ethio-
pian capital, the percentage dropped to 28 per-
cent, suggesting that urbanization and changing 
family structures can infl uence norms.51
Plural legal systems can affect women’s 
autonomy and equality 
In most countries of the world, different legal 
systems coexist, a situation we call legal plural-
marriage, diminishing her agency in the house-
hold. In many countries, mothers usually have cus-
tody until a certain age, and then custody reverts to 
the father (or the child is allowed to choose). But 
when the mother is not a citizen, her entitlement to 
custody is usually weaker. And in some countries, 
fathers may obtain custody if women remarry or 
may keep guardianship even when mothers have 
custody. Guardianship laws are often conceived 
to protect women and aim to ensure that fathers 
provide fi nancially for their children even where 
they do not retain custody (as in Morocco), but in 
practice these laws may diminish mothers’ ability 
to make decisions about their children. In other 
contexts where some fathers would neglect their 
roles and responsibilities, countries have laws to 
force men to support their children, even those 
born outside wedlock. In Brazil and Costa Rica, 
legislation establishes rights and obligations for 
parents independent of legal marriage, as well as 
mechanisms to determine paternity and ensure 
that fathers support their children born out of 
wedlock. Such legislation increased women’s bar-
gaining power in Brazil.47
On domestic violence, many countries have 
passed strong regulations, and many women in 
the WDR 2012 qualitative study on gender and 
economic choice study are aware of laws against 
it.48 But many penal and civil law codes still fail 
to criminalize certain kinds of physical, sexual, 
or emotional violence—just over half the coun-
tries have specifi c legislation on sexual harass-
ment49—or still include provisions that make 
convictions unlikely. Nor does the legislation 
always cover violence against girls and women 
perpetrated by family members other than their 
spouses—parents, step-parents, siblings, uncles 
or aunts, grandparents. In some countries, the 
law lessens the penalty for perpetrators if female 
infi delity can be established and allows rapists to 
escape criminal sanction by agreeing to marry 
their victims. In many parts of the world, rape 
within marriage remains highly controversial; it 
has been made illegal in only a third of all coun-
Some women fear that the 
husband will take the children 
away.
Adult woman, Serbia
“
”
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Islands.54 Customary practices can also be more 
benefi cial for women in some traditionally 
matrilineal societies.
So two areas must be considered by those 
promoting women’s rights in the context of 
 legal pluralism. First, discrimination must be 
addressed in both formal laws and informal 
laws. Statutory laws can strengthen women’s 
bargaining power over customary law represen-
tatives, and serve as a magnet to pull customary 
laws toward greater equality.55 Second, possible 
benefi cial elements that enhance women’s rights 
must be identifi ed within the different systems 
and mechanisms designed so as to mediate con-
fl icts between formal and informal systems and 
to help women navigate both. 
ism. Defi ned simply, legal pluralism arises when 
the population (or a part of it) recognizes more 
than one source of law (box 4.4). Within these 
countries (and sometimes outside of them) 
there are different venues where individuals can 
bring a case, and different types of laws that may 
be applied by judges or other decision makers.
Legal pluralism matters for women’s exercise 
of agency, because the interaction between the 
multiple systems and norms usually infl uences 
critical areas such as family formation, divorce, 
assets and land ownership, and inheritance, 
among others. 
Legal pluralism is neither intrinsically good 
nor bad for women’s agency and gender equal-
ity more generally. Indeed, multiple systems can 
coexist without hindering women’s agency—
when all systems are nondiscriminatory and 
gender-responsive. And all systems may prove 
to be equally ill-suited to serve women’s inter-
est when they refl ect underlying unequal social 
norms and power dynamics.52
Nevertheless, coexisting systems may afford 
different entitlements. Many statutory regimes 
give women more rights than customary laws 
do. In such cases, customary law can dilute 
statutory rights and result in a situation that is 
very different from what the statutory regime 
prescribes. For example, some countries that 
recognize customary law in their constitutions 
also exempt such customary law from the prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination (especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa) (map 4.1). That does not 
mean that customary laws are necessarily dis-
criminatory, but it can open the door for state-
sanctioned discrimination. And it does limit 
the mechanisms available to challenge the laws 
when they are discriminatory (by removing the 
option of declaring them unconstitutional). 
But customary practices can also in some 
instances be more benefi cial to women than 
statutory laws. For example, the process of for-
mally titling land (statutory law) has in some 
countries removed the access to land or use of 
land that women had under customary law.53 
In Kenya, access to land was regulated through 
communal systems of use that included women, 
and the introduction of statutory laws on land 
ownership vested communal land rights in men, 
marginalizing women in land transactions, be-
cause women’s rights of usage were not inte-
grated into the formal system. Similar examples 
can be found in Mozambique and the Solomon 
What is legal pluralism? Legal pluralism emerges when there is plurality of laws 
and venues for resolving disputes—national, supranational and international 
laws and bodies, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, religious and 
customary authorities. Legal institutions may be formal and embedded in the 
state system. Or they can be informal—independent from the state system—
as is the case of street committees in Brazil, Animist or Christian authorities in 
Chinese villages, or tribal jirgas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finally, some 
hybrid institutions can share elements of both state and nonstate systems—
they may be created or recognized by the state and integrated in the formal 
judicial system—as in the case of India’s lok adalats— but be able to apply dif-
ferent strands of law. 
How prevalent is pluralism? All legal systems are plural. In the United King-
dom, for instance, Shari’ah courts function in parallel to and under the ambit of 
state courts, and in Kenya, formal courts can interpret and apply customary law 
as well as statutory law. But while legal pluralism exists in most societies, it is 
particularly infl uential in low-income settings, rural areas, and postconfl ict and 
fragile states. In situations of legal pluralism, customary and religious laws are 
sometimes offi  cially recognized in constitutions or legislation and integrated 
into formal legal systems. An in-depth review of laws prevailing in 63 countries 
over the past 50 years revealed that more than half offi  cially recognize custom-
ary or religious laws. Offi  cial recognition is most prevalent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (in 27 of the 47 countries analyzed). Some of the countries reviewed have 
only recently offi  cially acknowledged customary law in their constitutions—
the Philippines in 1987 and Mozambique in 2004. 
In many contexts of legal pluralism, customary and religious laws play a role 
in the lives of large population groups, independently of their offi  cial recogni-
tion. For example, despite the existence of alternatives, approximately 80 per-
cent of women in Ghana celebrate their marriage under customary law. Also, 
about 72 percent of all land is held under customary law in Malawi, 80 percent 
in Mozambique, 60 percent in Swaziland, and 80 percent in Zambia. So, even 
where formal laws exist to protect women’s rights, they do not necessarily 
apply universally. More broadly, where the state system is weak or inaccessible, 
local traditional or religious dispute resolution bodies can play a more pro-
nounced role. 
BOX 4.4 Legal pluralism and its prevalence 
Sources: Chiongson and others 2011; Fenrich 2001; Hallward-Driemeier 2011.
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Low capacity of or biases in state institutions 
can constrain the implementation of laws
On the supply side, there is a wide range of de-
cision making and administrative institutions 
whose role is to ensure that laws are imple-
mented and enforced. They range from judicial 
institutions such as state courts of justice, po-
lice, state legal aid centers, bailiffs, and collection 
agencies, to quasi-judicial bodies such as land 
boards and immigration tribunals, to adminis-
trative bodies such as land registries and birth 
and marriage registries. There also are alterna-
tive private dispute resolution mechanisms and 
customary religious and community systems, 
Making rights effective is critical for 
women’s agency
One of the major limitations in translating 
stated rights for women into greater exercise 
of agency resides in women’s lack of access to 
justice. Many factors may limit this access both 
on the supply side—when legal institutions and 
other state actors do not perform their functions 
adequately—and on the demand side—when 
individuals or groups do not seek redress. Some 
factors limiting access to justice, such as the 
affordability of justice and the lack of awareness 
of rights, are common to both men and women. 
Others are by nature more gender specifi c. 
Source: Hallward-Driemeier 2011. 
M A P  4.1  In Sub-Saharan Africa, customary laws are formally recognized in most 
countries, and at times are discriminatory
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mestic violence.58 This reluctance could be re-
lated in part to men’s domination of many jus-
tice institutions. In more than two-thirds of the 
countries studied, women represent less than 
a quarter of supreme court benches, and their 
presence remains limited even in lower courts 
(except in some Eastern European countries).59 
In some courts, female judges may not have 
the same rights or responsibilities as their male 
counterparts. In Vanuatu island courts, for ex-
ample, social norms mean that women justices 
cannot take part in walking the boundaries of 
the land.60 Similarly, in 11 of 13 countries with 
data—including India, Romania, Sierra Leone, 
Sweden, and the United States—women make 
up less than 20 percent of the police force.61 
Low capacity, reluctance, and lack of sensi-
tivity likely are compounded by the diffi culty in 
monitoring and assessing the implementation 
of rights, especially for rights that play out in the 
privacy of homes. The status of many women’s 
rights is not easily observable within households 
and thus not easy to assess and address. 
Lack of awareness, social norms, and biased 
services limit women’s demand for justice
In many situations, women are not able to de-
mand enforcement, either because they are not 
such as traditional elders, religious leaders, and 
customary councils in communities.
The capacity of these actors to ensure the en-
forcement of rights is limited in many countries. 
Institutions can have limited knowledge of the 
law and limited administrative capacity to imple-
ment it, and procedures can be poorly designed. 
For example, procedures for land titling might 
not be conducive to including women on titles, 
even when the law promotes equal ownership by 
spouses. After a law is adopted, the justice insti-
tutions have a role in defi ning the rights granted, 
the responsibilities of different institutions in 
their implementation, and the enforcement pro-
cesses. Establishing gender-sensitive procedures 
can ensure stronger implementation of rights. 
In the context of domestic violence, such pro-
cedures would include rules allowing for private 
testimony for survivors of violence and nonad-
versarial processes for resolving confl icts. 
More generally, a lack of accountability and 
oversight often hinders enforcement. The at-
titudes of police offi cers or judges all too often 
mirror the social norms prevailing in the so-
ciety, thus limiting the ability of the system to 
enforce some laws. For instance, a survey reveals 
that almost all police offi cers interviewed in In-
dia agreed that a husband is allowed to rape his 
wife, half the judges felt that women who were 
abused by their spouses were partly to blame for 
their situation, and 68 percent of them said pro-
vocative attire was an invitation to rape.56
Indeed, in many contexts social attitudes 
result in hesitant enforcement. In the United 
States, judges and juries are more reluctant to 
convict for date or marital rape than for rape 
by a stranger.57 More generally, justice institu-
tions have in some contexts been reluctant to 
promote women’s rights, especially around 
property ownership, marital matters, and do-
Women know about laws on discrimination, but they are violated in real life. They are
asked whether they will marry at job interviews or are fi red when they become pregnant.
Woman, Serbia
After widowhood, the [husband’s] family collects everything. We don’t manage to make 
sure the laws are applied within families.
Woman, Burkina Faso
“
”
Doctors’ reports are always late; the woman 
cannot call the police because the husband will 
kill her. The police tell you to call if somebody 
winds up dead. The court will not believe 
me if I say that I am savagely beaten 
every day.
Woman, rural Serbia
“
”
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Many women also lack mobility and the time 
to engage with the legal system. Social norms for 
gender roles that often make women responsible 
for care and housework do not allow them the 
time to pursue legal services, especially when 
they must travel long distances to access them. 
Norms for acceptable behavior and safety can 
also constrain women’s mobility and their abil-
ity to access justice services. 
Another gender-specifi c factor is the social 
stigma and psychological trauma often involved 
in bringing claims. Women are often reluctant 
to pursue justice where outcomes are not pre-
dictable, where legal institutions are gender 
biased, and where legal actors themselves vic-
timize complainants, resulting in a double vic-
timization. A study of selected regions and cities 
in nine countries found that only about 10 per-
cent of women who had been physically abused 
sought services (fi gure 4.9). The main reasons 
given for not seeking services were strong social 
norms unsympathetic to the women’s claims 
and a lack of trust in the services (low qual-
ity, institutional condoning of violence, and 
lack of confi dentiality).63 Indeed, where good-
quality services are available, more women turn 
to them, as illustrated by the success of special-
ized units providing legal aid, health services, 
and counseling in urban Namibia and female-
run police stations and specialized services in 
Brazil and Peru.64
Other restrictions may also affect women 
disproportionately. In the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, women need the permission of a hus-
band or guardian to initiate court proceedings. 
They can face similar restrictions in customary 
tribunals where they may not be able to voice 
their grievances directly, and it is up to the male 
head of the family to bring the grievance to the 
attention of elders.65
SOCIAL NORMS PREVENT—OR 
PROMOTE—GAINS IN WOMEN’S 
AGENCY
Social norms infl uence expectations, values, and 
behaviors. As such they can prevent laws, bet-
ter services, and higher incomes from removing 
constraints to agency. In such cases, policy mak-
ers need to consider whether norms themselves 
can be shifted to improve gender outcomes. 
Trying to change social norms is particularly 
relevant where they are ineffi cient, or injurious, 
aware of their rights or because of the direct 
costs of pursuing claims. While this lack of access 
concerns both men and women, it is likely to af-
fect women more because of their lower literacy, 
lower incomes, lower mobility, and less extended 
social networks. Some countries have deployed 
paralegals to disseminate legal information and 
provide assistance to women in rural areas. In 
Indonesia, after women identifi ed court fees as a 
barrier to obtain divorce certifi cates (required to 
access social assistance programs), an increase in 
the Supreme Court’s budget for court fee waiver 
schemes increased access for women, the poor, 
and other marginalized groups.62 
F I G U R E  4.9   Few women seek services in case of domestic 
violence
Source: World Health Organization 2010. 
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have greater safety concerns than those in rural 
areas. And while women have greater concerns 
than men in rural areas, urban men and women 
express similar levels of concerns, likely a refl ec-
tion of violence in the streets in urban centers.69
Social norms can also determine whether 
women’s higher independent incomes translate 
into greater bargaining power within house-
holds. In India, the ability of women to use their 
earnings to infl uence household decisions de-
pends on their social background, with women 
with weaker links to their ancestral communities 
more able to challenge social norms and reap 
the benefi ts of autonomous incomes.70 About 
20 percent of the participants in the WDR 
2012 study said that husbands have complete 
control over their wives’ autonomous earnings 
(the share was a little more pronounced in ru-
ral areas). Participants also reported that when 
women do not keep control over their earnings, 
the potential empowering role of autonomous 
earnings is limited.71
Social norms appear particularly binding in 
areas such as family formation. Very few boys 
marry at a very young age, but the prevalence 
of child marriages for girls is still high in many 
countries. Numerous countries legally allow 
marriages of girls at a young age (usually with a 
lower minimum age than for boys)—from South 
or when the forces that gave rise to them are no 
longer in place. But sometimes social norms can 
change to promote women’s agency in ways that 
counter limitations in laws and services—for 
instance, norms around women’s physical mo-
bility have changed quickly in countries such 
as Bangladesh, when the demand for women’s 
labor increased rapidly.
Social norms can prevent policies and 
services from working
Social norms defi ne and constrain the space for 
women to exercise their agency—by imposing 
penalties both on those who deviate and on those 
who do not enforce the norms. For example, legal 
restrictions on mobility are found in only very 
few countries. But mobility is also driven by so-
cial norms on acceptable behavior for women—
norms around their role as caregivers, codes of 
modesty, and codes of honor—as well as by be-
liefs about women’s safety in public spaces. In 
South Asia and the Middle East and North Af-
rica, greater household resources relieve part of 
the normative constraints that prevent women 
from seeking medical advice without having to 
obtain permission. But education relaxes this 
constraint even more (fi gure 4.10). In all 19 coun-
tries included in the WDR 2012 qualitative study 
on gender and economic choice,  social norms 
are the most frequently reported constraint on 
physical mobility, followed by public safety (in-
frastructure is rarely mentioned).66
Norms that affect women’s mobility include 
those governing the appropriateness of using 
public transportation, riding bicycles, and ob-
taining driving licenses. In Malawi, social norms 
deterred pregnant women from using a bicycle 
ambulance that was set up to improve emer-
gency obstetric care.67 In urban areas, concerns 
about safety are more prevalent than issues re-
lated to norms per se. In Morocco and the Re-
public of Yemen, 25–30 percent of urban women 
(particularly younger women) report suffering 
sexual harassment in the street; the numbers are 
much lower in rural areas—around 5 percent. 
In Yemen, restrictions on school attendance for 
girls were related more to safety than to social 
norms.68 Around adolescence, when safety con-
cerns for girls increase, their mobility can be sig-
nifi cantly reduced, which can limit their ability 
to pursue economic opportunities or develop 
social networks. In the WDR 2012 qualitative 
study on gender and economic choice, both 
men and women in most urban communities 
F I G U R E  4.10  Education dampens normative constraints 
more than income
Probability of women who need permission to get 
medical care, by education and wealth levels
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys 2003–09, 40 countries.
Note: The blue line is the probability that women with average wealth and control characteristics require 
permission to get medical care. The yellow line presents the same probability for those with average 
education and control characteristics.
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pia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and Sierra Leone, 
over 50 percent think it is acceptable when she 
argues with him. Such beliefs are more preva-
lent in rural areas—where they are held by 10 
percent more women on average—but younger 
women hold beliefs that are surprisingly similar 
to those of their elders for all the dimensions 
explored (with the exception of slightly lower 
beliefs that a man can beat his wife if she refuses 
to have sex).75 Social norms on the acceptabil-
ity of violence also help explain why domestic 
violence often coincides with broader societal 
violence in the form of fi ghts, robberies, or gun 
violence, for instance. A study of selected cities 
in six countries found that men who had per-
petrated physical violence against their spouses 
were two to fi ve times more likely to have also 
participated in violence outside the home.76
Few survivors of violence seek help from 
public or private services. Women’s accounts 
of the main reasons for not reporting domestic 
 violence include a feeling of shame or guilt, a 
perception of violence as being normal or justi-
fi ed, fear of consequences, and lack of support 
from family members and friends (fi gure 4.12). 
These feelings are mostly driven by social norms 
on the acceptability of violence, by the view that 
survivors themselves are responsible for the vio-
lence, by the fear the families and friends will 
not recognize or provide support to the survi-
vor, and by the fear of the penalties that would 
be imposed if one deviated from the norm.77 In 
many contexts women are held responsible for 
the violence they face outside the home—in the 
streets, workplaces, or schools. 
In most countries, tasks associated with 
housework, childrearing, and caring for the sick 
and elderly are usually considered women’s sole 
and primary responsibility, while men’s main 
role is that of provider. The WDR 2012 quali-
tative study on gender and economic choice 
shows that while the defi nition of a “good man” 
has evolved a little over the past 10 years to in-
clude a few elements related to caring for their 
families, the defi nition of a “good woman” re-
mains mostly anchored in her role in the do-
mestic sphere (box 4.5). And this perception 
likely conditions girls’ aspirations and parents’ 
motivation to invest in girls’ human capital.
Some social norms are also strongly bind-
ing for men and boys because they defi ne their 
membership in society as men—and can con-
tribute to reinforcing norms that affect women 
Africa and Tanzania in Sub-Saharan Africa, to 
Bolivia and Venezuela in Latin America, and 
Kuwait in the Middle East.72 Many child brides 
are married to much older men. Both younger 
age at marriage for women and a greater age gap 
between spouses are associated with women’s 
lower bargaining power and higher risk of vio-
lence (as well as higher risk of contracting HIV 
in high-prevalence settings).73 In 29 of 46 coun-
tries analyzed, more than 30 percent of girls ages 
18–23 had been married between the ages of 12 
and 17. And in 11 of these countries, more than 
30 percent of girls married early are married to 
men at least 10 years older (fi gure 4.11).
Social norms on relations within house-
holds partly explain why domestic violence 
remains prevalent, even when national and 
individual incomes grow.74 Attitudes toward 
domestic violence have been changing in some 
countries over the past decade, as evidenced by 
data from Armenia, Malawi, and Rwanda. But 
these changes are still rather limited, and many 
forms of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse 
are still condoned by many men and women 
alike. In countries such as Guinea, Mali, and 
Niger, around 60 percent of women think it is 
acceptable for a man to beat his wife if she re-
fuses to have sex. And in Burkina Faso, Ethio-
F I G U R E  4.11   Despite differences in the age of marriage, many 
girls still marry before the age of 18
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on Demographic and Health Surveys 2003–09.
Note: The 45° line in each fi gure above shows parity in the values on the vertical and horizontal axis.
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around fertility control within households.81 In 
Turkey, in an example discussed earlier, the im-
pact of compulsory education on family forma-
tion hinged on social norms for sequencing edu-
cation, marriage, and childbearing. And in some 
cases, laws that strongly oppose social norms 
have had perverse effects. That was the case in 
the United States where strict laws that forced 
the police to arrest and prosecute perpetrators of 
domestic violence, even when complaints were 
withdrawn, ended up reducing reporting rates.82 
and girls (box 4.6). Men are also constrained 
by social norms that dictate their roles and be-
haviors, their ability to make choices, achieve 
their goals, and control their lives. On gender 
roles, even as women have increased their in-
volvement in productive activities outside the 
home, men have rarely increased their con-
tribution in the home (see chapter 5). So, a 
man’s identity is deeply rooted in his ability 
to provide for his family.78 In the 19 countries 
covered by the WDR qualitative assessment, 
a wife with a higher income was generally 
seen as a threat to male status rather than as 
a boost to the household economy, although 
there were isolated examples where men were 
receptive to women’s economic roles. Partici-
pants highlighted that economic stress is often 
at the root of domestic violence, likely because 
it challenges men’s ability to fulfi ll their role as 
providers. And discussions suggested that one 
of the ways women verbally or psychologically 
abuse men is by exacerbating the emasculation 
of joblessness. Men who experience economic 
stress were more likely to use violence against 
their intimate partners than those who did not 
in regions of Brazil, Chile, Croatia, and India.79
They were also more likely to suffer from de-
pression, and in India, men who experience 
economic stress are two and a half times more 
likely than their peers to regularly abuse alco-
hol, which presents a health risk for them as 
well as a risk factor for domestic violence.80
Because social norms shape the context in 
which markets and institutions operate, they also 
condition the impact of policies and public ser-
vices on women’s choices. For example, the ex-
tension of reproductive health services in Zam-
bia reduced unwanted births only when women 
had autonomy in their use of contraceptives, 
a fi nding that revealed binding social norms 
F I G U R E  4.12   Reasons why victims of violence do not seek help
Source: World Health Organization 2010.
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Particularly when women are successful, men’s vanity won’t stand that. It is diffi  cult for 
a woman to earn more than a man, provide him with money, and tell him what to do, 
and for the man to tolerate such a situation without being ashamed of himself.
Adult man, urban Serbia
[In response to job loss], men would get very frustrated, get very upset, get drunk, 
beat the wife.
Adult man, Papua New Guinea
“
”
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tal examples of gender norms for occupations 
and the allocation of domestic tasks. Box 4.7 
explores some of the reasons for persistence 
and explains how norms can persist even when 
most or all individuals who uphold the norm 
would be better off without it or have prefer-
ences that go against it. It also explains how 
women themselves may propagate and enforce 
social norms that injure them. Because many 
norms are learned at an early age, obsolete 
or disliked norms can be transmitted across 
 generations. Recent studies have emphasized 
the intergenerational transmission of attitudes 
and views, as in the United States, where stud-
ies show evidence that women pass on their be-
liefs about the importance of nurturing to their 
children.83
Social norms can be very persistent
Social norms are typically most resilient in ar-
eas that directly affect power or control. Those 
who would lose power under a change in the 
social norm actively resist change, and those 
who would gain often are too weak to impose 
change. The resilience of dysfunctional social 
norms may also stem from the diffi culty of the 
potential gainers to credibly commit to com-
pensate the losers after the change is made. 
Some gender norms can be very persistent—
from practices that no longer exist such as sati 
(the Hindu tradition of a widow’s immolation 
on her husband’s funeral pyre) and foot bind-
ing, to the current practice of female genital 
cutting and restrictions on women’s physical 
mobility or more ordinary but still detrimen-
B OX  4.5   What does it mean to be a “good wife” and a “good husband”? 
Source: World Bank 2011. 
What is a good wife? What is a good husband? In both urban and 
rural settings around the world, in both poor and rich communities, 
the social norms for what makes a good wife are remarkably similar. 
Above all, the good wife adeptly handles her domestic respon-
sibilities and is caring and understanding toward others. Good 
wives are “able to manage the home,” said a woman in Papua New 
Guinea. “They have to cook well,” stated another one in Poland. In 
Gaza, a good wife “spends most of her time in housework and also 
the education of children.” Whether a woman works outside the 
home and whether she is educated are rarely mentioned.
Even where women often work outside their homes, the norms 
surrounding a good wife remained similar. In Orissa, India, a group 
explained that a good wife “wakes up early in the morning, does all 
household chores, takes care of children and elderly, goes for wage 
work inside the village if there is an opportunity, and collects forest 
products for sale in the market to contribute to household income.” 
Similarly, in Bhutan, a village woman said, “Even if a woman and 
man work on the farm at the same time, once back in the house, the 
woman is expected to cook, wash the clothes, tend to animals, and 
look after the children.” 
Being a good wife also systematically involves respecting one’s 
husband—being faithful, supportive, respectful, and submissive. In 
South Africa, the good wife “respects her husband and cooks for 
him.” In Peru, wives must have a “good character, love their husband, 
help their husband, and be a homemaker.” In communities where 
gender norms proscribe women from working outside the home, 
being a good wife includes not having other tasks outside the home. 
In Afghanistan, “a good wife is busy at home with tasks and looks 
after her children at home and does not have other tasks.” 
When comparing the good wife of today to those in previous 
generations, many women observe positive changes. They regard 
their mothers as selfl ess and hard-working homemakers, as well as 
more subservient and dependent on their husbands than the good 
wives of today. According to a woman in Poland, in her mother’s 
time, “the perception of women was diff erent, she was a maid. But 
luckily it has changed. Nowadays, a woman thinks of the others, 
and of her family, but she doesn’t forget about her own needs.” The 
ability to earn an income has also appeared toward the top of the 
list of qualities of good wives. 
Men’s and women’s defi nition of what it means to be a good 
husband reaffi  rmed many stereotypes about masculinity. Across 
diverse contexts, what defi nes a good husband, over and above all, 
is the ability to provide. “If you are a man and you do not provide, 
what kind of man are you?” said a man in Tanzania. According to 
men in Vietnam, “a good husband should be a good income earner. 
His main responsibility is to bring money home.” And in Poland, “a 
good husband works a lot, provides for his family, is a real head of 
the household, and respects members of his family.” 
Yet the men’s groups also acknowledged that the times are 
pushing them to adopt more gender equitable norms in their roles 
as husbands and fathers. In that same Tanzanian village, a very 
powerful man would “take his children to school; he has a good 
relationship with his wife; he decides with the family.” Most often, 
focus groups linked the shift in norms for a good husband to a mix 
of men’s present-day struggles with being good providers and 
women’s increasing role as breadwinners for their families. In Viet-
nam, men said that with women working and earning income, 
“men have limited power,” and now “there should be discussions 
and agreements made between husband and wife.” In Fiji, men 
said a good husband used to “teach family morals” and was “strict,” 
and now he still maintains “family unity and morals” but will also 
“spend time with family” and “listen to his wife.” Over the past 10 
years, the need for good husbands to have authority and be the 
main decision maker has become less important and is now men-
tioned less frequently than caring characteristics—including help-
ing in housework. 
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imposed for departing from them. For example, 
if women’s earnings in labor markets or social 
transfers conditional on girls’ attending school 
are large enough, they can provide strong incen-
tives for women to enter the labor force and for 
parents to educate their daughters even in places 
The persistence of social norms is further 
accentuated by self-confi dence or self-effi cacy. 
Indeed, scientifi c evidence shows that indi-
viduals’ perceptions of their abilities and their 
likelihood of success are important to their ac-
tual performance. So, a social norm suggesting 
that women are less able than men to perform 
a particular function (be a leader in politics or 
business, or be successful in scientifi c careers) 
will likely be internalized by girls and women, 
who will then not perform as well as men be-
cause they lack a sense of self-effi cacy or who 
will be less likely to develop aspirations for 
these roles. Thus, the social norm will be fur-
ther confi rmed and sustained. Self-confi dence 
and the tendency for people to misread evi-
dence as additional support for their initial be-
liefs explain how norms can persist even with-
out any foundation.84 
In many countries, experimental evidence 
shows that women are more averse to competi-
tion than men, even when they are equally com-
petent. This difference is linked to men’s greater 
confi dence, a gap that can narrow as women 
acquire experience. It is also infl uenced by nur-
ture and socialization. Indeed, such differences 
are not present between young boys and girls 
but appear when social norms on gender be-
come more relevant, often around puberty. In 
female-dominated societies, this pattern is re-
versed. Groups of men and women in a female-
dominated society (the Khasi in Northeast In-
dia) and a male-dominated society at a similar 
level of development (the Maasai in Tanzania) 
were asked to choose between a game where the 
payoffs depended only on their performance 
and a game where the payoffs depended on the 
outcome of a competition with others. In the 
patrilineal society (Maasai), twice as many men 
as women chose to compete. But in the matri-
lineal society (Khasi), more women chose to 
compete than men. And these patterns persisted 
even when differences in education, income, and 
age were taken into account. This study suggests 
that nurture and socialization shape preferences 
toward competitiveness and that nature by itself 
cannot explain the fi ndings of gender differ-
ences in competitiveness.85
Market incentives, information, and 
networks can shift social norms 
Markets forces can sometimes help weaken so-
cial norms by compensating for the sanctions 
Prevailing concepts of masculinity are specifi c to sociocultural contexts, but 
some characteristics tend to cut across most cultures. Norms of masculinity 
infl uence men’s and boys’ relationships with women, children, and other men. 
Ideals about men—including ideas that men should be strong and tough, take 
risks, and endure pain to assert their manhood—appear to be nearly universal. 
These beliefs have consequences for risky behavior and health. 
A critical characteristic of masculinity is the ability to provide for one’s fam-
ily. And the social norms on men as providers result, in some contexts, in very 
high levels of stress and mental health issues, when men do not have enough 
work or income and thus fail to comply with the social norms (higher incidence 
of depression, arrest, violence, alcohol abuse). Beyond providing for their 
households, another prerequisite of masculinity is becoming a husband and 
father and having control over one’s family. This expectation puts a lot of pres-
sure on men in regions where single men are considered with suspicion or 
treated diff erently. 
Domestic roles are closely associated with women, and a signifi cant pro-
portion of men view changing diapers or washing clothes as strictly feminine. 
As a result, even as women work more outside the home, men do not take on 
more housework and unpaid care and thus miss out on the positive psycho-
logical and health benefi ts provided by greater engagement with their fami-
lies. Surveys suggest that better educated men are more likely to put more 
time into domestic roles and care giving, perhaps because education changes 
norms and weakens stereotypes and because more educated men have higher 
incomes, which may aff ect their ability or inclination to challenge norms. 
In some countries, such as Jamaica, underperformance in schooling and 
education often defi nes masculinity even as it reduces men’s future employ-
ment and earnings opportunities. Pressures to publicly defi ne themselves as 
“real” men can lead boys to exaggerate their masculinity through risky be havior 
as well as sexual experiences that focus on achievement or sexual competence, 
rather than on intimacy, and which can be associated with sexual abuse. In con-
fl ict settings, norms for masculinity heighten sexual and physical violence 
toward women (young men are also often victims of sexual violence during 
confl icts). Confl icts also challenge men’s ability to fulfi ll their role as providers 
and protectors of their families while in the battlefi eld. 
Men remain mostly invisible in discussions of gender equality. Programs 
and policies for gender equality are generally designed for women, and if they 
involve men it is often to limit or constrain their behavior. Much less often, pol-
icy is framed as providing an opportunity to change constructions of masculin-
ity in a positive way—one notable example is paternal leave in Scandinavian 
countries, where changing men’s roles is an explicit goal of social welfare pol-
icy. But the formation of gender identities for men, as with women, is a dynamic 
process malleable over time. 
BOX 4.6  Masculinity and its impact on roles, preferences, 
and behaviors
Sources: Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2011; Bannon and Correia 2006; Barker and others 2011; Barker and 
Ricardo 2005; Barker, Ricardo, and Nascimento 2007; Connell 2003; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; 
Emslie and others 2005; Greene and Levack 2010; Kimmel 2010; Möller-Leimkühler 2003; Ousgane and 
Morrell 2005; Pollack 1995; WHO 2000.
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In other contexts, information can shift social 
norms. A lack of knowledge on women’s ability 
as political leaders, resulting from women’s lack 
of exposure to such political roles, can shape 
perceptions about their worthiness and reduce 
the likelihood that women aspire to the political 
sphere, and policies such as quota systems can 
alleviate these constraints. In India, villagers who 
had never had a female leader preferred male 
leaders and perceived hypothetical female leaders 
to be less effective than their male counterparts, 
even when stated performance was identical. Ex-
posure to a female leader did not alter villagers’ 
preference for male leaders, but it did weaken 
stereotypes about gender roles in the public and 
domestic spheres, and it eliminated the negative 
perception among male villagers about female 
leaders’ effectiveness. These changes in attitudes 
where social norms dictate otherwise. In some 
cases, social norms have evolved very quickly in 
response to strong incentives from markets. In 
Bangladesh, social norms for women’s physical 
mobility evolved rapidly, largely in response to 
growing economic opportunities for women in 
the garment industry.86 
Two kinds of interventions can be deployed to 
infl uence social norms—those promoting greater 
knowledge about alternatives (to lower the cost 
of learning about options), and those promoting 
the coordination of individuals to challenge social 
norms or collective action (which is addressed 
later in this chapter). Some interventions, such 
as girls’ clubs, encompass both of these elements 
by providing girls with increased access to peers, 
social support, information, and ways to learn the 
value of and mechanisms for collective action.
Sources: Akerlof 1976; Benhabib 2002; Bruner and Potter 1964; Douglas 1986; Hoff  and Stiglitz 2010, 2011; North 2005; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Rabin and Schrag 1999. 
BOX 4.7 Why do social norms persist? 
Cultural beliefs shape views. Evidence from psychology and other 
social sciences shows that the beliefs of individuals shape what they 
pay attention to and how they interpret it. People have a cognitive 
bias that leads them to misinterpret new information in ways that 
can reinforce their initial beliefs. As a result of this bias, a belief can 
be diffi  cult to dislodge even when it is not supported by evidence. 
Indeed, if two groups have diff erent initial beliefs, the same new 
information may lead both groups to strengthen their confi dence 
that their original beliefs are correct. 
Because many presuppositions held by individuals are shaped 
by the society in which their parents or grandparents lived, a given 
set of beliefs may serve widely in a society as an unconsciously 
applied fi lter of how behavior is perceived and how it is interpreted. 
Culture shapes cognition. Cognition in turn shapes behavior. For 
example, beliefs that men have innately greater ability than women 
in some domains may shape individuals’ self-conceptions and per-
ceptions and, in turn, their behavior in ways that create diff erences 
in ability that confi rm the beliefs in a context in which neither abili-
ties and nor opportunities diff er between genders.
Widespread practices shape views. When (nearly) all households 
adhere to a social norm, and when the consequences from depart-
ing from the norm are signifi cant, voluntary compliance with the 
practice can become almost universal. For instance, in China, foot 
binding was practiced in all classes (except the poorest) within 
intramarrying groups—so the penalty for departing from the prac-
tice for a particular person or family was the loss of opportunities to 
marry within the group and a loss of honor or status. The practice 
was abandoned only when community members collectively 
decided to end it, by pledging not to bind their daughters or not to 
let their sons marry bound women. When practices are nearly uni-
versal, individuals might simply be unable to imagine alternative 
practices. With female genital cutting, for instance, the universality 
itself shapes beliefs by preventing a comparison of the sexual 
morality of cut and uncut women (ensuring sexual morality is one 
of the common justifi cations for cutting). 
Power shapes views. When a social norm benefi ts a particular 
group, that group will deploy various mechanisms to suppress dis-
sent and maintain the status quo—including presenting the norm 
as god given or the natural order of things, and withholding infor-
mation to prevent the disadvantaged group from understanding 
that alternatives exist. Indeed, cultures are constructed and at times 
deliberately shaped to ensure that men have greater control.
Pluralistic ignorance shapes views. The benefi t of following a 
social norm often depends on how many others follow it. Pluralistic 
ignorance describes a situation in which most members of a group 
privately reject a norm, but assume (incorrectly) that most others 
accept it: “no one believes but everyone thinks that everyone else 
believes.” Departing from the social norm in this case is thus diffi  -
cult. In addition, departing from a norm can be diffi  cult if individu-
als believe that they must ostracize norm violators or themselves 
risk ostracism. Then it can happen that, to avoid ostracism, all indi-
viduals adhere to a norm that no one benefi ts from and that no one 
personally endorses. 
 Promoting women’s agency 175
the speed of information sharing, especially as 
younger generations gain access to them. Popu-
lation movements—and in particular the return 
of migrants to their original communities—can 
also provide mechanisms for information to 
travel and norms to evolve. In China, migrants 
returning to rural areas have weakened son 
preference and promoted greater acceptance 
of family planning use in their communities of 
origin.92 
A broadening of women’s networks, which 
can be enhanced by greater participation in la-
bor markets and by greater physical mobility, 
can also reduce the cost of discovery—the cost 
of acquiring new information—for women. By 
broadening women’s sources of information 
beyond their immediate family (often the fam-
ily of their husbands) and peers, these networks 
expand the range of known alternatives and op-
tions. Labor force participation is an important 
mechanism to broaden and deepen networks 
(see fi gure 4.6). 
were electorally meaningful: after 10 years of 
the quota policy, women were more likely to 
stand for and win free seats in villages that had 
been continuously required to have a female 
chief councilor.87
In many new democracies, fewer women 
than men vote initially, partly because the cost 
of participation may be too high. Social norms 
may discourage the expression of preferences. 
Norms on women’s physical mobility (includ-
ing security concerns) might constrain par-
ticipation, and women might lack information 
about the signifi cance of their vote, their rights, 
and electoral processes. In such cases, informa-
tion can increase political participation. In 
Pakistan, the lack of information reinforced 
social norms and further disengaged women 
from public life. But campaigns to promote 
participation increased turnout (by 12 per-
cent) and increased women’s independence in 
choosing candidates.88
Role models can also convey information. 
When women discover that other women—
elected offi cials, successful entrepreneurs,  public 
fi gures—do not submit to prevailing norms, 
they feel more comfortable questioning those 
norms. Indeed, experiments suggest that expo-
sure to information on how abilities can grow 
can remove gender differences in performance.89 
Role models can also affect an individual’s self-
concept. Gender stereotypes impair women’s 
intellectual performance. Media exposure or 
education that increases knowledge of options 
and reduces the cost of discovering new infor-
mation can thus infl uence choices that girls and 
women make in their lives (box 4.8). With glo-
balization, greater dissemination of role models 
from one culture to another can contribute to 
this pattern, as chapter 6 explores.
At times, individuals’ exposure to differ-
ent models and information can change social 
norms. In Brazil, exposure to TV soap opera 
programs where characters have small families 
contributed to a reduction in both desired and 
actual fertility, equivalent to the impact of an 
additional two years of education.90 In rural In-
dia, cable television affected gender attitudes, re-
sulting in decreased fertility (primarily through 
increased birth spacing) and bringing gender 
attitudes in rural areas much closer to those in 
urban areas.91 The expansion of information 
and communication technologies can accelerate 
Histories of social diff erences can create stereotypes—widely held beliefs that 
members of one group are inherently diff erent from those in another group. 
And stereotypes aff ect performance in ways that perpetuate such diff erences. 
Experiments show that when people are reminded that one of their charac-
teristics is associated with negative stereotypes, they underperform. For exam-
ple, when people were asked to state their race before taking a test, those 
whose race is associated with a negative stereotype performed worse than 
when they were asked to state their race after taking the test. 
Another experiment addressed the stereotype that Asian students perform 
better than other ethnic groups and the stereotype that women perform worse 
than men. Asian-American women took a test after completing a questionnaire 
that contained many questions about Asians, a questionnaire that contained a 
variety of questions related to gender, or a neutral questionnaire with no refer-
ences to Asia or gender. The fi rst group did best, the second worst. This study 
showed a clear pattern of activation of self-doubt and group identity that 
reduced performance. Similarly, invoking the feeling that a person has little 
power has been found to impair his or her performance in complex tasks, while 
invoking feelings of greater power improves performance. 
Both negative stereotypes and feelings of powerlessness depress perfor-
mance, a fi nding that helps to explain why historical inequalities often persist 
despite progressive reforms. It also suggests a way to try to reverse the pat-
terns. Indeed, recent experiments show that changing beliefs about innate 
gender diff erences in intelligence, and teaching individuals that they have 
the power to raise their performance, can reduce or eliminate the eff ects 
described here. 
BOX 4.8 How stereotypes infl uence performance 
Sources: Ambady and others 2001; Hoff  and Pandey 2011a; Hoff  and Pandey 2011b; Krendl and others 
2008; Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady 1999; Smith and others 2008; Steele 2010; Steele and Aronson 1995.
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permission to go for health care is signifi cantly 
lower in urban areas than in rural areas in all 
countries where permission is a constraint.96 
But in some cases, migration to cities can re-
sult in the loss of social networks and in greater 
isolation for migrants. And in other cases, mi-
grant communities apply stronger social norms 
than they did in their location of origin.97 
Similarly, increased globalization and informa-
tion fl ows can pressure groups to adopt inter-
national social norms, and these can be met 
with resistance, leading to more conservative 
social norms, at least in the short term. In some 
countries in the Middle East, younger men hold 
more conservative attitudes than their elders 
about women working outside of the home. 
Despite progress in female education, around 
40 percent of men in Amman ages 15–44 think 
women should not work outside the home, 
many more than the 29 percent for men over 
the age of 45.98
WOMEN’S COLLECTIVE AGENCY 
CAN SHAPE INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, 
AND SOCIAL NORMS
The ability to challenge the status quo and in-
crease individual agency of women also depends 
on women’s ability to speak collectively. Chal-
lenging existing institutions and social norms 
requires voices that speak in favor of greater 
gender equality, including the voices of women. 
Women are not the only ones who can promote 
equality-enhancing policies (and not all women 
promote them); in many contexts, men have 
been a driving force behind such policies and 
are critical allies for further reforms (chapter 8). 
But women’s participation in decision-making 
processes is important in moving toward more 
gender-equal societies. 
For women to push for reforms, and for 
their voices to be transformative, they need to 
be heard where decisions are made—in parlia-
ments, legal institutions, formal professional 
associations, governments, legally recognized 
labor movements, land boards, zoning and 
planning committees, and the like. This voice 
can be achieved either by their participating in 
these decision-making institutions—as say, par-
liamentarians, judges, board members, or police 
offi cers—or by their shaping the context for 
(men’s) decisions. 
Adolescence can be a particularly criti-
cal period where social networks thin and the 
world contracts, both because safety concerns 
and social norms on acceptable behavior re-
duce girls’ physical mobility and because their 
role as care providers within the home becomes 
more pronounced. That is particularly true for 
poor, rural girls. In Guatemala, adolescent girls 
and boys both report lack of money and lack of 
interest as important reasons for not being en-
rolled in school. But among 13- to 24-year-olds, 
33 percent of girls said household chores was 
the main reason and 56 percent of boys listed 
work outside the home as the core reason (also 
mentioned by another 18 percent of girls). So, 
many of these girls lose their school networks 
and do not replace them with new ones in the 
workplace.93 In Ethiopia, adolescent girls have 
weaker networks than boys—fewer friends, 
fewer places to stay overnight if needed, fewer 
places where they can safely meet their same-
sex peers.94 Evidence from Bangladesh, Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, India, Malawi, South Africa, and 
Uganda also suggests that young women’s 
friendship networks are less robust than those 
of their male peers.95 
A weakening of the social fabric—the ties 
that link individuals or families with their 
communities—can also mute social norms. For 
example, migration from rural to urban areas 
or between rural areas can weaken family and 
group ties and diminish the ability of groups to 
enforce social norms. Similarly, greater female 
labor force participation can provide women 
with mechanisms to reduce the control of their 
peers and families. Some social norms related to 
a husband’s control over other members of his 
household in urban areas are less binding than 
in rural areas, likely a refl ection of greater labor 
force participation and different patterns of time 
use. The share of women who report needing 
Now, it is an obligation to have women among 
candidates on the ballot. Women can be part 
of the local council, not like before when they 
couldn’t. We even have a female judge and that 
gives me more trust in justice, and she also provides 
better advice.
Adult woman, urban Peru
“
”
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Gender gaps in women’s role in unions often 
mirror the gaps in political bodies. The propor-
tion of women who work full time and belong 
to a labor union is almost the same as that of 
men (around 30 percent in developed coun-
tries, 20 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia, and Europe and Central Asia, and 10 per-
cent in East Asia and Pacifi c), and their overall 
lower participation simply refl ects their lower 
labor force participation. Accordingly, the num-
ber of women leaders at the local level is fairly 
high but falls dramatically for high-level leader-
ship. Women represent 44 percent of members 
of a group of European unions with 50 million 
members, but less than 10 percent of their presi-
dents, 20 percent of their secretaries general, and 
a third of their vice presidents.102 
As a result, many issues that affect women 
are left off the agenda. For example, labor move-
ments have effectively advocated for equal work 
for equal pay within the same job classifi cation 
but have not devoted the same attention to ad-
vocating for higher pay for female-dominated 
jobs.103 Unions can even work against women. 
After World War I, for example, the largest 
civil service unions in the United Kingdom fa-
vored retention of the marriage bar (whereby 
women had to resign when they married). And 
the Trades Union Congress waited until 1963 
to ask for legislative intervention on equal pay. 
In other cases, unions can defend women’s in-
terest even when their leadership structure is 
male-dominated, as in the case of the central 
role played by teachers’ unions in the United 
States after World War II when they successfully 
fought the law that forced women to leave the 
workforce when they married.104 In Canada, Ja-
pan, Mexico, and Malaysia (but not the United 
States), the impact of unions on women’s wages 
was often greater than on men’s wages.105 Be-
Women have limited infl uence in political 
decision making 
Women do vote, but they do not enter or prog-
ress in formal political institutions as much as 
men. Despite increases in representation at na-
tional and, more markedly, subnational levels 
and in designated positions, progress generally 
has been slow and remains below the level typi-
cally considered suffi cient to ensure voice (often 
thought to be around 30 percent).99 Indeed, 
European (excluding the Nordic countries) and 
North American countries have not made more 
progress than countries in Asia, Latin America, 
or Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite recent improve-
ments, the situation is particularly striking in the 
Middle East and North Africa, where only about 
1 parliamentarian in 10 is a woman (up from 
1 in 25 in 2000).100
When women enter the political arena, they 
tend to remain in the lower ranks and to cluster 
into sectors perceived as “female.” Even where 
women’s representation increases, it can make 
a difference only when women have access to 
key decision-making bodies. For example, many 
women were in the legislature in the former So-
viet Union, but they were almost totally excluded 
from the central committees and state council of 
ministers, where the real power resided. Women 
are also more likely to lead ministries of health, 
education, or social welfare, rather than hold 
portfolios in economy or fi nance (fi gure 4.13).101
Constitutional restrictions on women becom-
ing heads of state still exist in some countries, 
guaranteeing that women are excluded from the 
highest rung of leadership. 
Women’s participation in the judiciary re-
peats this pattern. There generally are more 
female judges in the lower courts than in the 
higher courts. Men typically dominate other 
quasi-judicial bodies as well. 
F I G U R E  4.13  Even in 2010, women ministers were twice as likely to hold a social portfolio than an 
 economic one
Source: Data from Inter-Parliamentary Union 2010, as presented in UNIFEM 2010.
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Social norms and beliefs regarding 
women’s abilities and gender roles limit 
women’s voice in formal politics
In many countries men (and women) still view 
men as better political leaders than women. 
Among younger and more educated groups, 
and in such regions as Latin America, percep-
tions have weakened over recent years.108 But 
in 2005–08, more than 50 percent of men still 
held this perception in half the countries with 
data (fi gure 4.15). Part of the persistence of 
these perceptions results from a lack of expo-
sure to women leaders, and thus most men and 
women do not know how effective they can be 
(an information failure). Indeed, when parties 
(or unions) have adopted quotas on their lists 
of candidates, or when countries have reserved 
seats for women for some elections, perceptions 
have shifted and the effect of quotas has lasted 
beyond their implementation period.109
Women also tend to be less engaged in poli-
tics than men, with party affi liation rates on 
yond unions’ roles in promoting greater equal-
ity, they can broaden women’s social networks, 
increasing their ability to exercise agency. 
Women also have low representation on the 
boards of large fi rms (around 12 percent in Eu-
rope, 10 percent in the Americas, 7 percent in 
Asia and Pacifi c, and 3 percent in the Middle 
East and North Africa).106 That pattern is re-
peated in universities. In 2000, only 12 of the 70 
leadership positions on Princeton University’s 
undergraduate campus were fi lled by women 
(up from 6 in the 1970s, but down from 18 in 
the 1980s and 22 in the 1990s). Women are dis-
proportionately represented at lower, less visible, 
posts behind the scenes.107
Women’s limited voice in society refl ects a 
series of compounding constraints, as refl ected 
in our conceptual framework (fi gure 4.14). In 
particular, social norms about women’s roles 
and abilities, their limited networks, and their 
low representation in formal institutions play 
an important role.
F I G U R E  4.14  Women’s voice in society is limited by social norms on women’s roles and abilities and by 
formal institutions
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tors in women’s low participation in politics in 
middle- and low-income countries in Asia.111
These constraints often result in women 
concentrating in activities that are more 
“women friendly” and accommodating of time 
constraints—such as children’s schools or re-
average about half those of men (fi gure 4.16). 
Strong social norms on women’s roles can also 
lead women to prefer men in leadership posi-
tions and discriminate against other women 
because they overestimate men’s skills and have 
low perceptions of their own skills. In Spain, 
women tend to overestimate the qualifi cations 
of male candidates during the selection process 
for the judiciary. Being interviewed by a panel 
with a majority of women reduces female can-
didates’ chance of success by 17 percent (com-
pared with their chance when interviewed only 
by men) and increases men’s likelihood of be-
ing selected by 34 percent.110
Time constraints, largely stemming from 
social norms on the role of women as the main 
providers of child care and household work, 
also prevent women from accessing many for-
mal institutions. Finally, women’s lack of polit-
ical participation in offi ce can be partly attrib-
uted to a lack of professional networks. In more 
advanced economies, women are less likely to 
be employed in jobs that generate the politi-
cal networks and social capital for entry into 
the political sphere, while in developing coun-
tries women’s role in the home prevents the 
building of strong and broad networks. Time 
constraints and social norms relating to per-
ceptions of women as leaders are the key fac-
F I G U R E  4.15  Perceptions on leadership skills are still very prevalent, and less 
educated cohorts are more biased
Percentage who agree with the statement, “men make better political leaders”
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Value Survey 2005–08.
Note: The 45° line in each fi gure above shows parity in the values on the vertical and horizontal axis.
F I G U R E  4.16  Women are much less likely to belong to a 
political party than men
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Values Surveys, 1994–99 and 2005–07 waves.
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ber of men and women candidates irrespec-
tive of their order of appearance on ballots. In 
other cases, parties have been suspected of 
proposing weak female candidates who act as 
surrogates for men or who are unable to chal-
lenge traditional patterns.117 
Practices like these help explain why some 
countries put additional conditions on the po-
sition of women on lists, such as stipulating 
that the fi rst two individuals on a list must be 
of the opposite sex. In line with this discussion, 
the analysis of reforms toward greater gender 
equality highlights the importance of the elec-
toral system, the internal democracy of parties, 
women’s voting patterns, the penalties associ-
ated with noncompliance, and state capacity for 
implementation of the quota laws.118
In parties and unions, women at times form 
segregated, alternative groupings to circumvent 
the glass ceiling in the mainstream part of the 
institution. Tired of a lack of representation in 
national executive committees, female union 
members in Canada formed women-only com-
mittees to infl uence the overall agenda and pro-
mote women to leadership positions. In the early 
1980s, women successfully campaigned for affi r-
mative action positions on the executive commit-
tees of central labor bodies.119 In Iceland, around 
the same time, women formed a political party, 
the Women’s Alliance, to increase their presence 
in politics and to focus on issues important to 
them—increasing female representation.
The institutional context can also limit the 
translation of women’s presence in decision-
making bodies into actual changes on the 
ground. Parties might exert strong control over 
their members, preventing elected women from 
challenging the status quo and promoting dif-
ferent priorities—once elected, women may be 
obliged to follow party lines rather than gender 
lines. In South Africa, women in the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) sided with the party line 
and approved the Communal Land Rights Act, 
despite its failure to extend full rights of land 
ownership and control to women, because of 
the political threat to the ANC by a constituency 
hostile to women’s interests.120 
Party allegiances are likely to be particularly 
important at the national level, where parties 
have more infl uence over their representatives, 
and are perhaps more limited at the local level, 
where elected offi cials might be more account-
ligious associations’ activities. In these sub-
groups, women can progress, but these groups 
do not usually provide the networks that allow 
women to advance into higher decision-making 
positions.112 In many countries, from South 
 Africa to the United Kingdom, female represen-
tatives report struggling with established prac-
tices within parliaments—from sessions being 
scheduled late in the day at a time that is not 
compatible with family responsibilities to inap-
propriate language and attitudes.113 
Electoral laws, political parties, and public 
campaign funding perpetuate women’s 
marginal role in formal politics
The political and electoral system and process de-
termine women’s representation and the impact 
of policies designed to change it. Proportional 
representation systems are more effective at get-
ting women in parliament, and quotas work best 
in closed-list proportional representation sys-
tems. But women in such systems are also under 
greater pressure to vote along party lines.114 
Voters can elect more women representatives 
only if they are listed on the ballot. Because po-
litical parties are the gatekeepers to the political 
system, many efforts at increasing women’s rep-
resentation in elected bodies have called on po-
litical parties to ensure greater gender balance in 
their lists of candidates. But many incumbents 
resist sharing power. 
• In Spain, which follows the voluntary party 
quota system, parties have at times adhered to 
the guidelines for putting more women at the 
top of lists but only in constituencies where 
ballot order was not relevant for the outcome. 
Where the ballot order mattered, parties have 
tended at times to nominate female candi-
dates to poorer positions on the ballot.115 
• In France, parties have at times circumvented 
quotas by placing women in the most chal-
lenging districts, paying fi nes for failing to 
comply, or even setting ad hoc separate elec-
toral lists for male candidates who otherwise 
would be displaced by women.116 
• In Norway, the Labor Party introduced a 
quota but eased its rules during the 2009 par-
liamentary elections—replacing the ballot 
requirement that the same number of men 
and women had to be fi rst and second candi-
dates) with a requirement on the total num-
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ally, democratic transitions can create windows 
of opportunity for reform, as in Brazil, Chile, 
Greece, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey (but re-
form is not automatic).124 
Women play a larger role in 
informal groups
Women often resort to more informal groups—
women’s collectives organized around economic 
activity, informal labor unions, and so on.125 
The success of informal groups is related to 
their ability to remove the barriers preventing 
women from exerting decision-making power 
in the formal arena, or to gain benefi ts denied 
to them in the formal sector and to infl uence 
the overall policy agenda. Informal associations 
allow women to gather in a more fl exible envi-
ronment that accommodates time constraints, 
provide a less threatening space in line with their 
sense of self-effi cacy, and offer a more practical 
able to their constituencies. The ability of elected 
offi cials or voters to infl uence policies of course 
depends on the overall strength of the institu-
tions they sit in or vote for.121 In Uganda, 30 per-
cent of land board members have to be women, 
but the land legislation does not bestow un-
equivocal land rights on women and does not 
provide clear women-friendly administrative 
procedures, limiting the impact of female board 
members.122
Large and sudden gains in political represen-
tation for women are unlikely to take place un-
less the political systems themselves experience 
broader shifts—after a confl ict, a political rup-
ture, or another shock. These shifts offer unique 
opportunities for women to enter the political 
process without displacing male incumbents or 
without challenging the status quo when a sin-
gle party dominates the political scene.123 With-
out such shifts, progress is slower. More gener-
WHAT WE SEE
Entrenched diff erences exist between women’s and men’s capacity to 
exercise agency—defi ned as the ability to make eff ective choices—
both in the household and in society more broadly. Where women’s 
agency has increased, it has led to improvements in women’s welfare 
and that of their children; yet shifts in agency have generally proven 
diffi  cult to achieve. In some aspects of agency, such as political voice 
and representation, diff erences persist even in rich countries and 
despite a century of women’s activism and change in other domains.
WHY WE SEE THIS
Economic development can promote women’s agency by improv-
ing the conditions that allow agency to be exercised, such as higher 
incomes, greater access to services, and expanded infrastructure. 
However, this potential impact relies in part on women’s increased 
bargaining power within the household resulting from the ability to 
earn their own income. Moreover, the eff ects of economic develop-
ment vary across countries and are limited for some outcomes asso-
ciated with agency.
THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE APPLICATION 
OF LAWS
Although expansion of women’s rights has fostered agency in some 
realms, the eff ect of laws has been weakest in areas regulating rela-
tions within households, especially as they pertain to control over 
resources and family matters. Nor does progress in the form of legal 
change necessarily result in improvements in agency, because the 
eff ectiveness of these laws depends crucially on the ability and will-
ingness of governments to ensure they are fully applied and 
enforced.
THE POWER OF NORMS
Social norms can limit the eff ect of laws, services, or incomes, to the 
detriment of gender equality. And they are particularly binding 
where an increase in women’s agency would threaten the balance 
of power in the household. Social norms can also inhibit women’s 
collective agency—for instance, by limiting the political roles they 
can hold or their access to positions of power in business. In some 
instances, changes in norms can promote women’s agency. 
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR POLICY
When laws, services, social norms, and markets interact, they can 
result in mutually reinforcing constraints—and these need to inform 
the selection and sequencing of policies. Shifting social norms 
around gender roles and women’s abilities is particularly critical to 
promote women’s agency. This process can be complex and slow, 
but policies can change the costs or benefi ts of complying with pre-
vailing norms by providing the incentives or information needed for 
individuals or groups to challenge them. Although these norms—as 
well as institutional structures—at times limit women from infl uenc-
ing policies through formal political channels, women’s collective 
agency can work eff ectively through less formal channels. This in 
turn can infl uence policy debates, choices, and the factors that 
themselves shape women’s individual agency. 
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In sum, women’s collective voice—either 
through direct participation in decision-making 
institutions or through shaping the context for 
decisions—can result in policies, programs, 
and laws that are quite different from those that 
would have emerged without it. Providing an 
environment where women’s voice can coalesce 
into a collective voice can thus promote wom-
en’s agency and greater gender equality.
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focus on solutions to specifi c issues that are less 
likely to cut along party or ethnic lines.126 For 
example, in Bangladesh, women garment work-
ers set up their own informal unions rather than 
joining male-dominated unions, so as to better 
represent their interests.127 The spread of infor-
mation and communication technologies and 
social media can also play a role in facilitating 
women’s participation in informal groupings, 
despite the constraints of time and physical 
mobility. More generally, women’s involvement 
in associations in the social sphere is seldom a 
direct threat to men, because these groups tend 
to focus more on practical gender interests than 
on strategic ones and because they are confi ned 
to areas such as education or health, which are 
often considered female sectors.128 
Whether formal or informal channels are 
more effective facilitators for change depends on 
the political context. In some countries, such as 
France and the United States, with large numbers 
of women’s movements and gender-sensitive so-
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spite low representation of women in politics. In 
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depends on the issue and the extent to which it 
challenges norms, beliefs, and social institutions. 
As chapter 8 discusses, some issues may concern 
the status of all women, while others concern 
specifi c subgroups of women. Similarly, some 
issues may challenge beliefs and norms of par-
ticular religious or traditional groups, while oth-
ers are perceived as less controversial. The role of 
women’s movements is found to be stronger for 
issues that concern all women, while political 
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relevant for a subgroup of women. The great 
heterogeneity among women is refl ected in the 
different types of movements, as well as their 
positions and platforms (at times at odds or re-
fl ecting the interests of specifi c subgroups). 
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S P R E A D  2   The decline of the breadwinner: Men in the 21st century
Across societies and cultures, most men and boys have strong ideas about how they should behave and feel as men. From traditional roles in the 
family such as acting as the household head—the main 
provider and main authority—to personal characteris-
tics including strength, toughness, and ambition, the de-
sirable attributes for men are clearly summarized by two 
young men in Moldova: “The man is a conqueror, which 
is why he always needs to conquer something, a title, a 
woman, social status, a job.”
Most men recognize that the prevalent social norms 
in the community prescribe the dominant roles they 
should perform.1 The main role for men is the one of 
primary income-earner and breadwinner in the family. 
In all 19 countries in the study, income generation for 
the family was the fi rst and most likely mentioned defi -
nition of a man’s role in the family and of a good hus-
band: “A good husband is a good provider of things such as 
food, clothes” (Afghanistan). “A good husband is one who 
provides for everything in the house. He pays all the bills” 
(Burkina Faso). “A good husband is one who earns a decent 
income and keeps his family in good comfort. . . . He has to 
be a good provider and has to put in extra hours, if neces-
sary for this purpose” (India). “He should go to his work in 
the early morning and get money for his children” (North 
Sudan). Only under specifi c conditions can a man be 
excused from this role: “A good husband must be a good 
provider unless he is seriously sick and is unable to work. A 
husband who is not a good provider has no power at all in 
his family” (Vietnam).
The provider role also infl uences men’s perceptions of 
their social status and power: “[A man] is responsible, has 
a job, it is an element of pressure that he must give a sense of 
security” (Poland). “His income is the biggest and the most 
important for functioning of the household. It gives him 
self-respect” (Serbia). “One of the reasons why many men 
are not respected in the homes is that they cannot provide 
or provide little and women have become big providers in 
the homes. So, you fi nd that the husband is not in control of 
the family” (Tanzania). The power earned also gives men 
the fi nal say in household decision making.
But gender relations have evolved, and men are now 
also required to adapt to new demands, new expecta-
tions, new roles. Being authoritative and ensuring the 
family’s economic well-being was once enough to defi ne 
a good husband and father. Now men also are expected 
to share child-care tasks, to help in the household, and to 
show emotion and feelings, as well as to value their part-
ner’s voice in decision making. A good husband today 
has “to be able to balance his job with family life, a good 
husband should have a better time management, and love 
enough his family in order to be open to spend much time 
with his family members” (Moldova). In a community in 
West Bank and Gaza, all men participating in the group 
agreed that “a good husband today helps in the house more 
and consults with his wife and children about things in the 
house, whereas in the past he used to do things without dis-
cussing it with the household or the wife.” 
Men are adapting, but in many cases not as fast 
as women are changing their views and ways. While 
women are gaining power and freedom, men are resist-
ing change. Many men feel their male authority and 
dominance is being challenged on multiple fronts. Ru-
ral men express this discomfort more than urban men. 
“Everything has changed and gone the opposite direction 
these last 20 years, as if 200 years have passed, everything 
that was not normal is normal today. Everything has been 
radically changed. The whole system of values has disap-
peared,” said a group of rural men in Serbia. Men from 
Papua New Guinea echoed this discomfort, attributing 
it to new laws and rights granted to women: “We do un-
derstand that there are laws relating to rights of women but 
most of us do not take these seriously. As men, we are heads 
of the family. In the past, women and men did not know 
these laws, and women respected husbands. Now, because 
of these laws, women try to control their husbands, which is 
not good. Women, especially educated women, undermine 
their husbands; they must and should submit to their hus-
bands.” Men from South Africa and North Sudan agreed 
with these statements.
Men feel that their power in society has stagnated over 
the past 10 years. Partly because of changes in norms and 
laws but also because of lack of economic progress in 
their countries or communities, men report little to no 
power gains during the 10-year period.  When asked to 
rank a group of 100 men in their communities by the de-
gree of power they held now and 10 years earlier, men in 
about 60 percent of the communities report no or little 
increase in the share of men moving upward and gaining 
power. The remaining 40 percent sees some changes but 
these are not as large as women’s. 
Men’s gains in power largely depend on economic con-
ditions in their countries and communities, particularly 
economic growth and the functioning of local and na-
tional labor markets. An examination of the explanations 
men provide for changes in their power, points to several 
combinations of factors. First, the explanatory model that 
described forces behind perceived expansions in female 
empowerment held no explanatory power when applied 
to men (see spread 1). In fact, the pathways for men and 
women are entirely different. Female pathways to greater 
empowerment include a broader range of factors, largely 
dependent on the ability to make decisions, be free of 
violence, and participate in social networks. Male path-
ways are much narrower and dominated by the economy 
and the existence of and access to jobs. Only two pos-
sible combinations of factors were robust, both including 
development in the country (measured by the country’s 
Human Development Index [HDI] score):
• The combination of the availability of private sector 
jobs and a high HDI explains power changes in 56 
percent of the communities. 
• The combination of a high HDI, a high score for ac-
tive local markets (as perceived by the men in the 
community), and high male labor force participation 
at the national level explains changes in 39 percent of 
the communities. 
This model fi ts closely with men’s descriptions of 
those at the top of a power ladder and those who fall 
to the bottom.  “A man should be powerful. But how 
can he be powerful when the village is undergoing such a 
huge crisis. Power means fi nancial security,” said a man 
in Serbia, refl ecting how much weight men give to eco-
nomic conditions and to jobs in defi ning what it means 
for a man to have power. Employment-based status and 
power help those with appropriately masculine jobs to 
remain buoyant, sometimes, to the point of arrogance 
and ostentation. “[A] man at the top step of the ladder 
has big houses and a lot of wetland for farming. He will 
have herds of cows and can afford cow butter for cooking, 
and tea. His farms are more mechanized and he has many 
people working for him. He is a proud man and egoistic,” 
said a rural man in Bhutan. In Liberia, these men will 
be recognized because “they are people whose parents left 
them cocoa or other plantations that [are] needed by both 
the people at top and bottom; they can afford to buy a mo-
tor bike for income generation; they have the resources that 
makes them credit worthy to the top person.” Men report 
occupations and economic conditions as the main fac-
tors driving movement up or down the ladder (spread 
fi gures 2.1 and 2.2).
Men who lose self-esteem in the labor market may try 
to claw it back in other aspects of their lives, from invest-
ments in education to violent domination in the house-
hold to risky behavior. The profound impact on male 
self-esteem that occurs when men lose their jobs or when 
women take over as primary breadwinners is exacer-
bated by high unemployment and lack of job security so 
prevalent in today’s world. Young men invest less in their 
human capital because they see education as having low 
or mixed value, particularly in labor markets that do not 
operate on merit. Young men in Moldova, Poland, and 
Serbia were the most skeptical, stating that connections 
outstrip education in determining whether they could 
fi nd a job: “I think that education has lost its signifi cance. 
Everything is now about political connections.” (Poland). 
“Connections are everything, and mainly the resourceful 
people have success. Here it is a paradox, the less education 
you have, the more money you can make” (Serbia). High 
unemployment was leaving educated men either without 
jobs or with jobs below their skill levels: “I have two col-
lege diplomas and one vocation school diploma, and I could 
not get a good job” (Moldova). In some instances, there 
was considerable disillusionment: “I dropped out and did 
not want to continue my education because I lacked suf-
fi cient will and desire. It is all the same to me, whether I got 
an education or not, I certainly would not be able to get a 
job that would provide me with a normal life” (Serbia).
Cienfuegos, Dominican Republic, is one of the com-
munities that has seen the largest descent of men in their 
perception of power—mostly stemming from the clos-
ing of the free trade zones after the economic crisis. Here, 
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S P R E A D  F I G U R E  2.1   Factors that explain gains 
in power
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations, based on “Defi ning Gender in the 21st Century: A Multi-
Country Assessment” (dataset).
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men see that the only way to make money today is to 
sell drugs or embark on some similar unlawful activity. 
Across the world, men’s dependence on employment to 
assess their identity and self-worth makes them vulner-
able to economic volatility: “Men are affected more than 
women [by unemployment], which leads to frustration and 
family problems and, in some cases, leads to violence by 
men against women and children, and may lead to illness” 
(West Bank and Gaza). Asked what men in Papua New 
Guinea would do in response to losing a job, men said 
they would “get very frustrated, get very upset, get drunk, 
and beat the wife.”
NOTE
1.  The study economies include Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina 
Faso, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Libe-
ria, Moldova, North Sudan, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Po-
land, Serbia, South Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam, West Bank 
and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. The focus groups in-
cluded male adults, female adults, male youth, female youth, 
male adolescents, and female adolescents; the adolescent 
groups were conducted only in a subset of 8 of the 19 coun-
tries. For further information, the assessment methodology 
can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr2012.
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations, based on “Defi ning Gender in the 21st Century: A Multi-
Country Assessment” (dataset).
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ender differences in access to eco-
nomic opportunities are frequently 
debated in relation to gender differ-
ences in labor market participation. 
This chapter looks beyond such participation 
to focus on productivity and earnings—for two 
reasons. First, a focus exclusively on labor force 
participation provides only a partial picture of 
women’s and men’s experience in the labor 
market. Far from being a simple decision about 
whether or not to join the labor force, partici-
pation in market work involves reallocating 
time across a variety of activities—a process 
that can be diffi cult and costly, particularly for 
women. And a focus solely on participation 
masks gender differences in the nature and dy-
namics of work. 
Second, despite signifi cant progress in female 
labor force participation over the past 25 years 
(see chapter 1 and box 5.1), pervasive and per-
sistent gender differences remain in productivity 
and earnings across different sectors and jobs. 
Indeed, many women around the world appear 
to be caught in a productivity trap—one that im-
poses signifi cant costs on women’s welfare and 
economic empowerment today and serious dis-
incentives to invest in the women of tomorrow.
Despite lower earnings and productivity, 
women are not worse farmers, entrepreneurs, 
and workers than men. We argue instead that 
gender differences in labor productivity and 
earnings are primarily the result of differences 
in the economic activities of men and women—
although gender differences in human capital 
and in the returns to worker and job character-
istics also play a role.
Indeed, men’s and women’s jobs differ 
greatly, whether across sectors, industries, occu-
pations, types of jobs, or types of fi rms. While 
these differences evolve with economic devel-
opment, the resulting changes in the structure 
of employment are not enough to eliminate 
employment segregation by gender. So, women 
all over the world appear to be concentrated in 
low-productivity jobs. They work in small farms 
and run small fi rms. They are overrepresented 
among unpaid family workers and in the infor-
mal sector. And they rarely rise to positions of 
power in the labor market.
Three main factors lead to gender segrega-
tion in access to economic opportunities among 
farmers, entrepreneurs, and wage workers: gen-
der differences in time use (primarily resulting 
from differences in care responsibilities), gender 
differences in access to productive inputs (par-
ticularly land and credit), and gender differ-
ences stemming from market and institutional 
failures. Because the factors causing segregation 
are common across sectors of economic activ-
ity, we can integrate the analysis of the farming, 
entrepreneurial, and wage sectors within a com-
mon framework.
Gender segregation in access to economic 
opportunities in turn reinforces gender differ-
ences in time use and in access to inputs, and 
perpetuates market and institutional failures. 
For instance, women are more likely than men 
to work in jobs that offer fl exible working 
arrangements (such as part-time or informal 
jobs) so that they can combine work with care 
responsibilities. But because part-time and in-
formal jobs often pay lower (hourly) wages than 
Gender differences in employment 
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BOX 5.1  Closing the access gap—Recent advances in female labor force participation
Over the past quarter century, women have joined the labor market 
in increasing numbers, partially closing the gender participation 
gap (see chapter 1). Between 1980 and 2009, the global rate of 
female labor force participation rose from 50.2 percent to 51.8 per-
cent, while the male rate fell from 82.0 percent to 77.7 percent. Con-
sequently, gender diff erentials in labor force participation rates 
declined from 32 percentage points in 1980 to 26 percentage points 
in 2009.a
Female labor force participation is lowest in the Middle East and 
North Africa (26 percent) and South Asia (35 percent) and highest in 
East Asia and Pacifi c (64 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (61 per-
cent) (box map 5.1.1). Despite large cross-regional diff erences, par-
ticipation rates have converged over time as countries and regions 
that started with very low rates (primarily Latin America and the 
Middle East and North Africa) experienced large increases and 
those with higher rates (primarily Europe and Central Asia and East 
Asia and Pacifi c) experienced small declines (box fi gure 5.1.1).
The combined eff ect of economic development, rising educa-
tion among women, and declining fertility goes a long way in 
explaining changes in female participation rates over the past 25 
years. Globally, economic development has been accompanied by 
growing economic opportunities for women (particularly in manu-
facturing and services). And greater trade openness and economic 
integration have, in many countries, led to sig nifi cant growth of 
export-oriented sectors, with some, such as garments and light 
manufacturing, employing large numbers of women in recent 
decades (see chapter 6). Both developments have translated into 
stronger market incentives for women’s labor force participation in 
the form of rising demand for female labor and, in some cases, 
higher absolute and relative wages.
In addition, economic development has been accompanied by 
improvements in infrastructure, including electricity, water, roads, 
and transport, which can alleviate time constraints and reduce the 
B OX  M A P  5.1.1   Female labor force participation—Some high rates and some low
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BOX 5.1  Closing the access gap—Recent advances in female labor force participation (continued)
transaction costs associated with market work, particularly among 
women.
Changes in education have also facilitated women’s integration 
in the labor market. More educated women have traditionally exhib-
ited higher participation rates than their less educated counterparts; 
so as education levels have increased around the world, more women 
have ventured into paid work. In Latin America, this increase in 
human capital explains 42 percent of the observed increase in female 
labor force participation since 1975.b
Similarly, changes in family formation have increased the labor 
market attachment for young women and women with small chil-
dren. Marriage has traditionally been associated with a decline in 
female labor force participation, followed by further reductions 
once children are born. In the Arab Republic of Egypt, women who 
had just married in 1997 were 40 percent less likely to participate in 
the labor market than those to be married within a year of the sur-
vey (19 versus 29 percent), whereas 10 years later the gap between 
the two groups had narrowed substantially (32 and 27 percent, 
respectively), suggesting that some women rejoin the labor force 
several years after marriage.c Increases in the age of marriage and 
declines in fertility are thus likely to have contributed to higher 
participation rates in most countries and regions. 
That said, the impact of economic development and changes in 
education and family formation on female labor force participation 
varies across individuals, countries, and regions and ultimately 
depends on institutions, formal and informal, as well as on individ-
ual preferences. Where changes in markets and institutions have 
aligned to strengthen incentives and erode constraints to participa-
tion, women have joined the labor force in large numbers. In con-
trast, where other constraints existed—particularly in informal 
institutions—or where market and institutional changes generated 
opposing forces, the impacts have been much more muted. 
For instance, sustained economic growth has failed to boost 
participation in South Asia, while signifi cant improvements in edu-
cation have had only a limited impact on participation rates in the 
Middle East and North Africa. In both cases, social norms for wom-
en’s role in the economic sphere may have weakened the connec-
tion between stronger incentives to participation in market work 
and actual outcomes. Similarly, following the transition out of com-
munism, female labor force participation in Eastern Europe declined 
from (a relatively high) 56 percent to 50 percent in 2008. The decline 
likely refl ects institutional changes associated with the regime 
change, whereby participation in market work ceased to be a man-
date for most women, and with the retrenchment of some support 
structures for working mothers, such as child care.
More broadly, both formal and informal institutional structures 
can hinder (or support) female labor force participation. In many 
countries across all regions, legislation regulating market work, 
such as restrictions on hours and industry of work, treats men and 
women diff erently. Countries that impose these restrictions on 
women also have on average lower female labor force participa-
tion (45 percent, compared with 60 percent in countries with no 
restrictions) and higher gender participation gaps (45 percent, 
compared with 25 percent in counties with no restrictions). 
In addition, regulation of parental benefi ts and retirement can 
also aff ect female partici pation. Most countries provide some sort 
of maternity leave, but benefi ts vary considerably in the number 
of days, the percentage of leave that is paid, and who pays for it. 
Fewer countries provide  paternity leave, often under more limited 
conditions. Diff erences in parental leave between men and 
women could increase the perceived cost of em ploying women 
and therefore diminish their employment opportunities. And 
while earlier retirement ages for women workers have, in many 
cases, been motivated by protective instincts, they can create dis-
B OX  F I G U R E  5.1.1   Participation rates—Converging
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households range widely (table 5.1), but many 
cluster around 20–30 percent.2 Results from 
studies that compare the performance of men 
and women within households, and thus ac-
count for possible differences in market con-
ditions and institutional constraints, provide 
further support for this fi nding. For instance, in 
parts of Burkina Faso, women’s yields were 18 
percent lower than those of male farmers in the 
same household.3
Similarly, female entrepreneurs exhibit lower 
productivity than male entrepreneurs.4 Value 
added per worker is lower in fi rms managed by 
women than in those managed by men in urban 
areas in Europe and Central Asia (34 percent 
lower), Latin America (35 percent), and Sub-
Saharan Africa (6–8 percent).5 There are also 
signifi cant differences in profi tability between 
female-owned and male-owned businesses op-
erating in rural Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indone-
sia, and Sri Lanka. The differences are largest in 
Bangladesh, where average output per worker 
was eight times higher in fi rms operated by men 
than in those operated by women—and small-
est in Indonesia, where output per worker was 6 
percent lower among female-owned fi rms.6
Female-owned enterprises also perform less 
well than male-owned enterprises in other di-
mensions. They tend to be less profi table7 and 
to generate lower sales.8 Survival probabilities 
are also lower among female-owned fi rms, al-
though the evidence is more mixed.9
Differences in average wages between sala-
ried men and women have been extensively 
full-time and formal jobs, a high concentration 
of women in these lower-paying jobs weakens 
the incentives to participate in market work and 
thus reinforces the specialization in nonmarket 
(including care) and market work along gender 
lines within the household.
It is precisely this interaction of segregation 
with gender differences in time use, access to 
inputs, and market and institutional failures 
that traps women in low-paying jobs and low-
 productivity businesses. Breaking out of this 
productivity trap thus requires interventions 
that lift time constraints, increase women’s ac-
cess to productive inputs, and correct market 
and institutional failures.
UNDERSTANDING GENDER 
DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTIVITY 
AND EARNINGS
Gender differences in productivity and earn-
ings are systematic and persistent. Whether in 
agriculture or off the farm, among those self-
employed or in wage employment, women ex-
hibit lower average productivity and earn lower 
wages than men. These differences have been 
documented in both developed and developing 
countries, and although they have declined over 
time (primarily as a result of the reduction in 
the education gap), they remain signifi cant.1
Female farmers have, on average, lower pro-
ductivity than male farmers. Estimated yield 
gaps based on female-male comparisons across 
a. World Bank 2011.
b. Chioda, García-Verdú, and Muñoz Boudet, forthcoming.
c. World Bank 2010a.
d. Antecol 2000; Fernández and Fogli 2006; Fortin 2005; Goldin 2006.
e. Berniell and Sánchez-Páramo 2011b; Fortin 2005.
BOX 5.1  Closing the access gap—Recent advances in female labor force participation (continued)
parities in lifetime earnings, pension benefi ts, and career oppor-
tunities, thus discouraging women from market work.
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the impact 
of informal institutions, partic ularly cultural or social norms, on 
female labor force participation. This research suggests that more 
traditional views negatively correlate, in some cases strongly, with 
female employment rates (and the gender wage gap).d The impact 
of such views appears to be particularly binding for women at two 
distinct but related points in time: adolescence and after marriage 
(also see box 5.10 on family formation and female labor force par-
ticipation in Egypt). In both cases, norms related to gender roles for 
care and housework and for mobility can limit (young) women’s 
participation in market work (see chapter 4 and spreads on 
WDR2012 Gender Qualitative Assessment).
Finally, individual preferences for market work can also explain 
diff erences in participation rates across and within countries. 
Although culture and social norms within a country or particular 
group undoubtedly infl uence preferences, they nonetheless play 
an independent and distinct role through their impact on the 
household decision-making process. As was the case with social 
norms, more traditional individual attitudes and preferences are 
negatively correlated with participation in market work.e
202 WO R L D  D E V E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 2
teristics of female and male workers, differences 
in the types of activities and jobs that women 
and men do, and differences in the returns to 
both worker and job characteristics. We argue 
here that while differences in worker character-
istics (especially in human capital) and returns 
matter, it is primarily differences in jobs that ac-
count for the gender gaps in productivity and 
earnings. 
documented in both developed and developing 
countries10 (see fi gure 2.8 in chapter 2). Gaps 
have declined over time but remain signifi cant in 
the formal and informal sectors, where women 
often do casual and piece work.11 Gaps tend to 
be smaller in the public sector (fi gure 5.1).
What lies behind these systematic gender 
differences in productivity and earnings? Three 
possible explanations: differences in the charac-
TA B L E  5.1  Female farmers have lower average productivity than male farmers
Country Year/season
Type of gender 
comparison Crop(s) Productivity measure
Average gender 
diff erence in 
productivity (%)
Nigeria
(Osun State) 2002/03 Gender of the farmer Rice Yields 40
Benin (Central) 2003–04 Gender of the farmer Rice Yields 21
Ghana 2002 and 2004 Gender of the farmer Cocoa Yields 17
Malawi (National) 1998–99 Gender of the farmer Maize Yields 11–16
Kenya (Western) 1971 Gender of the farmer Maize Yields 4
Kenya (Western) 2004/05 Gender of head of household Maize Yields 19
Kenya (Subnational) 1989/90 Gender of the farmer Maize, beans, and cowpeas
Gross value of output 
per hectare 7.7
Ethiopia (Central 
Highlands) 1997
Gender of head of 
household All farm output Yields 26
Sources: Alene and others 2008; Gilbert, Sakala, and Benson 2002; Kinkingninhoun-Mêdagbé and others 2010; Moock 1976; Oladeebo and Fajuyigbe 2007; Saito, Mekonnen, and 
Spurling 1994; Tiruneh and others 2001; Vargas Hill and Vigneri 2009. 
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F I G U R E  5.1   There are systematic gender differences in earnings
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on the Structure of 
Earnings Survey, Eurostat.
Note: The 45° line in each fi gure above shows parity in the values on the vertical and horizontal axis.
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on LABORSTA, 
International Labour Organization.
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In contrast, gender differences in actual ex-
perience have narrowed less and remain sig-
nifi cant. As a result, their impact on earnings 
has received special attention in developed 
countries, where gender differences in educa-
tion are minimal but women continue to bear 
the responsibility for child rearing. In the United 
States and the United Kingdom, career inter-
ruptions associated with childbearing and other 
family events mean lower wages for women with 
children than for other women. Wage growth 
slows signifi cantly after having children, and the 
pay penalty, higher for skilled women, grows as 
time since the birth passes. 17
Further narrowing of the education and ex-
perience gaps will undoubtedly contribute to 
closing the gender gap in productivity and earn-
ings. But given that signifi cant wage gaps remain 
despite enormous progress in closing the educa-
tion gap, further improvements in human capi-
tal alone are unlikely to be suffi cient as long as 
gender differences remain in returns and, espe-
cially, in employment and care responsibilities.
Gender differences in returns to human 
capital and other productive inputs
Differences in returns could explain gender dif-
ferences in productivity and earnings if gender 
matters in production and in determining wages 
beyond systematic differences in individual and 
job characteristics between men and women.
Women are not worse farmers and 
entrepreneurs than men
In agriculture, gender differences in productiv-
ity almost always disappear when access to land 
and productive inputs are taken into account. 
Similarly, productivity differences between fe-
male-owned and male-owned businesses are of-
ten explained by differences in access to and use 
of productive resources, where these differences 
are primarily a function of the business size and 
sector of operation rather than a gender-specifi c 
factor.18 Among African fi rms in urban areas, 
the median female-owned fi rm in the formal 
sector has 2.5 times less start-up capital than 
the median male-owned fi rm, but it has 5 times 
more start-up capital than the median female-
owned fi rm in the informal sector. The same can 
be said about the number of paid employees in 
the fi rm.19
This evidence suggests that women are as effi -
cient as men in production when given access to 
Gender gaps in education and experience
Women are still less educated (in some countries) 
and more likely to suffer career inter ruptions 
than men (primarily because of childbearing), 
although the differences have narrowed. Dif-
ferences in education levels are still signifi cant 
among older workers in some countries but have 
disappeared among younger workers almost 
everywhere (see chapters 1 and 3). In contrast, 
the number of years an individual has been em-
ployed is greater for men in 15 of 19 countries 
with data, ranging from 0.3 years in Lithuania to 
5.4 years in Ireland.12 While insignifi cant among 
younger workers (ages 18–25), the gender differ-
ences in experience are most prominent among 
men and women ages 26–39, suggesting that 
they arise mainly during the childbearing years.
Because education and work experience are 
valuable inputs into production, gender dif-
ferences along these dimensions contribute to 
differences in productivity and earnings. Farms 
operated by more educated and experienced 
individuals exhibit higher productivity than 
comparable businesses, so gender differences in 
human capital translate into differences in agri-
cultural productivity.13 Similarly, less education 
and lower access to business training among fe-
male entrepreneurs can hold their productivity 
down.14 And in both developed and developing 
countries, differences in human capital have tra-
ditionally been a key contributor to the gender 
wage gap.15
The recent closing of the education gap has 
contributed to the observed narrowing in the 
gender wage gap. But it has also diminished the 
explanatory power of educational differences 
for the remaining gap. After controlling for in-
dividual characteristics and place of residence, 
education differences between men and women 
account for 10–50 percent of the observed wage 
gap in 5 low- and middle-income countries 
(of 53) and for 0–10 percent in an additional 5 
low- and middle-income countries and 3 high-
income countries (of 17) with data. These low- 
and middle-income countries are mostly those 
where gender differences in education levels 
are still signifi cant. In the remaining countries, 
gender education differences are either small or 
have reversed so that women have higher educa-
tion levels than men. In these cases, education 
not only does not explain the observed gap—
when taken into account, it actually increases 
the unexplained gap.16
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suggested that women were worse farmers than 
men, closer examination showed the practices 
to be optimal given the land tenure insecurity 
for women.20
Some authors argue, however, that gender 
differences in management and business per-
formance refl ect differences in women’s and 
men’s attitudes toward risk and competition, 
as well as toward personnel management and 
business organization—where these differences 
could be innate or learned.21 This literature has 
focused primarily on the impact of gender on 
entrepreneurship and fi rm performance in de-
veloped countries. Some studies have analyzed 
the role of gender differences in management in 
enhancing fi rm productivity, with a focus on the 
(positive) impact of women in boardrooms on 
fi rm performance (box 5.2).
Others have argued that gender differences 
in attitudes relevant to business explain why 
women are less likely to become entrepreneurs 
and why, even when they do, men tend to out-
perform them in their fi rms’ investment and 
growth. Traditional female roles and images may 
infl uence women’s perceptions of their abilities 
and undermine their self-effi cacy and poten-
tial, including that for growing their business 
(see chapter 4).22 Evidence from experimental 
studies suggests that personal characteristics do 
not affect men’s and women’s entrepreneurial 
behavior differently, with the exception of indi-
vidual perceptions of one’s own skills, likelihood 
of failure, and existence of opportunities.23
However, the evidence on the aggregate im-
pact of differences in management and beliefs 
on gender differences in productivity is still lim-
ited and mixed. We therefore conclude that the 
existing evidence, taken as a whole, suggests that 
women are not worse farmers and entrepre-
neurs than men.
Why do women’s jobs pay less?
Women’s jobs do indeed pay less than men’s 
jobs. First, even after accounting for observable 
the same inputs—and that, when provided with 
the same amount of resources, female farmers 
and entrepreneurs can be as productive as their 
male counterparts. In Ghana, where evidence of 
gender differences in farming practices initially 
Women have limited presence on boards of directors around the world. The 
share of female directors ranges from 40 percent in Norway, where the govern-
ment imposed a quota, to 21 percent in Sweden, and to less than 2 percent in 
Bahrain, Japan, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates.a Interestingly, the fraction of companies with at least one 
female director presents a more positive picture, which suggests that large 
numbers of companies engage in what could be called gender tokenism—90 
percent of French companies have at least one woman director, for example, 
while only 14 percent of all directors are women. 
Besides raising concerns about equity, low gender diversity is seen by many 
as undermining a company’s potential value and growth. Higher diversity is 
often thought to improve the board’s functioning by increasing its monitoring 
capacity, broadening its access to information on its potential consumer base, 
and enhancing its creativity by multiplying viewpoints.b Greater diversity 
implies that board directors can be selected from a broader talent pool.c But it 
could also lead to more confl ict and diminished decision power.d
The impact is diffi  cult to measure, however. Showing that companies with 
more female directors perform better, as a large fraction of the existing litera-
ture does, is not enough. More successful fi rms may have more resources to 
ensure higher diversity, in which case diversity results from success and not the 
other way around. It is thus important to be able to attribute improvements in 
fi rm performance to the presence of female board directors. 
The causal evidence presents mixed results. Carter and others show that a 
female presence on the board of directors leads to better performance among 
Fortune 500 fi rms, primarily through its eff ects on the board’s audit function.e 
Information for a sample of U.S. fi rms presents similar results, but positive 
impacts are limited to fi rms with weak governance.f The main channels are 
higher attendance rates and better board monitoring. Others have found evi-
dence of board gender diversity leading to increased gender diversity in the 
fi rm’s top management team.g In contrast, in a study of about 2,500 Danish 
fi rms, female directors elected by staff  have a positive eff ect on performance 
but other female directors have a negative eff ect.h
BOX 5.2 Women in the boardroom
a. CWDI and IFC (2010) as cited in Directors and Boards magazine 2010.
b. Carter and others 2007.
c. Adams and Ferreira 2009.
d. Hambrick, Cho, and Chen 1996.
e. Carter and others 2007.
f. Adams and Ferreira 2009.
g. Bilimoria 2006.
h. Smith, Smith, and Verner 2005.
[Women] are discriminated against in the salary even though they both do the same 
work; for example at . . . the local plastics factory, the woman gets 900 NIS ($247) a 
month and the man gets 1,800 NIS ($495).
Young woman, urban West Bank and Gaza
“
”
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tries and thus may not be very informative for 
developing countries. Indeed, the coverage of 
antidiscriminatory regulation and, especially, 
enforcement capacity are likely to increase with 
income, suggesting that the severity and reach 
of discrimination could be worse in developing 
countries. In Pakistan, female teachers in private 
schools in rural areas are paid 30 percent less 
than their male counterparts, and the difference 
persists even after individual and school char-
acteristics are taken into account.30 But more 
systematic information is needed.
The selection hypothesis relies on the notion 
that, because of care and other responsibilities, 
women are more likely than men to choose oc-
cupations that offer more fl exibility and that do 
not require large or continual investments in 
skills unique to a fi rm or group of fi rms—or oc-
cupations where skills do not depreciate signifi -
cantly because of career interruptions.31 These 
differences in worker and job characteristics, a 
signifi cant fraction of the gender wage gap re-
mains unexplained.24 Second, wages in female-
dominated sectors and occupations are lower 
than those in male-dominated sectors and occu-
pations. This phenomenon has received much 
attention, and abundant evidence shows that 
individual wages vary systematically with the 
gender composition of occupations.25
Two types of explanations have been volun-
teered for these stylized facts: one is gender dis-
crimination in the labor market, and the other 
is (voluntary) selection of men and women into 
different sectors and occupations, primarily in 
response to their different care responsibilities. 
That is, women are more likely to choose jobs 
that allow them to adjust working hours and to 
exit and enter the labor market more frequently 
and at a lower cost. The evidence provides (par-
tial) support for both.
An unexplained gender wage gap has often 
been interpreted as evidence of labor market 
discrimination, but caution is needed in inter-
preting these results because they could refl ect 
additional unobserved or unmeasured differ-
ences in worker and job characteristics between 
men and women.26
Recent studies of gender wage differen-
tials and discrimination have taken a new ap-
proach. A fi rst set compares men and women 
in especially homogenous groups, using exten-
sive information on qualifi cations to minimize 
the effect of gender differences in unmeasured 
characteristics.27 These studies still fi nd an 
unexplained wage gap (ranging from 12 to 20 
percent), albeit a smaller one than when com-
paring more heterogeneous groups of work-
ers. A second set tests the economic prediction 
that competitive forces in the product market 
should reduce or eliminate discrimination in 
labor and other factor markets.28 Consistent 
with this reasoning, several authors analyze the 
impact of changes in market power, deregula-
tion, and increased competition through trade 
on the gender wage gap.29 In all cases, the results 
suggest some gender discrimination in pay. A 
third complementary set of studies focuses on 
discrimination in hiring rather than in pay by 
presenting job candidates with equivalent char-
acteristics to potential employers. Its results are 
mixed (box 5.3).
Most evidence on gender discrimination 
in labor markets comes from developed coun-
Employment audit studies aim at isolating the impact of gender (or other types 
of) discrimination from that of other factors in the hiring decision by presenting 
otherwise identical female and male job candidates to potential employers. 
Results are mixed, apparently depending on the context and on the study’s 
design.
One study found signifi cant evidence of discrimination against women in 
upscale restaurants in Philadelphia.a Female candidates were 0.4 percentage 
points less likely to get an interview and 0.35 percentage points less likely to 
receive a job off er than comparable male candidates. These results should be 
interpreted with caution, however, because individual characteristics such as 
personality and appearance may have played a role in the hiring decision. 
To address the diminished comparability resulting from individual diff er-
ences in personal interactions, some studies used written applications instead 
of actual “fake” job applicants.b They failed to fi nd systematic evidence of gen-
der discrimination, although they did fi nd some suggestive gender stereotyp-
ing and statistical discrimination. A similar approach has assessed the mother-
hood penalty in hiring. Correll, Benard, and Paik found that single women were 
more likely to be called for interviews than single men, while childless women 
received 2.1 times more calls than equally qualifi ed mothers.c A third set of 
studies followed real candidates during their job search process and examined 
diff erences in hiring rates between men and women. The evidence was 
inconclusive.d In a related study examining the impact of gender-blind audi-
tions by symphony orchestras, Goldin and Rouse found evidence of 
discrimination.e
BOX 5.3  Gender discrimination in hiring? Evidence from 
employment audit studies
a. Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske 1997.
b. Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzua 2008; Riach and Rich 2006.
c. Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007.
d. Moreno and others 2004.
e. Goldin and Rouse 2000.
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And although the jury is still out on how much 
employment is voluntary in the informal sec-
tor, the reality is that the returns to skills are, 
on average, lower. Evidence from the Arab Re-
public of Egypt, Tanzania, and several European 
countries suggests that the returns to education 
and experience increase with fi rm size and are 
larger in the formal sector.33 Given that women 
are overrepresented among informal workers, 
this would translate into female jobs paying less 
than male jobs.
There are men’s jobs and women’s jobs: 
Employment segregation by gender 
There are signifi cant and systematic differences 
between men’s and women’s jobs, whether 
across sectors, industries, occupations, types 
of jobs, or types of fi rms (the phrase “employ-
ment segregation by gender” refers to these 
differences) (box 5.4). Women are more likely 
than men to work in agriculture (37 percent 
of all employed women, against 33 percent of 
all employed men) and in services (47 percent 
of all employed women, against 40 percent of 
all employed men). The opposite is true for 
manufacturing.34 Women also are overrepre-
sented among unpaid and wage workers and in 
the informal sector. Women account for about 
40 percent of the total global workforce, but 58 
percent of all unpaid work, 44 percent of wage 
employment, and 50 percent of informal em-
ployment (fi gure 5.2).35
These differences are also pervasive when 
comparing men and women within sectors—
female and male farmers and entrepreneurs, 
and female and male wage workers. Women 
are more likely than men to own and operate 
smaller farms and to cultivate subsistence crops. 
Land holdings among female-headed house-
holds in rural areas are smaller than those of 
male-headed households in 15 of 16 countries 
analyzed, with average differences equal to or 
larger than 1.5 hectares (or 50 percent of the 
average plot size) in 6 countries.36 In addition, 
men manage most of the commercial crops, 
although not without women’s (often unpaid) 
contributions. And while women participate in 
commercial farming, they do so within a rather 
rigid division of tasks. 
Similarly, the large majority of micro, small, 
and medium enterprises are run by women, 
and the percentage of female ownership de-
tend to be occupations where the returns to 
skills and experience are lower and, other things 
equal, so are wages.
The higher concentration of women in 
these jobs would then explain why female- 
dominated occupations pay lower wages than 
male-dominated ones. Evidence from the 
United States shows that predominantly fe-
male jobs pay lower wages to women and men 
in these jobs largely because of their (unmea-
sured) skill-related characteristics and tastes. 
Confi rming this, it has been shown that once 
skill-related job characteristics are taken into 
account, the negative impact of the share of 
female employment on wages is reduced by 25 
percent for women and 50 percent for men.32 
In developing countries, higher job fl exibil-
ity is usually found in informal employment. 
This Report uses the term employment (or labor market) segregation by gender 
to refer to diff erences in the kind of jobs men and women do. Although this 
term is most frequently used to talk about diff erences in the distribution of 
male and female wage and salaried workers across industries and occupations, 
this Report argues that similar gender diff erences occur in the jobs and activi-
ties undertaken by farmers and entrepreneurs. And it expands the discussion 
of segregation to include such diff erences because doing so provides insights 
about the root causes of gender diff erences in employment outcomes. 
Because farming and entrepreneurial activities diff er from wage employ-
ment in various ways, it is important to clarify what the term segregation refers 
to in each of these spheres. In talking about farmers, the discussion focuses on 
gender diff erences in farm size (measured by land size) and in market orienta-
tion of production. In talking about entrepreneurship, the discussion focuses 
on fi rm size (measured by number of employees) and sector of operation. 
Some evidence is also presented on gender diff erences in the motivation to 
become an entrepreneur and the fi rm’s growth orientation. In talking about 
wage employment, the discussion focuses on the industry and occupation of 
employment. The term employment segregation therefore refers to system-
atic diff erences along any of these dimensions.
Note that segregation results from a combination of gender- diff erentiated 
constraints in access to specifi c economic opportunities (including discrimina-
tion) and sorting based on gender-based preferences.
BOX 5.4  What do we mean by employment segregation 
by gender?
”
Garment companies hardly recruit men because the 
job needs sewing.
Young woman, urban Indonesia
“
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These gender differences in employment—
with women more likely than men to work in 
sectors, industries, occupations, and jobs with 
lower average (labor) productivity—explain a 
large fraction of the gender gap in productivity 
and earnings.
Gender gaps in agricultural productivity di-
minish signifi cantly or disappear once gender 
differences in the scale of operation (measured 
by land size and use of technical inputs) are 
controlled for.47 In all but one of the examples 
in table 5.1, gender differences in productivity 
become insignifi cant after controlling for dif-
clines with fi rm size.37 This decline becomes 
even sharper when using more restrictive 
defi nitions of ownership that account for ac-
tual decision power in the presence of mul-
tiple owners.38 In addition, female-headed 
enterprises are more likely than male-headed 
enterprises to be home-based and operate 
within the household.39 In Mexico, 30 percent 
of all female-headed businesses operate from 
home, compared with only 11 percent of male-
 operated businesses; the respective percentages 
in Bolivia are 23 and 10 percent.40 
Female entrepreneurs are also more likely 
than their male counterparts to be “neces-
sity” entrepreneurs (to view entrepreneurship 
as a choice of last resort) and less likely to be 
“opportunity” entrepreneurs. In the United 
States, women are underrepresented among 
high-growth fi rms, where growth orientation 
is measured by whether the entrepreneur was 
pushed or pulled into entrepreneurship.41 In 
developing countries, women often cite the 
need to supplement household income as the 
main reason to enter entrepreneurship, whereas 
men cite the desire to exploit market opportu-
nities.42 That said, the fraction of female “ne-
cessity” entrepreneurs declines with economic 
development, as more economic opportunities 
open for women.43
As noted, women and men work in different 
industries and occupations. Globally, women 
represent more than 50 percent of employment 
in communal services (public administration, 
education, health, and other social services) and 
among professionals (including teachers and 
nurses), clerical workers, and sales and service 
employees. They also represent more than 40 
percent of employment—equivalent to the fe-
male share of total employment—in the retail 
and restaurant sectors and among agricultural 
workers.44
Industry segregation patterns are simi-
lar when looking at fi rms rather than work-
ers. In both developed and developing coun-
tries, female-owned fi rms tend to operate 
in a restricted number of sectors, populated 
by smaller fi rms and characterized by low value 
added and low growth potential.45 Women en-
trepreneurs are heavily concentrated in the 
service sector and in businesses that conform 
more to female roles (such as beauty parlors, 
food vending, and sewing).46
F I G U R E  5.2   Women are overrepresented among wage and 
unpaid family workers
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on International Labour Organization.
Note: Most recent year available for 56 countries in the period 2003–08.
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Bank and teaching jobs are considered safe and 
respectable for women, whereas executive and 
engineering are considered respectable and high-
paying jobs for men.
Young woman, urban Indonesia”
“
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ferences in land size, access to fertilizer, degree 
of mechanization, and other productive inputs 
(fi gure 5.3). Evidence from intrahousehold 
comparisons produces similar results. Lower 
yields among female farmers in Burkina Faso 
were entirely explained by the lower labor in-
tensity and fertilizer used in women’s plots.48
Differences in sector of operation and size 
of fi rm contribute signifi cantly to average pro-
ductivity differences between female-headed 
and male-headed businesses (where produc-
tivity is measured as value added or revenue 
per worker). For instance, 9 percent to 14 per-
cent of the gender earnings differential among 
self-employed individuals is explained by in-
dustry of operation.49 Among formal fi rms in 
urban areas in Africa, differences in sector of 
operation explain more than 20 percent of the 
total gender productivity gap, and differences 
in fi rm size explain an additional 30 percent.50 
Impacts are similar among rural businesses 
in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Sri 
Lanka, where sector of operation and fi rm size 
explain between 30 and 90 percent of the gen-
der productivity gap.51 Performance gaps also 
decline signifi cantly after distinguishing be-
tween formal and informal businesses. Dwarf-
ing the differences in productivity between 
female-headed and male-headed fi rms within 
the informal and formal sectors are the differ-
ences across the two sectors (fi gure 5.4).
Differences in the distribution of men and 
women across industries and occupations ex-
plain much of the gender wage gap. After con-
trolling for individual characteristics (including 
human capital) and place of residence, gender 
differences in occupation and sector of employ-
ment account for 10–50 percent of the observed 
wage gap in 33 low- and middle-income coun-
tries (of 53) and 14 high-income countries (of 
17) with data. And they account for 0–10 per-
cent in an additional 9 low- and middle-income 
countries and 3 high-income countries (map 
5.1). So differences in occupation and industry 
can account for a large part of the unexplained 
wage gap in more countries than differences in 
education.
In addition, when comparing female and 
male wage workers in these countries, a fairly 
large number are employed in jobs done only 
by men or only by women—in other words, a 
comparator male or female cannot be found 
for many workers. In some countries, men with 
F I G U R E  5.3   Gender differences in agricultural productivity 
diminish considerably when access to and use of 
productive inputs are taken into account 
Sources: Alene and others 2008; Gilbert, Sakala, and Benson 2002; Kinkingninhoun-Mêdagbé and others 
2010; Moock 1976; Oladeebo and Fajuyigbe 2007; Saito, Mekonnen, and Spurling 1994; Tiruneh and others 
2001; Vargas Hill and Vigneri 2009.
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F I G U R E  5.4   Differences in productivity between female 
and male entrepreneurs are dwarfed by differences 
in productivity between formal and informal 
entrepreneurs 
Source: Hallward-Driemeier 2011b.
female-headed firms,
informal sector
male-headed firms,
informal sector
female-headed firms,
formal sector
male-headed firms,
formal sector
0 100
revenue per worker (US$)
$ = approximately 20 US$
200 300 400 500 800 900600 700
revenue per worker is almost 600 US$
higher in formal female-headed firms
than in informal male-head firms
 Gender differences in employment and why they matter 209
M A P  5.1  Gender differences in occupation and industry of employment account for a large fraction of the 
gender gap after accounting for individual characteristics
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates using data from the International Income Distribution Database (I2D2) and the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).
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as new economic opportunities open in differ-
ent sectors, market prices and wages may change 
to signal where labor productivity is potentially 
highest and workers are needed most. 
It is not clear, however, how these changes 
in economic activity and the structure of em-
ployment affect employment outcomes and 
ultimately employment segregation by gender. 
Higher gross domestic product (GDP) per cap-
ita and, particularly, higher service sector and 
wage employment encourage women’s partici-
pation in the labor market (see box 5.1). And as 
the number of female workers increases, women 
are likely to take traditionally male jobs. But 
other constraints may limit the impact of stron-
ger economic incentives to female employment 
in male-dominated jobs (and vice versa).
The extent to which households and indi-
viduals can—or are willing to—respond to the 
signals triggered by economic development de-
pends on their preferences and the ways new 
markets and institutional forces change incen-
tives and constraints. Because preferences, in-
centives, and constraints affect women and men 
differently, the impact of economic develop-
ment on employment segregation needs to be 
assessed empirically. We start by looking at the 
relationship between economic development, 
captured by GDP per capita, and employment 
segregation at the aggregate level, with a focus 
on how both the nature and the level of segrega-
tion change as countries get richer.
Is Bangladesh like Sweden? 
The structure of global employment has changed 
as countries have become richer. Over the past 
three decades, employment in agriculture de-
clined from 19.6 percent of the global labor 
force to 13 percent and that in manufacturing, 
from 31 percent to 23.5 percent—while that in 
services rose from 49 percent to 63.5 percent.53 
In addition, wage and salaried employment grew 
from 73 percent of total global employment to 
76 percent, while self-employment fell from 17 
percent to 16 percent and unpaid work from 8 
percent to 6 percent. The share of entrepreneurs 
in total employment remained roughly constant 
at 2.5 percent. As a result of these changes, infor-
mal employment declined from 25 percent to 21 
percent of global employment.54 These trends 
are common across regions, with differences in 
the relative importance of different types of jobs 
and in the magnitude of changes.
no female comparator earn higher than average 
wages and women with no male comparators 
earn lower than average wages, a fi nding that 
supports the premise that gender differences in 
occupation and industry of employment lie be-
hind the observed gender wage gap.52 
The focus here on productivity and earn-
ings as the main characteristic that determines 
whether a job is “good” or “bad” assumes that 
jobs where men and women can be more pro-
ductive and earn higher wages are preferable. 
Qualitative evidence suggests that this assump-
tion is not far from reality, although individuals 
also take into account other dimensions when 
evaluating the desirability of a particular job 
(box 5.5).
The evidence discussed here suggests three 
things. First, gender differences in human capital 
contribute to gender differences in productivity 
and earnings, but their relative importance is di-
minishing as the education gap closes the world 
over. Second, women farmers and entrepreneurs 
are as effi cient as their male counterparts, after 
accounting for gender differences in access to 
productive inputs. Third, although labor mar-
kets show some evidence of gender discrimina-
tion, a signifi cant part of the observed wage gap 
can be explained by women and men sorting 
into different occupations.
So, while differences in worker characteristics 
(especially in human capital) and returns matter, 
it is primarily differences in employment that 
account for the gender gaps in productivity and 
earnings. Gender differences in employment 
matter both directly—women work in smaller 
farms and fi rms, as well as in industries and oc-
cupations with lower wages—and indirectly, 
through their impact on returns, particularly the 
returns to human capital. The rest of this chapter 
is devoted to identifying and understanding the 
causes of employment segregation by gender.
WHAT EXPLAINS EMPLOYMENT 
SEGREGATION BY GENDER? 
A FIRST LOOK
As countries grow richer, the productive struc-
ture of the economy changes and, with it, the 
number and nature of available jobs. Farm jobs 
give way to off-farm jobs, the share of wage and 
salaried employment in total employment rises, 
and the incidence of informality declines. And 
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Using data for 100 developing countries between 
1993 and 2009, we estimate aggregate shares of 
agricultural and nonagricultural employment, 
as well as shares of unpaid and paid wage em-
ployment and entrepreneurship—the latter 
divided into self-employment and work as an 
Changes in the structure of employment 
brought about by economic development do 
not, however, necessarily eliminate or weaken 
labor market segregation. So employment seg-
regation in Bangladesh looks very similar to that 
in Sweden, despite their very different incomes. 
BOX 5.5  Good jobs and bad jobs: What are they and who does them?
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations, based on “Defi ning Gender in the 21st Century: A Multi-Country Assessment” (dataset).
Note: Data from focus group discussions with men and women in 88 urban and rural communities in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, 
Dominican Republic, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Moldova, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Serbia, South Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam, West 
Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. Focus groups were conducted separately for adult men, adult women, young men, and young 
women. Data present averages. 
Women and men in 88 urban and rural communi-
ties around the developing world talked to us 
about good jobs and bad jobs, what they are, and 
who does them. 
A good job is a well-paid job, as illustrated by 
the following quotes:
“A good job is a job with a good salary.”
Young woman, urban Serbia
“Nursing is a good job because they 
earn lots of money.”
Young woman, urban South Africa
“The best ways to make a living are to work 
in construction abroad, housekeeping, growing 
potatoes and maize, and entrepreneurship. 
These are considered the best jobs because 
they provide a higher income.”
Adult man, rural Moldova
Women and men consider most jobs (60 per-
cent of all jobs identifi ed by the focus groups) to be 
good, irrespective of their age or place of resi-
dence. And even though the nature of jobs varies 
by country and between urban and rural areas, 
there are some remarkable similarities in what are 
considered good and bad jobs. Working as a pub-
lic employee or in a high-skill job (doctors, lawyers, 
or judges) is generally good. In contrast, “dirty” 
jobs, such as garbage collection and street clean-
ing, are bad.
Across all countries and communities, employ-
ment segregation by gender is signifi cant—about 
50 percent of all jobs are considered to be men’s 
jobs or women’s jobs. And of the gender-specifi c 
jobs, more are men’s than women’s, as the fi gure 
shows.
In most countries, whether a job is considered 
male, female, or neutral refl ects traditional gender 
roles and perceptions. For example, men’s jobs 
are usually technical (electrician, mechanic) and 
those that require physical strength. In many 
countries, high-skill jobs are also considered male 
jobs. In contrast, female jobs include retail and 
personal services, as well as domestic service. 
Many communities also mentioned “housewife” 
as a female job—even if unremunerated.
The employment segregation by gender and 
the share of female jobs in segregated jobs are 
higher for bad jobs. More than 60 percent of all 
bad jobs are gender-specifi c. And of those, 25 to 35 
percent are female jobs, compared with 15 to 30 
percent of gender-specifi c good jobs. Finally, the 
diff erence in the share of gender-specifi c good 
and bad jobs that are female jobs is driven entirely 
by men’s perceptions—in other words, men think 
that the fraction of gender-specifi c jobs that are 
female is larger for bad jobs than for good ones, 
while women’s perceptions do not vary much with 
the quality of the job.
Good jobs Bad jobs
men-only job
women-only job
both women and men can do the job
50%
17% 19%
43%
33%
38%
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employer—as a function of GDP per capita. We 
do this for male and female workers separately 
and also calculate the share of female workers in 
each employment category.
Both men and women tend to move out of 
agriculture and into nonagricultural activities as 
countries grow richer (fi gure 5.5). For nonag-
ricultural employment, the shares of paid em-
ployment and, to lesser extent, employers grow 
with economic development. These patterns are 
common to men and women, but gender dif-
ferences in the incidence of unpaid work and 
self-employment at low levels of development 
suggest that women are more likely to transition 
from unpaid to wage work and that men are 
more likely to transition from self-employment 
to wage employment.
Combined, these trends suggest that eco-
nomic development—rather than eliminating 
gender segregation by employment status—
changes the nature of such segregation. Moving 
from low to medium per capita GDPs is posi-
tively correlated with the share of female work-
ers in wage employment and negatively cor-
related with the share of women in unpaid 
work, self- employment, and entrepreneurship. 
In other words, women are overrepresented 
among agri cultural and unpaid workers at low 
GDP per capita and among unpaid and wage 
workers at medium GDP per capita. These 
trends remain the same as GDP per capita in-
creases from  medium to high, with the excep-
tion of the share of women in unpaid work, 
which rises. Notice, however, that the overall in-
cidence of unpaid work is very low at high GDPs 
per capita, for both men and women. These 
changes in segregation patterns are illustrated by 
comparing Tanzania, a low-income country, and 
Brazil, a middle-income country (fi gure 5.6).
The impact of economic development on 
industry and occupational segregation is even 
more muted. These patterns are common 
across countries with very different levels of 
economic development and aggregate sectoral 
distributions of employment. For instance, the 
share of female wage employment across the 
nine main sectors of economic activity is re-
markably similar in Bangladesh, Mexico, and 
Sweden, with the most noticeable differences 
pertaining to communal services and retail and 
restaurants, where the presence of females is 
signifi cantly lower in Bangladesh. The same is 
true for female employment shares in the eight 
F I G U R E  5.5   Economic development is positively correlated 
with the share of female workers in wage employ-
ment and negatively correlated with the share of 
women in unpaid work, self-employment, and 
entrepreneurship 
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on the International Income Distribution Database (I2D2). 
Note: Data from 100 developing countries. Most recent years available between 1996 and 2008.
100
Women
Population ages 18–65 working 
in and outside agriculture
Nonagricultural 
employment status
Women
80
60
40
20
0
4 5 6 7
log, GDP per capita
middle highlow
8 9 10 4 5 6 7
log, GDP per capita
middle highlow
8 9 10
%
 w
om
en
, a
ge
s 
18
–6
5
100
80
60
40
20
0
%
 o
f w
or
ki
ng
 w
om
en
 in
no
na
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
100
Men Men
80
60
40
20
0
4 5 6 7
log, GDP per capita
middle highlow
8 9 10 4 5 6 7
log, GDP per capita
middle highlow
8 9 10
%
 m
en
 a
ge
s 
18
–6
5
100
80
60
40
20
0
%
 o
f w
or
ki
ng
 m
en
 in
no
na
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
100
Women Women
80
60
40
20
0
4 5 6 7
log, GDP per capita
middle highlow
8 9 10 4 5 6 7
log, GDP per capita
middle highlow
8 9 10
%
 w
om
en
 in
 e
ac
h 
ca
te
go
ry
100
80
60
40
20
0
%
 w
om
en
 in
 e
ac
h 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t c
at
eg
or
y
 
agriculture
nonagriculture activities self-employed
employer
paid employee
unpaid employee
 Gender differences in employment and why they matter 213
F I G U R E  5.6   Tanzania and Brazil illustrate how employment patterns by gender change with economic 
growth
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on the International Income Distribution Database (I2D2): Tanzania 2006 and Brazil 2005.
Note: GDP per capita in 2009, at constant 2000 US$.
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tion of women in paid employment (a growing 
service sector and increased employment op-
portunities in the wage sector) may also be re-
sponsible for the institutionalization of gender 
in the labor market through the feminization of 
some sectors and occupations.56
As the service sector grows, many “female” 
tasks, such as child care and food service, are 
incorporated in the market economy. The affi n-
ity of many of these new service sector jobs to 
women’s traditional domestic roles may broaden 
the gender division of labor into the sectoral and 
occupational spheres. Similarly, the presence of 
a large wage sector increases the possibilities 
for sectoral and occupational distinctions. As a 
result, gender differences in skills, family obli-
main occupational groupings, with the largest 
differences among clerical and service work-
ers (fi gure 5.7). Others have presented similar 
evidence using information for different sets of 
countries.55
Higher incomes do not always translate into 
less industry or occupation segregation, either 
in cross-sectional comparisons or over time. As 
chapter 2 discussed, there is little or no relation-
ship between GDP per capita and standard mea-
sures of (horizontal) segregation despite signifi -
cant cross-country differences in industry and 
occupational segregation. In fact, some authors 
have argued that economic development may 
add to industry and occupational segregation. 
The factors responsible for the overall integra-
F I G U R E  5.7   Industry and occupational segregation patterns are common across countries with very 
different levels of economic development and aggregate sectoral distributions of employment
Source: International Labour Organization (Bangladesh 2005, Mexico 2008, Sweden 2008).
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actions between individuals and households in 
the economic sphere—be it as consumers and 
producers or as employees and employers—in 
ways that produce, intentionally and uninten-
tionally, gender-differentiated outcomes. For ex-
ample, female farmers may have more diffi culty 
than male farmers in accessing markets if prices 
and other relevant information are communi-
cated and shared through networks that include 
few women.
Our framework captures these effects by 
highlighting that gender differences in access 
to economic opportunities, and the resulting 
segregation in employment, are the product of 
households, markets, and institutions and their 
interactions. Not only can constraints or barri-
ers in any one of these spheres block progress 
toward higher access and less segregation, but 
constraints and barriers in different spheres are 
mutually reinforcing (fi gure 5.8). We elaborate 
on these ideas by examining the roles of house-
holds, markets, and institutions in determin-
ing time use patterns and access to productive 
inputs, reviewing evidence on potential con-
straints and highlighting areas for policy action. 
A more detailed policy discussion is in part 3 of 
the Report.
GENDER, TIME USE, AND 
EMPLOYMENT SEGREGATION
Time is a resource. It can be devoted to produc-
tive activities, including market work, other 
(unpaid) work within the household, and child 
care, or it can be invested in personal activities 
(such as eating and sleeping) and leisure.59 This 
section focuses on the relationship between gen-
der differences in time use and employment seg-
regation by gender. The impact of time use pat-
terns on a variety of other (gender) outcomes 
and, more broadly, on individual and household 
welfare is discussed in other chapters.
Two basic ideas about time and its use shape 
this discussion on time allocation within the 
household. The fi rst is that households need 
to allocate a minimum amount of time to 
“survival-related” personal activities, such as 
cooking, sleeping, fetching water, or ensuring a 
minimum amount of consumption. Only after 
these tasks are taken care of can time be de-
voted to other activities (discretionary time).60 
gations, and preferences, as well as engendered 
cultural norms, are more likely to manifest in 
sectoral and occupational divisions than they do 
in simpler economies, where gender stratifi ca-
tion is usually along the home-or-market axis.57 
This argument is consistent with evidence of 
higher segregation in high-income countries 
and among wage workers.58
If not economic development, then what?
Gender segregation in employment that is per-
sistent (over time) and consistent (across coun-
tries) points toward structural causes rooted in 
economic and institutional systems, both formal 
and informal—with much commonality across 
countries at different levels of development and 
in different social settings.
We argue that three factors—gender differ-
ences in time use patterns, in access to produc-
tive inputs, and in the impacts of market and 
institutional failures—condition women’s and 
men’s decisions for participation in market 
work and the choice of a particular economic 
activity or job.
Gender differences in education trajecto-
ries also segregate employment, particularly in 
countries with a signifi cant fraction of tertiary-
educated men and women (see chapter 3 and 
box 5.6).
Markets and institutions shape household 
decisions about allocating time and other 
pro ductive resources and, in so doing, deter-
mine gender employment outcomes and their 
response to economic development. Where 
markets and institutions are aligned to pro-
vide consistent signals for change, households 
respond to these signals, and there is more 
progress in reducing gender inequalities. For 
instance, women are more likely to respond 
to an increase in economic opportunities and 
higher wages brought about by trade openness 
when child-care services are available or when 
women’s partici pation in market work is not 
frowned on socially. In contrast, where signifi -
cant barriers remain, signals are more muted 
or even contradictory, and advances are more 
limited.
But the impact of markets and institutions is 
not limited to their effect on incentives and con-
straints for individuals and households. Instead, 
markets and institutions, particularly market 
and institutional failures, also impinge on inter-
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may require a fi xed schedule as well as a mini-
mum amount of daily or weekly hours to be 
committed to a particular activity. In this sense, 
both the availability of discretionary time and 
its amount and predictability may affect the ca-
pacity of different individuals to take on specifi c 
types of activities.
The discussion focuses on gender differ-
ences in time allocated to three main catego-
ries of productive activities: housework, care 
(of both children and elderly), and market or 
paid work. Housework includes reproductive 
activities for which substitute markets could 
Gender differences in discretionary time trans-
late into differences in the capacity of women 
and men to engage in all nonsurvival activities, 
including such market-oriented activities as 
wage employment.
The second idea is that time can complement 
other production inputs, so some activities may 
require a minimum of time to be suffi ciently 
productive. For example, market-oriented pro-
duction of agricultural products may be prof-
itable only if enough time is available to travel 
back and forth between home and the market 
place. Similarly, (formal) wage employment 
BOX 5.6  The seeds of segregation are planted early—How gender differences in 
education trajectories shape employment segregation
a.  Cliff ord 1996; Goldin and Katz 2008; Morris and others 2006; Stevenson 1986; as well as new work commissioned for this Report: Flabbi 
2011; Giles and Kartaadipoetra 2011.
b. Giles and Kartaadipoetra 2011; World Bank 2010b.
c. Flabbi 2011.
d. Ibid.
e. Ibid.
The education gap is closing, yet signifi cant gaps 
remain as women and men continue to acquire 
very diff erent types of skills both as part of their for-
mal education and once in the labor market (see 
chapter 3). Limited evidence suggests that gender 
diff erences in education trajectories translate into 
gender diff erences in employment and ultimately 
into diff erences in productivity and  earnings.a
In developing countries, where only a limited 
number of people have a college education, it is 
primarily the level of education—and within ter-
tiary education, the type of degree—that can 
have a large impact in employment outcomes. In 
Indonesia, a general secondary education and 
high  academic ability increase the probability of 
completing college for both men and women, but 
impact on labor market outcomes varies with 
gender. A college degree substantially increases 
the probability of employment for both men and 
women, independent of whether it is a diploma or 
a BA. But for women, it is basically the entry point 
to a wage job in the public sector, while for men it 
appears to open a wider spectrum of employment 
possibilities.b
In developed countries, where levels of educa-
tion and tertiary enrolment rates are high for both 
men and women, gender diff erences in the fi eld of 
study become more important in determining 
labor market outcomes. With women and men 
concentrating in diff erent fi elds of study, these 
patterns immediately translate into occupational 
diff erences by gender. For example, information 
on tertiary graduates in 14 developed economies 
shows that 6 percent of males occupy senior man-
agerial positions, but only 3.8 percent of females. 
In contrast, 11 percent of women are employed in 
clerical positions, but only 7 percent of men.c
Occupational segregation persists even when 
comparing men and women with the same fi eld 
of study, suggesting that gender diff erences in 
education trajectories are only part of the story. 
Of those with a science degree, 55 percent of men 
but only 33 percent of women are in occupations 
related to physics, mathematics, and engineering. 
In contrast, 22 percent of women but only 13 per-
cent of men with these degrees become teachers. 
Similar diff erences are found for other fi elds of 
study.d
Gender diff erences in innate ability or aca-
demic performance cannot explain access to ter-
tiary education and selection into diff erent educa-
tion trajectories. But gender diff erences in the 
intensity of ability sorting and in preferences for 
the fi eld of study can. After controlling for relevant 
individual characteristics, the top male academic 
performers in developed economies were 10 per-
cent more likely to choose a male-dominated fi eld 
than other males, while the impact of tests scores 
on choice was insignifi cant among top female per-
formers and for female-dominated and neutral 
fi elds. Moreover, choosing a demanding or presti-
gious fi eld of study signifi cantly increases the 
probability of enrolling in a male-dominated fi eld 
for men but not for women, and it reduces the 
probability of enrolling in a female-dominated 
fi eld for both.e 
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clusion is corroborated by data from country 
studies.62
Second, women bear the brunt of house-
work and care while men are mostly responsible 
for market work, although the degree of special-
ization varies across countries. In all developed 
and developing countries in the sample, women 
devote more time than men to housework and 
child care, with differences ranging from about 
50 percent more in Cambodia and Sweden to 
about three times more in Italy and six times 
more in Iraq.63 But in no country do women 
invest as many hours as men in market work.64 
In Sweden, women spend about 70 percent of 
the time men spend on market activities, while 
in Pakistan this proportion is around one-
eighth (fi gure 5.9). Similar patterns have been 
documented by others for other middle- and 
low-income countries, as well as for the United 
States.65 
potentially exist (cooking, fetching water), 
while market work includes paid and unpaid 
work devoted to the production of goods sold 
in the market. Information on a fourth cat-
egory (survival-related and personal activities, 
including eating and drinking, personal care, 
sleep, education, leisure, and participation in 
community and social activities) is available 
in the data. But given that no signifi cant gen-
der or cross-country differences exist in time 
allocations to these activities, we exclude them 
from the discussion (box 5.7).
First comes love, then comes marriage, 
then comes baby sitting in a carriage
Signifi cant and systematic gender differences in 
time use can be characterized by three stylized 
facts. First, women work more than men once 
all productive (housework, care, and market) 
activities are taken into account.61 This con-
F I G U R E  5.8   Access to economic opportunities and the resulting segregation in employment are the 
product of households, markets, and institutions, and their interactions
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minutes a day, and single men 6 minutes a day, 
in care activities.66
Smaller but signifi cant differences among 
the well-off and educated
For couples, female and male time use converges 
as income and education increase, although 
overall differences persist even among the well-
off and educated. Average gender differences in 
hours devoted to housework decline as couples 
get richer and more educated, but half to two-
thirds of the difference remains unexplained, 
depending on the country.67
Convergence implies different things across 
activities and for men and women. Convergence 
in housework and, in most cases, care work is 
driven primarily by a decline in hours devoted to 
these tasks by women, rather than an increase in 
hours among men. In addition, the convergence 
is stronger for market work than for housework 
and care work (fi gure 5.10). Even when women 
contribute a substantial fraction of total mar-
ket work (horizontal axis), they continue to be 
largely responsible for housework and care work 
(vertical axis). And although men’s contribu-
tion to housework and care work is generally 
larger in France than in Ghana (increasing with 
income), for most couples in both countries, 
women contribute more than 40 percent of the 
time devoted to these activities (more than 50 
percent for care) irrespective of their employ-
ment status.68
And, in the end, gender trumps money. For 
instance, women in the United States reduce 
their housework as their relative contribution to 
total household income increases, to the point 
where both spouses contribute equally, and 
increase it again afterward.69 In other words, 
couples that deviate from the normative income 
standard (men make more money than women) 
seem to compensate with a more traditional di-
vision of housework. Perhaps it is more accept-
able for women to adopt masculine behavior, 
such as working for pay, than it is for men to 
adopt feminine behavior, such as doing house-
work and care work.70 So, allocating more time 
to market work generally comes at the price of 
higher total workloads for women.71
Interestingly, qualitative information from 
focus groups interviews with men and women 
confi rms that gender roles for care, housework, 
and main earner responsibilities are deeply en-
trenched around the world. When asked about 
what they and their partners do during the 
Time use data provide a detailed account of the time devoted to diff erent activi-
ties and tasks during a particular period of time—usually a day (24 hours) or a 
week. Collecting such information requires individuals to record the time 
devoted to a large number of activities during the period covered by the survey. 
The number and nature of activities and the instruments for recording the infor-
mation vary across countries and surveys, so cross-country comparisons often 
require some standardization.
This Report uses data from 23 countries collected between 1998 and 2009. 
Information for 11 countries comes from the Multinational Time Use Study 
(MTUS). To this are added data for 12 more countries (primarily developing) to 
ensure adequate regional coverage. These data come from country-level sur-
veys and have been standardized to make them comparable with those from 
the MTUS. Activities have been grouped into four aggregate categories (house-
work; care of children, the sick, and the elderly; market work; and survival-
related or personal activities), and time allocations have been expressed in 
hours per day. Data refer to individuals ages 15 and older, with information in 
some countries restricted to ages 18–65.
Most surveys also provide data on individual and household characteristics, 
although the same characteristics are not included in all surveys (Berniell and 
Sanchez-Páramo provide information on the main variables used for the analy-
sis and their availability). For instance, information on household income is 
available only in 18 of the 23 countries. Where required information is missing, 
the sample is restricted to only those countries with available data. In addition, 
in 6 countries time use information is available only for one person per house-
hold, so the analysis could only be performed at the individual level.
Finally, aggregate time use data are also available for Argentina, Armenia, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, India, Israel, Japan, Lithu-
ania, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and West Bank and Gaza. This information is 
combined with that from the household surveys when providing country aver-
ages and performing aggregate country comparisons.
BOX 5.7  Overview of data used in analyzing gender 
differences in time use patterns
Source: Berniell and Sánchez-Páramo 2011b.
Third, gender differences in time use patterns 
are primarily driven by family formation. Mar-
riage signifi cantly increases the time devoted to 
housework for women but not for men. In most 
countries, married women spend at least one 
hour a day, or 30 percent, more on housework 
than their single counterparts, after controlling 
for relevant individual and household charac-
teristics. Similarly, the presence of children, par-
ticularly small children, signifi cantly increases 
the amount of care by both men and women, 
but more for women. The presence of children 
under 5 years of age is associated with an addi-
tional 1.0–2.8 hours of care a day depending on 
the country, while the presence of older children 
(5–17) increases care by an additional 0.1–1.0 
hours a day. Equivalent changes for men range 
from 0.1 to 1.0 hour a day for small children and 
from 0 to 0.5 hours a day for older children. As a 
reference, single women spend an average of 30 
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day, women accurately report that men are 
mainly working outside the home and men 
accurately report that women are mainly de-
voted to care and housework. In contrast, both 
groups have relatively distorted views about 
less traditional activities undertaken by the op-
posite sex (box 5.8).
What happens in the home does not stay 
in the home
Gender differences in time use imply that women 
face important fi xed costs associated with mar-
ket work and thus are more likely to value fl ex-
ible work arrangements and to supply fewer 
hours of market work than men. High fi xed 
costs of market work result from fi xed schedules 
and minimum hour requirements, particularly 
in (formal) wage jobs, and the subsequent need 
to adjust the organization of other activities for 
which women are mainly responsible. They also 
refl ect women’s limited capacity to prevent total 
workloads from increasing as they engage more 
in market work.
Indeed, women working as paid wage em-
ployees face higher adjustment costs in the 
changes required in time allocated to house-
work than women employed as unpaid workers 
or self-employed. Men do not. Moreover, hus-
bands’ time in housework is signifi cantly higher 
when their wives are employed as paid wage 
workers than when they are unpaid workers or 
self-employed. So, larger intrahousehold adjust-
ments in time allocations are needed for women 
to take on paid wage employment.72
For women looking to do market work, the 
need to continue to attend to housework and 
care work often implies that jobs offering fl ex-
ibility or allowing for easy entry into and exit 
from the labor market are particularly attractive. 
These choices are sometimes associated with a 
potential risk of channeling women into lower-
quality jobs and weakening their labor market 
attachment.
F I G U R E  5.9   Women bear the brunt of housework and care 
while men are mostly responsible for market work
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on time use surveys.
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dual role as workers and mothers places them 
on a career path different from men’s.
In developing countries, where formal 
wage employment is a smaller fraction of total 
employment, fl exibility generally takes other 
forms—particularly, self-employment and in-
formality. In eight countries with information 
on employment status, women with heavier 
housework loads are more likely to be em-
ployed under more fl exible working arrange-
ments, self-employment and unpaid family 
employment. The same is true for care work. In 
some countries, men exhibit similar behaviors, 
but the results are more mixed.78
Gender differences in time use and care can 
also translate into differences in labor market 
transitions and labor market attachments for 
men and women. In Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, 
Mexico, Serbia, and Thailand, women spend 
substantially longer out of the labor force, tran-
sition less often into formal employment, and 
are more likely to move between inactivity and 
informal self-employment.79 These gender dif-
ferences are caused largely by household for-
mation. Marrying and having children is gen-
erally associated with less formal employment 
and more self-employment. In contrast, single 
women (including those with children) are far 
more similar to men in transitions, and those 
In high-income countries, fl exible work ar-
rangements are normally equated with part-time 
formal employment. In Austria, Germany, Swit-
zerland, and the United Kingdom, the percentage 
of women who work part time because of family 
responsibilities is quite high, above 40 percent.73 
Yet while part-time work might allow women 
to combine employment with care, it could also 
trap them in lower-quality jobs.74 Evidence from 
Europe and the United States shows that, even if 
having children causes women to take part-time 
work temporarily, part-time experiences often 
reduce the probability of full-time employment 
because only a few women can use part time as a 
bridge back into full employment.75 In addition, 
in most developed countries temporary part-
time work is penalized, with women who move 
back into full-time work receiving lower hourly 
wage rates for similar work and lower long-term 
wage growth, although the size of these penalties 
varies widely across countries.76 
Career interruptions to care for young chil-
dren are a second way women have tried to make 
their roles as wage earners and mothers compat-
ible. As discussed earlier, these interruptions re-
sult in less actual experience among women and 
ultimately lead to lower wages and wage growth, 
even after these women return to work.77 This 
“mommy-trap” makes it clear that women’s 
F I G U R E  5.10  Convergence in gender time use patterns is stronger for market work than for housework 
and care work
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Finally, women’s weaker labor market attach-
ment and less control over resources over their 
working lifetime translates into greater eco-
nomic insecurity, less economic independence, 
and lower access to pensions and other safety 
nets (see box 4.1 in chapter 4).
Lifting time constraints: Markets, formal 
institutions, and social norms and 
preferences 
Gender differences in time use for a couple or 
household result from differences in men’s and 
women’s productivity in house, care, and mar-
ket work and in their ability to substitute mar-
ket inputs for home time. Factors that increase 
without children are generally overrepresented 
in the formal sector (fi gure 5.11). 
Even when women have time available, their 
decision (and possibly capacity) to allocate 
it to market work is in many cases subject to 
the labor needs of (family) businesses run by 
their husbands or other household members. 
In Indonesia, women whose husbands are self-
employed are signifi cantly more likely to be un-
paid workers than those whose husbands are 
wage employees.80 To the extent that unpaid 
workers in a family business are less likely to re-
ceive an autonomous income, they could have 
less control over household resources and ulti-
mately less agency (see chapter 4).
BOX 5.8  What did you do all day? Perceptions on time use patterns of the opposite sex
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations, based on “Defi ning Gender in the 21st Century: A Multi-Country Assessment” (dataset).
Note: Focus groups were conducted in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Moldova, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Serbia, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. 
B OX  F I G U R E  5.8.1   Underestimating the amounts of time the opposite sex spends on nontraditional male/female activities and leisure
Young women and men in 18 developing countries were asked to 
report on their own time use patterns and those of the opposite sex 
as part of the Report’s Gender Qualitative Assessment.
In all 18 countries, both groups reported that women do the 
bulk of care and housework, while men devote more time to market 
work. When all work activities are combined, women bear heavier 
burdens than men. This is consistent with the time use survey data.
But agreement in reporting stops there. When asked about the 
opposite sex, women signifi cantly underestimate the time that men 
devote to “female” activities (care and housework)—on average, 
women thought men spend 0.96 hours a day on these activities, 
compared with men’s report of 2.04 hours a day, a 113 percent dif-
ference. And men signifi cantly underestimate the time that women 
devote to “male” activities—on average, men thought women 
devote 1.65 hours a day to market work, compared with women’s 
report of 2.24 hours a day, a 47 percent diff erence. Both groups also 
tend to overestimate how much leisure the opposite gender enjoys, 
with diff erences being higher for men’s leisure (box fi gure 5.8.1). 
These diff erences in perceptions are observed in both urban 
and rural areas and across most countries, although the magnitude 
of the diff erence between self-reports and perceptions by the 
opposite sex vary across countries.
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hiring labor rather than reorganizing house-
hold resources. For instance, a rural household 
in need of extra hands during the harvest can 
hire additional laborers in the local labor mar-
ket, while other household members continue 
to work in the family business or a wage sector 
job where their productivity and earnings may 
be higher.81 The opposite is true when house-
holds cannot hire suffi cient labor in the mar-
ket. Nonfarm rural family enterprises in Ban-
gladesh, Ethiopia, and Indonesia depend highly 
on the household’s labor supply, so decisions 
for the allocation of labor of various household 
members depend on the enterprise’s demand 
for such labor.82
Women’s responses will also depend on their 
ability to reduce the time devoted to housework 
and particularly care—either by contracting 
those responsibilities out through markets or 
reassigning responsibilities in the household.
Access to (subsidized) child (and elderly) care 
is associated with increases in the number of 
hours worked and, in developing countries, par-
ticipation in formal employment among female 
workers, suggesting that better access to formal 
child care affords women greater fl exibility and 
potentially allows them to seek employment in 
the formal sector.83 But where care options are 
not available, the opposite is true. In Botswana, 
Guatemala, Mexico, and Vietnam, the lack of 
child care pushes mothers from formal into in-
formal employment.84
Take-up rates of child- (and elderly-) care 
services can be muted, however, when prices 
are high. For instance, high child-care costs are 
a disincentive to work in the United States, par-
ticularly among less educated women, and in 
Guatemala.85 
Affordable child care is especially important 
in poor countries and among poor households, 
where, in the absence of such services, women 
are likely to take their children to work or to 
leave them in the care of other household mem-
bers. In Pakistan, Peru, and 10 African coun-
tries, 40 percent of working mothers take their 
children to work. Or older siblings, particularly 
older girls, act as caretakers when mothers work 
outside the home.86 
Time and formal institutions: Basic service 
delivery and fl exible working arrangements
Institutions can also affect time use by changing 
the relative productivity of men and women in 
women’s productivity in home production or 
in the paid sector, or that decrease their transi-
tion costs to market work, are likely to lead to a 
reallocation of their time to market work, away 
from other activities. At the same time, the ex-
tent to which women are able and willing to 
reassign time to market activities is a function 
of existing institutional constraints, such as 
the availability of fl exible (formal) working 
arrangements, social norms regarding wom-
en’s role as economic agents, and individual 
preferences. 
Time and markets: The impacts of returns to 
market work and of child care 
Women’s capacity to respond to stronger eco-
nomic incentives to participate in different 
market-oriented activities depends on labor 
markets. When labor markets function well, 
household labor needs can be met through 
F I G U R E  5.11  In Mexico and Thailand, married women are 
more likely to move between inactivity and 
informal self-employment than men and single 
women 
Source: Bosch and Maloney 2010.
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ing their productivity in the market sector and 
raising their time allocation to paid work. Yet 
in many countries, part-time work is not le-
gally recognized. And even in countries where 
it is available, the vast majority of job open-
ings in the formal sector are in full-time po-
sitions. Because women tend to be dispropor-
tionally responsible for housework, and thus 
have less time for other activities, the limited 
or nonavailability of reduced-hour employ-
ment diminishes their ability to participate in 
the formal sector and increases the probability 
that they work in the informal sector. Evidence 
regarding the impact of the greater availabil-
ity of day care on employment outcomes sup-
ports this link between the availability of part-
time work and female participation in formal 
employment.
In developed countries, there is a strong re-
lationship between household formation and 
part-time work.97 In the United Kingdom, 
single women without children are 6 percent 
more likely than single men without children to 
hold a part-time job, but the likelihood rises to 
24 percent for those married without children 
and to 50 percent for those married with small 
children. In developing countries, the evidence 
is more limited, primarily because of the high 
incidence of informal employment. But for 
multinational corporations in India and South 
Africa, employee demand for fl exible work 
schedules is high, comparable to that in Spain, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.98 
Less clear is whether and how companies re-
spond to this demand.
In Argentina, both female labor force partic-
ipation and employment in the formal sector 
increased with part-time contracts, and female 
formal employment grew more in sectors with 
more part-timers. Married women with chil-
dren increased their participation in formal 
employment 9 percent and reduced their self-
employment 7 percent, compared with mar-
ried women without children. That is equiva-
lent to a fall in female informality of about 4–5 
percent.99
That said, part-time and fl exible work often 
do carry a penalty in lower wages, fewer pro-
motions, and a lower probability of full-time 
employment after a part-time spell. So, while 
part-time and fl exible employment should be 
available, part-time work should not be used in 
ways that reinforce existing employment segre-
unpaid and paid work and by reducing transac-
tion costs associated with market work.
In the 20th century, electrifi cation and run-
ning water in developed countries enabled 
families to produce housework at lower cost.87 
But higher productivity in the home had only a 
muted impact on time use and thus on women’s 
supply of market work.88 Rather than reduce 
the time devoted to housework, the time-saving 
innovations changed the composition of that 
work, with less time spent on preparing food 
and more on shopping and managing family 
tasks.89 And while increases in female participa-
tion in market work in the second half of the 
century were related to higher appliance own-
ership,90 the decline in women’s housework was 
offset by a rise in housework by other household 
members—so the total time devoted to house-
work increased slightly.91 
The overall impact of water and electricity 
on women’s time allocation to market work in 
developing countries is also unclear. For water, 
the number of studies is small, and results ap-
pear to depend on the specifi c intervention and 
context.92 More conclusive evidence is available 
for the impact of access to electricity on time 
spent in market work, perhaps because electric-
ity can reduce the time allocated to housework 
and complement market-oriented activities.93
In contrast, investments in transportation 
can increase women’s access to economic oppor-
tunities by reducing travel time and increasing 
mobility (see chapter 4).94 Given their multiple 
responsibilities, women often choose jobs on 
the basis of distance and ease of travel, choices 
that tie them to local work options. These limi-
tations are particularly severe for poor women, 
who often reside in more marginal neighbor-
hoods where most available jobs are informal 
and low in productivity.
Investments in transport can thus have large 
payoffs. In rural Peru, 77 percent of surveyed 
women reported that the availability of reha-
bilitated roads and tracks enabled them to travel 
farther, 67 percent reported that they could travel 
more safely, and 43 percent reported that they 
could obtain more income.95 In Bangladesh, 
better rural roads led to a 49 percent increase in 
male labor supply and a 51 percent increase in 
female labor supply.96
Making part-time work possible is one in-
stitutional change that can reduce the transac-
tion costs of market work to women, increas-
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stration effects become stronger.107 Take part-
time work among male employees in the Neth-
erlands. It was dominated by women until very 
recently, when a few men in relatively high pro-
fessional positions started experimenting with 
“daddy Fridays.” Acceptance of this new regime 
was slow at fi rst, but once an example was set, 
part-time rates among male workers grew rap-
idly to almost 25 percent. The changes were 
faster in companies where one or more males in 
managerial positions adopted this fl exible sched-
ule early on, highlighting the demonstration ef-
fects.108 The question is whether these relatively 
organic learning processes can then be fostered 
or accelerated through policy interventions that 
generate incentives for experimentation in ways 
that overcome existing constraints to the alloca-
tion of time between market and nonmarket ac-
tivities by men and women.
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS 
TO PRODUCTIVE INPUTS AND 
EMPLOYMENT SEGREGATION 
Productive inputs determine the scale of pro-
duction, investment, and growth. Farmers de-
pend on land, labor, water, seeds, fertilizer, 
pesticides, machinery, and other inputs to pro-
duce crops.109 Entrepreneurs require labor and, 
depending on the business’s size and sector of 
operation, capital. Access to credit is crucial for 
farmers and entrepreneurs. The discussion here 
focuses on gender differences in access to land 
and credit based on the belief that they deter-
mine both the access to other inputs and the 
scale and mode of production. It would be best 
to compare individual farmers and entrepre-
neurs, but data constraints often limit the com-
parisons to female-headed and male-headed 
households engaged in farming and to female 
and male entrepreneurs (box 5.9).
Gender differences in access to and use of 
land and credit 
Female farmers and entrepreneurs have less ac-
cess to land and credit than their male coun-
terparts. Whether access to land is measured 
as ownership or as the ability to operate land, 
gender differences persist. Similarly, both the 
demand for and use of credit are lower among 
female farmers and entrepreneurs than among 
their male counterparts.
gation and ultimately reinforce gender roles for 
care responsibilities. Companies that have in-
creased female participation in their workforce, 
as well as in management and the boardroom, 
can offer insights on ways to avoid employment 
segregation (see box 8.8 in chapter 8).
Time and informal institutions: Preferences 
and social norms
Social norms about gender roles in the eco-
nomic sphere also infl uence women’s employ-
ment outcomes. Traditional views and values 
about women’s participation in market work are 
associated with lower female employment (and 
higher gender wage gaps) the world over.100 But 
the impact is mediated by the status of individ-
uals in the family—fathers, mothers, daughters, 
daughters-in-law, and so on—and by house-
hold structure. In India, daughters-in-law face 
a higher work burden than daughters.101 In 
Mexico, time use and time allocation to market 
work for single mothers are similar to those for 
male heads.102 
Individual preferences for women’s roles as 
wives, mothers, and economic agents also affect 
women’s decision to allocate time to market 
work. In particular, traditional personal views 
of women’s roles as mothers and caretakers, 
measured as the degree of disagreement with 
the statement “A working mother can establish 
just as warm and secure a relationship with her 
children as a mother who does not work,” have 
signifi cant and negative effects on the time al-
located to paid work.103
Preferences also affect the choice to work a re-
duced (part-time) schedule, although this is true 
mainly in rich countries. In Australia, the Neth-
erlands, and the United Kingdom, married and 
partnered women in part-time work have high 
levels of job satisfaction, a low desire to change 
their working hours, and partnerships in which 
household production is highly gendered.104 In 
contrast, many women in Honduras would pre-
fer to hold a full-time job but instead work part-
time because of low labor demand.105
Recent studies of the intergenerational trans-
mission of attitudes and views have found that 
a mother’s position in the household and her 
ability to make her own decisions regarding 
economic participation play an important role 
in the dynamics of social norms.106
Changes in norms and preferences are likely 
to be slow initially and to accelerate as demon-
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plots.111 In Benin, the average size of women’s 
holdings is 1 hectare, compared with 2 hectares 
for men’s.112 In Burkina Faso, male-controlled 
plots are on average eight times larger than 
female-controlled plots.113 And in four other 
African countries, the average area cultivated by 
women ranges from one-third to two-thirds of 
the average area cultivated by men.114 Similar 
evidence comes from Latin America.115
Even when women do have access to land, 
they suffer greater land tenure insecurity. In 
much of the developing world, women’s land 
rights are signifi cantly circumscribed, if not in 
principle, then in practice (see chapter 4).116
Signifi cant gender differences also exist in 
access to and use of credit, particularly formal 
credit.117 Female-headed households in the 
World Bank/Food and Agriculture Organization 
data are less likely to have received credit in the 
past 12 months than male-headed households 
(24 percent, compared with 28 percent), with 
smaller gaps for female-headed households with 
at least one male of working age (26 percent) 
(fi gure 5.13).118
In addition, businesses managed by women 
are less likely to receive a loan than fi rms man-
aged by men, although the differences narrow 
On average, female-headed households are 
less likely to own and operate land than male-
headed households. For 16 countries in fi ve de-
veloping regions, 55 percent of female-headed 
households own land, compared with 64 per-
cent of male-headed households. The fi gure for 
female-headed households where a working-
age male is present is 61 percent. Female-headed 
households are also less likely to operate land 
than their male counterparts—on average, 83 
percent of female-headed households operate 
land in these 16 countries (86 percent among 
those with male presence), compared with 89 
percent among male-headed households (fi gure 
5.12). More generally, where evidence is avail-
able for all farmers, women seldom own the 
land they operate. In Latin America, male farm-
ers represent 70–90 percent of formal owners of 
farmland depending on the country.110
Female-headed households own and operate 
smaller plots than male-headed households. In 
particular, land holdings among female-headed 
households in the data cited in fi gure 5.13 are 
22 percent smaller than those of male-headed 
households. The differences for female-headed 
households with a male presence are 21 percent 
for owned plots and 26 percent for operated 
BOX 5.9  Gender of the household head versus household composition: What 
matters most for policy?
Source: WDR 2012 team.
Asset ownership and use are often measured for 
the household rather than the individual. As a 
result, the analysis of gender diff erences in the 
access to and use of land relies mostly on compari-
sons of female-headed and male-headed house-
holds rather than on comparisons of individual 
female farmers and male farmers.
But comparisons of female- and male-headed 
households can exaggerate gender diff erences, 
because they fail to account for the number of 
working-age adults in the household and the num-
ber of dependents. Households with a low ratio of 
dependents to working-age adults are better able 
to generate income than those with a high depen-
dency ratio. To account for this fact, we distinguish 
between female-headed households where one or 
more men of working age are present and female-
headed households where no man of working age 
is present (working age is 15–59 years).
Perhaps not surprisingly, female-headed 
house holds with a male present often fare better 
than those with no male—and, in some cases, do 
as well as male-headed households. This fi nding 
suggests that a more nuanced categorization of 
rural households may be relevant for policy design 
and targeting.
There are no resources for women to turn to for loans and also there is not any kind of 
support and assistance for women.
Adult woman, rural Afghanistan”“
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and microfi nance institutions123 and to be more 
credit-constrained than men.124
Undoubtedly, the rapid growth of microfi -
nance has alleviated credit constraints among 
women. In 2007, microfi nance organizations 
reached 154.8 million clients, 106.6 million 
among the poorest when they took their fi rst 
loan, 83.4 percent of them women.125 It is not 
clear, however, how much microfi nance has in-
creased access to formal fi nancial services (by, 
say, helping individuals build a credit record), or 
whether, given the small size of the loans, it has 
lifted constraints for women who want to bor-
row slightly larger amounts.126
How gender differences in access to land 
and credit affect segregation in agriculture 
and entrepreneurship
Gender differences in access to land and credit 
are likely to translate into gender differences in 
production. First, the willingness and capacity 
with fi rm size and are smaller among formal 
businesses.119 In Guatemala, 14 percent of self-
employed men have access to credit, compared 
with 7 percent of self-employed women; the 
numbers among male and female entrepre-
neurs with 2–4 employees are 19 percent and 
9.8 percent, respectively; and 18 percent and 
16.5 percent, respectively among entrepreneurs 
with fi ve or more employees.120 Among for-
mal fi rms in Africa, female entrepreneurs have 
about the same access to credit as their male 
counterparts.121
Data on access need to be interpreted with 
caution, however, because they could refl ect 
both gender differences in the demand for credit 
as well as differential gender access to and treat-
ment by fi nancial institutions. Female entre-
preneurs are less likely to have ever applied for 
loans than male entrepreneurs.122 And when ap-
plying, they are more likely to borrow from ro-
tating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) 
F I G U R E  5.12  Female-headed households are less likely to own and operate land than male-headed 
households 
Source: World Bank/Food and Agriculture Organization database, most recent year available.
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machinery. The gap in rates of machinery use 
between female- and male-headed households 
ranges from almost 20 percentage points in 
Guatemala and Nicaragua to less than 1 per-
centage point in Indonesia and Tajikistan, with 
the gap in most countries 5 percentage points or 
more (fi gure 5.14). 
Land size and, more generally, the capacity to 
produce at scale determine input use and mech-
anization.129 So, women suffer disproportion-
ately from indivisibilities in the use of inputs and 
machinery because they cultivate smaller plots 
and thus are more likely than men to experience 
higher unit costs. Credit (and cash) constraints 
are also important. One of the most prominent 
barriers to the use of fertilizer is capital. Simi-
larly, the large fi nancial outlays for mechaniza-
tion suggest that credit constraints explain some 
of the gender differences, although the evidence 
for this conclusion is sparser. That women are 
less likely to cultivate cash crops may imply that 
it is not worthwhile to invest in agricultural in-
puts or machines.130
Gender differences in access to land, credit, 
and labor also affect women’s capacity to access 
markets and take advantage of new economic 
opportunities. Female-headed households sell 
a lower fraction of their agricultural output in 
the market than male-headed households in 14 
of the 16 countries in our database (Bangladesh 
and Nicaragua are exceptions). Gender differ-
ences in market access are largest in Pakistan 
(25 percentage points) and lowest in Ghana and 
Tajikistan (2–3 percentage points)—two coun-
tries with the lowest overall market penetration 
(see fi gure 5.14). Gender differences in access to 
markets are even more marked for export agri-
culture.131 In the Central Highlands of Guate-
mala, women hold only 3 percent of contracts 
for snow peas and broccoli (two of the most im-
portant crops grown for export in the area).132
In South Africa, Senegal, and China, process-
ing fi rm managers prefer to sign export con-
tracts with men because women have limited 
access to productive assets, lack statutory rights 
over land, and have less authority over family 
(and therefore over potential farm labor).133 
In Guatemala, women’s independent—but not 
joint—ownership of land was found to be a 
signifi cant predictor of women’s participation 
in nontraditional agro-export production.134 
Smaller plots and lower capitalizations among 
female farmers also act as barriers to entering 
into the export sector.135 In northern Nigeria, 
to use additional production inputs are affected 
by these resources. Second, access to markets, in-
vestment decisions, and growth potential refl ect, 
to some extent, existing constraints on farmers 
or business owners, as well as their capacity to 
overcome them. In other words, gender dif-
ferences in access to land and credit affect the 
relative ability of female and male farmers and 
entrepreneurs to invest, operate to scale, and 
benefi t from new economic opportunities. 
The combination of small plots, insecure 
land rights, and binding credit constraints limits 
female farmers’ ability to use agricultural inputs 
and technology. Women have lower access than 
men to agricultural inputs, including fertilizer, 
pesticides, and improved seed varieties.127 In 
all countries in our database, female-headed 
households are less likely to use fertilizer than 
male-headed households, with differences rang-
ing from 25 percentage points in Pakistan to 2 
percentage points in Nicaragua.128 The same is 
true for mechanization—the use of ploughs, 
tractors, water pumps, and other agricultural 
F I G U R E  5.13  Female-headed house-
holds in rural areas are 
less likely than male-
headed households to 
have received credit in 
the last 12 months
Source: World Bank/Food and Agriculture Organization database, 
most recent year available.
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Credit constraints are also a serious obstacle 
to female-owned business creation, investment 
decisions, and growth. A recent study by the Eu-
ropean Commission shows that diffi culties in ac-
cessing fi nancing are among the main obstacles 
for female entrepreneurs-to-be.139 The number 
of studies looking at start-ups in developing 
countries is small, but the available evidence 
points in the same direction.140 In India, among 
those with access to microcredit, women with an 
existing business increased their consumption 
of durable goods; women with a high probabil-
ity of becoming business owners did the same, 
and at the same time reduced their nondurable 
consumption, which is consistent with the need 
to pay fi xed costs to enter entrepreneurship.141 
Access to credit and savings mechanisms also 
affect the investment decisions of entrepreneurs. 
higher unit costs and more stringent credit con-
straints make irrigation farming less feasible 
for female barley outgrowers (those who grow 
crops for others on contract).136
Gender differences in access to land and 
credit also reduce the capacity of female farmers 
to start a business, invest, and grow, relative to 
their male counterparts. Greater land tenure se-
curity promotes higher agricultural investment 
and productivity.137 In Nicaragua, possessing a 
registered document increases the probability 
of carrying out land-attached investments by 
35 percent, irrespective of whether the docu-
ment is a public deed or an agrarian reform 
title, but it has no impact on access to credit. 
This fi nding suggests that security of tenure is 
the channel for formal land ownership to affect 
investment.138
F I G U R E  5.14  Access to productive inputs and markets is lower among female-headed households than 
among male-headed households
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Source: World Bank/Food and Agriculture Organization database, most recent year available.
I think you should consider everything carefully if you want to get a loan. If I want 
to get a 10 million loan, what do I want to do with that money? In initial months, 
I breed some livestock to get some revenue. I may spend some money on breeding
pigs and some on breeding chickens. I can use the money I earn from breeding 
chickens to pay for the debt. I have something to rely on to pay for the debt. The 
loan not only helps create jobs for my family members but also improves my family 
conditions.
Adult woman, Vietnam
“
”
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and business, and the local conditions of the 
credit market.148
Higher interest rates could also refl ect dif-
ferences in observable indicators of credit wor-
thiness or in lenders’ perceptions of borrowing 
risks associated with women in the absence of 
objective information on their performance as 
borrowers. Because women are less likely than 
men to interact with the (formal) fi nancial sys-
tem, they are more likely to suffer dispropor-
tionately from higher interest rates because of 
the lack of information on their potential per-
formance as borrowers. 
Having said that, market and institutional 
constraints (discussed below) on access to for-
mal credit can be surmounted through fi nancial 
innovation and adapting the credit model to ad-
dress the needs of small businesses (see box 7.5 
in chapter 7).
Formal institutions: Land rights, land 
distribution programs, and fi nancial 
regulations 
Institutional structures in land and credit mar-
kets often disadvantage women. Inheritance 
and marital regimes and land titling perpetu-
ate and sometimes add to gender disparities in 
land ownership and accumulation (see chap-
ter 4).149 Marital property regimes governing 
the ownership and control of assets brought to 
and acquired during marriage determine how 
women fare in the event of widowhood or mar-
ital breakdown.150 When women are consid-
ered to be under the guardianship of husbands, 
the control and often the ownership of marital 
property rests with husbands and their fam-
ilies—so many women are vulnerable to dis-
possession at the dissolution of their marriage 
or the death of their husband. Similarly, cus-
tomary patrilineal inheritance systems, where 
property passes to and through male members 
of the lineage, can relegate women to the status 
of unpaid family labor on family farms or, for 
the growing numbers of landless and land-poor 
households, to agricultural wage labor.151 Evi-
dence from Ethiopia and the Philippines shows 
that, by means of marriage and inheritance, 
larger and better-quality assets, including land, 
are transferred to men.152
Women are also less likely to benefi t from 
state-sponsored land redistribution programs. 
In 13 Latin American land reform programs, 
the fraction of female benefi ciaries was around 
11–12 percent.153 In most cases, gender imbal-
In Kenya, access to savings accounts had a large 
and positive impact on productive investments 
and expenditures for female microentrepreneurs 
but not for male ones, despite the availability of 
informal saving sources such as ROSCAs.142 Re-
stricted access to fi nance is also likely to curtail 
business growth, particularly among micro and 
small fi rms, because they are less able to provide 
collateral and because the number of fi nancial 
products that target them specifi cally is more 
limited.143
Lifting constraints on access to land 
and credit
Markets, institutions, households, and their 
interactions—rather than economic develop-
ment—explain gender differences in access to 
productive inputs. Market prices can constrain 
women’s access to inputs, particularly credit, 
disproportionately. Similarly, formal and infor-
mal institutional constraints can have gender-
differentiated impacts on access, even when 
they were not intended to do so. And household 
preferences (and underlying gender norms) can 
lead to resource allocations that favor men over 
women, even when these allocations are ineffi -
cient. In contrast, many of the gender gaps in ac-
cess to productive inputs are fairly insensitive to 
economic development and to the density and 
coverage of specifi c markets.144
Markets: Discrimination and differential 
pricing in land and credit markets 
Land and (formal) credit markets have been 
weak means of increasing access to land and 
credit among female farmers and entrepre-
neurs.145 And inequalities in one market often 
reinforce inequalities in the other—land often 
serves as collateral for credit, and credit is often 
needed to acquire land.
Lower access to markets results from the 
combination of gender discrimination and dif-
ferential pricing. In some parts of the world, 
women face discrimination in land and credit 
markets.146 In Europe and Central Asia, female-
managed fi rms pay higher interest rates than 
their male counterparts (0.6 percentage point 
more on average), with even higher price dis-
crimination against female entrepreneurs in the 
region’s least fi nancially developed countries.147 
In Italy, female-owned microenterprises pay a 
higher interest rate (about 0.3 percentage point 
more) than those run by men, even after ac-
counting for the characteristics of the borrower 
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but individual preferences for asset allocation 
on their death may perpetuate gender imbal-
ances in access to land and other assets. A review 
of wills in Mexico shows that partners were cho-
sen to inherit land 39 percent of the time, sons 
39 percent of the time, and daughters 9 percent 
of the time.160 
Some gender-based preferences are so power-
ful that they lead to and help support ineffi cient 
allocations of productive resources and imper-
fect resource pooling within households—with 
negative impacts on gender access. In Burkina 
Faso, preference is given to male-controlled plots 
in the allocation of productive inputs, which re-
sults in a 6 percent estimated loss in total house-
hold income.161 In Paraguay, women benefi ted 
more than men from increased access to credit, 
including women in households that were not 
credit constrained, suggesting that fi nancial re-
sources were not effectively pooled across men 
and women in the same household.162
But behavior does respond and adapt to eco-
nomic change that opens new opportunities. In 
southern Cameroon and western Ghana, in-
creased bargaining power among women asso-
ciated with higher demand for labor in cocoa, a 
very labor-intensive traditional export crop, has 
led many husbands to circumvent traditional 
practice by enabling their wives to inherit land 
through “indirect means” as a reward for help-
ing them plant and cultivate cocoa.163 The result 
was more individual land ownership and stron-
ger women’s land rights.
GENDER IMPACTS OF “AGGREGATE” 
MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL 
FAILURES
Markets and institutions—their design and op-
eration—are themselves products of the agents 
who populate them as well as of the agents’ 
interactions. The extent to which market par-
ticipants share and transmit information deter-
ances in access can be attributed to the institu-
tional structure of these programs—they tend to 
target household heads (in the past solely identi-
fi ed as male), sometimes restricting households 
to one benefi ciary (perhaps to prevent fraud), so 
men were much more likely to have benefi ted. 
That implies that gender differences can be 
mitigated through policy reform. In Colombia, 
the share of female benefi ciaries from agrarian 
reform increased from 11 percent to 45 percent 
once joint titling for land parcels was mandated 
and enforced.154 
For credit, the rules and regulations ap-
plied by formal and, in some cases, informal 
institutions can restrict access by small farm-
ers and producers, among whom women are 
overrepresented. Because credit often requires 
collateral, preferably land or immobile assets, 
women are at a disadvantage because they have 
lower or less secure access to land and are dis-
proportionately employed in the service sec-
tor where capitalization is lower and output is 
often intangible. In India, the absence of land 
titles signifi cantly limits women farmers’ access 
to institutional credit.155 In the Middle East, 
women’s small and medium enterprises are 
often in services, where banks have diffi culty 
quantifying output because there are no physi-
cal assets, such as machinery, to serve as a basis 
for loan assessment.156 In addition, application 
procedures that require a husband’s or father’s 
cosignature could discourage prospective fe-
male borrowers.157 Similar requirements are 
sometimes also found in informal and micro-
fi nance institutions.158 
Where credit comes through informal insti-
tutions, the structure of the organization and 
its membership and the norms governing it can 
restrict access to women. For example, rules for 
membership in farmers’ clubs in Malawi (one 
of the main sources for credit and extension 
services for small farmers) disqualify married 
women from full membership and stigmatize 
single women or women in polygamous mar-
riages, undermining their capacity to benefi t 
from the services the club could offer.159
Informal institutions: Gender-based 
preferences and intrahousehold allocations 
of productive resources 
Gender-based preferences can lead to unequal 
resource allocations to men and women in the 
same household. For example, inheritance laws 
in Latin America treat men and women equally, 
If there is a job opening in a 
company that is oriented toward 
male jobs, they will rather hire a 
man.
Adult woman, urban Serbia
“
”
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perpetuating the bias against female employ-
ment (this behavior is usually referred to as sta-
tistical discrimination).
The story is similar in the credit market, 
where limited access of women precludes learn-
ing about their potential performance as bor-
rowers, including their ability to repay. Perceived 
cost or other differences between men and 
women and reinforcing social norms exacerbate 
this problem. For example, a preference for well-
tried-and-tested borrowers among commercial 
banks could reduce the credit to small farms and 
nonfarm enterprises and thus for women who 
predominate in these groups.164 
Affi rmative action policies in the United 
States and other developed countries have pro-
moted learning among employers about the 
performance of such groups by supporting the 
employment of underrepresented groups. In 
the United States, these policies did indeed re-
distribute employment from white males to 
women and minority groups at no signifi cant 
effi ciency costs.165
In the absence of affi rmative action policies, 
female employment in the public sector in fairly 
large numbers can also have such a demonstra-
tion effect. In rich countries, public sector growth 
has been important in integrating women into 
the labor markets.166 Data for 15 developed econ-
omies show a very strong correlation between 
female labor force participation and female pub-
lic sector employment but a much weaker cor-
relation for males. More important, increases 
in female labor force participation in countries 
with large public sectors or high public sector 
employment growth are driven by increases in 
both public and private sector employment. Of 
12 such economies with data, women were more 
likely than men to work in the public sector in 
only 5 countries, and less likely to do so in 4. In 
the remaining 3 countries, gender was not sig-
nifi cant in explaining the probability of public 
sector employment after controlling for other 
relevant worker characteristics.167
mines their behavior and ultimately the market 
outcomes. Market failures in information occur 
when information is lacking or when some par-
ticipants have more information than others. 
These failures can affect employment outcomes 
of men and women and therefore contribute to 
employment segregation by gender. 
For example, a recent female graduate in 
industrial engineering may fail to get a job in 
a private company because the potential em-
ployer is not sure how well a female worker 
will fi t into an otherwise all-male company. In 
other words, she may not get the job because 
the employer has too little information about 
her potential performance. Similarly, a female 
entrepreneur in a village may use her capital to 
buy chickens—because that is what all other 
women in the village do, not because it would 
yield the highest returns. In other words, she 
mimics the behavior of others in her network 
because she does not have information about 
productive alternatives.
The structure and rules of different institu-
tions can also affect how agents interact with 
these institutions and among themselves. In 
some cases, the institution’s structure or rules 
could lead to gender-differentiated behavior or 
impacts, even if they were conceived to be gen-
der neutral. These institutional failures can con-
tribute to employment segregation. For exam-
ple, a female farmer in rural Ethiopia may have 
limited use for agricultural extension services in 
her area because these services focus on crops 
cultivated by men. Similarly, a woman of repro-
ductive age may have more diffi culty fi nding a 
job in the formal sector if maternal leave is paid 
by the employer than if it is fi nanced through 
general taxes because she will be perceived by 
the prospective employer as potentially more 
expensive to hire than an equivalent male.
What you know and whom you know 
matters: Gender impacts of information 
and access to networks 
Lack of information about women’s performance 
arising from the limited presence of women in 
some markets may reinforce low female labor 
participation, especially without compensatory 
measures that foster experimentation and learn-
ing. In many countries, low female participation 
in formal private employment makes it diffi cult 
for employers to adequately form expectations 
about female workers’ productivity. So they may 
continue to be reluctant to hire female workers, 
People fi nd out [about available jobs] through 
networking and connections; if you know someone 
who is working they will tell you about a job 
opening.
Young woman, urban South Africa
“
”
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credit markets. By targeting women and de-
signing delivery mechanisms that promote 
good performance and high repayment rates 
among borrowers, microfi nance institutions 
have generated enormous amounts of informa-
tion about women’s performance as borrowers. 
Updated expectations about the high average 
profi tability of lending to women are now at-
tracting more traditional credit providers (see 
box 7.5 in chapter 7).
Low female participation in some occupa-
tions or professions not only affects those try-
Public sector employment growth in devel-
oping countries has often been the main or even 
the only opportunity for formal wage employ-
ment for women, especially for educated and 
married women and where views of women’s 
participation in market work are more restric-
tive. In Egypt, women’s clustering in public 
sector jobs can be partly explained by the ob-
servation that government jobs fi t better with 
married life (box 5.10).
The expansion of microfi nance may have 
produced a similar demonstration effect in 
Source: World Bank 2010a.
BOX 5.10  Family formation and public sector employment in Egypt
In 2006, private sector fi rms accounted for less than 
a quarter of female employment in urban Egypt. 
Their share in rural female employment was even 
lower, hovering at around 8 percent. The majority 
of working urban women held government jobs, 
and in rural areas the government and household 
enterprises accounted for more than 70 percent of 
female employment.
It has been asserted that work in the public 
sector is more compatible with women’s “repro-
ductive role,” off ering “shorter hours, more access 
to childcare, and greater tolerance for maternity 
leave.” In 2006, the proportion of workers who 
reported having been at work during their last 
pregnancy was signifi cantly higher in the public 
sector. As many as 86 percent of public sector 
workers who had a baby while working were given 
paid maternity leave of at least six weeks, in con-
trast to only 47 percent of those working in the for-
mal private sector. And the percentage of working 
women aged 15–29 years who complain of long 
working hours is signifi cantly higher in the private 
sector (50 percent) than in the public sector (32 
percent).
Job separations are also lower in the public sec-
tor. Among women working in 1998, government 
and public sector employees were the least likely 
to have left the labor force by 2006. Specifi cally, the 
rate of exit of female private fi rm employees was 
about 12 percentage points higher than that of 
female government employees, and this diff erence 
was statistically signifi cant. The exit rates for 
women working in an informal fi rm or household 
enterprise or for those self-employed were about 
35 percent points higher than the exit rate of gov-
ernment employees. These diff erences persist after 
accounting for individual characteristics.
Exit rates are driven primarily by marriage, but 
the association between marriage and leaving the 
labor force is far weaker in the government (pub-
lic) sector. Relative to women whose marital status 
was unchanged, those who married between 
1998 and 2006 were signifi cantly more likely to 
have left the labor force by 2006 (by about 14 per-
centage points). Moreover, women age 20 and 
working in a private sector job in 1998 would have 
a 26 percent chance of exiting the labor force by 
2006 if they did not marry in the interim, and a 
54 percent chance of exiting if they did marry, 
compared with 16 and 22 percent for women 
employed in the public sector. So, the eff ect of 
marriage was to raise the exit rate for a private 
employee by 28 percentage points and that of a 
government employee by 6 percentage points. 
The eff ect of marriage on exit among informal 
sector employees is signifi cantly higher than 
among government employees.
The diff erence across government and informal 
sector employees in women’s labor market exit 
rates after marriage is largely an urban phenome-
non. In rural areas, the diff erence was not statisti-
cally signifi cant. That suggests that informal sector 
work in rural areas, which consists primarily of ani-
mal husbandry and processing of dairy products, is 
just as compatible with marriage as government 
work. The line between women’s productive and 
reproductive roles in rural areas is much more 
blurred. 
For urban areas, there is some evidence that 
the post-marriage retention rate is highest among 
women working in household enterprises, higher 
even than that among government employees. 
Because work in a household enterprise is likely to 
be very fl exible in hours, this result also supports 
the idea that married women are more likely to 
keep working if work hours and married life are 
compatible.
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business improves fi rm productivity,172 sug-
gesting that better access to networks boosts 
productivity. But the effect is signifi cant only for 
men, implying that women face stronger con-
straints that diminish the positive impact of this 
potential advantage. Women also face barriers 
to membership in rural organizations and coop-
eratives, which may further inhibit a channel to 
facilitate market access.173 Even in West African 
rural markets, despite the fame of the “market 
queens” and greater mobility of women relative 
to other regions, women rarely achieve upward 
economic mobility. The economic resources 
and connections necessary for the spatial and 
social mobility to amass wholesale consign-
ments, command transport, and own process-
ing facilities are typically in the hands of men.174 
Here new information and communications 
technology holds enormous promise for lifting 
some of the time and mobility constraints that 
women face (see chapter 6).
Finally high female participation rates in spe-
cifi c occupations and signifi cant (or “thick”) net-
works can also have negative effects.175 New mar-
ket entrants will be more likely to cluster where 
others from the same group are already present, 
perpetuating segregation. This argument has 
been used in the education literature to explain 
gender segregation by fi eld of study, as well as the 
feminization of the teaching profession.176 A lack 
of adequate information would only exacerbate 
this phenomenon. For example, employment au-
dits showing that employers discriminate against 
men in “traditionally female” jobs (nursing) and 
against women in “traditionally male” jobs177 are 
more likely to refl ect discrimination arising from 
imperfect information than differential hiring 
preferences across sectors.
The rules of the game matter: Gender 
impacts of formal (economic) institutions
Institutions conceived to serve men and women 
equally can have unintended differential im-
pacts on gender outcomes. In some cases, the 
design and functioning of a particular institu-
ing to enter these occupations or professions 
but can also adversely affect the performance of 
women already employed in them, especially if 
gathering information is costly or if networks 
built around gender are important. For both sets 
of women, there is a benefi t to additional par-
ticipation by women. In the United States, over 
the past century, the evolution of female labor 
force participation can be explained thus: when 
small proportions of women worked, learning 
was very slow and the changes in female labor 
force participation were also small, but when 
the proportion of women working was close to 
half the total working, rapid learning and rapid 
changes in female labor force participation took 
place.168 Investment and participation decisions 
are often driven by perceived rather than actual 
returns, so in the absence of critical group mass 
in a specifi c market, imperfect information can 
slow learning even more.169 
Barriers to being part of networks, either 
because of low female participation rates or be-
cause of more explicit gender-based member-
ship rules, can reduce women’s productivity by 
limiting their ability to gather and share infor-
mation and potentially access markets. Women 
are less likely than men to participate in nonex-
clusively female networks and to be connected 
to peers within larger, more informal groups. 
Data from the Global Entrepreneurship Moni-
tor suggest that in high- and middle-income 
countries female entrepreneurs are substantially 
less likely than men to know an entrepreneur 
who started a business in the two years preced-
ing the interview.170 Similarly, Mexican female 
entrepreneurs’ diffi culties in breaking into men’s 
networks constitute one of the most important 
constraints to business growth.171
To the extent that valuable information is 
communicated through these networks, dif-
ferential access by gender can impair women’s 
economic performance. Data from Investment 
Climate Surveys on formal urban businesses in 
Sub-Saharan Africa show that having a father 
who was an entrepreneur or joining a family 
[Getting a job] is very diffi  cult, even to have an opportunity for apprenticeship. 
I have diffi  culties to be an apprentice because only ‘insiders’ can bring people to 
apprenticeships.
Young woman, urban Indonesia
“
”
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single unit, particularly when men and women 
are carrying out different tasks or growing dif-
ferent crops. This pro-male bias can also result 
from discriminatory norms or practices within 
the institution. The U.S. Department of Agri-
culture recently settled with a group of women 
farmers who brought a lawsuit for gender dis-
crimination in access to credit services.
Bias in service delivery also arises because 
the large majority of extension offi cers are men. 
Only 15 percent of extension agents globally are 
women,184 and in Africa, a mere 7 percent.185 As 
a result, social norms that prevent women from 
moving around (and thus visiting the exten-
sion offi cer) or speaking with a male without 
her husband present constrain women’s access 
to extension services. In addition, male offi cers 
tend to serve male farmers.186 That extension 
resources tend to be allocated toward larger 
commercially oriented farms, where women are 
underrepresented, has also contributed to the 
observed gender differences in access.
How labor legislation and hiring and 
personnel practices can hurt women
Labor legislation and other practices regulat-
ing the functioning of labor markets can have 
signifi cant gender impacts. In some cases, the 
legislation itself focuses on gender; examples in-
clude restrictions on hours of work, industry of 
employment and parental leave. In others, such 
as employment protection laws, the legislation is 
meant to be gender neutral, but its effect is not. 
Practices for hiring and personnel management 
can also hurt women.
Impact of gender-based legislation on women’s 
employment outcomes 
Many countries impose restrictions on women’s 
access to market work and on the kind of work 
that women may do. Numerous African coun-
tries require by law that a woman acquire her fa-
ther’s or husband’s permission to work outside 
the home, while in other places women may not 
open or operate an individual bank account.187 
In addition, restrictions on work hours and in-
dustry of work are often introduced as protec-
tive measures to take into account the health of 
pregnant women, nursing mothers, or women 
engaged in potentially hazardous jobs. Industry 
restrictions are more common than work hour 
restrictions, but the two often coexist. Although 
tion are products of existing inequalities, so the 
institution does little to mitigate them. Agricul-
tural extension services illustrate this point. In 
other cases, gender inequalities on dimensions 
other than the ones a specifi c institution deals 
with directly mediate its impact in ways that 
may lead to differential gender outcomes. “Gen-
der neutral” labor legislation and hiring person-
nel practices illustrate this point. In both cases, 
the failure to account for gender differences in 
the sphere of infl uence of a particular institu-
tion lead to further gender inequality.
Agricultural extension services for all—
or just for men?
Agricultural extension services—which include 
advisory services, information, training, and 
access to production inputs such as seeds and 
fertilizers—increase the productivity of farm 
activities. But extension services have largely 
ignored women farmers in many areas.178 In 
Vietnam, women spent 30 percent of their total 
labor efforts in agricultural self-employment, 
compared with 20 percent for men, but made up 
only 25 percent of participants in training pro-
grams on animal husbandry and 10 percent on 
crop cultivation.179 In Karnataka, India, 29 per-
cent of land-holding male-headed households 
received an extension visit, while 18 percent of 
female-headed households did. For livestock 
extension, by contrast, 79 percent of female-
headed households had contact with an exten-
sion agent, against 72 percent for male-headed 
households.180
Gender differences in access to extension ser-
vices arise even within households. In Ghana, 
12 percent of male-headed households received 
extensions visits, compared with 2 percent of 
female-headed households. And in male-headed 
households, only 2 percent of spouses received a 
visit. This is particularly striking because Ghana 
is one of the African countries with the largest 
number of female-extension offi cers.181 
A bias in service delivery toward men has been 
identifi ed as a cause of gender differences in ac-
cess to extension services—bias often stemming 
from the belief that men are the decision makers 
and so should be more actively targeted,182 com-
bined with the assumption that educating men 
will ensure that they share knowledge with other 
household members.183 This reasoning may run 
afoul of the reality of households not acting as a 
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ference between permanent and temporary em-
ployment more marked.189
Social security regulations for domestic work-
ers is another clear example of legislation with a 
strong gender impact. Across the world, domes-
tic workers have very limited access to employ-
ment insurance, retirement and health benefi ts, 
and other forms of workers’ compensation—
even when formally employed. Because the large 
majority of domestic workers are women, this 
translates into signifi cant lower access to social 
security among female workers than their male 
counterparts.190
Job segregation by gender can depend on 
job assignment and promotion practices within 
fi rms. Some people who make job assignments 
intentionally discriminate against one sex for 
certain jobs (see box 5.3); others discriminate 
statistically, using sex as a proxy for productiv-
ity. Statistical discrimination is often based on 
gender stereotypes—stereotypes of men as ra-
tional and women as emotional often favor 
men for managerial positions.191 The gender 
composition of jobs and fi rms infl uences who 
applies and who is hired, presumably refl ecting 
both the job’s gender labels and the employers’ 
tendency to recruit through employees’ personal 
networks.192 In sum, whether the participants in 
the matching process view the job as appropri-
ate for persons of a particular sex boosts the as-
sociation between gender and people’s jobs or 
place of work—in other words, it boosts em-
ployment segregation.
 Industry and occupational segregation in 
turn contributes to the observed gender promo-
tion and authority gaps, as well as to differences 
in workers’ attitudes and behavior.193 First, dif-
ferences in the spacing and length of the job lad-
ders in male- and female-dominated jobs create 
a mobility gap among the sexes. Predominantly 
male jobs have longer ladders  (promotion paths 
that connect lower- and higher-level positions) 
than female jobs.194 In addition, the rungs be-
tween the steps on ladders in predominantly 
female jobs are closer together, so promotions 
yield less advancement for women than men.195 
Second, women are more likely to be manag-
ers in heavily female industries,196 so men and 
women usually have same-sex supervisors.197 
Third, men’s and women’s concentration in dif-
ferent jobs or fi rms and their different location 
in the fi rm’s “opportunity structure” generate 
now gone, such practices were also common 
in the not too distant past in some developed 
economies such as Spain.
These restrictions appear to be associated 
with lower female participation rates and higher 
labor market segregation. Countries that impose 
some kind of work hour or industry restrictions 
have on average lower female labor force partici-
pation (45 percent, compared with 60 percent in 
countries with no restrictions) and higher gen-
der participation gaps (45 percent, compared 
with 25 percent in countries with no restric-
tions). Measures limiting women’s work to day-
time hours, or to a subset of industries, may also 
limit their employment opportunities—driving 
employers to hire only men for jobs that women 
may otherwise chose. Their overall impact de-
pends on women’s preferences for employment, 
however—that is, even without restrictions, few 
women may choose work in mines or work that 
requires strong physical labor.188
Differential regulation of parental leave and 
retirement can also affect female labor force par-
ticipation. Most countries provide some sort of 
maternity leave, but benefi ts vary considerably 
in the number of days, the percentage of leave 
paid, and who pays for it. Fewer countries pro-
vide paternity leave, often under more limited 
conditions. Existing differences in parental leave 
between men and women could increase the 
perceived cost of employing women and there-
fore diminish their employment opportunities 
(see chapter 7). And, while differential retire-
ment ages have in many cases been motivated by 
protective instincts, these differences can create 
disparities in lifetime earnings, pension benefi ts, 
and career opportunities, thus discouraging 
women from market work (see chapter 4).
The impact of “gender neutral” legislation 
and personnel practices on women’s 
employment outcomes 
Employment protection legislation and other 
regulation aimed at providing job security to 
those in formal jobs—the insiders—often does 
so at the expense of those who have no access to 
such jobs or have no job at all—the outsiders. 
Unemployment rates and the incidence of tem-
porary contracts are signifi cantly higher among 
women and youth than among men, and these 
differences are more marked in places where 
labor protection is more restrictive and the dif-
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increase productivity of female plots (either 
directly through complementary productive 
inputs or indirectly through, say, time-saving 
investments) and potentially increase access to 
markets. And, a general perception that wom-
en’s businesses have a more limited capacity for 
growth among credit institutions could limit 
access to credit for female entrepreneurs, which 
itself would impede growth.
In addition, market and institutional con-
straints can be mutually reinforcing so that 
progress in one area fails to lead to higher gen-
der equality in access to economic opportunity 
without progress in another area. For instance, 
increasing returns to education in the labor 
market provide stronger incentives for female 
participation in paid work, but these incentives 
may fail to attract more women to the market 
in the presence of traditional norms for female 
participation in market work. And institutional 
changes that allow more fl exible employment, 
such as part-time work, can ease existing time 
constraints but may have a limited effect on 
women’s employment outcomes in the absence 
of complementary measures such as an expan-
sion in (child) care services. 
This feedback loop between the main causes 
of employment segregation by gender and seg-
regation itself, together with mutually reinforc-
ing market and institutional constraints, are 
the main reasons why women appear to be in 
a productivity trap (fi gure 5.15). Breaking out 
of this trap thus requires interventions that lift 
time constraints and increase access to pro-
ductive inputs among women and that correct 
market and institutional failures. Successful in-
terventions will depend on adequately identify-
ing and targeting the most binding constraint in 
each context, while acknowledging the problem 
of multiple constraints, perhaps by sequencing 
policies (see chapters 7 and 8).
The payoff from breaking out of the 
productivity trap 
The payoff from breaking out of the produc-
tivity trap will be apparent on several critical 
fronts. Increasing gender equality in access to 
economic opportunities can have large impacts 
on productivity. Women now represent more 
than 40 percent of the global labor force and 43 
percent of the agricultural workforce. Accord-
ing to the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
equalizing access to productive resources be-
differences in their attachment to the labor 
force, their career aspirations, and their work 
behavior. Data from a Fortune 500 corporation 
reveals that although most workers in dead-
end white-collar jobs were women, anyone in 
such a job would lack job commitment, pre-
ferring instead to socialize with coworkers.198 
And while men held most of the jobs on pro-
motion ladders, both men and women in such 
jobs displayed career commitments and sought 
 advancement.199
BREAKING OUT OF THE 
PRODUCTIVITY TRAP: HOW AND 
WHY TO DO IT
We conclude with a brief review on the main 
insights that arise from the application of the 
Report’s framework to the analysis of employ-
ment segregation by gender and its causes and 
their implications for policies, as well as a dis-
cussion of the reasons for policy action for 
lower segregation. 
Weakening feedback loops and mutually 
reinforcing constraints 
There is a feedback loop between employment 
segregation and its causes. As we have shown, 
three main factors contribute to gender segrega-
tion in access to economic opportunities among 
farmers, entrepreneurs, and wage workers: gen-
der differences in time use (primarily stemming 
from differences in care responsibilities), gender 
differences in access to productive inputs (partic-
ularly land and credit), and gender-differentiated 
impacts of market and institutional failures.
At the same time, gender segregation in ac-
cess to economic opportunities reinforces gen-
der differences in time use and access to inputs, 
and markets and institutional failures. Take 
gender differences in time use. Because women 
tend to be employed in low-productivity and 
low-pay jobs, they have a comparative advan-
tage in home production relative to men. So, 
gender differences in productivity in paid and 
unpaid work strengthen existing incentives for 
specialization in housework and care work and 
reinforce gender differences in time use.
The same can be argued about gender differ-
ences in access to productive resources. For ex-
ample, lower commercialization among female 
farmers may discourage investments that could 
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women. For instance, in the United States, about 
40 percent of the convergence in wages between 
the south and the northeast between 1960 and 
1980 and 15−20 percent of total wage growth 
between 1960 and 2008 resulted from declining 
labor market segregation by gender and race.202
These gains can bring wider benefi ts. To the 
extent that increased access to economic op-
portunities leads to greater control by women 
over household income and other resources, 
it can strengthen women’s agency and benefi t 
others in the household, particularly children 
(see chapters 3 and 4). The private sector can 
support and gain from higher female participa-
tion in market work and lower segregation as 
women’s skills and talents are employed in jobs 
that make the best use of those abilities (box 
5.11). Taking advantage of this opportunity 
is particularly important as rapid technologi-
cal change and the spread of information and 
communication technologies increase the de-
mand for skilled workers around the world, and 
tween female and male farmers could increase 
agricultural output in developing countries by 
2.5–4 percent.200 In-depth studies from specifi c 
countries point to similar gains. For example, 
ensuring that women farmers have the same ac-
cess as men to fertilizer and other agricultural 
inputs would increase maize yields by 11–16 
percent in Malawi and 17 percent in Ghana. 
And improving women’s property rights in 
Burkina Faso would increase total household 
agricultural production by about 6 percent with 
no additional resources—simply by reallocating 
fertilizer and labor from men to women.
Eliminating discrimination against female 
workers and managers could increase produc-
tivity per worker by 25–40 percent, depending 
on the type and degree of exclusion from the 
labor force and the managerial pool.201 And 
eliminating barriers that prevent women from 
entering certain occupations or sectors of em-
ployment would have similar positive effects, 
reducing the productivity gap between men and 
F I G U R E  5.15  Mutually reinforcing market and institutional constraints are the main reason why women 
appear to be in a productivity trap
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women. Europe can expect a shortfall of 24 mil-
lion workers by 2040 if the participation rate 
for women remains constant. If instead this 
rate rises to that of men, the projected shortfall 
drops to 3 million.203 And in an economically 
integrated world, even modest improvements 
in the effi ciency of use of resources can have 
signifi cant effects, giving countries with less 
discrimination and more equality a competitive 
edge (see chapter 6).
women—especially educated women—present 
an untapped pool of resources in the search for 
talent and skills.
Gender inequality in access to economic op-
portunities is also becoming more costly for most 
countries. Global aging implies that fewer work-
ers will be supporting a growing popu lation of 
elderly in the years and decades to come, unless 
labor force participation increases signifi cantly 
among groups with low rates today—basically, 
BOX 5.11 The business case for gender equality
Sources: International Finance Corporation 2010a, 2010b. 
More fi rms realize that promoting women’s economic empower-
ment can be a win-win situation for business and women. Belcorp 
in Peru and Hindustan Unilever in India illustrate how using innova-
tive business models to invest in the female workforce can be good 
for business and bring tangible change to women’s lives and local 
communities.
Belcorp. A well-established cosmetics company with over 40 years 
of experience in the industry, Belcorp has a stellar reputation for 
high-quality products. Through direct sales, in 15 countries in North 
and Latin America, its 9,000 employees generate US$1.3 billion in 
annual revenue.
Women are crucial to the company’s business model and suc-
cess. They make up 80 percent of Belcorp’s workforce and 77 per-
cent of its senior staff . Belcorp realized early on that promoting 
women’s empowerment was a sound business strategy. Through its 
operations, it gives each of its 650,000 beauty consultants (most 
from low-income households) the opportunity to become entre-
preneurs and to benefi t from business training, social networking, 
and group activities to educate and empower them, their families, 
and their communities.
Belcorp’s business model is based on three axes: economic 
 support (by providing a business opportunity with appropriate 
training), emotional support (through incentives, recognition, and 
confi dence building, as well as awareness on issues such as nutri-
tion, health, and child upbringing, to address both the personal and 
the family considerations crucial to women), and social support (by 
giving women the chance to be part of a network of peers).
Hindustan Unilever. With a long record of market leadership in 
India, Hindustan Unilever has market shares of nearly 60 percent in 
categories including soap, detergent, and shampoos. But the liber-
alization of India’s economy and the opening of markets to foreign 
multinationals such as Proc ter & Gamble increased the pressure to 
improve revenues and profi ts. By the late 1990s, the company was 
looking for the next big opportunity—to reach the really small vil-
lages that were not part of their distribution network. 
The business case of focusing on rural Indian markets was clear. 
India has the world’s second-largest population after China, and 
more than 70 percent of its 1.2 billion people live in rural areas. 
While the business reason was clear, setting up a distribution chan-
nel to reach remote parts of India was less straightforward. Hindu-
stan Unilever had been tapping into some of the rural populations 
through such tools as van road shows, but a large share remained 
outside its reach. It came up with an interesting solution: build a 
distribution system through a network of women microentrepre-
neurs to get the product directly to consumers.
It designed Shakti, a direct-to-consumer sales distribution net-
work that relies on 45,000 female microentrepreneurs and has 
tapped into 3 million homes across 135,000 villages in remote rural 
markets. The program has brought a new competitive advantage 
and increased profi ts while increasing women’s incomes. And by 
packaging products into very small amounts and selling them at 
prices aff ordable to the rural poor, it is improving hygiene and well-
being in rural India.
 Gender differences in employment and why they matter 239
WHAT WE SEE
Men’s and women’s jobs diff er greatly and the changes in the struc-
ture of employment brought about by economic development are 
not enough to eliminate employment segregation by gender. All 
over the world, women are concentrated in low-productivity, low-
pay jobs. They work in small farms and run small fi rms, they are over-
represented among unpaid workers and in the informal sector, and 
they rarely rise to positions of power.
WHY WE SEE THIS
Care Responsibilities and Time Use
Women bear a disproportionate share of house and care responsi-
bilities and consequently face important fi xed costs associated with 
market work. Fixed schedules and minimum hour requirements, 
particularly in (formal) wage jobs, and the diffi  culty in adjusting 
responsibilities at home result in barriers to market work for women. 
Social norms around the role of women in the household and soci-
ety also infl uence these trade-off s. Women are thus more likely to 
value fl exible work arrangements and to supply fewer hours of mar-
ket work on average than men, putting them at risk of being chan-
neled into lower-quality jobs.
Land and Credit
Across countries, female farmers and entrepreneurs have less access 
to land and credit than their male counterparts. Gender diff erences 
in access to these productive inputs result from a combination of 
barriers to market access, including discrimination and diff erential 
pricing in land and credit markets, and institutional constraints, 
including land rights and fi nancial rules and regulations. They may 
also refl ect discriminatory preferences within households that favor 
men in the allocation of productive resources. These diff erences are 
likely to translate into gender diff erences in scale of production, pro-
ductivity, and investment and growth capacity.
Market and Institutional Failures
Women’s limited presence in certain markets may create barriers to 
knowledge and learning about women’s performance, which in turn 
reinforces women’s lack of access to these markets. In addition, the 
design and functioning of institutions may be (intentionally or unin-
tentionally) biased against women in ways that perpetuate existing 
inequalities.
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR POLICY
The interaction of employment segregation with gender diff erences 
in time use and access to inputs and with market and institutional 
failures traps women in low-paying jobs and low-productivity 
businesses. Breaking out of this productivity trap thus requires 
interventions that lift time constraints, increase access to produc-
tive inputs among women, and correct market and institutional 
failures.
C H A P T E R  S U M M A RY    Persistent employment segregation by gender traps women in 
low-productivity, low-paying jobs
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T
he world is becoming more and more 
integrated. What started with greater 
trade openness is translating into 
growing global economic integration 
and interdependence, as transnational move-
ments of people and capital accelerate and in-
formation becomes ever more accessible. Tech-
nological developments are rapidly changing 
the way people learn, work, and communicate. 
And the world population is concentrating in 
medium and large cities. 
The new forces associated with globaliza-
tion—understood as the combination of eco-
nomic integration, technological diffusion, and 
greater access to information—have operated 
through markets, formal institutions, and infor-
mal institutions to lift some of the constraints to 
greater gender equality.
First, trade openness and the diffusion of 
new information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs) have translated into more jobs 
and stronger connections to markets for many 
women, increasing their access to economic 
opportunities. In some countries and sectors, 
women’s wages have also increased relative to 
those of men.
Second, gender inequality has more costs in 
an integrated world. It can diminish countries’ 
ability to compete internationally—particularly 
for countries with export potential in goods and 
services with high female employment. And 
given growing global awareness of women’s 
rights, continued gender inequality can also 
hurt a country’s international standing. These 
factors strengthen the incentives for policy ac-
tion toward gender equality around the world. 
Third, greater access to information has al-
lowed many in developing countries to learn 
about life and mores in other parts of the world, 
including those pertaining to the role of women, 
possibly affecting attitudes and behaviors. A shift 
toward more egalitarian gender roles and norms 
has also been facilitated and, in some cases, rein-
forced by women’s economic empowerment.
But in the absence of public policy, globaliza-
tion alone cannot and will not reduce gender in-
equality. Despite signifi cant increases in agency 
and in access to economic opportunities for 
many women in many countries, the rising tide 
has not lifted everybody. Those often left behind 
are women for whom the existing constraints are 
most binding. That is why public action aimed 
at closing existing gender gaps in endowments, 
agency, and access to economic opportunities is 
necessary for countries to fully capitalize on the 
potential of globalization as a force for develop-
ment and greater gender equality.
This chapter discusses the evidence on the im-
pacts of economic integration, technical change, 
and access to information on gender inequality. 
It examines the literature and, where knowledge 
gaps exist, draws on new work commissioned 
for this Report. This new work focuses on gen-
der equality in trade,1 technological change and 
diffusion,2 and access to information.3 Existing 
evidence is strongest on the impact of trade and 
technology on labor market outcomes. And it is 
weakest, at least in the economic literature, on 
the impact of new trends on gender roles and 
norms, so that discussion is more tentative and 
speculative.
Globalization’s impact on gender 
equality: What’s happened and 
what’s needed
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These changes have taken place against (and 
possibly contributed to) the backdrop of rising 
economic growth in most areas of the world, 
particularly in some developing countries—
even with the recent food, fuel, and fi nancial 
crises. Until the second half of the 20th century, 
no country had sustained annual per capita in-
come growth averaging 5 percent or more over 
15 years. But since then, more than 35 countries 
have accomplished that feat, three-quarters of 
them in the developing world.7
TRADE OPENNESS AND ICTS HAVE 
INCREASED WOMEN’S ACCESS TO 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES 
Over the past 25 years, trade openness and 
the spread of information and communica-
tion technologies have expanded economic 
opportunities.
The demand for female workers in the ex-
port and ICT-enabled sectors has increased, and 
as women have fi lled these new jobs, the gen-
der distribution of employment across sectors 
and across countries has changed. Women have 
moved out of agriculture and into manufac-
turing and particularly services. These changes 
have taken place across all countries, but female 
(and male) employment in the manufacturing 
and services has grown faster in developing than 
THE WORLD IS BECOMING MORE 
INTEGRATED—RECENT TRENDS 
AND FACTS
The world has witnessed an enormous economic 
transformation over the past three decades, 
fostered by growing global fl ows of goods and 
services, technology, and information. These 
changes have transformed the way domestic 
and global markets and institutions function—
and have thus changed the economic landscape 
for individuals, households, fi rms, and govern-
ments. A few numbers illustrate the magnitude 
of these changes. 
Merchandise trade in the low- and middle-
income countries rose from 31 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1993 to 57 percent 
in 2008, refl ecting both larger North-South and 
South-South fl ows (fi gure 6.1).4 Signifi cant in-
creases in trade openness occurred in all regions, 
particularly in South Asia, where merchandise 
trade rose from 16 percent of GDP to 41 percent, 
and in East Asia, where it rose from 35 percent to 
52 percent. Changes in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) have also been signifi cant, with fl ows in-
creasing from 0.5 percent of GDP in 1980 to 4 
percent in 2007, followed by a decline during the 
recent fi nancial crisis.
As goods, services, capital, and people fl ow 
across countries faster than ever before, infor-
mation and knowledge have become global 
commodities. Technological change crosses 
borders embedded in traded goods, accelerating 
its adoption and adaptation. And although tech-
nology transfers tend to happen fi rst in exports 
and imports, they quickly spread beyond them 
as fi rms interact and workers change jobs.5 Sim-
ilarly, ideas and skills move from one country to 
another as the share of skilled migrants in the 
pool of international migrants increases—from 
about 25 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2000.
Thanks to the spread of cell phones and 
the Internet, more men and women are gain-
ing access to information—global, domestic, 
and local. In 1998, only 20 percent of people 
in developed countries and about 1 percent in 
the developing world had a cell phone subscrip-
tion. By 2009, these shares had climbed to 100 
percent and 57 percent. Internet access and use 
have also grown. In high-income countries, In-
ternet users increased from 12 percent of the 
population in 1998 to 64 percent in 2009, and 
from near 0 to 17.5 percent in developing coun-
tries (fi gure 6.2).6
F I G U R E  6.1   Global trade has grown rapidly since 1990
Source: World Development Indicators.
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Female workers wanted 
The early years of trade liberalization were 
mainly characterized by the move of textile and 
information technology manufacturing from 
developed to developing countries.9 New em-
ployment in manufacturing often consisted of 
labor-intensive assembly line jobs, and the ini-
tial gains in manufacturing employment were 
greatest in countries with abundant unskilled 
labor and a comparative advantage in produc-
ing basic manufactures.
This shift in geographic location of produc-
tion promoted female labor force participation 
and the feminization of employment in manu-
facturing in developing countries—particularly 
in Asia and Central America.10 In the Repub-
lic of Korea, the share of women employed in 
manufacturing grew from 6 percent in 1970 to 
around 30 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The importance of manufacturing as an em-
ployer of female labor in the Republic of Korea 
has since declined (to 14 percent in 2007), but 
the sector still employs 10 times more women 
today than in the 1960s. Similarly, in Mexico, fe-
male employment in manufacturing grew from 
12 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 2008, with 10 
times more women in 2008 than in 1960.11 
In the past 15 years, the spread of ICTs has 
expanded trade in services and has, to a lesser 
extent, promoted the growth of ICT sectors in 
developed countries, refl ecting broader changes 
in the global distribution of production and 
labor. In developing countries, the shares of fe-
male manufacturing and service employment 
in global female employment increased from 
6 and 17 percent respectively in 1987 to 7 and 
24 percent in 2007. In contrast, in developed 
countries the share of female manufacturing 
employment in global female employment fell 
from 12 percent in 1987 to 6 in 2007, while the 
share of female service employment rose from 
44 to 46 percent over the same period (fi gure 
6.3).8 Changes in male employment shares were 
qualitatively similar but different in magnitude.
At the same time, improvements in ICT tech-
nology have allowed women (and men) around 
the world to access markets in growing numbers 
by lowering information barriers and reducing 
the transaction costs associated with market 
work. Because time and mobility constraints are 
more severe for women than men, women stand 
to benefi t more from these developments (chap-
ters 4 and 5).
Greater access to economic opportunities 
and, in some cases, higher returns to economic 
activity provide stronger incentives to accumu-
late human capital, particularly for women, and 
are likely to increase investments in the skills of 
girls and young women—tomorrow’s workers 
(box 6.1).
F I G U R E  6.2   Cell phone and Internet access has increased signifi cantly in both 
developed and developing countries
Source: International Telecommunications Union 2010.
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developing world
developed world
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1998 2009
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interaction with clients and customers more 
common. 
As technology advanced, low-skilled women 
in light manufacturing were often displaced by 
men. In Malaysia, women made up to 80 per-
cent of manufacturing workers in the fi rst phase 
developing countries. As a result employment 
shifted from manufacturing, where jobs could 
be automated, to services. In the process, de-
mand for nimble fi ngers on the assembly line 
gave way to demand for computer literacy as 
the tasks became more sophisticated and direct 
F I G U R E  6.3   Economic opportunities have changed
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on World Development Indicators.
F I G U R E  6.3b  . . . and increases in female employment levels (but not male) 
between 1995 and 2005 were correlated with increases in 
international trade
F I G U R E  6.3a   Female (and male) employment in the manufacturing and service 
sectors has grown faster in developing countries, refl ecting the 
broader changes in the global distribution of production and labor
export volume index, 2005 (1995 = 100)
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in Delhi and Mumbai, where call centers em-
ploy more than 1 million people, most of them 
women.15
In both manufacturing and service exports, 
growth in female employment was faster than 
ever before and faster than in other sectors. And 
although exports in many countries initially ac-
counted for a small fraction of total female em-
ployment, their importance grew over time as a 
result of rapid employment growth.
Global agriculture has also changed. The 
export share of traditional crops has declined, 
while the share of nontraditional and high-
value-added exports—such as horticulture, 
fl ori culture, protein-rich meats, and processed 
foods—has grown rapidly. Their expansion—
driven by advances in refrigeration, lower trans-
port costs, and the growth of supermarkets as 
dominant buyers in global value chains—has 
created a wide range of jobs.16
But the feminization of employment through 
exports appears to be less common in agricul-
tural economies. Growth in traditional agri-
cultural exports has benefi ted men more than 
women because women are less likely to work 
on commercial crops and are crowded out of 
traditionally female-intensive crops when these 
crops become commercial.17 In contrast, non-
traditional and high-value-added exports have 
stimulated higher female employment in export 
production, although the impacts vary by coun-
try and product.18 In Chile and South Africa, 
new female employment was mainly temporary 
and seasonal,19 while in Colombia and Kenya, 
women were more often hired as permanent 
workers in the fl ower industry.20
Higher female employment in exports has 
often (but not always) been accompanied by 
wage gains. Transnational and exporting com-
panies may be able to pay higher wages than 
locally owned fi rms and fi rms producing for 
the domestic market. They also may be better 
able to insulate their workers from economic 
cycles—and their workers may be better pro-
tected by labor legislation and are more likely 
to be unionized and thus eligible for benefi ts.21 
That is why female wages are frequently higher22 
and the gender wage gap is lower in exports than 
in other sectors, even after controlling for worker 
characteristics. Evidence from China shows that 
female workers receive higher wages in the new 
export-oriented industries than in the older 
state industries.23 In Mexico, over 1990–95 a 
of globalization, but by 1987 that percentage 
had fallen to 67 percent and has since continued 
to decline.12 In Latin America, too, low-skilled 
female workers in light manufacturing, particu-
larly electronics, lost their jobs as various aspects 
of production became automated.13
New ICT-enabled jobs in services—particu-
larly information processing in banking, insur-
ance, printing, and publishing—were mainly 
taken up by women, but not the same women 
who lost their manufacturing jobs, because the 
new jobs required a different set of skills, in-
cluding keyboarding, English, and sometimes 
French. Female employment in data entry and 
processing was initially highest in Barbados, Ja-
maica, and the Philippines.14 Later, ICT-related 
jobs were concentrated in software, call centers, 
and geographical information systems, and 
clustered in Malaysia and India, particularly 
Globalization’s impact is not limited to today’s female workers—stronger eco-
nomic incentives to accumulate skills could also foster higher labor force par-
ticipation among young women in the years to come. Whether and how much 
expected economic returns to education aff ect schooling decisions have 
received much attention in the literature over the past few decades, particu-
larly in developing countries, where compulsory education laws either do not 
exist or are enforced poorly and where a large part of the young population 
does not go to school. But families and individuals do respond to higher eco-
nomic returns by increasing their investments in education,a and the prospect 
of higher returns matters more for girls (chapter 3).
In this context, increased employment opportunities in export-oriented 
sectors and ICT-related jobs are expected to strengthen existing incentives for 
investments in education. In India, the emergence of jobs linked to information-
 technology-enabled service centers (mainly call centers) increased the number 
of children enrolled in school by 5.7 percent. English-language schools ac--
counted for all of this change, consistent with the idea that new job opportuni-
ties were linked to specifi c skills, such as speaking English.b South Africa pro-
vides similar evidence.c
Because female workers have benefi ted disproportionately more than men 
from the changes brought about by trade openness and technological change, 
girls and young women should have stronger incentives to go to school than 
boys and young men. For example, in rural India business process outsourcing 
recruiting and placement services increased employment among young girls, 
with no eff ect for older women or for men of any age. Girls ages 5–15 in villages 
that received the recruiting services were 3–5 percentage points more likely 
to be in school than comparable girls in other villages. There was no change 
for boys.d
B OX  6.1   A job today or a better job tomorrow—The impact 
of increased access to economic opportunities on 
women’s human capital 
a. Foster and Rosenzweig 1996; Jensen 2010b.
b. Oster and Millet 2010.
c. Levinsohn 2004.
d. Jensen 2010a
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higher export orientation was associated with 
a narrowing of the gender wage gap.24 And in 
Bangladesh and Morocco, wage discrimination 
against women in textile exports was lower than 
in other manufacturing in the early stages of 
liberalization, and it declined even further over 
time.25
In some places, however, greater openness has 
had little impact on the gender wage gap, and in 
others, the gains have been only temporary.26 In 
the Republic of Korea, greater openness had lit-
tle impact or even widened the  gender gap. And 
data from Mexico and Honduras suggest that 
wages in recently established export processing 
zones tend to be higher than local wages but over 
time the differences narrow.27 In the developed 
world, the impact of higher trade openness on 
women and men has been extensively debated 
(box 6.2).
Brain or brawn? 
ICTs have transformed the organization of eco-
nomic activity over the past quarter century, 
increasing the demand for and the returns to 
brain (cognitive) and nonroutine skills relative 
to brawn (manual) and routine skills (box 6.3).28 
In the United States, for example, brain tasks in-
creased and brawn tasks declined between 1950 
and 2005.29 Driving this shift were changes in 
the composition of the economy’s occupational 
structure, such as the rise in the number of doc-
tors per 100 workers and the fall in the number 
of production line operators per 100 workers. 
Changes in specifi c occupations, such as the 
growing use of robotics for production line 
operators, also contributed to the shift. As with 
growing trade in goods and services, these shifts 
have boosted demand for female workers.
These changes are captured in fi gure 6.4, 
where circles represent different occupations. 
Circles become bigger or smaller between 1950 
and 2005 depending on whether the number of 
people employed in that occupation increased 
(lawyers and judges) or decreased (farmers) 
during the period. Similarly, movements from 
left to right or right to left represent changes in 
the brain requirements of a particular occupa-
tion, whereas movements up and down capture 
changes in the brawn requirements—where 
requirements are measured on a scale of 0 to 
100. As brain requirements increase and brawn 
requirements decrease between 1950 and 2005, 
most circles shift downward and to the right. 
Greater economic integration has also had an impact on workers in the devel-
oped world. It has benefi ted skilled workers, sometimes at the expense of 
unskilled ones. It has increased the demand for skilled workers, relative to that 
for unskilled ones. And this shift has translated into greater wage inequality in 
the United States and greater unemployment among the unskilled in Europe, 
where labor market regulations prevented the wages of the unskilled from 
falling.a
Impacts were larger among men than among women because men were 
concentrated in the industries and occupations most aff ected by foreign com-
petition and the relocation of production to the developing world. Higher 
trade openness accounts for 12–33 percent of the employment losses in manu-
facturing and for about 20 percent of the rise in the skill premiums during the 
1980s and 1990s in the United States.b Technological change also accounts for 
an important share of the increase in skill premiums. Evidence of trade’s impact 
on women’s wages and employment is more mixed.c
Trade liberalization and foreign direct investment leading to the off shoring 
of medium- and high-skill jobs may have also raised job insecurity. Workers in 
the United Kingdom in sectors with high foreign investment are more likely to 
report greater economic insecurity.d And U.S. workers in service activities and 
occupations that are potentially tradable report both greater insecurity and a 
stronger desire for a strong government safety net.e
In some cases, the impact of these changes reaches beyond the economic 
sphere. The notion of men as the main breadwinners has been challenged by 
the greater economic opportunities for women and the job destruction in 
male-dominated sectors; these changes have often led to adjustment in the 
power balance in families.
B OX  6.2   The impact of globalization on men (and women) 
in developed countries
a.  Freeman 1994; Wood 1995.
b.  Baily and Lawrence 2004; Bivens 2004; Bivens 2006; Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan 2010; Lawrence 
2008.
c.  Black and Brainerd 2004; Wood 1991.
d. Scheve and Slaughter 2004.
e. Anderson and Gascon 2007.
The work performed in a particular occupation can be broken down to tasks, 
each characterized by its intellectual or physical requirements and by how 
amenable it is to standardization. The discussion here uses the word pairs “cog-
nitive/manual” and “brain/brawn” interchangeably to capture whether a task is 
primarily intellectual or physical. Similarly, tasks amenable to standardization 
are referred to as routine and those that are not as nonroutine. These choices 
refl ect the terminology used in the literature on the impact of technological 
change on occupational skills requirements.
Both manual and routine cognitive tasks are well defi ned in the sense that 
they are easily programmable and can be performed by computers at econom-
ically feasible cost—a feature that makes them amenable to substitution for 
computer capital.a Nonroutine and cognitive tasks, by contrast, are not well 
defi ned or programmable and, as things currently stand, cannot be easily per-
formed by computers.
B OX  6.3   Occupational tasks and skill requirements—
Getting the terms right
a. Levy and Murnane 1992.
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of the workplace explain most of the observed 
rise in demand for female workers, female labor 
force participation, and female employment in 
these countries over the past few decades.31 In 
addition, increases in the returns to brain rela-
tive to brawn can account for a large fraction of 
the reduction in the gender wage gap in both 
countries since the 1970s and 1980s.32
To the extent that economic integration and 
particularly foreign direct investment promote 
the move of technological change from the de-
veloped to the developing world and facilitate its 
adoption and adaptation, the relative demand 
for—and the returns to—brain should increase 
similarly in developing countries.
The data on this question are very limited,33 
but new work for this Report provides sup-
porting evidence from Brazil, India, Mexico, 
and Thailand during 1990–2005.34 In all four 
countries, brawn requirements were signifi -
cantly higher and brain requirements signifi -
cantly lower in 1990 than those in the United 
States in 1950. But differences then diminished, 
as brain requirements increased and brawn re-
quirements decreased for both men and wom-
en—driven mainly by the decline in the relative 
importance of agricultural employment and the 
associated changes in the occupational structure 
of the economy.
In Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand, women 
were in occupations with lower brawn require-
ments than men at the beginning of the period, 
while in India brawn requirements were similar 
for women and men because of women’s heavy 
presence in agriculture. In Brazil, India, and 
Thailand, brain requirements increased faster 
for women than for men. In Mexico, by con-
trast, the expansion of low-skill female maquila 
employment meant that brain requirements 
declined and brawn requirements increased 
slightly among women (fi gure 6.5).35
Similar evidence of the impact of ICT and com-
puters on the demand for brain versus brawn is 
also available for other developed countries.30 
Traditionally, men have been more likely to 
be employed in sectors and occupations with 
stronger physical requirements than women 
(men have an advantage in brawn). So comput-
ers, by deemphasizing physical skills, should fa-
vor women, even if women have no advantage 
over men in using a computer or acquiring 
computer skills. Evidence from the United States 
and Germany supports this idea. Sustained in-
creases in the demand for brain versus brawn 
associated with ICT and the computerization 
F I G U R E  6.4   The United States experienced a dramatic increase 
in brain requirements and a decline in brawn 
requirements between 1950 and 2005
Source: Rendall 2010.
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4 and 5), they stand to benefi t more from these 
developments.
The focus here is on cell phones and the In-
ternet because they are the two most commonly 
available ICTs outside the workplace and their 
coverage is expected to continue to rise rapidly.
Mobile phone access, very high in developed 
countries, has grown substantially in the recent 
past in the developing world, and the gap be-
tween the two is closing fast. Within countries, 
gender differences in cell phone access and use 
are almost imperceptible in high- and middle-
income countries, especially among young peo-
ple, but gender differences are still large in low-
income countries, where a woman is 21 percent 
less likely than a man to own a mobile phone. 
This fi gure increases to 23 percent in Africa (fi g-
ure 6.6), 24 percent in the Middle East, and 37 
percent in South Asia.37 
In contrast, the differences in Internet ac-
cess and use between developed and developing 
countries are still very large, and gender gaps are 
signifi cant in some countries. Among countries 
with data, Internet use ranges from 90 percent 
of the population in Iceland to 10 percent in 
Honduras and Nicaragua. In addition, gender 
gaps are substantial within some developed and 
Changes in the supply of and returns to brain 
and brawn have also narrowed the gender wage 
gap in these countries, although the impacts 
vary more widely. In Brazil and India, these 
changes account for a large part of the observed 
decline in wage differences between men and 
women during 1990–2005. In Mexico, where 
the gender wage gap increased slightly, the rise 
in the returns to brain mitigated the widening 
of the gap. In Thailand, changes in the supply of 
and returns to brain and brawn cannot explain 
changes in the gender wage gap—primarily 
because men and women are distributed fairly 
evenly across sectors and occupations.36
More connected and better informed—
ICTs have increased women’s access 
to markets
ICTs can improve access to markets and in-
crease participation in market work by reduc-
ing transaction costs associated with time and 
mobility constraints. They facilitate the gather-
ing and transmission of price and other infor-
mation and increase the fl exibility in where and 
when economic activities can occur. Because 
women often face more restrictions than men 
in their mobility and available time (chapters 
F I G U R E  6.5   Men and especially women in Brazil, India, Mexico, and Thailand 
have experienced an increase in brain requirements and a decline in 
brawn requirements over the past 15 years
Source: Rendall 2011.
United States
Brazil
India
Mexico
Thailand
United States
a.  Brain requirements b.  Brawn requirements
0 10 20 30 40 50
brain requirements scale brawn requirements scale
60 70 80 90 100
w
om
en
m
en
Brazil
India
Mexico
Thailand
United States
Brazil
India
Mexico
Thailand
United States
w
om
en
m
en
Brazil
India
Mexico
Thailand
1990 2005
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1990 2005
50kg
262 WO R L D  D E V E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 2
gers report that access to cell phones facilitates 
communication with their clients and suppli-
ers, reducing travel time and costs, and with 
their families while they are away from home.39 
Similarly, 41 percent of women interviewed in 
Bolivia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, India, and 
Kenya declared that owning a mobile phone 
had increased their income and their access to 
economic opportunities. The impacts were sig-
nifi cantly higher among female entrepreneurs: 
female business owners reported that they were 
2.5 times more likely than nonbusiness own-
ers to use their mobile phone to earn income, 
and they were signifi cantly more interested than 
other women in receiving services such as no-
tifi cations of money transfers on their phones 
(63 percent versus 41 percent).40 Finally, while 
the focus here is on access to economic oppor-
tunities, the impact of mobile phones is broader 
(box 6.4 and chapter 7).
In many cases, women, particularly rural 
women, were willing to reduce expenditures on 
other items to have access to a mobile phone, 
suggesting that the perceived benefi ts out-
weighed the costs, which averaged 3.5 percent 
of household income among those surveyed. 
Thirty-four percent of women in rural Bolivia, 
Egypt, India, and Kenya reallocated resources 
away from other items to pay for a phone sub-
scription, compared with 20 percent among all 
women surveyed and 12 percent among women 
who do paid work. 
Closing the gender gap in cell phone access 
would bring the benefi ts of mobile phones to 
an additional 300 million women in low- and 
middle-income countries. And it could also gen-
erate up to $13 billion in incremental revenue to 
mobile operators, given that women represent 
two-thirds of the untapped market for mobile 
growth.41
The picture is quite different for the Inter-
net. Low private access in the developing world, 
especially in rural areas, has severely limited its 
impact on access to economic opportunities—
beyond the impact of ICTs on outsourcing and 
service export employment discussed earlier. 
Governments and development agencies have 
set up village “telecenters” for public use, gener-
ally as a fee for service, to increase access to basic 
ICT services among underserved populations. 
These centers generally offer computers linked 
to the Internet and are available for word pro-
cessing and graphics work, faxes, e-mail, photo-
copying, and phone lines. They may also feature 
developing countries and appear to be uncor-
related with the overall levels of access in the 
country—in Luxembourg, Serbia, Switzerland, 
and Turkey, differences in access to Internet be-
tween men and women exceed 10 percentage 
points (fi gure 6.7). 
So, mobile phones should have had a much 
more transformative impact than the Internet 
in developing countries so far. The evidence on 
both aggregate and gender-disaggregated im-
pacts of cell phones on labor market participa-
tion and access to economic opportunities in 
these countries is surprisingly sparse, however, 
with most information coming from case stud-
ies, many of them in Africa and South Asia.
Cell phone access and use can alleviate 
time and mobility constraints for women by 
increasing the ability to coordinate their fam-
ily and work lives, reducing the cost of money 
transfers, and cutting down the physical labor 
or travel required to discover information (in-
cluding avoiding fruitless trips to get supplies or 
meet customers).38 In Senegal, female fi shmon-
F I G U R E  6.6   In Africa, women are less likely than men to own 
or use a cell phone 
Source: www.ResearchICTafrica.net.
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Home-based telework is much more limited 
in other developing regions. Even in dynamic 
cities such as Mumbai and Kuala Lumpur, the 
incidence of telework is 0.4–1.0 percent of em-
training on the equipment, and some incorpo-
rate radio broadcasts or video resources.
The lack of systematic evaluation again makes 
it diffi cult to assess whether these centers con-
tribute much to business, particularly for female 
entrepreneurs in the local community, but anec-
dotal evidence suggests some positive impacts.42
In Cameroon, 50 percent of female entrepre-
neurs in textiles reported using these centers for 
both professional and social uses and extolled 
their usefulness for business-related communi-
cation.43 But given high set-up and maintenance 
costs for telecenters, more conclusive evidence 
is needed on their impact on (women’s) labor 
force participation and access to economic op-
portunities. In other places, groups of female 
entrepreneurs have used the Internet to have 
more direct access to domestic and international 
markets. In Morocco, home-based female weav-
ers use the Internet to sell rugs and other textiles 
and to keep a larger share of their profi ts than 
traditional middle-man-based systems.44 
In high-income countries, by contrast, ICTs 
allow people to work from different locations 
and on different schedules—in other words, to 
work in more fl exible ways, lowering the trans-
action costs in market work. Telecommuting (or 
telework) is fueled by increased access to home 
computing systems, complementary telecommu-
nication devices, and cheaper implementation 
costs associated with lower-priced equipment 
and broadband services. In the United States, 26 
percent of workers used telework fully or regu-
larly in 2009. In the European Union, telework 
almost doubled in 2000–05 to reach 9 percent of 
all workers. This trend appears to refl ect broad 
practices. Data from the Netherlands suggest 
that the proportion of companies employing 
teleworkers doubled from 2003 to 2007.45
To the extent that time constraints are more 
binding for women, particularly those in fami-
lies with children (chapter 5), telework can have 
big gender impacts. Seven percent of working 
women in Europe report that they telework reg-
ularly, compared with 12 percent of men. These 
differences refl ect the fact that telework is more 
common in sectors where male employment is 
dominant. However, it is women who have ex-
perienced faster growth in telework in the past 
few years in almost every European country 
for which data is available, suggesting a stron-
ger willingness or desire among women to take 
advantage of more fl exible work arrangements 
(fi gure 6.8).
F I G U R E  6.7   Differences in Internet access and use between 
developed and developing countries are still very 
large, and gender gaps are signifi cant in some 
developed and developing countries
Source: World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database.
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tage in female goods, gender differences in access 
to market work and persistent employment seg-
regation by gender could severely undermine 
the country’s capacity to compete internation-
ally and ultimately hamper economic growth.
Added to this economic reality is growing in-
ternational pressure for countries to grant and 
enforce formal rights for women. International 
action in this area has translated into agreements 
sponsored by international organizations, pri-
marily the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and the United Nations (UN), followed 
by strong international pressure on countries to 
formally adhere to these agreements either di-
rectly or indirectly as part of broader trade and 
other economic agreements. 
The evidence (albeit limited) discussed in the 
following section suggests that this combination 
of home-grown and international pressure for 
greater gender equality, fostered by globaliza-
tion, has contributed to the progress of the past 
few decades.
The rising costs of (gender) discrimination 
in a global world 
Economic theory says that greater competition 
in product markets should reduce discrimina-
tion in factor (labor, capital, and land) markets.47 
In other words, stronger competitive pressures 
from greater economic integration should force 
employers to reduce costly gender (and other) 
discrimination.48 This idea is supported by data 
from the United States in the 1980s, where in-
creased competition through trade contributed 
to the relative improvement in female wages in 
concentrated industries, suggesting that trade 
benefi ted women by reducing fi rms’ ability to 
discriminate—although there are concerns that 
this decline also refl ects changes in the compo-
sition of employment in favor of more skilled 
female workers (at the expense of less skilled 
ones).49 
It is not simply the overall level of trade that 
matters for how trade openness affects gender 
equality: the comparative advantage of coun-
tries is equally important.50 New work for this 
Report shows that countries with a comparative 
advantage in female- or brain-intensive indus-
tries (fi gure 6.9)—ones employing a large share 
of female workers—face higher costs from gen-
der discrimination when they open to trade. The 
reverse holds for countries with a disadvantage 
in the production of such goods. In addition, the 
ployment in ICT-enabled jobs. This low level 
may refl ect both women’s preference for institu-
tion-based teleworking and managers’ concerns. 
In Malaysia, ICT fi rm managers reported that 
face-to-face interaction with their employees 
was essential, and in India, managers also ex-
pressed a preference for direct monitoring and 
supervision of workers.46
ADAPT OR MISS THE BOAT
Trade openness, technological diffusion, and ac-
cess to information have fundamentally changed 
the way countries interact and compete with 
each other in the global economy. Because gen-
der (and other) inequality has more costs in a 
globalized world, these changes could translate 
into stronger incentives for both fi rms and gov-
ernments to move toward gender equality. Spe-
cifi cally in countries with a comparative advan-
Mobile phones, the Internet, and more traditional communication technolo-
gies, such as radio, are providing new platforms to disseminate information 
and increase access to services among those in remote or underserved areas 
and among those with lower mobility. Because women are overrepresented in 
these groups, they tend to benefi t disproportionately from these initiatives—
even when the initiatives are not targeted to women.
Most experiments have been in banking, health, and education. A few 
examples follow. Mobile phone technology provides access to fi nancial ser-
vices, such as processing money transfers and small payments, and promotes 
savings (M-PESA in Kenya). Text messaging provides women and health work-
ers valuable information about pre- and postnatal care, nutrition (Text4Baby in 
the United States and the Russian Federation, Rapid SMS in Rwanda), and ongo-
ing treatments. Some projects allow for interactions with users, including the 
customization of services (Wawanet in Peru). And some health services have 
been combined with other tools to promote savings to pay for the cost of pre-
natal care and delivery (Mamabika, in coordination with M-PESA, in Kenya). 
Mobile phones and the Internet also promote literacy (Mobilink and United 
Nations Educational, Scientifi c, and Cultural Organization in Pakistan) and facil-
itate access to distance education, particularly higher and vocational education 
(Community Nurses in Kenya).
Beyond access to services, mobile phones and the Internet allow women to 
be more connected to each other and their communities (Project Zumbido in 
Mexico, Tostan and UNICEF in Senegal) and to have a stronger social and politi-
cal voice (Mobili-ise in Kosovo).
Most of these initiatives are fairly new and have not yet been evaluated. 
Moving forward, it will be important to learn more about what works and what 
does not in each context and to continue experimenting to fully capitalize on 
the potential power of new technologies.
B OX  6.4   Leveraging mobile and ICT technology to improve 
access to services
Sources: Franklin and others 2006; GSMA Development Fund 2010; Kanwar and Taplin 2001; Lester and 
others 2010; Melhem, Morrell, and Tandon 2009.
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to spread. Moreover, industries with high shares 
of female employment tend to be more labor 
intensive than those with low shares and to ac-
count for most export-related employment. So, 
without actions to eliminate existing barriers to 
access to markets, countries with a comparative 
advantage in female-intensive goods will lose 
ground to their competitors in global markets.
Peer pressure and international carrots 
and sticks
Since the 1960s, concerns about gender equality 
and systematic discrimination against women 
status of women should affect not just trade vol-
umes but also trade patterns in the short run.51
Indeed, gender equality appears to be higher 
in countries with larger export shares in female-
intensive goods and vice versa. Countries with 
higher female labor force participation, lower 
fertility, and higher educational attainment 
have larger export shares in sectors intensive 
in female labor. Specifi cally, moving from low 
equality (bottom quarter of the distribution 
for any of the three selected indicators) to high 
equality (top quarter) increases the global ex-
port share of sectors with high shares of female 
employment (female-intensive sectors) by 1–2 
percentage points more than that of sectors 
with low shares of female employment (non-
female-intensive sectors).52 This effect holds af-
ter accounting for gender equality and trade as 
a two-way relationship.
Furthermore, countries with a comparative 
advantage in the production of female-labor-
intensive goods have lower fertility rates and, to 
a lesser extent, higher female labor force partici-
pation and educational attainment. For instance, 
moving from low female-intensity in exports 
(bottom quarter of the distribution) to high in-
tensity (top quarter) lowers fertility by as much 
as 0.21 births per woman, or about 10 percent 
of the global total fertility rate.53 As before, the 
effect is measured after controlling for reverse 
causality between gender equality and trade.
The new research undertaken for this Report 
focused specifi cally on the relationship between 
trade and labor force participation, but other 
analysts have examined the role that wages play 
as a source of comparative advantage based on 
low costs of production, and have argued that 
in some sectors and countries low wages (par-
ticularly among women) have allowed export-
oriented industries to remain competitive.54
Yet, while it is true that wages in export fi rms in 
developing countries are frequently lower than 
those paid by fi rms in developed countries, they 
are often higher than the wages offered by other 
job opportunities in the local labor market (see 
discussion in concluding section).
That the nature of comparative advantage 
matters in understanding how trade openness 
affects gender equality has implications for pol-
icy. Since 1970, the share of female labor embed-
ded in exports in developing countries has in-
creased by about 10 percent, and most countries 
should expect further increases as ICTs continue 
F I G U R E  6.8  Telework has grown rapidly in recent years, 
particularly among female workers
Source: WDR 2012 team estimates based on European Working Conditions Survey 2000, 2001, and 2005.
Note: No data are available for Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in 2000–01. 
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granting formal rights in several areas of wom-
en’s lives, in large part by facilitating legislation 
either where it did not exist or where existing 
laws were discriminatory and needed to be over-
turned.55 Some evidence also shows that partici-
pation in CEDAW has improved women’s lit-
eracy levels, labor force participation rates, and 
parliamentary representation—and in some 
cases has reduced absolute gender inequalities.56
But legal reform, however necessary to ensure 
full equality for women, is often not suffi cient in 
the absence of adequate enforcement (chapter 
4), so efforts to ensure de facto reform should 
continue.
Trade and other economic agreements have 
provided a second channel for international pres-
sure to elicit domestic action on gender equality. 
These documents often include antidiscrimina-
tory and social clauses, linking a country’s access 
to the economic benefi ts in the agreement to ad-
herence to certain minimum standards. This is 
the case in trade agreements, such as the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
and agreements regulating member accession to 
economic zones, such as the European Union. 
For enforcement, these agreements have an ad-
have gained momentum internationally, lead-
ing to both the drafting of a number of self-
standing international treaties and conventions 
and the inclusion of nondiscriminatory clauses 
in several broader-purpose economic agree-
ments. These conventions and agreements have 
also fostered legislative action toward higher 
gender equality around the world.
The most prominent among the international 
treaties is the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General 
Assembly. As of August 2011, 187 countries (of 
a total of 193 UN member nations) were par-
ties to the convention (fi gure 6.10). The coun-
tries that had not yet become party at that time 
were the Islamic Republic of Iran, Palau, Soma-
lia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tonga, and the United 
States. The ILO conventions C.100 (equal remu-
neration for equal work) and C.111 (elimina-
tion of discrimination on employment and oc-
cupation) have also been widely ratifi ed around 
the world.
These treaties and conventions have become 
the primary international vehicle for monitor-
ing and advocating for nondiscrimination, and 
their ratifi cation has spurred progress toward 
F I G U R E  6.9   The share of female employment varies 
signifi cantly across industries
Source: Do, Levchenko, and Raddatz 2011.
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Source: CEDAW.
nu
m
be
r o
f s
ub
sc
rib
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s
175
200
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
subscribed to CEDAW
within the first 10 years
100 +
countries
 Globalization’s impact on gender equality: What’s happened and what’s needed 267
ultimately promoting more egalitarian views. 
The evidence on this effect is more limited and 
tentative than that in previous sections but suf-
fi ciently suggestive (we think) to merit some 
discussion here, in the spirit of spurring further 
work on these issues.
Women turned income earners may be able 
to leverage their new position to change gender 
roles in their households by infl uencing the al-
location of time and resources among house-
hold members, shifting relative power within 
the households, and more broadly exercising 
stronger agency. In fact, women appear to gain 
more control over their income by working in 
export-oriented activities, although the impact 
on well-being and agency is more positive for 
women working in manufacturing and away 
from their male relatives than for those work-
ing in agriculture. Women in factories feel their 
status has improved.61 They are more likely to 
vantage over international conventions in that 
economic considerations and, in some cases, the 
threat of potential sanctions may motivate oth-
erwise reluctant countries to accept and imple-
ment some minimum standards. For example, 
countries more open to trade also have better 
economic rights for women and a lower inci-
dence of forced labor.57
Pressure from media and consumers in de-
veloped countries can also lead multinational 
fi rms to offer better working conditions to their 
workers in developing countries. For instance, 
both wages and nonwage working conditions 
(such as hours worked, accidents, contractual 
characteristics, work environment, and other 
benefi ts) among formal workers (most of them 
women) in the export textile and apparel indus-
tries in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Indonesia 
were found to be at or above the average in the 
rest of the economy.58 Similarly, antisweatshop 
campaigns in Indonesia led to large wage in-
creases in foreign-owned and export fi rms, with 
some costs to the fi rms in the form of reduced 
investment, falling profi ts, and increased prob-
ability of closure for smaller plants, but no sig-
nifi cant impact on employment.59
Important challenges remain in working 
conditions for those outside formal employment 
(box 6.5). In the end, a combination of differ-
ent strategies—including social clauses in trade 
agreements, corporate codes of conduct, and the 
ILO’s “decent work” approach—is needed. Social 
clauses put the onus for workers’ rights on the 
governments of exporting countries rather than 
on the companies that dominate global produc-
tion systems. Codes of conduct put the burden on 
corporations, but they are usually voluntary and 
may not address the behavior of subcontractors 
and others involved in the production of export 
goods. Finally, the ILO aims to engage with gov-
ernments, fi rms, and workers, but its only tools 
are dialogue and persuasion.60 So a combination 
of all three may be the most desirable.
GLOBALIZATION COULD ALSO 
PROMOTE MORE EGALITARIAN 
GENDER ROLES AND NORMS
The changes unleashed by globalization—espe-
cially the greater access to economic opportu-
nities and information among women—could 
also infl uence existing gender roles and norms, 
In the public’s mind, increasing global economic integration and moving pro-
duction to developing countries have been associated with low wages, long 
hours, and poor working conditions. Public opinion in developed countries 
generally connects globalization with sweatshops where child labor is com-
mon and workers are denied the most basic rights. Frequently, it is argued that 
women are especially hurt by this process. The fact that workers willingly take 
this type of job is usually explained by the lack of better options and the 
destruction of their traditional ways of life caused by globalization.
In reality, the impact of trade liberalization on working conditions varies 
across fi rms, sectors, and countries. In some cases, trade openness and eco-
nomic integration have led to the adoption of higher work standards, particu-
larly for formal workers. For example, wages and nonwage working conditions 
for formal workers in the export textile and apparel industries in Cambodia, 
El  Salvador, and Indonesia matched or exceeded the economy’s average.a 
Increased trade openness also appears to be correlated with better economic 
rights for women and lower incidence of forced labor.b
In other cases, however, low wages and poor working conditions are part of 
a broader strategy to keep costs low. This is particularly true for workers oper-
ating under subcontracting arrangements with local fi rms where there is no 
control over working conditions—and may be especially detrimental to 
women, who are overrepresented in the informal sector.c In India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, subcontracted workers suff ered from pre-
carious job security, an almost total absence of benefi ts, and a general impos-
sibility to organize and fi ght for their rights. Yet in many cases, subcontracted 
work was the only possible paid employment that women could take that 
meshed with family responsibilities or social norms.d
B OX  6.5   Globalization and working conditions—
Some progress, but more needs to be done
a. Robertson and others 2009.
b. Neumayer and De Soysa 2007.
c. Carr and Chen 2004.
d. Balakrishnan 2002.
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pacts are quite large. For example, cable televi-
sion decreased the differences in attitudes and 
behaviors between urban and rural areas by 
45–70 percent. The effects appeared quickly, 
with observable impacts in the fi rst year follow-
ing cable’s introduction.
Interestingly, and somewhat contrary to stan-
dard notions about gender roles and women’s 
agency in the household, the evidence discussed 
here suggests that under some circumstances ex-
posure to information can induce large and fast 
change. This fi nding is consistent with work on 
the broader impact of media exposure, which 
typically fi nds that such exposure leads to sig-
nifi cant and rapid changes in behavior such as 
contraceptive use, pregnancy, and latrine build-
ing, as well as the perception of the status of 
one’s village.67
Access to economic opportunities has also 
brought change in the public sphere. In Bangla-
desh, the employment of hundreds of thousands 
of women in the ready-made garment industry 
feminized the urban public space, creating more 
gender-equitable norms for women’s public 
mobility and access to public institutions.68 In 
the process, Bangladeshi women had to rede-
fi ne and negotiate the terms of purdah, typically 
reinterpreting it as a state of mind in contrast 
to its customary expression as physical absence 
from the public space, modest clothing, and 
quiet demeanor.69
The impact of ICTs and access to information 
on gender norms and, more broadly, gender in 
the public sphere is more mixed. The spread of 
ICTs has empowered women socially and politi-
cally by increasing access to networks (box 6.4 
and chapter 8). For instance, activist networks in 
Africa and Latin America have used the Internet 
to increase public awareness about questions of 
gender inequality.70 But the network structure 
also allows women to become actors without 
fundamentally changing their local conditions 
or their role in their households, bypassing con-
straints rather than confronting them—in other 
words, the transformative power of technology 
is manifest in a parallel universe.71 The tension 
between immobile personal circumstances and 
greater awareness and public presence could 
provide fertile terrain for further change. But 
such change will require a critical mass of 
women with access to the Internet and other in-
formation sources.72
marry and have their fi rst baby later than other 
women of similar socioeconomic status and to 
have better quality housing and access to mod-
ern infrastructure.62 They also report greater 
self-esteem and decision-making capacity, with 
benefi ts extending to other family members.63 In 
contrast, women in agriculture have not experi-
enced signifi cant changes in decision-making 
capacity or agency as a result of commercializa-
tion and higher export orientation, even when 
typical “women’s crops” are promoted.64
Beyond the economic sphere, increased access 
to information, primarily through higher expo-
sure to television and the Internet, has also ex-
posed many in developing countries to the roles 
women play in other parts of the world, which 
may affect gender roles and outcomes (chapter 
4). For instance, in Brazil, a country where soap 
opera watching is ubiquitous and cuts across 
social classes, the presence of the Globo signal 
(a television channel that offers many popular 
Brazilian soap operas) has led to lower fertil-
ity, measured as the number of live births for 
women ages 15–49.65 The effect is about one-
tenth that of being married—and comparable 
to the effect of an increase of 1 doctor or nurse 
per 1,000 people or of two additional years of 
education. In other words, it is signifi cant.
Similarly, evidence from rural India suggests 
that gender attitudes among villagers changed 
with cable television.66 Women with access to 
cable were less likely than others to express a 
son preference or to report that it is acceptable 
for a husband to beat his wife. Behaviors tra-
ditionally associated with women’s status also 
changed—women reported more autonomy 
(able to go outside without permission and to 
participate in household decision making) and 
lower fertility. As in the Brazil study, the im-
I would like to be better [than my mother]. 
In their time, there was no education and they 
were not aware of the world around them. 
Nowadays, we have access to the Internet and 
other media. We can improve our lives and do 
better things.
Young woman, Sudan
“
”
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engineers, system analysts, and designers (chap-
ter 3).75 Data from the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
suggest that women represent a small percentage 
of all ICT-related employment and, within the 
sector, are underrepresented in managerial, sci-
entifi c, and professional positions and overrep-
resented in offi ce and secretarial occupations.76 
These differences are important because ICT 
skills are among the driving forces for techno-
logical development, and growth and employ-
ment in these areas is expected to rise over time. 
Second, gender differences in care responsi-
bilities can prevent women from seizing new ag-
ricultural and wage opportunities in the export 
sector if no other household members can take 
on their duties. That is particularly true when 
new opportunities arise in large farms or the for-
mal sector, where a premium is placed on longer 
work hours and a fi xed schedule. Studies of the 
cut fl ower industry in Ecuador, export proc-
essing zones in Guatemala, nontraditional and 
high-value exports in Kenya, and rural- urban 
linkages in Malaysia all point to the presence 
of other female members in the household as 
a determinant of women’s participation in new 
opportunities created by trade.77 These other 
female household members may be mothers or 
elder daughters available to take on household 
duties relinquished by women who go out to 
work. Very little is known about their circum-
stances and the price they pay for the realloca-
tion of housework and care in the household.78
Third, women’s weaker property rights in 
land and limited access to productive inputs 
also constrain their capacity to benefi t from 
trade openness. This problem has been particu-
larly perverse in Africa, where natural resources 
and agricultural products account for a large 
fraction of exports.79 In Senegal, only 1 of 59 
french bean farmers (export crop) is a woman80 
OLD PROBLEMS, EMERGING RISKS
The rising tide of globalization has not lifted 
everybody. Gender differences in endowments, 
time use patterns, access to productive inputs, 
and agency have muted positive impacts for 
some and, at times, added to inequalities be-
tween men and women and among women. 
Even among those who have benefi ted from 
higher access to economic opportunities, old 
patterns of employment segregation by gender 
can emerge. Signs of defeminization of (formal) 
employment in some countries, industries, and 
occupations—combined with increased infor-
mality—suggest that some of the gains may not 
be sustainable.
Public action to close gender gaps in agency, 
endowments, and access to economic opportu-
nities is thus necessary for countries to fully cap-
italize on the potential of globalization as a force 
for development and greater gender equality.
When “old” gaps meet new trends, 
disadvantaged women are left 
farther behind
Women caught at the intersection of “old” 
gender gaps (in endowments, time availa-
bility,  access to productive resources, and 
agency) and the new forces unleashed by 
 globalization risk falling farther behind both 
men and women who have managed to bene-
fi t from trade openness, technological change, 
and access to information.
First, gender differences in education have 
limited women’s access to new employment 
opportunities. In agriculture, besides having 
a positive impact on productivity (chapter 5), 
education affects farmers’ capacity to adopt im-
proved seed varieties and fertilizer73 and, more 
broadly, to comply with output standards and 
other important factors that determine access to 
the nontraditional and high-value export sector. 
Because of lower education levels, female pro-
ducers experience more constraints in access-
ing international markets than male producers 
in Samoa and in Mozambique and other Sub-
Saharan countries.74 Insuffi cient education and 
skills have also impeded access to export and 
ICT-enabled jobs in the service sector.
Education sorting along gender lines has also 
limited female presence in occupations directly 
related to ICTs, such as computer programmers, 
There is tailoring and embroidery 
work, but people will fi nd the 
best jobs by having computer skills, 
and that is still not provided to 
women.
Adult woman, Afghanistan
“
”
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intensifi ed competitive pressures and facilitated 
by the spread of ICTs, these changes have con-
tributed to the defeminization and informaliza-
tion of employment in export-oriented sectors.
 In many cases, recapitalization has reduced 
employment opportunities for unskilled, pri-
marily female, workers. Men are perceived to 
have the education and skills to manage new 
generalized technologies, while women are 
pushed to smaller subcontracting fi rms. It is 
not clear, however, what prevents women from 
benefi ting from upgrading and shifting pro-
duction toward skill-intensive goods because 
gender educational gaps are quickly narrowing 
in many countries. One possible explanation is 
that signifi cant differences still exist between 
men and women in the content of their edu-
cation and their nonformal skills, including 
sector-specifi c experience and access to on-the-
job training.86
The struggle for greater fl exibility in produc-
tion has made informal working arrangements 
more common, affecting women disproportion-
ately.87 In India, the decline in women’s share 
of industrial employment (from 21.3 percent 
in 1989–90 to 17.5 percent in 1994–95) despite 
high export growth was associated with an in-
crease in subcontracting to home-based workers 
or small manufacturers that work on a piece-rate 
basis.88 Although more fl exible working alterna-
tives may allow women to better balance work 
and home responsibilities, the advantages of 
such arrangements need to be assessed against 
their potential negative impact on wages and 
other benefi ts.89
Greater fl exibility has in some cases also led 
to higher turnover and job instability. In Turkey, 
where women benefi ted from the gender gap 
in net job creation in the export sectors, female 
employment was more volatile than men’s.90 
Similarly, in Colombia, workers employed in 
less protected sectors have shorter job tenure 
and are less likely to fi nd work in the formal sec-
tor, but these differences are only temporary and 
not affected by gender.91
Perhaps most worrisome about these trends 
is the realization that old patterns of employ-
ment segregation by gender can quickly emerge 
in these new industries and occupations. So, 
what initially seemed to be a break from estab-
lished gender roles in the labor market ends up 
proving in some cases to be a short-lived devia-
tion. Moreover, the segregation of women seems 
while in Meru, Kenya, more than 90 percent of 
export contracts were issued to male household 
members.81
Fourth, conservative gender norms for mo-
bility and women’s role in the economic sphere 
can disproportionately affect women’s access to 
technology (including ICTs) and more broadly 
to information. At home, men often regulate 
the family radio, mobile phone, or television, 
controlling when and how other family mem-
bers can use them.82 At work, men may deter-
mine that operating a plow or a computer is not 
something women should be allowed to learn. 
Even technology programs that target women 
can be co-opted by men once their utility and 
profi tability are established—so women who do 
gain access to the technology do not see its eco-
nomic benefi ts.83
Given that the number of private Internet 
connections in developing countries is still low, 
women’s access to ICTs and information is also 
affected by the geographic location of public In-
ternet centers. When Internet centers are a long 
way from residential communities or in unsafe 
neighborhoods, women are less likely to frequent 
them. Beyond safety, women’s access can also be 
inhibited when services are offered in settings 
and institutions that women are unlikely to visit 
or when men and women are expected to share 
the same space. In a 2000 study, 72 percent of 
Arab female Internet users declared that home 
was their preferred place of access.84
Are gains for women sustainable? 
Segregation in new industries and 
occupations
Signs of defeminization of employment in some 
sectors and occupations, together with concerns 
about growing informality among women em-
ployed in export-oriented sectors, have raised 
concerns about whether the segregation ob-
served in nonexport sectors is emerging in new 
industries and occupations.
Production in export sectors has changed in 
the past few decades in two ways. First, fi rms 
have recapitalized to adopt production systems 
based on generalized rather than specialized 
equipment, shifting comparative advantages 
in export-oriented manufacturing from labor-
intensive to capital-intensive technology. Second, 
fi rms have reorganized production to be more 
fl exible, by lowering costs, shortening lead times, 
and differentiating product lines.85 Fostered by 
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For example, women in Indonesia perceive 
employment in large-scale export-oriented 
factories as prestigious, because it pays higher 
wages and offers better working conditions 
than jobs in the domestic nonexport sector and 
local services. Although educated women as-
pire to nonmanual service employment (such 
as teaching and tourism), employment in large 
export- oriented factories seems to offer the 
best short-term alternative.94 Similarly, despite 
the problems faced by female agricultural 
workers in global production, especially those 
with fl exible and informal work, many still ex-
press a preference for this kind of work over the 
alternatives.95
But persistent gender differences in endow-
ments, time availability, access to productive 
inputs and agency, and pervasive employment 
segregation by gender, mean that not all women 
have fully benefi ted from the economic oppor-
tunities brought about by globalization. And 
even among women who did benefi t, remaining 
gaps, primarily in wages and working condi-
tions, still need to be closed.
to arise as (exporting) fi rms move up the value 
chain through recapitalization and retooling of 
workers, both normally associated with higher 
productivity and better wages.
IS THE GLASS HALF FULL OR 
HALF EMPTY? THE NEED FOR 
PUBLIC ACTION
What, then, are we to conclude from the discus-
sion in this chapter? The evidence suggests that 
employment in the export sector represents an 
attractive option for a large number of women 
in the developing world.92 These jobs enable 
women to contribute to household income, 
increase their economic empowerment within 
the household, and allow for greater social 
 participation. They sometimes also offer access 
to  government and community-support pro-
grams, which would otherwise be inaccessible.93 
So, even where there are negative work attri-
butes, there are also many positives, and women 
may still prefer this work to the alternatives.
WHAT WE SEE
The forces unleashed by trade openness, technological change and 
diff usion, and increased access to information have lifted some of 
the constraints to greater equality. Not everyone has benefi ted, 
however, and it is often women, for whom existing constraints are 
most binding, who are left behind.
WHY WE SEE THIS
Increased access to economic opportunities
Trade openness and the spread of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) have increased women’s access to economic 
opportunities and in some cases increased their wages relative to 
men’s. Growth in export and ICT-enabled sectors, together with a 
decline in the importance of physical strength and a rise in the 
importance of cognitive skills, has increased the demand for female 
labor. ICT has also increased access to markets among female farm-
ers and entrepreneurs by easing time and mobility constraints.
Stronger incentives for action
Several factors associated with a more global world strengthen the 
incentives for action toward greater gender equality. Gender in -
equality is more costly in an integrated world because it diminishes 
a country’s ability to compete internationally—particularly if the 
country specializes in female-intensive goods and services. Interna-
tional peer pressure has also led more countries than ever to ratify 
treaties against discrimination, while growing media exposure and 
consumers’ demands for better treatment of workers has pushed 
multinationals toward fairer wages and better working conditions 
for women.
Shifting gender roles and norms
Increased access to information, primarily through wider exposure 
to television and the Internet, allows countries to learn about life 
and social mores in other places—knowledge that can change per-
ceptions and ultimately promote adoption of more egalitarian atti-
tudes. And increased economic empowerment for women can rein-
force this process by promoting changes in gender roles and 
allowing newly empowered women to infl uence time allocation, 
shift relative power within the household, and exercise agency more 
broadly.
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR POLICY
In the absence of public policy, globalization alone cannot and will 
not make gender inequality go away. Despite signifi cant increases in 
agency and in access to economic opportunities for many women in 
many countries, large gaps remain in some areas. Public action 
aimed at closing existing gender gaps in endowments, agency, and 
access to economic opportunities is therefore necessary for coun-
tries to fully capitalize on the potential of globalization as a force for 
development and greater gender equality.
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S P R E A D  3    Changing ages, changing bodies, changing times—Adolescent boys 
and girls
Across urban and rural communities in eight countries, 800 girls and boys between the ages of 11 and 17 talked about their everyday life, their 
use of time, their aspirations and hopes for the future, 
and what it means to be a girl or a boy today.1 Aware of 
the demands and opportunities of today’s world, boys 
and girls deeply value education and aspire to good jobs. 
Their answers and conversations also bring to light how 
early in life gender differences emerge and how expected 
gender roles and behaviors permeate all aspects of their 
everyday lives—from their relation with their parents to 
their evaluation of each other. That includes their defi ni-
tions of what constitutes appropriate behavior—what it 
means to be a good or bad girl, a good or bad boy (spread 
fi gure 3.1).
Dedicating effort to study and doing well in school 
are defi ning attributes of good girls and boys alike and 
one of their main responsibilities. Second to school for 
girls comes helping at home. Other markers of a good 
girl include individual character traits—such as being 
obedient and respectful. In contrast, lack of modesty in 
dress and going out without a specifi c purpose or stay-
ing out late are perceived as inappropriate behavior for 
girls. For boys, risky behaviors—smoking, drinking, 
drug use—are central in the defi nition of a bad boy, and 
a good boy is defi ned as a boy who does not have these 
behaviors. 
Adolescents and their parents alike place a high value 
on education. Most of the adolescents surveyed were 
attending school at the time of the survey, except for a 
quarter of the girls and boys participating in India. These 
girls and boys had left school at different stages from 
grades 1 to 10, the majority around grade 5 or 6. The 
girls left school to help at home or in home agricultural 
production, while boys left to work as painters, carpen-
ters, and mechanics in urban areas and as agricultural 
workers in rural communities. 
In all cases, the adolescents’ participation in school 
and their decision to leave largely depended on parental 
views about education, which have changed over time, 
particularly for daughters, as a woman from the Red Sea 
region in North Sudan narrates: 
I was born in 1963 in a middle-income family of a 
Bega tribe. Things were very different then. When I 
became seven years of age, I began to help my mother 
in home farming and household duties. Women in 
our area do not work in farms but they help in seed-
ing and harvesting. I did not go to school, because 
there was no school in our village. Also, there was no 
girl’s education, and there was not one educated girl 
in our area. It was believed that girls’ education was 
shameful. When I was 17 years old, they married 
me to my cousin without asking me. We had seven 
children, three girls and four boys. All my daughters 
started school but only one of them passed grade 4 
and continues studying. . . . I hope, God willing, that 
she would continue and complete her education to 
the highest level reached by any girl in the village. 
Yes, now I have changed my ideas to education, espe-
cially to girls’ education.
Girls and boys have the expectation that getting an 
education will give them a better future than their par-
ents had and that it will allow them to meet their aspi-
rations: “School is very important, I see my big brothers 
who are civil servants and I want to be like them” (young 
man, Burkina Faso). “Education lets us join the modern 
world, and offers us better jobs now; in the past it was not 
important since our people were farmers and were not pay-
ing attention to their future or look[ing] to change their 
present” (young man, North Sudan). “Brighter future, less 
hard work than being farmers, better economic life” (young 
man, Vietnam). “Complete education up to university to 
get a job, then become an educated mother” (young woman, 
North Sudan).
But they are also aware that they may not reach the 
education levels they wish. When asked to compare their 
desires with reality, all girls surveyed in Bhutan, Burkina 
Faso, and the Republic of Yemen said they would like to 
attain at least a college degree, but rural girls are aware 
that their schooling is unlikely to extend beyond second-
ary level, if they are lucky. Fijian girls and girls from the 
West Bank and Gaza feel that they will meet their dream 
of a college degree. The overwhelming majority of girls 
in India aspire to a degree, but when asked about how 
far they are really likely to go in their education, answers 
vary, and some think they may just make it to secondary 
school and not fulfi ll their dreams to become doctors, 
lawyers, or engineers. Boys too aspire to college and pro-
fessional degrees, but in Burkina Faso and rural Fiji, they 
are aware that many will not make it past primary school. 
And while some Gaza boys share dreams of advanced 
tertiary education, they know they are likely to stop their 
schooling at secondary level. Some boys from Burkina 
Faso do not really want to go beyond primary levels. And 
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boys in the Dominican Republic share the perception 
that studying is not the best path to a better future. 
The reasons that explain the gap between their wishes 
and reality range from physical distance to economic 
hardship to gender roles. Distance and lack of infrastruc-
ture affects boys and girls alike, but girls have more dif-
fi culties when there is no school in their village or when 
their friends start dropping out and they have no peers 
to join them on their journey to school. In all places, girls 
face more mobility restrictions than boys do. Boys and 
girls are also affected by their family’s economic situa-
tion. Boys leave school to contribute to family income, 
girls to help at home. In these cases, the number and or-
der of children play a role in parents’ decisions. “If pos-
sible, all the children are sent to school; if there is a fi nancial 
problem, younger children are sent to school and older kids 
are sent to work,” a boy in India pointed out. Girls from 
other communities in the country offered similar expla-
nations. 
Gender differences also play in the decision to leave 
school. In Bhutan, Burkina Faso, India, North Sudan, and 
the Republic of Yemen, girls leave school to prepare for 
S P R E A D  F I G U R E  3.1   Characteristics of good girls/boys and bad girls/boys
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations, based on “Defi ning Gender in the 21st Century: A Multi-Country Assessment” (dataset).
a.  Good girl b.  Good boy
c.  Bad girl d.  Bad boy
14
po
lite
ha
rd
wo
rki
ng
no
 bo
yfr
ien
d
sta
ys
 ho
me
dr
es
se
s a
pp
ro
pr
iat
ely
rel
igi
ou
s
ob
ed
ien
t
res
pe
ctf
ul
he
lps
 at
 ho
me
stu
die
s
no
 gi
rlf
rie
nd
ha
s g
oo
d f
rie
nd
s
po
lite
ob
ed
ien
t
rel
igi
ou
s
he
lps
 at
 ho
me
no
 vi
ce
s
(sm
ok
ing
, d
rin
kin
g)
res
pe
ctf
ul
stu
die
s
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
%
 o
f m
en
tio
ns
 b
y 
fo
cu
s
gr
ou
p 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
14
fig
ht
s
pr
os
tit
ut
e
bo
yfr
ien
ds
do
es
 no
t li
ste
n t
o p
are
nt
s
vic
es
 (s
mo
kin
g, 
dr
ink
ing
)
dis
ob
ed
ien
t
no
t r
eli
gio
us
do
es
 no
t h
elp
 at
 ho
me
dis
res
pe
ctf
ul
dr
es
se
s in
ap
pr
op
ria
tel
y
do
es
 no
t s
tu
dy
ro
am
s a
ro
un
d/
ou
t la
te
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
%
 o
f m
en
tio
ns
 b
y 
fo
cu
s
gr
ou
p 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
14
lie
s
fig
ht
s
ma
ny
 gi
rlf
rie
nd
s
dis
ob
ed
ien
t
no
t r
eli
gio
us
ste
als
dis
res
pe
ctf
ul
ro
am
s a
ro
un
d/
ou
t la
te
do
es
 no
t s
tu
dy
vic
es
 (s
mo
kin
g, 
dr
ink
ing
)
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
%
 o
f m
en
tio
ns
 b
y 
fo
cu
s
gr
ou
p 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
%
 o
f m
en
tio
ns
 b
y 
fo
cu
s
gr
ou
p 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
male respondent female respondent
282 WO R L D  D E V E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 2
but not always: “I got married when I was 10 years old, 
and I had a child when I was 15 years old. . . . This is not 
the right age. It is good only if they have a child at the age 
of 18 or more. It is good for a girl to have a child when she 
is able to think what is right and what is wrong” (young 
woman, India). In the Dominican Republic most girls say 
that they start having sex—and becoming mothers—at 
age 13. “A friend of mine is 11, and she is pregnant,” said 
a girl from Santo Domingo. In Tanzania, the average age 
for fi rst pregnancy was seen to be 15. “But there are girls 
who have got their fi rst child at the age of 12,” said a young 
woman. “Sometimes you can die for having a baby this 
early,” recognized another girl in Liberia.
Most surprising, no adolescent girl or boy in any dis-
cussion group indicated that childbirth at such a young 
age was desirable or acceptable. In fact, when asked about 
the ideal and desired age to start a family, most said age 
18 or older for both marriage and childbirth. There were 
no reports of boys under the age of 15 becoming fathers, 
and they recognize that they begin their sexual activity 
later than girls. In Peru, where 16 was the youngest age 
of sexual activity reported for boys, early onset of sexual 
relations also determines early household formation; 
while couples do not formally marry, they start cohab-
iting once the girl is pregnant, acknowledging that the 
pregnancy is “a shared mistake,” as a boy called it.
Having a boyfriend or a girlfriend at an early age was 
part of what groups defi ned as bad behavior. For boys, 
bad behavior extends to bad habits and bad company. 
Violence and smoking or drinking were frequently men-
tioned, as was participation in gangs and in groups of 
boys that bully other boys or harass girls in the street (see 
spread fi gure 3.1). The bad company was associated with 
boys staying out late more often; increasing their expo-
sure to drugs, alcohol, and other bad habits; and losing 
interest in their studies. While girls are pulled into the 
house, boys are pushed out of it. This freedom of move-
ment puts boys more at risk than girls. “The boys are 
happy when they are a free man and the girls are happy to 
be in their home,” said boys in North Sudan. “Boys, they 
take their bikes and scoot off and roam around in villages 
here and there” (young man, Fiji). “Boys can infl uence 
each other into becoming more violent. Girls aren’t violent 
at all” (adolescent boy, West Bank and Gaza). “Boys are 
in gangs and fi ght each other with machetes, stones, and 
guns” (adolescent boys, Dominican Republic). 
Girls are more restricted to the home space. Boys and 
girls say that girls enjoy being at home or spending time 
with their friends “We feel happy when we play together 
or we mingle with friends, the feeling of togetherness makes 
us happy” (young woman, India). But some of these per-
ceptions are related to specifi c restrictions on girls’ abil-
ity to move about freely and to have free time. “They 
future marital duties, to keep them safe from danger, or 
to prevent unwanted pregnancies: “My boyfriend got in 
the way of my education when I got in the 6th grade, I got 
pregnant” (young woman, Liberia). “It was my own fault. 
I had a boyfriend and got pregnant while still in school. I 
left school and had to stay home” (young woman, Papua 
New Guinea).
Prevalent views of gender roles and binding social 
norms shape adolescents’ daily lives. The expectation is 
that girls will help in the house, and their responsibility 
for certain chores means that, in general, girls enjoy less 
free time than boys. Across four communities in Burkina 
Faso, it was unanimously recognized that “boys devote 
more time to having a good time because they have more 
free time, they don’t have to wash or prepare food.” A group 
of girls in the Dominican Republic complained, “We 
have to clean the fl oors, we have to wash, we have to look 
after our siblings, we have so many things to do!!” Almah, 
from rural Papua New Guinea, explains, “Boys do noth-
ing to help. They look for their friends to tell stories, and 
roam the streets the whole day, chewing gum, listening to 
music, sleeping, and resting. Girls take care of all household 
chores, collect fi rewood, and fetch water. Daughters have to 
take over housework, and they have no free time.” Sangay, 
a boy from Bhutan, agrees, “Girls spend most of the time 
working at home and they play less, whereas boys play more 
and work less at our age.”
While boys are expected to help, their tasks are more 
contained and take less of their time: “Boys don’t have spe-
cifi c tasks to do. They go shopping within the neighborhood 
whenever that is needed, but this doesn’t take more than 
an hour daily.” “I would help at home if I am requested to 
do, but nobody asks me” (young man, North Sudan). And 
while they devote some of their free time to studying, 
boys say they would like to have ways to use their time 
in a more productive way, in part responding to social 
norms of their future roles as income providers for their 
households: “I would like to work more and play less Nin-
tendo” (young man, Dominican Republic). “Rather than 
staying at home and doing nothing, I would be happy if I 
could get money and start a small business” (South Africa). 
“We would very much like to get a job or anything useful 
to use our free time” (West Bank and Gaza). “We want to 
engage in activities that will bring income” (Afghanistan). 
Adolescence, a time to transition into adulthood, is 
also a time when many form a family and have children. 
In two of every fi ve communities in all 19 countries in the 
assessment, young women said that girls are often mar-
ried and have children before they reach age 17. In 11 of 
the 19 countries, young women said marriage and child-
birth was common for girls under the age of 15, more 
so in rural than urban settings. The early onset of sexual 
activity was in some cases associated with early marriage, 
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NOTE
1.  The WDR2012 Qualitative Assessment included 19 econo-
mies (the complete country list can be found in Spread 1, 
note 1). Specifi c focus groups with adolescents were con-
ducted in a subsample of 8 economies including Bhutan, 
Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, India, North 
Sudan, West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. In 
many other countries, adolescents participated in interviews 
with young women.
have more freedom to be out, girls have limits.” “Girls are 
afraid that if they go out something can happen to them or 
they can get raped,” said girls and boys in the Dominican 
Republic. Their peers in other countries agree: “Boys can 
be as free as they wish and that is alright. Girls cannot 
go out in the evening. Boys can go anywhere they wish” 
(Indonesia). “Boys are free to move around the commu-
nity. Wherever they go they don’t worry and no one ques-
tions them” (Republic of Yemen). “Girls have to fi nd fun 
inside the house because they are not allowed to go out like 
the boys” (West Bank and Gaza). “Women should stay 
home. . . . It is preferred to be at home and not go out on 
the street or any other place” (North Sudan).
But girls are willing and open to challenge the norms 
that confi ne them to the domestic sphere. While young 
men have a more traditional view of the role of women 
in the household, girls aspire to a different life from their 
mothers and want to combine productive and reproduc-
tive tasks (spread fi gure 3.2). While admiring the hard-
working nature, devotion, and care of their mothers, 
most girls whose mothers were housewives do not want 
to replicate that in the future. Many boys also want their 
sisters and future wives to have a different life from their 
mother: “She works at home, she is also fi nancially sup-
porting the family, she has more responsibilities at home. 
If my father comes home drunk, he might verbally and 
physically abuse her [but] she has always encouraged the 
boys to dream. We can’t face so many diffi culties, we don’t 
want that kind of life” (young boy, India). “Our mothers’ 
lives were diffi cult,” said a group of girls in Fiji. “They 
stay home and have a lot of responsibilities—look after 
kids, household chores, cooking and cleaning and work on 
farms;” “[we want] better education and advanced job in 
life . . . education fi rst and then work and get married last 
[not at a young age like their mother’s did].”
S P R E A D  F I G U R E  3.2   Adolescents’ opinions on 
women’s roles
Source: WDR 2012 team calculations, based on “Defi ning Gender in the 21st Century: A Multi-
Country Assessment” (dataset).
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The role of and potential for 
public action  
PART III
he analysis in Part 2 points to four priority areas for pub-
lic action: reducing excess female mortality, especially in 
infancy and early childhood and in reproductive years; 
closing earnings and productivity gaps between women and 
men; shrinking gender differences in voice in households and in 
society; and limiting the reproduction of gender inequality over 
time, whether it is transmitted through endowments, economic 
opportunities, or agency. Gender gaps in these four areas persist 
despite economic development, thus providing a strong ratio-
nale for public action. 
Part 3 of the Report is concerned with three questions: How 
to choose the right policies? What would enable the successful 
implementation of these policies? How can the international 
development community support policies for greater gender 
equality? The discussion starts with a detailed description of 
policy options for addressing the four priority areas for action, 
complemented with concrete illustrations of their use in various 
country contexts (chapter 7). An examination of the political 
economy of gender reforms follows, emphasizing the issues that 
distinguish reform in this area from other types of redistributive 
or equality-enhancing reforms (chapter 8). We end by proposing 
a global agenda for action (chapter 9).
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POLICIES
Policy makers can choose interventions that work through mar-
kets and through formal and informal institutions. The policies 
can also vary with the problem being tackled. For the market, 
prices can be altered through a range of taxes and subsidies. For 
formal institutions, laws can be changed or better enforced, and 
the level and quality of service provision can be enhanced. Poli-
cies are typically more indirect when targeting informal insti-
tutions, particularly social norms: examples include providing 
information and facilitating the formation of groups.
Chapter 7 illustrates how the framework in Part 2 helps reduce 
the complexity of policy choice and design in three ways. First, it 
focuses policy attention on the gender gaps of greatest concern. 
Second, it shifts attention from symptoms to determinants so 
that policies target the root cause of the problem rather than its 
most apparent manifestation. Third, it provides guidance about 
the most binding constraints and the potential entry point(s) 
for policy action. Where mutually reinforcing constraints exist, 
it highlights the need to sequence or combine interventions.
In each of the priority areas, the chapter looks at experi-
ences across diverse countries––rich and developing––with 
different policies. In evaluating and recommending policies, 
we rely as far as possible on rigorous evidence, including from 
impact evaluations where these exist. We are thus able to dis-
tinguish between policies (such as conditional cash transfers 
to improve educational access or job placement programs to 
promote wage employment) regarding which there is more 
and better evidence and other interventions where less is 
known (such as measures to improve women’s access to jus-
tice or ways of reducing unintended pregnancies among ado-
lescent girls). 
By looking beyond policies targeted at the underlying 
causes of persistent gender equality, chapter 7 also illustrates 
how the framework can inform effective and strategic gender 
mainstreaming. Many policies are not concerned directly with 
gender but may nonetheless infl uence gender relations within 
the household and society. Ignoring these links can make in-
terventions less effective in achieving their goals. And in some 
circumstances, taking account of gender-differentiated im-
pacts can make it possible to use policy as a way of enhancing 
gender equality. 
ENABLING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Designing appropriate policies is just the fi rst step toward 
greater gender equality. Implementing them effectively is 
equally important. Chapter 8 looks at the experience of a 
range of countries to highlight the main aspects of the politi-
cal economy of gender reform. 
Two characteristics of gender reforms are likely to spark 
opposition that needs to be managed if positive change is to 
result. First, as with all reforms, they redistribute resources 
and power between groups in society, including between men 
and women. So, even when the reforms enhance economic ef-
fi ciency, some groups may lose. Second, gender reforms often 
challenge powerful societal norms and beliefs regarding gen-
der roles. 
The chapter highlights four political economy issues that 
are especially relevant to gender equality. First, it is essential 
to build coalitions that mobilize around the reforms and cata-
lyze broad-based support. While state action is at the center of 
gender policy reform, coalitions that include nonstate actors 
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ments, civil society organizations, and international institu-
tions working in concert—can enhance the scope for and 
impact of domestic policies. Chapter 9 discusses the moti-
vation for actions by the international community as com-
plements to country-level efforts and where those actions 
should focus. 
Global action for gender equality is warranted for three 
reasons. First, progress on some fronts, such as addressing 
the root causes of excess female mortality, requires channel-
ing more resources from rich to developing countries, espe-
cially the poorest and most fragile countries. Second, effective 
action sometimes requires the production of a public good, 
such as the generation or dissemination of new knowledge. 
And third, international coordination among a large number 
of countries and institutions can promote the adoption and 
enhance the overall effectiveness of policies, for instance by 
building momentum and pressure for domestic action.
Chapter 9 concludes that this global agenda should focus 
on areas where our analysis has pointed to the largest intrin-
sic gender gaps, where the potential development payoff is 
greatest, and where these gaps persist with income growth. 
So, the international community should focus its efforts on 
complementing countries’ actions in the four priority areas 
identifi ed in this Report: reducing excess female mortality 
and closing education gaps where they remain; improving 
access to economic opportunities for women; increasing 
women’s voice and agency in the household and in society; 
and limiting the reproduction of gender inequality across 
generations. And we highlight an additional cross-cutting 
priority: supporting evidence-based public action through 
better data, better knowledge generation and sharing, and 
better learning.
In these areas, the support from the international commu-
nity should be a mix of providing fi nancing; fostering innova-
tion and learning; and strengthening partnerships, including 
with academia, civil society, and the private sector. As chapter 
9 notes, the specifi cs will vary by country and priority area 
and will require sustaining support in some areas while scal-
ing up support in others.
such as political parties, trade unions, civic organizations, and 
the private sector can be a strong force for change. Women’s 
groups in particular have been, and will continue to be, impor-
tant in working for greater gender equality in labor legislation 
and family law. And while men are still not as active in the push 
for gender equality, there is broader male engagement in many 
areas and growing male support for women’s rights in many 
developing countries. 
Second, fi rms—big and small—have strong business reasons 
to become proponents of gender equality. In a globalized econ-
omy, the competition for talent is great; companies can no  longer 
afford to overlook or ignore talented women. Commitment to 
gender equality is something customers and investors increas-
ingly demand, especially in large corporations. And the growing 
market power of women can encourage businesses to back up 
these commitments with action.
Third, dislocations such as natural disasters or political or 
economic change, can present policy makers with windows of 
opportunity to launch reforms that improve gender outcomes. 
The advocacy of transnational agencies and role modeling in the 
global agenda can play a similar role. 
Finally, there are multiple paths to reform. Often governments 
follow societal cues in pacing and pushing reforms. When policy 
formulation and implementation derive from ongoing shifts in 
markets and social norms, convergence and alignment can fuel 
sustainable change. But such “incremental” reforms may not be 
enough to overcome the path dependence and institutional ri-
gidities that result in persistent gender inequality. Bold govern-
ment action with “transformative” reforms may be necessary to 
alter social dynamics and move to a more equitable equilibrium. 
In choosing between incremental and transformative policies as 
part of gender reforms, the challenge for policy makers is to bal-
ance the pace of change with the risks of reversal. 
THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR ACTION
As chapters 7 and 8 show, domestic public action is central 
to reducing gender inequalities. Yet global action—by govern-

F
ollowing on the trends and analysis in 
Parts 1 and 2, this chapter looks at the 
choice of public policies to address the 
most serious gender gaps. In practice, 
policies for greater gender equality take a variety 
of forms and work through markets (taxes and 
subsidies), formal institutions (legal or regula-
tory changes and public service delivery), or 
even through informal institutions (efforts to 
change social norms). This multiplicity of pos-
sible interventions can make the policy choice 
and design problem appear overwhelming.
Our approach to making this problem more 
tractable is threefold and illustrates how better 
analysis that builds on our framework can help. 
First, we focus on what the analysis in the pre-
ceding chapters highlighted as the gender gaps 
of greatest concern. These are the disparities 
that matter for societal welfare and countries’ 
development prospects but that do not nec-
essarily close as countries grow richer. These 
priorities are reducing excess female mortal-
ity, especially in infancy and early childhood 
and in reproductive years; closing earnings and 
productivity gaps between women and men; 
shrinking gender differences in voice in society 
and in households; and limiting the reproduc-
tion of gender inequality over time, whether this 
inequality is transmitted through endowments, 
economic opportunities, or agency. Obviously, 
not all these priorities will apply to all countries 
across all income levels. And country charac-
teristics will dictate how corrective policies will 
need to be customized.
Second, we emphasize that, in choosing and 
designing policies, it is necessary to target the 
determinants—the underlying causes—of the 
gender gaps of concern rather than their symp-
toms. The analytical framework carried through 
Part 2 of the Report helps highlight these causes 
and how they emerge from the workings of 
markets and institutions and their interactions 
with each other and with households. 
Third, we draw on the insight from the frame-
work that, despite income growth, some gender 
gaps tend to persist and remain “sticky” for one 
of two main reasons. Either the single impetus 
for progress may be blocked, as with the insti-
tutional improvements needed to reduce infant, 
child, and maternal mortality in many low- and 
middle-income countries. Or the workings of 
markets and institutions and their interactions 
with each other and with households can mean 
that multiple constraints to progress require 
changes on several fronts. So, addressing gender 
gaps in where women and men work and how 
productive they are may require changes in how 
markets work, in the laws and regulations that 
apply to their work, and in the beliefs and norms 
that apply to the work that men and women do. 
In practice, therefore, policy makers need to 
understand whether a single constraint is most 
salient for a particular problem or whether mul-
tiple constraints are at work, and whether to ad-
dress them simultaneously or sequentially. 
Most of the chapter is organized by look-
ing at policies to target the priority gender gaps 
within the three dimensions of endowments, 
economic opportunities, and agency. Some as-
pects of the reproduction of gender inequality 
over time, such as pockets of disadvantage in 
education, are covered here. However, we discuss 
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To effectively address gender inequalities that 
emerge in adolescence and early adulthood, it 
is necessary both to intervene early and in ways 
that recognize how an intervention can have 
impacts on various outcomes. For example, job 
training for an adolescent girl not only can im-
prove her access to employment but may also 
delay pregnancy, which in turn can enable her 
to spend more time acquiring skills. 
The fi nal part of this chapter shifts from the 
choice and design of policies targeted at reduc-
ing gender inequality to looking at how and 
why the gender-differentiated impacts of poli-
cies that have other goals should be taken into 
account. We show how ignoring gender issues 
can sometimes make these policies less effec-
tive in achieving their objectives. And policies 
that are not concerned with gender equality 
can often be designed in ways that improve 
gender outcomes. So, even where gender equal-
ity is not the stated policy objective, gender 
may matter for policy design, illustrating how 
gender mainstreaming can be undertaken in a 
strategic way. 
POLICIES TO REDUCE GAPS IN 
HEALTH AND EDUCATION
Many gender gaps in education—and some 
in health—narrow as countries grow richer. 
For households, higher incomes relax the need 
to choose between sons and daughters when 
spending on basic education, health, and nutri-
tion. For countries, higher incomes permit the 
supply of services in these areas to expand—
increasing not only the number of schools and 
health clinics but also their accessibility. And 
the market signals that typically accompany 
growth and encourage the greater participation 
of women in the wage labor market also work to 
reduce gender gaps by raising the value of girls’ 
education.
But our analysis shows that two gender gaps 
in health and education persist even as incomes 
rise: excess female mortality at specifi c periods 
in the life cycle, and pockets of gender disad-
vantage in education. Addressing each gap re-
quires better service delivery, especially to the 
poor and other excluded groups; that in turn 
requires strengthening the institutions respon-
sible for providing the services (colored in green 
in fi gure 7.1).
ways of dealing with the gender disadvantages 
that emerge in adolescence and early adulthood 
separately both because of the importance of 
these gaps in giving rise to “gender inequality” 
traps and because corrective measures have to 
recognize how endowments, economic oppor-
tunities, and agency are even more tightly linked 
for this age group. 
Addressing gender gaps in human capital 
endowments—excess female mortality at spe-
cifi c periods of the life cycle, and pockets of 
gender disadvantage in education—requires an 
emphasis on better delivery of public services. 
Improving the availability of clean water and 
sanitation to households and providing timely 
basic services to expectant mothers will go a long 
way to closing gender gaps in excess mortality. 
Education services should focus on improving 
access for the signifi cant population groups now 
disadvantaged by poverty, ethnicity, caste, race, 
or geography. Such an emphasis will address the 
“gender inequality traps” that affect the poor 
and excluded, with solutions coming from either 
the demand or the supply side. And broad-based 
safety nets can dampen the adverse impacts of 
income shocks, which can affect males or fe-
males differently, depending on the nature of the 
shock and the underlying gender relations. 
Closing the gap between women and men in 
their access to economic opportunities means 
reducing earnings and productivity gaps be-
tween them, whether in wage employment, ag-
riculture, or entrepreneurship. This effort will 
take targeted policies to lift the constraints on 
women’s time stemming from the burdens of 
housework and care and to improve the work-
ings of labor and credit markets and the struc-
ture of formal institutions—particularly laws 
and delivery of economic services. 
Reducing gender gaps in voice, whether 
within society or in households, also typically 
requires policies in multiple domains. Policies to 
improve female education can help. For societal 
voice, measures are needed to provide informa-
tion and change beliefs about women’s abilities 
as political and corporate leaders as well as to 
change norms that consider leadership to be a 
male job. For voice within the household, most 
important are policies to expand economic op-
portunities for women and to reduce biases in 
the legal system, enforcement of laws and access 
to justice, and in some instances, measures to 
infl uence norms. 
290 WO R L D  D E V E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 2
of use through piped delivery while improving 
sanitation in urban areas. And where water sup-
ply has been improved in developing countries, 
it has made a signifi cant difference. In Argentina, 
improvements in water supply reduced child 
mortality by 5 to 7 percent, with even larger ef-
fects in the poorest areas.4
The Joint Monitoring Programme of the 
United Nation’s Children’s Fund and the World 
Health Organization noted that while access to 
improved water sources rose from 71 percent 
in 1990 to 84 percent in 2008, access to piped 
water grew more slowly––from 39 percent in 
1990 to 49 percent in 2008––with access in urban 
areas stagnating due to rapid population growth. 
Fewer than a fi fth of the poorest 40 percent of 
Africans now have safe water (either piped or 
through standposts).5 In this situation, house-
holds (especially, but not only, the poor) fi nd it 
hard to accurately assess the risks and benefi ts of 
each of the choices they must make concerning 
the purifi cation of water. The problem is that the
default option for these households is generally 
For excess female mortality, it’s about 
fi xing institutions 
As the World Development Report 2004 and 
others have shown, improving the delivery of 
public services is no small or simple task.1 The 
main challenge for all governments is fi nancing 
expanded coverage while ensuring that the ser-
vices are provided effi ciently and remain acces-
sible to poor people. 
Providing clean water and sanitation 
As chapter 3 showed, today’s rich countries re-
solved excess female deaths in infancy and early 
childhood between 1900 and 1930 by improv-
ing access to clean water and better sanitation. 
In general, water treatment at the point of use 
reduces diarrhea more than water treatment at 
the source, which is less effective because of the 
potential for recontamination.2 For example, 
more than half of the water stored in household 
containers tested in Ethiopia showed postsource 
contamination.3 So, governments in rich coun-
tries chose to provide clean water at the point 
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ating ineffi ciencies, and improving cost recovery 
could yield more than a third of the necessary 
fi nancing.
Enhancing the effi ciency of the institutions 
providing water and sanitation services requires 
appropriate regulations that recognize the ratio-
nale for government intervention while improv-
ing accountability to service users. In urban areas, 
water is provided through networks. So, efforts 
need to strengthen both the “short route” of ac-
countability (of the provider to service users) and 
the “long route” of accountability (of policy mak-
ers and politicians to service users and of provid-
ers to policy makers). Ways must also be found to 
keep water affordable for the poor (box 7.1).
bad and will not improve unless water supply 
and sanitation institutions work better. 
Just as the modes of delivering clean water 
and improving sanitation in urban and rural ar-
eas differ, so do the ways service delivery can be 
improved in these settings. For most low- and 
middle-income countries, substantially more 
resources will be needed to increase access in all 
settings. For instance, a comprehensive analysis 
of infrastructure funding needs for Sub-Saharan 
Africa concluded that about $11 billion needs to 
be spent annually on clean water and sanita-
tion needs—about 1.5 times the current level.6 
The same study also showed that addressing 
bottlenecks in capital spending, reducing oper-
BOX 7.1 Improving water supply: Dakar and Phnom Penh
Improving the provision of water services is a diffi  cult, yet achiev-
able goal that can lead to signifi cant reductions in child mortality—
and it is possible even in low-income settings, as the cases of Sene-
gal and Cambodia illustrate. Both these countries have been highly 
successful in improving water service delivery in major urban and 
periurban areas. Success has come through two main channels: 
increased investment and complementary measures to increase 
effi  ciency while preserving greater aff ordability for the poor. 
Since the mid-1990s, substantial improvements have been 
made in access to and quality of water in Dakar, home to more than 
half of Senegal’s inhabitants. Increased production capacity and 
expansion of existing networks, including construction of approxi-
mately 97,000 new social connections (subsidized access to the 
poor), increased the proportion of people with access to water ser-
vices from 79 percent in 1996 to 98 percent in 2006—the highest 
coverage rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, water users experi-
ence fewer interruptions. 
In parallel, the Senegalese government took several measures 
to ensure services would be provided at aff ordable rates without 
compromising long-run fi nancial sustainability. The tariff  structure 
for water services was designed specifi cally with this trade-off  in 
mind, allowing for diff erent prices for domestic and nondomestic 
users, and imposing higher tariff s on those users who surpassed 
specifi c quotas (for example, the well-off  who used water for gar-
dening). These tariff  schedules were incorporated into fi nancial 
models in the planning stages and post-implementation to moni-
tor progress toward fi nancial self-suffi  ciency. To bring down opera-
tional costs, the day-to-day water supply operations were trans-
ferred to a private company, which was also made responsible for 
billing and collecting payments for both water and sanitation ser-
vices. To encourage provider eff ort, remuneration was directly 
linked to performance indicators such as the amount of reduction 
achieved in unaccounted-for water and improvements in billing 
and collection effi  ciency. In 2006, the tariff  collection rate stood at 
98 percent, up from 80 percent in 1996, and water losses declined 
from 32 percent to less than 20 percent—a saving roughly equiva-
lent to the water needs of nearly a million users—over the same 
period. Furthermore, since 2006 the Senegalese urban water sector 
has been able to cover its operational and maintenance costs with-
out direct government subsidies. 
In the late 1990s, reform in Cambodia’s water sector trans-
formed access to water in Phnom Penh, where approximately 20 
percent of the country’s population lives. In 1997, only half of the 
city’s population had access to piped water for an average of 12 
hours a day. Between 1997 and 2003, water production doubled, 
distribution networks were expanded by nearly 150 percent, and 
subsidized connections for low-income groups mostly living in 
periurban areas were introduced. By 2010, over 90 percent of the 
population, including 3,800 poor households, had access to water 
24 hours a day. 
Similar to the Senegalese experience, reducing water losses and 
uncollected revenue and providing a tariff  structure that was aff ord-
able for the poor but that did not threaten long-run sustainability 
were critical to turning around the capital city’s ailing water sector. 
Cambodia chose a diff erent avenue to achieve effi  ciency gains, 
however; instead of focusing on public sector participation, it com-
bined increased investment in the public sector with adoption of 
new technology. Acquisition of a fully computerized monitoring 
system enabled Phnom Penh’s water utility to reduce losses from 
unaccounted-for water from 57 percent in 1998—one of the high-
est rates in Asia—to 17 percent by 2003. The tariff  structure pro-
vided subsidies to the poorest users ranging between 30 to 100 
percent of fees. The remaining tariff s were set to ensure long-run 
fi nancial viability and were reviewed annually to determine the 
necessary increases (although the signifi cant reductions in water 
losses meant these tariff  increases were modest). Information tech-
nology was also employed to improve the management of account-
ing data, which pushed the bill collection rate to 100 percent in 
2003, up from 89 percent in 1997. As in Senegal, Phnom Penh’s 
water supply authority has reached fi nancial autonomy, and, in 
2010, it was awarded the Stockholm Industry Water Award for excel-
lence in water management.
Source: World Bank Water Sector project documents.
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profi le, and the structure of the customer base 
of the utility. 
The second issue is how to pay for the sub-
sidy. Cross-subsidization (for example, from 
nonresidential to residential customers) is one 
option. Using general government revenues is 
another option. Ultimately, the best fi nancing 
mechanism will depend on the local context. 
In rural areas, network provision of water 
is feasible where population densities are high, 
as in parts of East and South Asia and where 
community-managed systems are common. 
Elsewhere, including in much of rural Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, households provide for 
themselves through groundwater and surface 
sources. For community systems, local govern-
ments can make improvements. Uganda uses its 
extensive local networks for income tax collec-
tion to collect an additional small tax—placing 
it in a fund administered by the district council 
to pay only for major water repairs. 
Even where rural supply systems provide ac-
cess, supply is often spread quite thinly. Poor 
households are typically excluded, and many 
households continue to use other unprotected 
sources. Many villages in Bolivia, Ghana, and 
Peru have access, but the use of alternative un-
protected sources remains high—at 21 percent, 
23 percent, and 38 percent, respectively. Access 
to funding is often limited, and problems of fi -
nancial sustainability remain pervasive, so even 
when systems are put in place, maintenance is 
problematic.
Sanitation differs from water in that indi-
viduals and households are affected not only 
by their own choices but also by the actions of 
others in their community. These “externalities” 
need to be taken into account in improving san-
itation in both rural and urban settings. That is 
particularly true for the treatment and safe dis-
posal of waste, where individuals’ willingness to 
pay for proper service is usually below its cost. 
Thus, government has a clear role in setting 
standards, regulating provision, and possibly 
providing subsidies. In urban areas, strengthen-
ing property rights including the recognition 
of informal settlements can help stimulate de-
mand and thus individuals’ willingness to pay 
for sanitation services. On the supply side, en-
suring that communities have access to inde-
pendent providers can help improve services. 
The priority in rural areas and less dense ur-
ban settings is to raise awareness of sanitation 
Improving the structure of contracts and 
designing and enforcing appropriate regula-
tions for service providers is critical in improv-
ing the “long route” of accountability by sepa-
rating providers from policy makers. In some 
cases, the optimal approach may involve private 
participation. For example, private providers 
played an important role in expanding cover-
age of water supply in Manila from 67 percent 
in 1997 to 99 percent in 2009 and in realizing 
effi ciency gains through lower water losses and 
operating costs.
Buttressing the short route of accountability, 
by increasing the infl uence of users over provid-
ers, can be achieved by benchmarking, ensuring 
that standards of service are clear, and by charg-
ing for services. Cambodia enhanced this form 
of accountability by working through both large 
utilities and small providers (in smaller cities) to 
set up clear mechanisms for charging—install-
ing meters at each connection, computerizing 
billing systems, and shutting down water supply 
to those who do not pay—as well as instituting 
complaint mechanisms for clients. 
It is important to charge for water services, 
but at the same time the services must remain 
affordable, particularly for the poor. So, subsi-
dies to some users may be needed to ensure that 
the cost of the service is covered. But two issues 
arise with providing subsidies. The fi rst is how 
to target these subsidies so that they reach the 
poor and do not encourage excessive water use. 
Several options exist, with attendant pros and 
cons. The most commonly used structure is a 
subsidy based on volume (where the subsidy is 
applied up to a certain volume). However, given 
that the rich and poor do not consume vastly 
different quantities of water, this subsidy usually 
ends up being regressive—benefi ting the well-
off more than the poor. Geographic targeting 
(as in Colombia) and means-based targeting (as 
in Chile) may provide better ways of targeting 
the poor, but they require additional data and 
administrative capacity to work effectively. As a 
result, in Chile the targeting is done by an agency 
other than the water utility. Finally, targeting can 
take the form of providing subsidies for inferior 
levels of service––for example, providing subsi-
dies for standpipes but not for households that 
have a house or yard connection. The most ap-
propriate targeting mechanism will generally 
depend on the context, including the population 
that is not currently served, their socioeconomic 
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mothers and young children. And early in 2011, 
a group of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies 
and private foundations launched a grant facil-
ity—the Grand Challenge for Development—to 
reduce maternal and neonatal mortality.
But as Malaysia and Sri Lanka illustrate, more 
money is not always the critical factor—both 
countries dramatically reduced maternal mor-
tality with fairly modest increases in spending. 
In both countries, spending on maternal and 
child health since the 1950s has never exceeded 
0.4 percent of GDP annually. Instead, they up-
graded the quality of the people delivering the 
chain of services. 
While there will be a continuing need for 
 additional health workers, especially skilled 
birth attendants, coverage can also be increased 
especially in underserved areas by drawing in 
community-level providers and the private sec-
tor. One way of doing this is to delegate many 
clinical tasks from higher-level health providers 
to mid- or lower-level providers. In rural India, 
the management of sepsis, typically done by phy-
sicians, is instead done by trained community-
based health workers using preassembled anti-
biotic packages.9 Locating skilled health workers 
closer to those who lack access also helps. An 
example is Indonesia’s Bidam Di Desa (village 
midwife) program, which trained more than 
50,000 midwives and placed them in rural areas 
throughout the country. The proportion of at-
tended births increased signifi cantly, especially 
among the poorest rural residents.10 Technology 
can help provide these front-line service provid-
ers with assistance when they need it. Uganda’s 
Rural Extended Services and Care for Ultimate 
Emergency Relief program uses radios and 
 walkie-talkies to connect health facilities, am-
bulances, and midwives and to provide birth at-
tendants with a way to receive immediate advice 
from more senior medical staff.11 
Purchasing services from private providers 
can also be a cost-effective alternative to the 
public provision of maternal health services. In 
Cambodia, districts in which nongovernment 
organizations received government funding to 
issues, change behavior, and boost demand. In 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, appeals 
to people’s sense of collective community re-
sponsibility contribute to sustainable sanitary 
behaviors. Some rural communities in Vietnam 
agreed on targets for better sanitary practices 
(building facilities, disposing waste), with local 
governments monitoring compliance and pub-
licizing the results over community radio. Some 
communities in Indonesia initiated competi-
tions by schools and found that the subsequent 
pressure from children to adopt “winning” be-
haviors were the main drivers of changes in hy-
giene practices.
Reducing maternal mortality
While signifi cant progress has been made in 
reducing maternal mortality in the past twenty 
years, global progress is happening at a pace 
far short of that needed to reach the Millen-
nium Development Goal of reducing maternal 
mortality by three-quarters. Certain regions lag 
behind. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a woman faces 
a 1 in 31 chance of dying from complications 
from pregnancy or childbirth; in rich countries, 
this risk is 1 in 4,300.7 Signifi cant disparities 
exist within countries as well. In Afghanistan, 
the overall maternal mortality rate of 1,400 per 
100,000 live births masks large variations—the 
rate is around 400 in Kabul but over 6,500 per 
100,000 live births in some remote rural areas.8
The key to lowering maternal mortality is 
to provide prompt and adequate attention to 
expectant mothers. As chapter 3 noted, that is 
easier said than done because of the number of 
links in the chain—for mortality to come down, 
the whole system needs to work. Women need 
attention before, during, and after childbirth so 
that the risk of potentially life-threatening con-
ditions can be mitigated or addressed in a func-
tioning hospital if necessary. Better institutions 
are critical because they mean that pregnant 
women and their families do not need to make a 
series of diffi cult decisions about what medical 
attention to seek, when, and where. Improving 
the institutions charged with providing mater-
nal health care means acting on many fronts. 
First, more resources are required to expand 
access to the chain of services—especially to 
front-line service providers—that can reduce 
maternal mortality. Recognizing that need, the 
global community in 2009 committed an ad-
ditional $5.3 billion to improve health care for 
We need a clinic nearby and it should be open 
every day.
Rural woman, South Africa
“ ”
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Fourth, improving these institutions requires 
political will, because maternal health services 
are often low on the political agenda (in contrast 
to, say, education). Honduras and Turkey show 
what is possible. Honduras’ maternal mortal-
ity rate in 1990 was stubbornly high—182 per 
100,000 live births—despite two decades of do-
nor-supported reforms to reduce it. When the 
public was made aware of this high mortality 
rate, the government (and the health minister) 
made its reduction a national priority. A new 
program emphasized health system reforms, 
trained traditional and formal health workers, 
established maternity facilities for high-risk 
mothers, and formed private-public partner-
ships. Donors fi nanced the training and health 
infrastructure. By 1997, the maternal mortality 
rate had fallen to 108.17
Similarly, Turkey’s maternal mortality rate 
in 2000 was 70 per 100,000 live births. A new 
government capitalized on the political support 
that brought it to power and, in 2003, started a 
Health Transformation Program, emphasizing 
institutional reform, client responsiveness, and 
a focus on underserved areas. The budget for 
primary health care and prevention in under-
served areas rose by 58 percent, air ambulances 
were put in service for remote populations, and 
the health workforce was redistributed for better 
coverage in poor areas. Conditional cash trans-
fers encouraged attendance at prebirth hostels 
for pregnant mothers and deliveries in public 
hospitals. By 2009, the maternal mortality rate 
was down to 19.8.18
Fifth, efforts to reduce maternal mortality 
must work across sectors, going beyond a focus 
on only improving health systems and services. 
The successes of Malaysia and Sri Lanka in ad-
dressing maternal mortality relatively early in 
their development support this point (box 7.2). 
Investments in infrastructure (such as rural 
roads), attention to women’s education, efforts 
to increase training of maternal health provid-
ers, and investments in hospitals all combined 
to reduce maternal mortality dramatically and 
consistently.19
Reaching the excluded—Providing 
education to severely disadvantaged 
populations
The institutions that deliver educational services 
matter for gender equality as well. As chapter 3 
showed, the greater access to education accom-
provide maternal health services showed greater 
improvements in antenatal care and facility-
based deliveries than those with services pro-
vided directly by the government.12
Second, maternal health service providers 
have to be more responsive to expectant moth-
ers. One way is by making service providers 
more accountable to them. For accountability 
to work, users need not only information on 
service standards, service quality, and policies 
to improve them but also some way to act on 
that information. In Uganda, community-based 
monitoring improved both the quality and the 
quantity of primary health care services.13 Com-
munities became more involved in monitoring 
service providers, who then provided more ma-
ternal health services of higher quality. Waiting 
times fell, more professional care was given, and 
facility-based deliveries increased. 
For maternal health services, ensuring that 
the long route of accountability works better is 
even more important: citizens need to be able to 
hold their political representatives to account for 
failures in service delivery, and the politicians, in 
turn, need to exercise more effective control over 
the service providers. Take Peru, where improv-
ing maternal health required not only the exten-
sion of coverage but also the right incentives for 
service providers and a citizens’ voice demand-
ing effective services loud enough to be heard by 
policy makers.14 Professional attention at deliv-
eries rose from 58 percent of births in 2000 to 71 
percent in 2004. A new health insurance program 
for the poor made direct payments to front-line 
providers for services actually provided rather 
than allot additional budgetary resources to the 
health ministry to distribute. And greater par-
ticipation of citizens in infl uencing policy design 
increased the responsiveness to client needs. 
Third, the fi nancial constraints that poor 
women face in accessing maternal health services 
need special attention. One way is to provide 
poor women with cash transfers conditional on 
their seeking health-care services known to re-
duce maternal mortality. An example is India’s 
Janani Suraksha Yojana program, which in-
creased the proportion of women delivering in 
the presence of a skilled attendant by around 36 
percent.15 Schemes that provided vouchers for 
antenatal and postnatal care and institutional 
deliveries, like those in Bangladesh and Cam-
bodia, also increased the proportion of assisted 
deliveries and antenatal and postnatal visits.16 
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for those of lower status. Designing solutions 
crafted to the specifi cs of each problem can be 
demanding and complex. 
Where adequate schools exist, simpler mea-
sures work to increase demand by providing 
parents cash transfers conditioned on sending 
their daughters to school. While these transfers 
may not be targeted precisely at the underlying 
issues, programs in Pakistan and Turkey show 
that they can be effective, as discussed in chap-
ter 3. And they are easier to design in the short 
term. The Pakistan program also shows how 
such cash transfers can work to reduce disad-
vantages other than income poverty that com-
pound gender inequality: they reduced educa-
tional attainment gaps for girls with mobility 
constraints. How groups are targeted is criti-
cal to the effi ciency of programs in closing the 
gaps, and using different targeting mechanisms 
within a country, such as household poverty 
panying economic growth and better service 
delivery has gone a long way to reducing dif-
ferences between boys and girls in enrollments 
at all levels. And while poor learning outcomes 
persist in many countries and will require im-
provements in how educational systems are 
managed, there are few gender gaps in them. But 
many groups in many low- and middle-income 
countries still remain underserved by education. 
Because these disadvantaged populations show 
the largest and most persistent gender gaps in 
enrollments, reaching them is a clear priority for 
educational policy. 
These severely disadvantaged populations 
can be sizable, sometimes making up entire sub-
regions or populous parts of countries (as with 
a broad swath of West Africa and rural Afghani-
stan) or communities within countries (as with 
the Roma in Eastern Europe). What marks them 
all is some combination of extreme poverty, 
remoteness, and social exclusion on the basis 
of ethnicity, race, or some other characteristic. 
And because gender gaps in educational access 
among these groups persist and worsen over 
time, failure to address them will lead to their 
perpetuation over time with poor and excluded 
girls and women consigned to “gender inequal-
ity traps.” 
Needed are solutions to address the specifi c 
disadvantages that compound gender inequality. 
At one extreme would be local supply-side solu-
tions that go to the source of the compounding 
disadvantage in specifi c contexts. For instance, 
where distance is the key problem, especially for 
girls to get to school (as in rural Afghanistan), 
building more schools in remote areas can reduce 
gender gaps.20 Or if ethnicity is the key problem, 
recruiting teachers who speak the local language 
could be cost-effective. In other instances, there 
will need to be attention to specifi c factors such 
as sexual abuse directed toward girls in schools. 
Such customized supply-side measures have 
the advantage of directly targeting the underly-
ing problem, but designing them is likely to be 
costly and time-consuming. Recent work from 
Pakistan tells a complicated story—for high-
status girls, having to cross settlement boundar-
ies is a constraint on enrollment. But for girls 
from lower social groups, the main barrier is 
attending school with children from higher 
groups.21 So distance is the constraint that needs 
to be addressed by policy for the higher-status 
girls, while exclusion needs to be addressed 
Improving the delivery of maternal care is hard, but it can be done—even at 
relatively low income levels, as the experience of Sri Lanka and Malaysia show. 
From more than 2,000 deaths (per 100,000 births) in the 1930s, the maternal 
mortality ratio in Sri Lanka fell to about 1,000 by 1947, and then halved to less 
than 500 in the next three years. By 1996, it had fallen to 24. In Malaysia, it 
halved from 534 over the seven years from 1950 to 1957. Then, with a halving 
every decade or so, it came down to 19 by 1997.
To overcome the range of institutional obstacles that hamper the eff ective 
workings of health systems, Sri Lanka and Malaysia adopted integrated and 
phased approaches. And they did so with modest total public expenditures on 
health—1.8 percent on average—or less than 4 percent of GDP  since the 
1950s. Health programs in both countries exploited synergistic interactions of 
health care with basic education, water and sanitation, malaria control, and 
integrated rural development—including building rural roads, which helped 
deal with obstetric emergencies. Financial, geographic, and cultural barriers 
to maternal care were addressed by making a front line of competent, pro-
fessional midwives widely available in rural areas, providing them with a reli-
able supply of drugs and equipment, linking them to backup services, and 
improving communication and transportation. Simultaneously, facilities were 
strengthened to provide obstetric care and deal with complications. Better 
organizational management improved the supervision and accountability of 
providers. Area-specifi c mortality data were provided through monitoring 
systems so that empowered communities could hold political leaders account-
able, and national and subnational actors were forced to recognize the unac-
ceptability of every maternal death. Finally, both countries were strongly com-
mitted to improving the status of women—women gained voting rights 
before or soon after national independence, and female education received 
special attention. 
BOX 7.2   Reducing maternal mortality: What Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka have done
Source: Pathmanathan and others 2003.
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POLICIES TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES
As chapter 5 showed, persistent gender gaps in 
earnings and productivity result from the fun-
damentally different experiences of women and 
men in accessing economic opportunities—
whether in wage employment, agriculture, or 
entrepreneurship.
The different patterns of economic activity 
for women and men emerge from the ways mar-
kets and formal and informal institutions work 
and how households respond. So, policies need 
to target the underlying determinants of access 
to economic opportunity. Chapter 5 highlighted 
time constraints, access to inputs, and market 
and institutional failures as priorities for inter-
vention. And because more than one factor may 
be at play, a package of interventions is typically 
needed (colored in green in fi gure 7.2). 
This section looks at determinants of gender 
gaps in wage employment, agriculture, and en-
trepreneurship to illustrate the range of policy 
 indicators or community-based mechanisms, 
may help. Similar principles also apply to the 
design of safety nets to address gender differen-
tiated impacts of shocks (box 7.3).
F I G U R E  7.2  Improving economic opportunities
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Shocks have gender-diff erentiated impacts. Whether they hurt men or women 
or girls or boys more depends on the nature of the shocks and, at the same 
time, the underlying structure of the local economy, as we saw in chapters 2, 3, 
and 5. The policy response to these shocks thus has been to draw on solid diag-
nostics that identify the relevant gender dimensions and then to design eff ec-
tive safety net measures that target those gender diff erences. Interventions 
can take many forms, including cash transfers, food stamps, temporary subsi-
dies for basic needs (food, basic utilities, health, and education), and temporary 
employment (possibly combined with the active labor market programs dis-
cussed below). Moreover, given that shocks can have long-lasting and irrevers-
ible eff ects on the very young (0–3 years), particularly in low-income countries, 
interventions should be targeted at this group, including, for example, feeding 
programs and cash transfers to parents. 
BOX 7.3  Protecting men and women and boys and girls from 
income shocks
Source: WDR 2012 team.
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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bia, the Hogares Comunitarios program, which 
provides subsidies to designated homes turned 
into community child-care centers, signifi -
cantly increased mothers’ participation in the 
labor market as well as their hours worked.23 
In Argentina, the expansion of universal pub-
lic school facilities increased both labor force 
participation and hours worked, although the 
magnitudes differed across studies.24 In low-
income neighborhoods in urban Brazil, access 
to publicly provided child care signifi cantly 
increased the maternal employment rate but 
did not affect the number of working hours for 
those already employed before the program’s 
introduction.25 In other settings, the effects of 
increased access to or reductions in price of 
child care on female employment rates were 
minimal. In Norway, subsidized and universally 
accessible child care had only negligible effects 
on child care use and female participation.26 In 
Chile, the expansion of public day care centers 
had no impact on female labor force participa-
tion.27 And in the United States, the responsive-
ness of maternal employment to the availabil-
ity of free public day care varied across groups 
with, for instance, no impact for married moth-
ers of fi ve-year-olds with no younger children 
but large impacts for single mothers of fi ve-
year-olds with no younger children.28
This diversity of experiences highlights the 
need for policy design to identify those groups 
of women who face barriers to labor market 
participation because they lack child care and 
to understand better the nature of these con-
straints.29 Mothers who choose not to partici-
pate in the labor market do so for diverse rea-
sons, and their labor responses to preschool 
programs will vary accordingly. The availability 
and affordability of alternative child-care op-
tions also matter. If, for example, fairly cheap al-
ternatives already exist, subsidies to new child-
care programs may crowd them out, and labor 
supply will be unaffected. That was the case in 
Norway, where the program mostly crowded 
out informal arrangements, thus imposing sig-
nifi cant costs while failing to bring meaning-
options and what is known about their effi -
cacy from the experience of different countries 
across income levels. Following our framework, 
the discussion of policies works successively 
through constraints that come from informal 
institutions, the workings of markets, and for-
mal institutions. 
Informal institutions: Lifting the 
constraints on women’s time 
Constraints on women’s time are a major cause 
of their lower earnings and productivity (chap-
ter 5). These constraints come mainly from in-
formal institutions—norms and beliefs about 
who does housework and provides care within 
the home. Policies to address these constraints 
primarily work around these norms rather than 
try to change them. There are four main ap-
proaches: providing increased access to child 
care, improving parental leave policies, freeing 
up women’s time through infrastructure invest-
ments, and easing women’s access to markets 
through technology and transport. 
Increasing access to child care
Women spend more time on child care than 
men—ranging from twice as much in Sweden 
to 4.6 times more in Ghana to 6 times as much 
in Pakistan.22 This greater demand on women’s 
time constrains their economic opportunities—
both because of the sheer quantity of time they 
have to devote to this activity and because it 
restricts the continuity of their participation in 
market work. Child care provides a way to relax 
this constraint on women’s time. This service 
can either be provided directly by the state (in-
cluding local governments) or by the private sec-
tor or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
possibly with public subsidies and regulation. 
Evidence on the effects of these various 
forms of child-care policies comes mainly from 
the high-income economies of Europe and 
North America, and middle-income countries 
in Latin America. It is mixed on the impacts on 
the number of hours worked by women and on 
their labor force participation rates. In Colom-
What will stop us from getting a job is having plenty of children and having nobody 
to mind them.
Young woman, Indonesia
“ ”
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bers’ children (up to age six). This service not 
only provides education and nutrition for the 
children but also reduces the work days women 
have to miss to take care of their children––es-
pecially important because few of them are sala-
ried workers.32
Employers can also provide day care. In ru-
ral areas, employer-provided day care is likely to 
work best where a large number of employees 
are clustered in one location, as in the case of 
plantation agriculture. In Kenya, a large export 
coffee producer provides crèches and nurseries 
at each of its plantations to serve both regular 
and seasonal workers—a practice that dates 
back to the 1950s.33
An option for publicly provided day care to 
informal women workers is to either lengthen 
the school day (particularly at grades where at-
tendance is only for half of a day) or to lower 
the age at which children enter the school sys-
tem. Vietnam implemented the former, while 
the latter approach has been tried in a number 
of contexts. In Israel, the government offered 
free public preschool for children ages three and 
four. This resulted in a signifi cant increase in the 
labor supply of Arab mothers, whose children 
were previously less likely to be in any day care.34 
In Kenya, the government is expanding its early 
childhood and preschool education programs 
with the goal of providing access to all four-to-
fi ve-year-olds throughout the country.35 
Improving parental leave policies
Three main factors determine the effectiveness 
of parental leave in opening additional labor 
market options for women. First is the question 
of who pays. In countries that offer only mater-
nity leave and the costs are borne by employers, 
maternity leave reduces the incentive to hire 
more women. That implies a role for public sub-
sidies or, alternatively, a requirement that fi rms 
grant equal amounts of maternity and paternity 
leave. The second question is what proportion of 
regular wages to cover during the leave period. 
The more pay that is covered, the more leave in-
dividuals are likely to take. And because men ap-
pear to be more responsive than women to the 
coverage of earnings during leave, one way to 
encourage men’s uptake of paternity leave is to 
cover a greater proportion of earnings. Finally, 
the length of parental leave matters. If it is too 
short, women are more likely to leave the labor 
force instead of taking leave. And if it is too long, 
ful increases in overall child care or women’s 
participation in the labor force.30 The evidence 
from Brazil also suggests a similar crowding out 
of existing informal arrangements. 
Less is known about ways to address the 
child-care needs of women who work in the 
informal sector (especially important in low-
income countries) and in rural areas more 
generally. Some programs, including those run 
by NGOs, provide guidance on how child care 
could be expanded for these groups. As chapter 
9 highlights, this is an important area for further 
innovation and learning.
In India, the NGO Mobile Creches is experi-
menting with different models for providing 
child-care services for women employed in the 
rural informal sector and on public works pro-
grams. 31 Day-care facilities were set up around 
New Delhi on public construction sites in part-
nership with contractors, who provide child-
care facilities in addition to sharing other costs. 
These centers responded to the expectation that 
women would represent a large proportion of 
those taking up public work programs—for 
example, this fi gure reached 80 percent at some 
sites. The day-care programs include a nutri-
tional component by providing meals during the 
day and tracking nutritional status of children 
over time, as well as integrated health services 
(for example, immunizations, regular doctor 
visits). To provide access to child care to women 
working in the informal sector in resettlement 
colonies in Delhi, Mobile Creches also helped 
in the creation of both home-based centers and 
community-based programs by identifying and 
training local women to provide these services. 
Together with Pradan, another Indian NGO, 
Mobile Creches also built a group of centers in 
remote rural areas in the states of Jharkhand and 
Bihar following discussions with local women 
about the child-care constraints they faced in 
accessing income-generating activities (specifi -
cally, yarn production) in their communities. 
These centers follow a community-based model, 
relying on employers as well as the broader com-
munity for their management, contribution of 
food materials, and training and selection of 
teachers. 
Similar efforts have been undertaken in the 
Indian state of Gujarat by the Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA), a trade union 
for poor self-employed informal sector workers. 
SEWA has set up day-care centers for its mem-
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the time spent gathering fi rewood in Bhutan 
and increased free time in the evenings in Ban-
gladesh.40 The increase in women’s time was, 
in some cases, at least partly matched by an in-
crease in male labor devoted to domestic tasks. 
For example, in Sri Lanka men engaged more in 
household chores, including ironing, after the 
introduction of electricity.41
Improved access to water closer to house-
holds also releases demands on women’s time. A 
study from Pakistan, for example, showed that 
water sources closer to the home were associated 
with increased time allocated to market work.42 
Other evidence, however, suggests that the time 
saved is not necessarily used for market work; it 
sometimes increases leisure, thereby improving 
women’s welfare. A broad, cross-country study, 
for instance, did not fi nd an association between 
proximity of water source and increases in mar-
ket work but did fi nd a negative association with 
nonmarket work in some countries—thus indi-
cating increased time for leisure.43 Similar re-
sults emerged from a recent randomized study 
of in-home versus standpipe water provision in 
urban Morocco—the gains in time were spent 
on leisure.44 More research is required to under-
stand the effects of improved water supply for 
women’s work outside their households, partic-
ularly in remote rural areas where water sources 
are more distant. 
Bringing women closer to markets and 
markets closer to women
Given the multiple demands on women’s time, 
making it easier for them to access markets will 
also help increase their economic opportunities. 
Improving roads and transport can help achieve 
employees risk losing skills and experience. 
One solution to the latter is to allow some part-
time work during the leave period, as is done in 
Germany. 
Apart from its impact on improving wom-
en’s labor force opportunities, alternative pa-
rental leave policies will also differ in whether 
they reinforce social norms around child care 
or try to shift them. Providing maternity, but 
not paternity, leave can enhance the prospects 
for women to participate in economic activity 
opportunities, but it risks reinforcing the norm 
that women are the primary household care 
providers. Such a policy is “incremental” in that 
it takes social norms as given and works around 
them. In contrast, providing both maternity and 
paternity leave and making paternity leave man-
datory likely will be “transformative”—by giving 
men incentives to take on more care duties, it at-
tempts to change the norms around care. This 
latter approach has been tried in some Northern 
European countries. In Norway and Sweden, 
offering nontransferable paternity leave has in-
creased its uptake. Iceland’s approach has been 
to offer a package of nine months of parental 
leave (with 80 percent of wage replacement); the 
mother and father must each take three months 
and decide how to allocate the remaining three 
months. Women take most of this additional 
leave, but overall this policy has resulted in high 
paternity leave uptake among men with some 
promising changes in gender relations at home 
and in the workplace.36
Freeing up women’s time through 
infrastructure investments
Women also spend more time than men fetch-
ing water and gathering fi rewood. For example, 
in rural Guinea they spend over three and a half 
times more fetching water, while in rural Ghana, 
women spend at least three times more col-
lecting fi rewood.37 These tasks, as well as other 
household chores, represent a signifi cant de-
mand on women’s time, reducing the time they 
have available for market work or leisure.
Electrifi cation is often cited as one way to 
ease the demands on women’s time.38 In rural 
South Africa, it increased female labor partici-
pation by around 9 percent, mainly by reducing 
the time spent on domestic tasks while in Ni-
caragua, it resulted in a signifi cant increase in 
the likelihood that young rural women worked 
outside the home.39 Electrifi cation also reduced 
We know about the labor laws. About the 
protection of pregnancy. About fi ring. 
Women are better today because of such laws. 
Woman, Dominican Republic
Women are faced with discrimination in case of 
pregnancy. Private company owners always rather 
employ men because they will have no maternity 
leave.
Woman, Serbia
“
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en’s lower ownership of assets in most parts of 
the world limits their ability to offer collateral.
Second, information about jobs and the pros-
pects for advancement within professions typi-
cally exists within networks that are gendered. 
This situation can limit women’s participation 
and progress in occupations and sectors where 
they are underrepresented while encouraging 
them to concentrate further in jobs, such as 
nursing, where they are already overrepresented 
(men follow similar patterns, seeking work in 
jobs in which they are already concentrated, such 
as engineering). So, where few women work, 
their numbers will increase only once a critical 
mass is reached. Similarly, gendered networks 
also may limit the opportunities for women-
owned businesses to expand and diversify. 
Overcoming information problems in 
labor markets
Active labor market policies can address infor-
mation problems, especially with skills training 
and wage subsidies.48 Several measures of this 
sort provide training; some also place individu-
als in new jobs, usually temporarily, to allow 
participants to overcome information problems 
by communicating their abilities to employers. 
Wage subsidies work by making it cheaper for 
employers to experiment with hiring women 
workers. 
Many of these policies were put in place in re-
sponse to economic downturns rather than with 
the explicit goal of improving women’s economic 
opportunities, but they nonetheless produced 
signifi cant gains consistent with addressing the 
information problems facing women seeking to 
enter (or reenter) the labor market. 
Some of the early evidence comes from Ar-
gentina’s Proempleo program of wage subsidy 
vouchers, which had a signifi cant impact on 
employment but not income. Women benefi ted 
more than men.49 In Mexico, the PROBECAT 
program provided short-term vocational train-
ing. Female trainees with work experience were 
more likely to be employed within a year of com-
pleting the training, but the program increased 
monthly earnings only for men.50 
More credible evidence is needed on the im-
pacts of alternative active labor market policies 
in diverse low- and middle-income settings. An 
ongoing effort in Jordan systematically evaluates 
the effi cacy of wage subsidies and skills training 
in increasing the employment of women col-
this. Men and women use transport differently, 
however, with women more likely to walk, for 
instance. Mindful of this difference, a project in 
Peru prioritized the repair and improvement of 
over 3,000 kilometers of rural pedestrian tracks. 
A survey of female benefi ciaries found that 77 
percent of women were able to travel farther, 67 
percent said they traveled more safely, and 43 
percent reported that they were able to increase 
their incomes.45 In Bangladesh, the upgrading 
and expansion of rural roads led to increased la-
bor supply for both men and women and raised 
household incomes.46 
Markets can also be brought closer to women 
through the use of technology. Access to the In-
ternet and the use of mobile phones can help 
women get information about prices and con-
nect them with buyers. In India, a program run 
by an NGO, the Foundation of Occupational 
Development, organized groups of women to 
market their products directly and increase their 
profi t margins by providing them with access to 
cell phones and the Internet.47 Also in India, the 
SEWA trade facilitation center created an online 
outlet for women to sell textile and handicraft 
products to supplement efforts along the sup-
ply chain to improve quality and reduce deliv-
ery times. Of course, as highlighted in chapter 
6, gaps in women’s access to these technologies 
persist, and looking for ways to close them, as 
noted in chapter 9, should be a priority so that 
women can reap the gains from technological 
progress. 
Improving the working of markets
As discussed in chapter 5, markets can work dif-
ferently for women and men (“gender-differen-
tiated market failures”) because of information 
problems. These can work against women in 
two ways. First, prospective employers may be-
lieve that women workers are not as productive 
in some jobs or sectors precisely because so few 
women work in them. These beliefs reinforce 
their reluctance to hire women, perpetuating low 
female participation in those jobs, which may 
also be strengthened by actual discrimination by 
employers. Women farmers and entrepreneurs 
can face similar information problems in credit 
markets. Because women in most countries use 
credit less than men do, lenders have little or no 
information about women’s potential repay-
ment capacity and are unwilling to extend them 
credit even if they are creditworthy. And wom-
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U.S. experience and that in other countries also 
indicates that some of the negative impacts can 
be addressed in two ways. First, affi rmative ac-
tion policies should be temporary so that they 
do not come to be seen as entitlements. Second, 
lege graduates (box 7.4), and the early results are 
promising.
A second set of policies uses affi rmative ac-
tion programs, either voluntary or compulsory, 
to increase the entry of women into wage em-
ployment and their advancement on the job 
once they are employed. The public sector can 
take the lead in affi rmative action—both in its 
human resource practices and in its contract-
ing. As the public sector hires more women, and 
women advance in public sector institutions 
(and enterprises), the information that public 
sector managers use in hiring decisions starts 
to change. It also demonstrates to potential pri-
vate sector employers that women can succeed 
in particular sectors and jobs. The public sector 
can also use the power of the purse to demand 
affi rmative action from its contractors, by mak-
ing a certain level of female employment and 
management a condition of eligibility for a gov-
ernment contract.
A clear lesson about affi rmative action is that 
voluntary programs have limited effects, if any. 
To be effective, programs need to be mandatory, 
to track progress, and to sanction noncompli-
ance.51 Where mandatory programs have been 
implemented, as in the United States, the effect 
has clearly been to redistribute wage employ-
ment from men to women. But debate con-
tinues on the economic effi ciency impacts of 
such policies. In theory this trade-off is clear. 
Gender-based quotas in labor markets can en-
hance effi ciency by reducing discrimination and 
correcting beliefs about women’s potential as 
employees. And they can promote female em-
ployment over time by providing role models, 
overcoming negative stereotypes, and enhanc-
ing incentives for educational and other invest-
ments by women. But such measures can also 
reduce effi ciency if, in their application, less able 
women are selected and promoted. Over time, 
quotas could reduce the incentives of women 
to invest in education and training if they think 
they will be employed even with fewer qualifi ca-
tions. Finally, over time, quotas can also gener-
ate the belief that female employees are under-
qualifi ed and that they succeed only because of 
affi rmative action.
Although some evidence exists for each of 
these impacts, the most comprehensive evidence 
comes from the United States.52 Overall, it indi-
cates that affi rmative action in the labor market 
has had little or no adverse effi ciency effects. The 
Despite rising educational attainment, labor force participation rates for 
women in the Middle East and North Africa remain very low. In Jordan, only 17 
percent of women ages 20–45 work, compared with 77 percent of men. This 
gap also holds among the more educated; and with community college gradu-
ates, it starts immediately on graduation and widens thereafter.  
These low rates make it diffi  cult for new graduates seeking to enter the 
labor market. Because relatively few women hold jobs, young women lack both 
role models to follow into employment and the networks to help them fi nd 
jobs. Employers, lacking experience with working women, may be reluctant to 
hire women if they believe women are less committed to staying employed.
The Jordan New Opportunities for Women (Jordan NOW) pilot program rig-
orously evaluates the eff ectiveness of two potential policies: short-term wage 
subsidies, and employability skills training.
Short-term wage subsidies give fi rms an incentive to take a chance on hiring 
young female graduates and an opportunity to overcome stereotypes through 
directly observing young women working for them. They can also give young 
women more confi dence to search for work and to approach employers. In the 
pilot, each voucher has a value equal to the minimum wage for six months.
Employability skills training augments the technical skills graduates learn in 
community college with the practical skills for fi nding and succeeding in 
employment. Employers often say recent graduates lack interpersonal and 
other basic job skills. So, students in the pilot program received 45 hours of 
instruction in team building, communications, presentations, business writing, 
customer service, resume writing, interviewing, and positive thinking.
Demand for these kinds of policies appears to be strong. Despite low 
employment rates, the majority of recent female graduates want to work: 93 
percent say they plan to work  and 91 percent say they would like to work out-
side the house after they are married. Of those invited to attend the training 
courses, 62 percent completed them, with unmarried women more likely to 
attend. Those who began the courses gave them positive reviews, claiming the 
courses had given them much more confi dence to begin searching for jobs. 
Four months into the wage subsidy program, about a third of those using 
vouchers had found a job.
Early results from a midline evaluation suggest that job vouchers have sig-
nifi cant employment eff ects: employment rates among graduates who 
received vouchers alone or vouchers plus training are between 55 to 57 per-
cent compared with 17 to 19 percent among those who received training alone 
or received neither training nor vouchers. In all groups, employment eff ects are 
higher for unmarried women. Financial empowerment (measured as the pro-
portion of women who have their own money and can decide how to use it) 
also increased signifi cantly for all who received either vouchers or training or 
both. Follow-up surveys will determine whether these employment eff ects of 
job vouchers are sustained in the longer term and also will focus on other mea-
sures of empowerment and changes in attitudes. It will also allow further inves-
tigation of the link between marriage and work, given the early fi ndings that 
married women are less likely to attend the training, less likely to use the vouch-
ers, and less likely to be employed.
BOX 7.4  Catalyzing female employment in Jordan 
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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The next stage in policy evolution is helping 
borrowers to exit (or even skip) microfi nance 
and go to larger formal sources of credit. The In-
ternational Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Women 
in Business programs shows how this step might 
be done. Recognizing that women are less likely 
to have credit records than men, and lower as-
set bases to draw on for collateral, the IFC works 
with large commercial banks in Africa to extend 
credit to female-owned businesses. Interven-
tions include developing new products such 
as loans that are collateralized with equipment 
or based on cash fl ow—as well as training and 
strategic assistance for the staff of fi nancial insti-
tutions to help banks increase their numbers of 
woman clients. Initial experience shows an in-
crease in women entrepreneurs using fi nancial 
services and taking out larger loans, with better-
than-average repayment (box 7.5).
Where gendered networks hinder women 
business owners and farmers, a broader set of 
policies is needed. For business owners, both 
fi nance and training for business development 
are critical. One example of the value of training 
comes from Peru, where credit was coupled with 
business training on overall business strategy 
and managing the fi rm. The women trained were 
more likely to separate business and household 
accounts, increasing revenues with less variabil-
ity over time.53 Other studies show more limited 
effects of training, but in at least one context the 
combination of fi nance and enterprise training 
had a larger effect than each alone.54 In agricul-
ture, the analogous policy would include exten-
sion services in addition to support in accessing 
product markets, inputs, and fi nance. 
Making formal institutions more 
evenhanded
Formal institutions—laws, regulations, service 
delivery institutions, and the like—can work in 
ways that hinder women’s access to economic 
opportunities. Consider two sets of policy mea-
sures to address these obstacles: correcting dis-
criminatory laws and regulations, and redressing 
gender biases in the delivery of services––where 
either of these affects women as employees, en-
trepreneurs, or farmers.
Correcting discriminatory laws
The main biases in laws blocking economic op-
portunities for women come from labor regula-
employers need to be encouraged to improve 
their recruitment and screening processes in 
tandem with the use of the quotas as well as to 
invest in on-the-job training. 
Where these labor market policies focus on 
specifi c sectors or occupations, they can ad-
dress the information problems that arise from 
gendered networks. These measures could in-
clude providing information about the wages 
and qualifi cations for a given job or occupation 
or for advancement within a profession and 
engaging experienced female or male workers 
as mentors for younger workers of the same 
(underrepresented) sex. 
Dealing with information problems for 
farmers and entrepreneurs
Microcredit schemes, in a variety of forms, are 
the most common way of addressing informa-
tion problems for farmers and entrepreneurs. 
The programs originated with group lending, 
such as Grameen Bank and others in its wake, 
where individuals (who typically lack collateral) 
band together to obtain a loan. The loans go to 
individuals, but the liability for repayment falls 
on the entire group. The size of the group can 
differ (Grameen typically has groups of 5 bor-
rowers in Bangladesh, while FINCA (Founda-
tion for International Community Assistance) 
in Peru has groups of 10 to 50). The common 
characteristic is the joint liability of group 
members coupled with regular group meetings, 
which allow lenders to overcome the informa-
tion problem. 
Microcredit schemes have since evolved be-
yond group lending, fi nding new ways to deal 
with information problems. Banco Sol in Bolivia 
and Bank Rakyat Indonesia offer larger indi-
vidual loans to established (typically better-off) 
clients who begin within group lending. Such 
individual lending relies not on peer monitoring 
and social sanctions (as group lending does) but 
on incentives for repayment that threaten to ex-
clude borrowers who default from future loans.
Life will be very diff erent if there is marketing 
assistance and credit for the products women can 
make at home.
Urban woman, India
“
”
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ing the ban on part-time contracts in the formal 
sector led to a signifi cant shift of women with 
children from part-time work in the informal 
sector to part-time contracts in the formal sec-
tor.55 So, the higher informality of female em-
ployment was a consequence not of discrimina-
tion in the formal labor market but of the ban 
on part-time contracts in the formal sector. 
Rather than restrict part-time work, some 
countries have legislated greater fl exibility in 
work arrangements. Sweden guarantees parents 
of children under age eight the right to work 
reduced hours in the same job with the same 
pay, increasing women’s labor force partici-
pation.56 It also reduces the risk of reinforcing 
tions and legislation and from laws that confer 
property rights, especially over land.
Labor Laws
Beyond the fundamental step of legislating non-
discrimination on the basis of gender in em-
ployment practices, the policy priority in many 
countries should be to revisit the limits (includ-
ing outright bans) on part-time work. Such re-
strictions discriminate against women workers 
who cannot consider full-time work because 
they bear a disproportionate share of household 
and care work. Relaxing these prohibitions 
would give women more opportunities for paid 
employment. In Argentina, for example, remov-
B OX  7.5   Innovative approaches to expanding access to fi nance for women and entrepreneurs
Source: International Finance Corporation.
Financial institutions are recognizing that women, who account for 
half of all entrepreneurs, represent a large and underserved market 
opportunity. Three examples here show how innovative thinking 
and fl exible business models can help overcome existing barriers to 
women’s access to credit and help fi nancial institutions develop a 
larger female clientele. All three examples emphasize training, 
fi nancial literacy, and new products and processes that directly 
address women’s needs.
Leveraging the power of training and fi nancial innovation to 
promote access to the formal fi nancial sector—Access Bank’s 
and DFCU’s Women in Business programs. 
Access Bank in Nigeria and Development Finance Company of 
Uganda (DFCU) are among the largest banks in their countries. In 
2006–07, both banks were looking at ways to improve their market 
share by expanding to attractive and growing market segments. 
Nigeria and Uganda have very dynamic and growing women-
owned small and medium enterprises, and both banks were eager 
to capture this market but had no previous experience in how to 
do it. 
Access Bank and DFCU partnered with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) to design and launch Women in Business pro-
grams in the two countries. IFC provided an initial credit line for 
lending to women entrepreneurs and advisory services for imple-
mentation. The programs enabled Access Bank and DFCU staff  to 
off er better business advice to women entrepreneurs. The banks 
also trained women clients on business skills. And they boosted 
their confi dence to approach the bank for credit services. 
In Nigeria, Access Bank staff  designed alternative collateral sys-
tems, including the pledging of jewelry and equipment and cash-
fl ow-based lending using assets, debentures, or bills of sales. 
In Uganda, DFCU also developed new products better aligned 
with the needs of women entrepreneurs, such as the Savings and 
Credit Cooperative Societies Loan. It targets registered associations 
and groups whose members have overcome the start-up phase of 
business but lack the conventional securities needed to secure 
 individual business loans and prefer to borrow through a group 
approach. 
During 2006–09, Access Bank disbursed $35.5 million and 
DFCU $16.1 million in loans to women entrepreneurs, while main-
taining a nonperforming loan ratio of less than 1.5 percent. Both 
banks’ portfolios also increased signifi cantly (Access Bank opened 
more than 1,300 new deposit accounts and 1,700 checking accounts, 
and DFCU created more than 1,800 new deposit accounts). Access 
Bank trained 650 women in business and management skills and 
DFCU 368. 
Access Bank replicated its model in The Gambia and Rwanda in 
2011, and other commercial banks in Nigeria and Uganda adopted a 
similar model. The Access Bank, the fi rst West African bank to be 
admitted to the Global Banking Alliance for Women, received the 
African Banker’s 2007 Most Innovative Bank award and the Alli-
ance’s 2008 Most Innovative Bank of the Year award. DFCU followed 
suit, winning the Alliance’s 2009 award.
Using leasing to overcome existing barriers to access and 
promote graduation into the formal fi nancial sector—
Sero Lease and Finance in Tanzania. 
Customary law largely excludes women from owning land in Tanza-
nia (and many other countries). With a predominantly collateral-
based banking system, women are eff ectively excluded from loans. 
Sero Lease and Finance Ltd. (Selfi na), a women’s leasing and fi nance 
company, went into microleasing in 1997 to enable women to 
acquire equipment for immediate use with a down payment and a 
fi nancial lease. Targeting 3,000 small and medium enterprises, it has 
a zero default rate and a 99 percent pay-back rate, with average 
loan sizes of $500. 
The IFC brokered a $1 million loan from Tanzania’s Exim Bank to 
Selfi na and supported fi nancial literacy and business planning and 
management training for female clients. As of October 2007, 150 
Selfi na clients had opened savings accounts. 
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countries come from the way government land 
distribution and registration schemes and agri-
cultural extension agencies work. These biases 
can be addressed in a variety of ways. 
First, service providers could be required to 
target women explicitly and additionally. The 
Agricultural Technology Management Agency 
in India targeted women in Orissa to set up self-
help groups in conjunction with community 
organizations to provide agricultural extension. 
These groups led women to diversify their ag-
ricultural income sources.62 The principle of 
focusing on women also applies when the state 
is (re)distributing resources such as land. Redis-
tribution programs that target the head of the 
household will not serve women well, because 
most heads of household are men (see chapter 
4). Instead, the government could issue joint 
titles to land distributed by the state, either at 
the time of distribution (as is the law in Bo-
livia, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay), or later 
when property rights are registered and titles is-
sued (as has been the experience in Bolivia, for 
example).63 Alternatively, such programs could 
give men and women, individually, equal shares 
of the distributed land. The law alone might not 
be enough, however, and governments may have 
to actively engage to ensure that women receive 
their land, as was the case in South Africa where 
47 percent of the benefi ciaries under one phase 
of land redistribution were women.64 To in-
crease women’s access to land markets—where 
they are underrepresented—a number of NGOs 
have been organizing groups of women to lease 
or purchase tracts of land. Such is the case for 
BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Com-
mittee) in Bangladesh and the Deccan Develop-
ment Society in India.65 
Second, the power of women can be en-
hanced within the service delivery organization, 
including in setting priorities. For agricultural 
extension, women could be put in decision-
making positions at the Ministry of Agriculture. 
In Ethiopia, local land committees were required 
to have at least one female member, resulting in 
their participation in land registration.66 
Third, technology can be used to expand the 
reach of services to women. An example is the 
Kenya Farmer Helpline, which was introduced 
in 2009 by Kencall, Kenya’s largest call center, to 
provide free advice to small-scale farmers. Call 
center operators provide expert advice in vari-
ous local languages on a range of agricultural 
practices such as controlling pests, raising live-
occupational segregation. High levels of part-
time work by women in developed countries 
points to the demand for such arrangements. 
Property Laws
Laws that determine property rights and con-
trol over resources within marriage—including 
many aspects of family law (governing mar -
riage, divorce, and inheritance) as well as land 
laws—are particularly important for women en-
trepreneurs and farmers. Reforms in family law 
in many developing countries aim at eliminating 
differences in how they treat women and men. 
In the past 15 years, Lesotho, Namibia, and South 
Africa abolished provisions that recognized the 
husband as head of household in civil marriages, 
enhancing the wife’s ability to enter contracts, 
register property in her name, and administer 
the joint property.57 Ethiopia reformed its family 
law in 2000—raising the minimum age of mar-
riage for girls, eliminating a spouse’s ability to 
deny permission for the other spouse to work 
outside the home,58 and requiring both spouses 
to agree when administering marital property. 
The impacts of such reforms can be signifi -
cant. The fi rst phase of Ethiopia’s family law re-
form shifted women’s economic activities toward 
occupations that involve higher skills, full-time 
work, and work outside the home.59 Changes in 
inheritance laws that gave equal rights to daugh-
ters in some South Indian states increased the 
likelihood that women inherited land.60
Providing for joint ownership of land in 
marriage increases women’s ability to use land 
in accessing economic opportunities. But since 
it may be costly for women to get their share of 
the land in the case of divorce, even with joint 
ownership under marriage, a better way to en-
sure women’s land rights is mandatory joint land 
titling (which would have the added benefi t of 
protecting a wife’s rights in the event of her hus-
band’s death). In two regions in Ethiopia where 
land certifi cation involved the issuance of joint 
titles to both spouses, women’s names appeared 
on more than 80 percent of all titles, four times 
the 20 percent in the region where the certifi cate 
was issued only in the name of the household 
head.61 (The discussion of agency, below, looks 
at how changes in property rights can also in-
crease women’s voice within households.)
Addressing biased service delivery
The main service delivery biases against wom-
en’s access to economic opportunity in many 
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networks in politics and other professional set-
tings also limit women’s leadership prospects. 
And, as is the case for economic opportunities, 
norms around care and housework limit the 
time available to women to invest in seeking 
these positions. 
The muted voice of women within their 
households refl ects the combined infl uence 
of their access to economic opportunities, the 
nature of social norms, the legal framework, 
and the enforcement of laws. For control over 
household resources, key determinants are ac-
cess to economic opportunities and the legal 
framework—particularly rights over property 
within the household as refl ected in family, 
land, and inheritance laws. For domestic vio-
lence, social norms and the content and en-
forcement of laws play important roles. And 
for fertility, norms and bargaining power plus 
service delivery are critical factors. 
These limits on the societal and domes-
tic voice of women, therefore, refl ect the ways 
in which formal and informal institutions are 
structured and how they interact with each 
other. So, policies need to target these determi-
nants. As with economic activities, a combina-
tion of interventions may be needed in any spe-
cifi c context (colored in green in fi gure 7.3). 
In the following, we look at how policies that 
directly address several of these constraints can 
increase women’s voice in society and in the 
household. These policies supplement some 
of those discussed earlier in this chapter in two 
respects. First, policies that improve female edu-
cation can be important in exercising agency—
ranging from literacy, which helps people un-
derstand their rights, to higher education, which 
increases their ability to participate in political 
life. Second, policies that expand women’s eco-
nomic opportunities, including by addressing the 
impacts of norms around care and housework, 
can also foster agency, particularly by increasing 
women’s control over household resources.
Increasing women’s societal voice
Policies aimed at increasing women’s participa-
tion in societal institutions can do so by address-
ing the information problems or the underlying 
beliefs that women make worse leaders than 
men. Forcing a departure from norms and im-
proving information (to voters and sharehold-
ers, for instance) are likely to be the most feasible 
options. In practice, imposing quotas in politics 
and on corporate boards has proved helpful.
stock and poultry, harvesting and marketing of 
products, connecting to local markets, and rais-
ing capital. The project follows a demand-driven 
model, in which call content and caller profi les 
are stored and the database then used to ensure 
operators develop expertise on the most fre-
quent or pressing issues encountered. Although 
the impact on yields has not yet been evaluated, 
nearly half of the 30,000 Kenyan farmers reached 
by the program are women—a much higher 
fraction than those reached through standard 
agricultural extension services. 
Fourth, improved monitoring can inform 
policy. Numbers can help tell the story: for in-
stance, the number of female clients served by 
agricultural extension agents as a percent of 
overall female farmers.
Finally, female users of the service can be 
given information about the level of service they 
are due. This step can be aided by building the 
collective element of demand—for example, 
supporting women’s farmer organizations or 
women’s business organizations.
Because solid evidence on the effectiveness 
of each of these and the best way to implement 
them is patchy, further work is needed to de-
velop a wider repertoire of programs proven to 
work in a variety of contexts. 67
POLICIES TO IMPROVE WOMEN’S 
AGENCY
Chapter 4 showed that women’s agency remains 
constrained both in society and in the household 
even as countries get richer. And the most signif-
icant shortfalls relate to women’s voice. Women 
are underrepresented in decision-making bod-
ies both in politics and in social and economic 
spheres such as the judiciary, the corporate 
world, and trade unions. And women’s voice in 
the household remains limited in many settings 
and is evident particularly in their lack of control 
over household resources and family formation 
and in the high incidence of domestic violence. 
At the societal level, constraints on women’s 
voice stem from a combination of factors. So-
cial norms that associate leadership with being 
a masculine activity may contribute to widely 
held beliefs that women are unable to lead ef-
fectively or that they should not lead at all. Lack 
of information about women’s abilities as lead-
ers and the absence of women leaders may bias 
beliefs about their performance. The gendered 
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have candidate quotas (largely in Latin America 
and in part of Africa), and 20 percent have re-
served seats (mostly in South Asia and part of 
Africa).68 
The form that is best for a country depends 
on the political system. For example, reserving 
individual seats for women is not feasible in 
proportional representation systems, and vol-
untary party quotas may work when parties 
have strong leadership and internal discipline. 
Moreover, the detailed design of quotas and 
their enforcement is key. In Spain, where posi-
tions on the ballot are in alphabetical order for 
elections to the Senate, parties tended to choose 
women with last names that put them lower 
on the ballot and thus were less likely to win a 
seat—demonstrating the need for more careful 
design on where women’s names were to appear 
on the ballot.69 In France, some political parties 
preferred to pay fi nes rather than comply with 
quotas in national elections, highlighting the 
importance of enforcement mechanisms that 
Political representation
Quotas, the most common way of increasing 
the representation of women in formal politics, 
take different forms. Political parties can volun-
tarily commit to including a given number of 
women candidates on electoral lists (voluntary 
party quotas); a certain fraction of candidate 
positions can be reserved for women, often with 
conditions on the position of women on the 
lists themselves (candidate quotas); or a share 
of legislative slots can be reserved for women, 
for which only female candidates can compete 
(reserved seats). Among countries with gender 
quotas, 61 percent have voluntary party quotas 
(predominantly in Western Europe), 38 percent 
F I G U R E  7.3  Improving women’s agency 
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representation. However, in Pakistan, quotas 
that violated strong social norms have led to 
increased discrimination or even persecution of 
women.72
In many places, these political reservations 
also have had broader positive effects. Where 
seats were reserved for women, female citizens 
were more likely to participate in village meet-
ings and to receive a constructive response from 
those in power.73 When women were elected to 
head local governments, their public invest-
ment decisions were more in line with female 
preferences.74 And other dimensions of wom-
en’s agency saw improvements as well. For ex-
ample, areas with reserved seats for women saw 
a substantial increase in the number of reports 
of crimes against women, with a concomitant 
increase in arrests.75 Quotas and other similar 
mechanisms can also be effective in enhancing 
women’s voices in peace and postconfl ict re-
construction processes with attendant benefi ts 
(box 7.6).
More generally, sustained change will happen 
only when female representation increases at all 
levels—through quotas and otherwise. And a 
critical ingredient in sustaining this representa-
tion includes providing capacity building and 
mentoring for female party members, emerging 
candidates, and newly elected women, as well as 
building networks among female politicians—
both within and across countries. 
Chapter 4 also highlighted that women have 
been more successful in achieving greater repre-
sentation in less organized institutions such as 
women’s producer organizations and informal 
labor unions. Policies to promote greater free-
dom of association and facilitate participation 
of such groups in decision making can spur this 
form of voice (as discussed more in chapter 8). 
Increasing women’s participation at other lev-
els of government, including in administrative 
agencies in charge of implementing laws or in 
the judiciary, is also critical, as discussed else-
where in this chapter. One example of this type 
of policy comes from Colombia, which requires 
that 30 percent of all political appointees be fe-
male, including in the cabinet. 
Economic representation
In the private sector, some governments have 
imposed corporate board quotas.76 Similar to 
political quotas, the corporate quotas are de-
signed to increase female representation, which 
provide strong sanctions for noncompliance—
both through signifi cant fi nancial sanctions and 
through mechanisms to reject lists that do not 
comply with the quotas, as in the case of Costa 
Rica or municipal elections in France. 
In addition, the broader picture has to be 
kept in mind when designing quotas for politi-
cal representation. Mandatory quotas circum-
scribe part of the democratic process, and this 
interference has to be balanced against the need 
to redress a persistent inequality. One option, 
used for local governments in India, is to imple-
ment quotas on a rolling basis—with a different 
set of seats chosen for reservation in different 
elections over time. And as with all affi rmative 
action policies, it can help to specify a clear goal 
or time period up front. A fi nal consideration 
is to think carefully about the structure of the 
reservation. Designating particular seats for 
women (perhaps even without assignment to a 
particular constituency) runs the risk of creat-
ing “token” women’s seats, which will be signifi -
cantly less effective. 
Quotas can increase women’s representation 
signifi cantly. Following the imposition of can-
didate quotas, the representation of women in 
parliament jumped from 16 to 22.6 percent in 
Mexico and from 6.7 to 17.5 percent in Macedo-
nia. With the implementation of reserved seats, 
the proportion of women in parliament jumped 
from 0.6 to 10.8 percent in Morocco and from 
1.3 percent to 5.5 percent in Jordan. 
Quotas can have effects in other dimensions 
as well, but because countries pursuing other 
policies to increase gender equality are probably 
more likely to also put in place quotas for wom-
en’s political participation, assessing the impact 
of the quotas alone can be diffi cult.  Local gov-
ernment in India is an exception because reser-
vations were assigned randomly—with several 
clearly measurable effects on women’s voice 
in politics. First, given that this quota required 
women to hold the offi ce, more women were 
elected. Second, after the reservations were re-
moved as a result of rotations, women were still 
elected in higher percentages than they were in 
communities with no reservation.70 And men 
favorably changed their opinion of the poten-
tial of females as leaders.71 So, an initial push of 
forced female representation caused voters, par-
ticularly men, to update their information, over-
coming the information problem that  appears 
to be one of the root causes of female under-
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positive association between the share of female 
board members and women’s presence among 
top executives and top earners.79
Increasing the share of female board mem-
bers could also improve fi rms’ performance. 
Greater gender diversity on boards is associ-
ated with better indicators of organizational 
excellence.80 And there is a positive association 
between board diversity and fi rms’ fi nancial re-
turns.81 But none of these studies employs meth-
ods that can accurately identify the impact of 
board diversity on fi rm outcomes. Moreover, the 
two studies that present the most rigorous evi-
dence fi nd the opposite result: corporate board 
quotas led to poorer fi nancial performance in 
the short run in Norway.82 Nevertheless, one of 
the Norwegian studies also fi nds that these losses 
resulted from the younger age and lack of high-
level experience of new board members rather 
than from their gender.83 Taken together, these 
results suggest that further work is needed to 
fully understand the links between greater rep-
resentation of women on corporate boards and 
fi rms’ performance. 
Enhancing women’s voice within 
households
The muted voice of women within their house-
holds refl ects the combined infl uence of their 
access to economic opportunities, the nature of 
social norms, the legal framework, and the en-
forcement of laws. Some of the policies aimed 
at increasing women’s economic opportunities 
have been discussed earlier, and this section fo-
cuses more on the laws that affect households 
(including their enforcement) as well as on the 
societal norms that impinge on households. 
Of the two, the laws and their enforcement are 
more directly amenable to public action, and 
that is the main focus here. Although such legis-
lative change will not by itself shift social norms, 
experience shows that removing or amending 
discriminatory laws is an essential part of that 
process over time. And changes in law have to 
be accompanied by other interventions to make 
them effective.
Reconciling multiple legal systems
Before discussing specifi c laws, it is impor-
tant that the overall system function well even 
where, as in many countries, multiple legal sys-
tems exist. Customary law and religious law are 
sometimes part of the formal state-sanctioned 
in turn can change perceptions of women’s per-
formance as leaders and shift attitudes and so-
cial norms by breaking down gender stereotypes 
of women in positions of power.
In Norway, the only country where legislated 
corporate quotas are now fully effective, female 
representation on boards has increased.77 Some 
studies from the United States provide sugges-
tive analysis that this type of increase translates 
into a greater proportion of women in other 
high-level positions within companies. In one 
study, a greater share of female board mem-
bers in the previous year was associated with 
an increase in the share of women in other top 
positions in the following year, suggesting that 
the impact runs from boards to managers and 
not the reverse.78 A similar study fi nds a strong 
Women’s representation in peace and reconstruction processes is extremely 
low. A review of 24 peace processes that took place between 1992 and 2010 
reported female representation to be as low as 2.5 percent of signatories and 
7.6 percent of the negotiating parties. Another review of peace negotiation 
processes showed that only about 7 percent of government delegates were 
women. 
Although systematic evidence of the impacts of women’s participation in 
peace and reconstruction is limited, recent experience from a number of post-
confl ict situations, documented by UNIFEM (United Nations Development 
Fund for Women), points to the likely gains from giving women more voice in 
the process. In Burundi, Guatemala, Sudan (Darfur), and Uganda, when more 
women participated in the process and their inputs were channeled into deci-
sion making, gender-related issues such as support to victims of sexual vio-
lence during the confl ict, services for widows and displaced households, and 
health and education services were more likely to make it onto the policy 
agenda. In postapartheid South Africa and some Latin American countries 
(such as Guatemala and Colombia), women’s active participation shifted public 
spending toward social and economic programs. Women’s experiences (and 
typically greater vulnerability) during confl ict are also likely to shape their pri-
orities for the reconstruction agenda. Involving civil society and increasing the 
links between them and political leaders, as was done in Liberia and Rwanda in 
the postconfl ict transition and in postapartheid South Africa, helped align pol-
icy priorities with the needs and concerns of women.
While more work is needed to look at the effi  cacy of diff erent ways of 
enhancing women’s voice in peace and postconfl ict processes, experience sug-
gests that two mechanisms may be worth considering. First, as with political 
representation, using quotas for women can help increase representation, 
especially at the outset of the process. Second, creating thematic units to deal 
with gender issues, as was done in Colombia’s National Commission for Repara-
tion and Reconciliation, can ensure that these concerns receive due attention.
BOX 7.6   Including women’s voice in peace and postconflict 
reconstruction processes
Sources: Anderlini 2007, 2010; Fisas 2008; UNIFEM 2010; World Bank 2011.
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Control over household resources
While greater economic opportunities can pro-
vide a vehicle for increasing women’s resources 
and their control over these resources, laws are 
a direct way to ensure more control. Modifying 
aspects of family law that govern marriage, di-
vorce, and provisions of land laws that are dis-
criminatory should be a priority. 
Laws over property within marriage
The main inequities in this arena are those that 
concern the rights of husbands and wives to de-
cide on the use and disposition of matrimonial 
property. Despite recent reforms, many such 
laws remain on the books of countries, particu-
larly in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East 
and North Africa. Fifteen of the 47 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, still have laws 
that give husbands greater control over marital 
assets. Laws that vest control over marital prop-
erty in the hands of the husband also remain in 
force in Chile. 
But progress is possible. Ethiopia reformed 
its family law in 2000, eliminating the husband’s 
ability to deny his wife permission to work out-
side the home and requiring both spouses to 
agree in administering family property. The fi rst 
phase of these changes contributed to a shift in 
women’s economic activities toward work out-
side the home, full-time work, and jobs requir-
ing higher skills.84 Morocco reformed such laws 
in the 1990s, and in 2004, the new Moroccan 
Family Code completely eliminated references 
to the husband as the head of the household. 
Registering marriages
What about the many women who do not have 
a registered and legally recognized marriage? 
To bring more women into the protection of 
benefi cial statutory regimes, civil registration 
procedures should be kept simple and locally 
accessible with low costs, as in Rwanda. An al-
ternative is to legally recognize customary mar-
riages or consensual unions and confer rights on 
women in these relationships, as in South Africa, 
where women in monogamous customary mar-
legal framework, and, even where these are not 
offi cially recognized, they continue to matter 
in determining women’s capacity to access and 
control assets. So, where there is a constitutional 
nondiscrimination clause (as in the major-
ity of constitutions in the world), the fi rst step 
is to make sure that all sources of law are gov-
erned by it. Nondiscrimination needs to be the 
benchmark for the validity for all laws, particu-
larly those determining the control of resources 
within households and families. For example, 
Kenya recently removed the exemption from 
nondiscrimination that the constitution had 
previously granted to customary family and in-
heritance law.
Ensuring that all laws conform to the nondis-
crimination clause will also enhance the ability 
of citizens to challenge laws as uncon stitutional. 
Such challenges, initiated by alliances of wom-
en’s groups and other stakeholders, have over-
turned statutory laws favoring male heirs in 
Nepal and Tanzania. A key is ensuring that the 
legal system provides for constitutional chal-
lenges and also increases women’s access to the 
justice system. 
In reconciling multiple legal systems, cus-
tomary law should not be ignored. It is the 
everyday reality for many men and women, so 
recognizing its impact and potential for change 
is both pragmatic and constructive. Customary 
law is more familiar and accessible. It uses me-
diation rather than an adversarial model. And it 
offers greater legitimacy particularly in fragile, 
postconfl ict countries where the formal sys-
tem is nonexistent or decimated. In Botswana, 
where customary law and customary courts 
are formally recognized, women have become 
tribal chiefs, making decisions and breaking 
centuries of tradition. Removing gender biases 
in the customary system through sensitization, 
encouraging greater participation by women, 
and promoting the system’s values, such as the 
protection of women, should thus be encour-
aged. And forging links between the informal 
and formal systems can help bring about greater 
parity throughout the legal system. 
This law has assisted us. . . . When you leave the man’s home, you divide the property 
and go with something to begin your new life.
Adult woman, Tanzania
“ ”
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often the most valuable marital asset, laws that 
mandate or presume its joint titling can protect 
women from loss of assets in divorce. 
Inheritance laws and widows
In many countries, inadequate or discrimina-
tory inheritance legislation places widows in a 
particularly vulnerable situation with regard to 
asset ownership. For example, 22 Sub-Saharan 
African countries do not give widows a right to 
half the estate. And because the writing of wills 
is not common in low-income countries, intes-
tacy laws (which govern property distribution 
on death in the absence of a will) determine the 
division of the estate. So, widows’ access to prop-
erty is often reduced, leaving them dependent 
on the goodwill of male relatives or in-laws with 
little guarantee of support. Another problem is 
that plural legal systems often apply to widows’ 
inheritance, particularly land. In Botswana, Ni-
geria, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Togo, customary 
law prevails over statutory law. And in Zambia, 
about 90 percent of the total land is held under 
customary law, which excludes the land from 
the estate and conveys it only to male heirs. 
If possible, discriminatory intestacy laws 
should therefore be changed, and where indi-
viduals elect to write a will the law should en-
sure that widows’ interests are protected. But 
discretion in deciding to whom to bequeath 
property does not always work in favor of wid-
ows or daughters. This pitfall can be avoided by 
designating widows and daughters as necessary 
heirs under the law even when a will exists, as in 
Brazil, where widows and both sons and daugh-
ters are legally entitled to equal shares of half the 
deceased husband’s estate. In Argentina, Bolivia, 
and República Bolivariana de Venezuela, wid-
ows cannot be legally excluded from a will.87 
Laws that protect widows’ assets by prosecut-
ing those who evict widows from land can also 
help and are in place in Ghana, Malawi, Uganda, 
and Zambia. But their enforcement remains a 
stumbling block. Another way to help protect 
women’s assets when the spouse dies is to have a 
default community of property marital regime, 
which automatically entitles the widow to half of 
the joint marital property, leaving only the other 
half for the husband’s estate. Overall, progress 
in reforming marital laws has been faster than 
progress in reforming inheritance laws in many 
countries, suggesting that the former can be an 
important entry point for establishing widows’ 
rights early in the reform process. 
riages are regulated by the same default com-
munity of property regimes as civil marriages. 
The key is to keep evidentiary requirements to 
a minimum to take into account the wide range 
of circumstances in establishing a relationship. 
The starting point could be a presumption that 
couples are in a customary marriage if they are 
living together, a presumption that could be left 
up to the contesting spouse to refute. This regis-
tration provides a key step in women’s access to 
legal systems (see below).
Laws for divorce 
The laws that apply to the disposition of marital 
property with divorce and those that determine 
the ability of men and women to seek divorce 
help shape women’s control over resources while 
they are still married (through her bargaining 
power) as well as their welfare if their marriages 
end. For the division of marital property, the de-
fault property regime that prevails during mar-
riage matters for women’s ability to accumulate 
assets—as does having a choice over it. As chap-
ter 4 showed, community of property regimes 
generally offer greater protection to women, 
because marital property is divided equally on 
divorce.85 Many countries, particularly civil law 
countries, already have default community of 
property regimes. In Morocco and Tunisia, re-
cent family law reforms allow women to opt for 
a community of property regime for the fi rst 
time. And making the community of property 
regime the default, as Turkey did in 2001, will 
result in higher uptake than if couples have to 
choose to opt in. 
Where separate property regimes remain the 
default, recognizing a spouse’s nonmonetary 
contribution to household wealth in divorce 
legislation is crucial. If the baseline for divi-
sion of matrimonial property on divorce is an 
equal split, women who have spent time caring 
for children, performing unpaid housework, 
and contributing to the welfare of the family in 
other ways can be compensated upon divorce. 
If recognition of nonmonetary contributions is 
enforced, a separate property regime can be as 
effective as community of property in protect-
ing women’s property. One key element in this 
enforcement is clear legislation that specifi es 
what this compensation should be—it should 
not be left to the courts to interpret an equita-
ble starting point. As Kenya’s experience shows, 
contradictory case law can lead to many differ-
ent outcomes.86 And because the family home is 
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short run). Complementary programs directly 
targeting this cause of violence may help reduce 
it. Improving women’s fallback positions may 
also provide more durable ways to improve bar-
gaining power and thus reduce domestic vio-
lence. One option is to increase women’s asset 
base, particularly the ownership of a dwelling 
(which gives them somewhere to go) and land. 
Work in Kerala, India, has shown that women’s 
property ownership is associated with signifi -
cantly lower levels of domestic violence.93 A 
second option is to improve women’s ability to 
leave their marriage. Unilateral divorce laws in 
the United States reduced domestic violence by 
around 30 percent.94 Attention also needs to be 
paid to the custody of children and the resources 
available to them after divorce.
Putting laws against domestic violence in place 
Continuing efforts are needed in many coun-
tries in the Middle East and North Africa, South 
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa to enact laws 
against domestic violence. Such laws serve many 
purposes including defi ning different types of 
violence against women, prescribing mandates 
and duties for various actors in enforcing laws 
and investigating charges, raising societal aware-
ness, and signaling government commitment. 
Countries that already have laws on the books 
should review them to ensure that they are spe-
cifi c and actionable. Additional reforms can 
include enacting legislation and implementing 
policies that regulate criminal procedures and 
responses to victims (restraining orders, foren-
sic procedures, victim assistance, and medical 
protocols).
Providing an effective response to 
domestic violence
Support to victims should be quick and inte-
grated—with telephone hotlines, emergency 
shelters, legal assistance, psychological care, 
support groups, income generation programs, 
and child welfare services.95 Integrating these 
Reducing domestic violence
Domestic violence results largely from a com-
bination of strong social norms surrounding 
power within households as well as from wom-
en’s limited bargaining power in their house-
holds. These determinants need to be addressed 
in addition to strengthening the legal framework 
and improving services to victims of violence.
Shifting norms and behavior through 
information and bargaining power
Although rigorous evaluations are scant, some 
programs to shift norms and behavior around 
domestic violence show promise. These fall into 
two main types. The fi rst are education and 
awareness campaigns aimed at men, women, 
and youth. An example is the Soul City program 
in South Africa, a multimedia program aimed at 
changing norms and beliefs of individuals and 
communities. Some norms, such as the view 
that intimate partner violence was a private 
issue, changed after the campaign.88 Another 
example, also in South Africa, is the Stepping 
Stones program, which promotes communica-
tion and relationship skills in separate training 
for men and women. A rigorous impact evalua-
tion found that it signifi cantly reduced the per-
petration of intimate partner violence by men.89 
Evaluations of other programs, however, show 
limited or no effects from providing informa-
tion, indicating that further work is needed on 
how to make these programs effective.90
Education and information should also target 
adolescents—for instance, at school—through 
education on gender norms, rights, legal re-
course, and available resources. School-based 
programs, especially those with several compo-
nents, can strengthen knowledge and protective 
behaviors against abuse, but evidence of their ef-
fect on the incidence of abuse is not available.91 
Rigorous evaluations of programs reducing date 
violence in the United States and Canada show 
that they can have positive effects in preventing 
or reducing violence, with the effects mostly at-
tributable to changes in norms, roles, and greater 
awareness of community services.92 
Second, increasing women’s bargaining 
power in the household can reduce domestic 
violence, but experience shows that a cautious 
approach is warranted. Increased economic op-
portunities or larger transfers (through condi-
tional cash transfers, for instance) to women are 
likely to increase their bargaining power but can 
also increase domestic violence (at least in the 
Men used to beat us and everything 
would carry on as normal. But now 
we can report them to the 
police.
Adult woman, South Africa
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protection orders and temporary custody of 
children.98 And some have eased procedures 
for issuing temporary restraining orders (at the 
local level) to respond faster to crisis situations. 
In the Philippines, Panang Barangay (village 
offi cials) have the power to grant protection 
orders that remain in place for 15 days, giving 
women and children time to travel to seek a 
court order. The police can also issue tempo-
rary restraining orders.99 
Making rights effective—Increasing women’s 
access to justice
Besides improving the substance of the law, 
measures also need to be taken not only to em-
power women to demand that their rights are 
effective but also to make justice systems more 
responsive to women’s needs. Actions in three 
areas are needed. 
First, women need to be better represented 
within the organizations charged with formu-
lating, implementing, and enforcing these laws, 
and the voices of female clients and stakehold-
ers must be better refl ected in the justice sys-
tem. Greater representation has been achieved 
in some countries by setting quotas for female 
judges, police offi cers, and offi cials who im-
plement laws and regulations for property, but 
 evidence on the impact of these changes is lim-
ited. In Papua New Guinea, female local magis-
trates have helped raise awareness among their 
male counterparts of the need to adopt gender-
sensitive approaches to the cases that come be-
fore them.100 In Ethiopia, local land committees 
must have at least one female member, increas-
ing knowledge of land issues among women 
and their participation in the land registration 
process.101 Government-sponsored policy dis-
cussions in Rwanda on changes in land laws 
in Rwanda that engaged civil society, including 
women’s groups, not only helped refi ne these 
policies but also made individuals aware of their 
rights. And, in Pakistan, female paralegals con-
duct consultations and synthesize women’s con-
cerns into policy reports, shaping the discourse 
and infl uencing policy makers.102 
In addition to helping women access the jus-
tice system, technology also can play a role in 
making sure that women’s views are represented 
in the setting of legal policy. In Kosovo, following 
independence in 2008, the commission drafting 
the country’s constitution decided to allow rural 
women to participate provided they could reach 
services makes the response more effective be-
cause of the importance of a timely response 
both to establish the facts and to protect victims. 
For example, Malaysia has one-stop crisis cen-
ters at government hospitals. When a woman 
arrives at an emergency department with inju-
ries from domestic violence, she is immediately 
examined and treated by medical personnel and 
referred to social workers and volunteers from 
women’s organizations who then see that she 
receives counseling, if needed, and coordinate 
further assistance. A similar integrated response 
should also be in place elsewhere in the system, 
particularly in police stations, which may be the 
fi rst point of contact for victims.
Even where services are not integrated, the 
police, hospital staff, and other providers need 
training in how to support victims, the services 
available, and the relevant laws. Spain required 
such training as part of its Law on Comprehen-
sive Protection Measures against Gender-Based 
Violence. The law’s implementation includes 
awareness and communications campaigns, 
hotlines for victims, advice services for men, and 
training for judges and other judicial personnel 
(on domestic violence awareness, treatment of 
victims, and features of the law). Police offi cers 
and medical staff were also trained, the latter 
in a specialized health protocol on how to treat 
victims of violence under the national health 
system. 
But the systematic criminalization of vio-
lence can backfi re. Not all women want their 
partners to be convicted (especially when he is 
the main source of the family’s livelihood), and 
many reject systems that force them toward a 
punitive course of action.96 Many women per-
ceive protective orders to be more helpful. For 
instance, data from the United States show that 
such orders reduce repeat violence and that 
women report feeling safer with them, even 
though the orders are often violated.97 Many 
countries, such as Bulgaria, offer temporary 
They are bombarding us with stories about 
safe houses, but that is a smokescreen. What 
does it mean for us, the two safe houses [that] 
are in Belgrade, while all of us rural women 
can be killed?
Young woman, Serbia
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donesia, the waiving of court fees for poor and 
marginalized groups has increased the ability of 
women to come before the courts.107 
Third, data have to be collected and made 
public so that the problems of women’s access 
to justice are made more visible. Many countries 
still lack comprehensive data on issues around 
the type and quality of justice services available 
to women and the barriers that women face in 
engaging with judicial institutions. More in-
formation in the public domain will add to the 
urgency to act and help identify bottlenecks 
and improve accountability within the justice 
system, establish priority areas for action, and 
design interventions.
Increasing voice in fertility decisions 
The availability of family planning services re-
mains a constraint in some parts of the world. 
In some cases, the underserved population cov-
ers entire countries, but more often the under-
served live in specifi c geographic areas within 
countries—for example, availability is more 
likely to be a problem in rural than urban ar-
eas. In addition, certain subpopulations such as 
the poor may also face limited access. For these 
groups, improved delivery of family planning 
services is a priority. 
Control over fertility decisions—the number 
and spacing of children—goes beyond the pro-
vision of reproductive health services, however. 
Thus, two additional areas of policy are critical 
to increase women’s control over fertility. The 
fi rst involves boosting women’s ability to exert 
bargaining power within the household, allow-
ing them to act on their preferences about the 
number of children the couple has, and over 
time to change the social norms that help deter-
mine these preferences. The second policy focus 
involves improving the quality of family plan-
ning services to excluded groups.
The relative bargaining power of a man and 
woman within a household plays an important 
role in determining their fertility outcomes. For 
example, when men inherit more land, the cou-
ple is likely to have the number of children that 
is closer to male rather than female preferenc-
es.108 Some policy options for increasing female 
bargaining power already have been discussed. 
These include building up women’s assets and 
increasing their income; increasing women’s 
exit options; and increasing women’s education 
and access to maternal healthcare. 
the city where the drafting was taking place 
within 48 hours. Women for Women Interna-
tional used mobile phones to mobilize 250 rural 
women to come to the city within this tight time 
frame and address the commission. The result 
was a constitution with provisions for female 
participation in political institutions as well as 
other guarantees related to gender equality.103 
Second, women’s rights can be made more 
effective when various parts of the justice system 
are made sensitive to the specifi c needs of women 
or target women clients explicitly. In some coun-
tries where judicial delays in cases of domestic 
violence can be long, governments have set up 
special courts, as Liberia did for rape cases, or 
fast-track courts, as Nepal did for cases involving 
women and children. Service providers can also 
be made more aware of the relevant laws. The 
PEKKA (Program for Women Headed House-
holds) Women’s Legal Empowerment program 
in Indonesia provided training for village para-
legals that focused on domestic violence and 
family law. It also held district forums to bring 
together judges, prosecutors, police, NGOs, and 
government offi cials to raise awareness of gen-
der issues.104 In Spain, judges, magistrates, and 
others in law enforcement are required to attend 
specifi c sessions on gender equality, nondiscrimi-
nation, and violence against women. Judges who 
have taken the training report changing their 
perceptions on violence issues and providing 
foster training for their peers. Where women’s 
limited literacy is a constraint, translating laws 
into simpler language or local languages, as has 
been done in Botswana, can be helpful.
Targeting women also requires bringing ser-
vices closer to women to deal with time and 
mobility constraints—for example, through 
providing community paralegals and mobile 
legal aid clinics for women to access the justice 
system. In Tamil Nadu in India, the introduction 
of 188 all-women police units, covering both 
rural and urban areas and focusing on crimes 
against women, increased women’s comfort in 
approaching the police, including reporting do-
mestic abuse.105 Female-run police stations and 
specialized services for women were fi rst intro-
duced in Brazil and Peru, and they have resulted 
in greater access for women.106 Targeting may 
also include cost considerations because women 
may be less likely to have the funds needed to 
access the legal system—particularly where 
poverty compounds gender inequalities. In In-
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the contraceptives are not sold or expire before 
they are sold, for example). 
Second, to make informed decisions, clients 
need to have adequate information about the 
available options, their side effects, and the ad-
vantages and limitations of different methods. 
For example, only about half of the clients in 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, Honduras, Mal-
dives, and Niger were informed about poten-
tial side effects or problems with contraceptive 
methods.114 Third, services need to be provided 
in a manner that protects the individual’s or the 
couple’s privacy. That requires training health 
care providers in protocols designed specifi cally 
for family planning. As the earlier discussion 
of Zambia showed, very different outcomes can 
result depending on whether women are ap-
proached individually and in private or as part 
of a couple. 
AVOIDING THE REPRODUCTION OF 
GENDER INEQUALITIES ACROSS 
GENERATIONS FOR ADOLESCENTS 
AND YOUNG ADULTS 
The reproduction of specifi c gender inequalities 
across generations gives rise to gender inequal-
ity traps, which are likely to most affect the poor 
and excluded in society. Some of these have been 
dealt with in earlier sections—reaching pockets 
of remaining disadvantage in education; in-
creasing women’s voice and participation in so-
cietal institutions; and enhancing women’s voice 
within households. Here we examine measures 
to address gender inequalities that emerge in 
adolescence and early adulthood, a particularly 
critical time when decisions and choices are 
made that determine outcomes regarding skills, 
health, economic opportunities, and voice. The 
effects of these policies illustrate not only the im-
portance of intervening early but also the ways 
in which the realms of endowments, economic 
opportunities, and agency are interrelated. For 
example, job training programs can improve 
employment prospects, but they also may delay 
pregnancy––shaping the future human capital 
and voice of these women.
Improving education and health outcomes
Evidence from careful impact evaluations across 
a broad range of countries at different income 
levels suggests that conditional cash transfers can 
Educating men on the benefi ts and use of 
contraception can help enhance women’s voice 
in determining their own fertility. Contracep-
tion uptake is higher when husbands are in-
cluded in family planning education, as was the 
case in Bangladesh and Ethiopia.109 Fewer chil-
dren are born as a result. For example, in China, 
pregnancy and abortion rates were lower when 
men were educated with their wives as part of a 
family planning program, in contrast to couples 
where only the woman was educated.110 But con-
text is important. Sometimes excluding the hus-
band altogether can lead to signifi cant impacts. 
Evidence from Zambia showed that targeting a 
voucher for free contraception services to women 
alone, rather than to couples, led to signifi cantly 
higher contraception use and a large reduction 
in unwanted births. While targeted couples also 
increased their use of contraception, there was 
no reduction in unwanted births.111
More generally, shifting role models regard-
ing family size and the resulting change in pref-
erences can lead to signifi cant drops in fertility. 
For example, the spread of televised soap operas 
in Brazil, depicting smaller families, led to lower 
fertility, especially for women in lower socio-
economic groups.112 Evidence on which specifi c 
government policies could change norms in this 
way is limited, however. One example comes 
from an evaluation of a government-sponsored 
radio soap opera in Tanzania, which found that 
the program worked by raising the discussion of 
contraception within families and the commu-
nity and increased contraceptive use.113
Improvements in family planning services 
should focus on three areas. First, a suffi cient 
range of contraceptive options needs to be pro-
vided, registered, and prequalifi ed expeditiously, 
but policy makers must take into account service 
providers’ ability to keep the relevant contracep-
tives in stock. Effi ciency improvements in sup-
ply chains may also be required because holding 
a large amount of reserves can be expensive (if 
Education and awareness may be the 
right tools to make both men and 
women use more family planning 
services.
Young woman, Bhutan
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Second-chance opportunities in education 
include programs intended for those currently 
in school who are falling behind (for example, 
remedial language instruction), as well as those 
designed to facilitate transition or reentry into 
mainstream systems (for example, equivalency 
and literacy programs). In designing these pro-
grams to reach teenage girls, policy makers 
should target those most at risk of falling be-
hind because of lack of money, domestic bur-
dens, and early marriage and pregnancy, all of 
which are typically associated with low socio-
economic status. 
Extensive analysis in the 2007 World Devel-
opment Report on youth points to the need to 
ensure these programs are tailored specifi cally 
to these groups (and are well targeted, since 
they tend to be costly).123 Getting the curricula 
right and building in fl exibility emerge as being 
of particular importance, although none of the 
programs discussed here has been rigorously 
evaluated. Examples of promising interventions 
include an equivalency program in Mexico 
allowing choice within curricula (including 
vocational skills) to ensure that out-of-school 
teenagers receive training most relevant to their 
needs, and a similar program in Colombia al-
lowing greater fl exibility of schedule and pace of 
learning. Other interventions have attempted to 
integrate life-skills and vocational training into 
literacy or numeracy programs to increase rel-
evance for out-of-school adolescents. For exam-
ple, the Senegal Pilot Female Literacy Program 
combines literacy training with life-skills pro-
grams that vary according to local needs, such as 
instruction in health, small-scale trades, or fruit 
and vegetable processing.124 
Programs to increase school enrollment (al-
though not typically conceived of as second- 
chance programs), such as cash transfers to 
girls, may be particularly effective in giving 
out-of-school girls incentives to resume their 
studies in addition to reducing dropout rates. 
In Malawi, the effects of a small cash transfer 
be effective in keeping adolescent girls in school. 
The positive impacts on secondary school en-
rollment for girls are well documented in Latin 
America in countries such as in Colombia, Ec-
uador, Mexico, and Nicaragua.115 More recently, 
evidence from Africa is beginning to show simi-
lar results. In Malawi, fairly small cash transfers 
to girls increased their enrollment and reduced 
dropout rates.116 Moreover, while these transfers 
were aimed at education, they had benefi ts in 
other realms: those who received the transfers 
had one-third the rate of HIV infection of those 
who did not receive transfers,117 and they had 
better mental health.118 
Other measures also appear to work in 
helping adolescent girls stay in school. Provid-
ing them with information on the returns to 
schooling is an example: in Madagascar, infor-
mation on earnings for primary school com-
pleters provided to boys and girls as well as to 
their parents increased attendance rates by 3.5 
percentage points.119 In the Dominican Repub-
lic, a similar effort to provide accurate informa-
tion on returns to education to boys also had a 
positive impact.120 And incentives such as the 
prospect of winning a scholarship or direct pay-
ments for performance can affect self-effi cacy 
and improve test scores.121
Beyond providing encouragement for ado-
lescent girls to stay in school, policies are needed 
to help them catch up when they have been de-
prived of the opportunity—whether through 
poor decision making on their part or that of 
others—to accumulate human capital earlier 
on and through more conventional routes. 
Such “second-chance” programs can mitigate 
the risk of other bad outcomes later in the life 
cycle (such as reduced earnings and lower health 
status) that may result from poor educational 
outcomes early in life.122 Moreover, since health 
and education outcomes for mothers are posi-
tively associated with those of children, these 
programs can also reduce the intergenerational 
transmission of gender inequality. 
Going to school has great importance. We will learn reading and writing and they 
will have a key impact on our future. If we don’t study at school, we will end up 
disappointed and we would not get a good job.
Young woman, Afghanistan
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sures, women did better than men—indeed, 
after 18 months, women saw an increase in 
labor income of more than 92 percent, com-
pared with less than 11 percent for men. And 
occupational segregation was lower among pro-
gram benefi ciaries.129 In Colombia, the Jovenes 
in Accion program illustrates another way to 
overcome information problems: placing the 
trainees in an internship with additional-on-
the job training at the end of classroom training 
(this program also included additional stipends 
for mothers).130 This program, which targeted 
poor, unemployed 18–25-year-olds, increased 
women’s earnings more than men’s. It also in-
creased the likelihood that women had a formal 
sector job. And analysis shows that the training 
was more effective as the intensity of the on-the-
job training increased.131 
While these examples show the potential of 
these programs in middle-income countries, 
more evidence is needed on programs appropri-
ate for lower-income settings. Recent evidence 
from Kenya shows that providing informa-
tion to young girls about the higher returns to 
vocational training in male- relative to female-
dominated industries increased girls’ enroll-
ment in trade school courses that prepared them 
for these male-dominated trades.132 Given the 
need for more robust evidence from a broader 
range of settings, the Adolescent Girls Initiative, 
a public-private partnership, is in the process of 
evaluating a number of interventions in several 
low- and middle-income and postconfl ict coun-
tries; these interventions include both “hard 
skills,” such as vocational training, and “soft 
skills,” such as life-skills training and mentoring 
(box 7 in the Overview).
Helping adolescents make smart 
reproductive decisions
Adolescence is also the time of sexual debut for 
many girls and boys. Girls tend to start their 
sexual life in relations with older boys or men. 
This age difference and partners who are (often) 
more experienced reduce the voice and bargain-
ing position of these girls when deciding on 
contraception use. Girls are also underserved 
in many cases by reproductive health services 
or lack suffi cient information regarding their 
rights. The unintended pregnancies that result 
can have a range of health and long-term eco-
nomic effects, including lower educational qual-
ifi cations and delayed entry into work. 
on reenrollment were large, with the reenroll-
ment rate for girls who had dropped out before 
the program increasing two and a half times.125 
In addition, a year after the program’s introduc-
tion, the probability of marriage for girls receiv-
ing transfers declined by more than 40 percent 
and the probability of pregnancy fell by 30 per-
cent.126 These results imply that small incentives 
can bring substantial improvements for girls 
most at risk. Nevertheless, evidence also indi-
cates that the design of these transfer programs 
needs to take into account intrahousehold re-
source allocation to ensure they do not indirectly 
worsen schooling outcomes for adolescent girls. 
A conditional cash transfer program in Colom-
bia that increased the likelihood of attendance 
and enrollment in secondary school for both 
boys and girls also decreased attendance and in-
creased work hours for nonparticipating sib-
lings—particularly sisters—of participants.127
Enhancing access to economic 
opportunities
The transition of young women into employ-
ment is a key moment to address the reproduc-
tion of gender inequalities across generations, 
and there is some evidence on what works in 
this regard. Active labor market policies, dis-
cussed earlier, can help with this transition, and 
recent impact evaluations suggest two ways to 
make these programs more effective. First, addi-
tional subsidies to encourage the participation of 
young mothers can help them cover the costs of 
child care. One example comes from Programa 
Joven in Argentina, which targeted low-income 
men and women under the age of 35. Besides 
providing extra subsidies for mothers, the pro-
gram covered training, books, material, work 
clothing, and transport expenses. The benefi ts 
were particularly strong for women ages 21–35, 
who saw a signifi cant increase in earnings and a 
9–12 percentage point increase in employment, 
as well as for men under age 21.128 
Second, these programs can be targeted on 
underlying problems of information in the labor 
market that may hinder young women’s partici-
pation. In Peru, the ProJoven program provided 
training for youth, including classroom training 
and internships plus a stipend. And, because it 
also explicitly targeted labor market segregation 
by training women in traditionally male occu-
pations, it was also potentially “transformative” 
in changing gender roles. On a range of mea-
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to recruiters for high-paying telephone work 
found that men and women in these communi-
ties were more likely to expect large dowries for 
their sons and to fi nd it acceptable for women 
to live alone before marriage and to work before 
and after marriage or childbirth.137
Protecting the inheritance of daughters can 
also enhance their agency. In Cambodia, Colom-
bia, and Rwanda, intestate succession laws des-
ignate girls (as well as boys) to receive a share of 
their parents’ land. Although the writing of wills 
can also help direct assets toward daughters, pa-
rental preferences shaped by prevailing norms 
may often discriminate against girls. In Mexico, 
although wives were selected nearly as often as 
sons to inherit property and women chose their 
daughters as sole heirs more often than men did, 
women still did not choose to leave equal shares 
to girls—both men and women preferred sons 
as sole heirs.138
One policy response is to circumscribe a frac-
tion of the property over which the will writer 
has control, reserving the remaining fraction 
to be inherited by the spouse and children. In 
Rwanda, this policy change, enforced through 
land title registration, led to a signifi cant in-
crease in inherited land designated for girls (as 
well as boys).139 In India, this legal reform led 
not only to increased land inherited by girls but 
also to an increase in age at marriage and higher 
education levels.140 While these reforms in India 
were not suffi cient to completely eliminate the 
male bias in inheritance patterns, they provide a 
powerful push to efforts to address gender gaps 
for the next generation.
MAKING GENDER-SMART 
POLICIES: FOCUSING “GENDER 
MAINSTREAMING” 
The preceding discussion has focused on tar-
geted interventions to address various facets of 
gender inequality. This section broadens the dis-
cussion to more general policies and asks how 
and why their gender-differentiated impacts 
should be taken into account systematically. The 
reason for considering these impacts is twofold, 
mirroring the motivation of the Report. First, 
lack of attention to gender issues can undermine 
the effectiveness even of policies whose objective 
has nothing to do with gender equality. Second, 
these effects matter because many policies can be 
Helping adolescents reduce these risks is not 
simple. The promotion of contraception, when 
done in isolation, has not been shown to be an 
effective tool for reducing unintended pregnan-
cies among adolescents. Similarly, educational 
interventions alone have not yet been found to 
be broadly effective. However, interventions that 
combine these measures with other interven-
tions such as skill building have been shown, in 
rigorous evaluations, to be effective in reducing 
unintended pregnancies among adolescents in a 
range of settings, although programs still need 
to be appropriately tailored to cultural and social 
settings.133 For example, a program for adoles-
cent girls in Uganda, which combined reproduc-
tive education, life-skills training, and livelihood 
training, resulted in a signifi cant increase in 
condom use and a lower number of children 
among the adolescent girls who participated.134 
Sometimes, economic empowerment alone can 
have a marked impact. A recent evaluation of a 
youth job-training program in the Dominican 
Republic, which included life-skills training plus 
apprenticeship showed a signifi cant reduction 
in pregnancies among participants. 135
Aspirations
Adolescence is also the age when lifelong aspi-
rations are molded and when social norms and 
perceptions really start to bind for boys and 
girls. Across countries and cultures, adolescence 
is a period where horizons for boys often expand 
while those for girls may shrink, especially for 
poor girls or girls in rural areas where distance 
and norms around mobility can be a signifi cant 
constraint. So, interventions in this area need to 
focus on building life skills, including social cap-
ital for adolescent girls, improving their aspira-
tions and agency, and reducing risky behavior.
Exposure to female role models whose posi-
tions of leadership or power contradict stereo-
types of women’s roles can reduce the intergen-
erational transmission of gender norms. A study 
of political reservation for women in India 
showed that teenage girls who had repeated ex-
posure to women leaders were more likely to ex-
press a desire to marry later, have fewer children, 
and obtain jobs requiring higher education—all 
aspirations that challenge traditional norms.136 
Increased economic opportunities for young 
girls can also change their own perceptions of 
gender roles and those of their communities. 
A program in Delhi that linked communities 
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fi gure out what they might do to improve gen-
der equality at the same time, an issue to which 
we turn below. 
Dealing with gender-differentiated 
market failures
What you don’t know can hurt others: 
Problems of information
As chapter 5 showed, the lack of good infor-
mation on the part of employers and creditors 
makes it hard for women to break into new sec-
tors and get the fi nancing they need. While the 
policies discussed earlier in this chapter can pro-
vide some ways to facilitate this fl ow of infor-
mation, interventions in other areas also can be 
brought to bear. Take the case of banking super-
vision, where one of the central goals of policy 
interventions is to improve banks’ management 
of risk. One risk management tool is credit bu-
reaus, which collect information about the cred-
itworthiness of individuals for use by banks in 
making their lending decisions. Women, more 
likely to be concentrated in informal borrowing 
and microfi nance, are underrepresented in these 
databases, so a prospective formal sector lender 
faces an information problem. But if women’s 
credit history from their microfi nance activity 
were in these databases, this information prob-
lem could be alleviated. Improving bank super-
vision policies in this way is also more likely to 
improve gender equality. 
For Proyecto Servir in Ecuador, a range of 
government actors, international agencies, mi-
crofi nance institutions, and private credit bu-
reaus came together to include microfi nance 
data in the credit bureaus’ databases. The initial 
target was the data for two geographic areas and 
27 microfi nance institutions, but demand was 
so great that data for more than 180 institutions 
across the country were eventually put into the 
databases. Not only will this intervention help 
microfi nance institutions make better lending 
decisions, it will also help microfi nance clients—
mostly women—get formal sector credit. 
It’s not only who you know, it’s how many 
you know: Building women’s networks
Networks that form with a critical number of 
individuals of one sex can help new members 
decide to enter a sector or profession and pro-
vide information about how to succeed and the 
like. In this way, they can also exclude members 
implemented in a way that also improves gender 
equality. This discussion serves to focus “gender 
mainstreaming” in a more strategic way. 
How can gender issues undermine policy 
effectiveness? Throughout, the Report has dis-
cussed areas where gender inequalities are per-
sistent. Underlying this persistence are the work-
ings and interactions of markets and formal and 
informal institutions and the responses of house-
holds. These factors, in turn, affect how men and 
women respond to different policies. Failing to 
take these factors into account can mean the 
policies will have unintended consequences—or 
simply not work––even when they have nothing 
to do with gender. 
Take relations within the household. The rela-
tive bargaining power of men and women affects 
how the household responds to policy—and 
this bargaining process extends not only to what 
their options are outside of the household (for 
example, divorce laws, labor market opportuni-
ties) but also to how much information is shared 
with each of them. An experiment with married 
couples in the Philippines illustrates. When men 
were given an amount equal to one day’s wage, 
their response differed simply according to what 
their spouses knew—when she did not know, 
men chose to save the money, and when she did 
know, they chose to spend the money. And when 
spouses were able to discuss what to do, the men 
put the money into their wives’ accounts.141
Another example of how household rela-
tions matters comes from Papua New Guinea. 
Gender roles in harvesting oil palm call for 
men to climb the trees and harvest fruits, while 
women collect the fruit that has fallen on the 
ground. When the oil palm industry realized 
that 60–70 percent of the fruit on the ground 
was not being collected, it tried to deal with 
constraints women faced, such as giving them 
special nets and timing collection to coordinate 
with their care duties. Nothing worked—until, 
in the Mama Lus Frut scheme, women got their 
own harvest record cards and were paid directly 
into their personal bank accounts. Yields in-
creased signifi cantly, as did female participation 
in oil palm harvesting.142 
These examples show why all policy makers 
need to consider the underlying causes of per-
sistence of gender equality, understand which 
ones matter for the policy at hand, and then fi g-
ure out how to make the policy more effective. 
This kind of analysis can also help policy makers 
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as part of a larger effort to restructure the trans-
port sector, the National Railway Company, 
in collaboration with the unions, has set aside 
earmarked funding to compensate surviving 
widows and orphans of employees who are due 
retiree benefi ts. The funds will go directly to the 
benefi ciaries and, where they cannot be imme-
diately found, be kept in a dedicated fund for fu-
ture claims. This approach was taken expressly 
because widows and orphans tend to be less 
likely to either know about or assert their claim 
when their employed spouse or parent dies. 
Better access to services
Women use services in ways different from men, 
for reasons that range from the constrained mo-
bility of women to the attitude of service pro-
viders toward female clients. Policy responses 
require both changes in client orientation and 
more fundamental structural changes. One ex-
ample of these kinds of issues comes from the 
prices charged for electricity. One recent study 
found that 14 of 15 electricity utilities in Latin 
America charged more to residential electric-
ity users than to commercial users.145 Because 
women are much more likely than men to run 
their business out of their home, this pricing 
policy increased costs for women who own 
small businesses.
Paying attention to norms 
Recognizing women’s care duties
Women bear a disproportionate amount of the 
care duties within households and families. As 
we have seen, a wide range of policies have the 
potential to affect this—ranging from infra-
structure improvements to labor regulations. 
Other policies can make a difference as well, in 
ways that may not be as obvious. One example 
is the approach taken in Vietnam to calculat-
ing severance packages as part of restructuring 
public enterprises. The benefi ts provided by the 
public sector (better maternity leave and fl exible 
work arrangements) relative to the private sector 
meant that the average woman would lose more 
from retrenchment than her male colleagues. 
So, compensation based entirely on seniority 
would effectively penalize women.146 The gov-
ernment took this into account by combining 
a payment based on seniority with a signifi cant 
lump-sum payment. The policy explicitly took 
into account women’s care duties, making them 
of the other sex, which can perpetuate gender 
inequalities. A rural road project in Peru sought 
to overcome this problem. The project’s main 
policy objective was to improve rural transport 
for economic integration, but in pursuing this 
objective, gender equality was also considered, 
with a focus on increasing women’s representa-
tion in road maintenance. The project explicitly 
recruited women among the entrepreneurs who 
ran the microenterprises responsible for road 
maintenance. A quota of 10 percent female par-
ticipation initially helped boost female engage-
ment from a baseline of 4 percent, and eventu-
ally 24 percent of the microentrepreneurs were 
female. Women engaged more in group activi-
ties, and road maintenance work became a more 
socially acceptable occupation for women. 
Leveling the playing fi eld 
Addressing discrimination in laws and 
regulations
Looking for and fi xing discrimination when re-
vising regulations for other reasons can improve 
gender equality. Take the case of tax policy. Taxes 
can explicitly discriminate against women when 
they face different tax rates for the same income 
or earnings as men. In Morocco, the tax allow-
ance for children is allocated to men unless 
women can prove that their husband and chil-
dren depend on them fi nancially.143 So men face 
a lower tax burden than women. Tax reforms 
aimed at effi ciency would try to equalize this tax 
rate so that women are not penalized for market 
work. These reforms would also enhance gender 
equality. In Uganda, inherited property not used 
for business, property, or employment income is 
exempt from taxation. Effi ciency-enhancing tax 
reforms would reduce or eliminate this tax ex-
emption. And because men inherit much more 
than women, such a reform would also promote 
gender equality.144 
Making existing laws and regulations work 
better for women: Improving enforcement
Women often face more limited access to mech-
anisms of redress—whether complaint mecha-
nisms within a fi rm or access to police and legal 
services. Improving women’s access to enforce-
ment mechanisms can thus improve gender 
equality in a range of interventions involving 
fi rms, state-owned enterprises, and govern-
ments. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
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in place effective monitoring systems to capture 
the gender dimensions of the problems they are 
addressing and the effects of their activities. This 
step requires, among other things, not only clear 
sex-disaggregated data from baseline surveys 
but also attention in those surveys to the causes 
of gender inequality that may matter for project 
design (for example, barriers in accessing ser-
vices the project provides). As the project pro-
gresses, sex-disaggregated data on benefi ciaries 
can help monitor progress and identify the need 
for mid-course corrections.
Second, there needs to be a focus on under-
standing whether specifi c interventions work. 
Evaluations are the only way this question can 
be answered. Different types of evaluations will 
provide answers to different questions. Well-
designed impact evaluations can be especially 
helpful because they use a well-defi ned compar-
ison group to measure the effects on program 
benefi ciaries. In this regard, much remains to 
be done. For example, in the realm of economic 
opportunity, the effects of active labor market 
policies have been subject to impact evalua-
tions. But very little is known about policies to 
improve women’s networks. And while a lot is 
known from impact evaluations about the ef-
fects of conditional cash transfers on a host of 
outcomes, less rigorous evidence is available on 
the effects of such programs that address mater-
nal mortality. Finally, while the effects of political 
reservations in local governments in India have 
been well studied, there is less evidence about the 
effects of reservations for parliamentary seats or 
on the impacts of improving women’s access to 
justice.
The good news is that more evidence of 
this type is available today than existed even 10 
years ago. But more needs to be done. Evalu-
ations need to be built into projects as they 
are designed, which means planning for them. 
And additional resources will be needed. While 
knowledge gaps in individual areas are evident, 
two overarching themes deserve particular at-
tention. First, efforts should focus on contrast-
ing the impact of incremental interventions 
(those that work within existing gender norms) 
and transformative interventions (those that 
seek to transform gender roles), particularly 
when they focus on the same policy area, as in 
vocational education. Second, given that mul-
tiple constraints underlie many “sticky” gender 
gaps, emphasis should be placed on evaluating 
part of the calculation in compensating workers 
for their lost jobs.147 One year after separation, 
women were more likely than men to rate their 
well-being as better or the same.148 
Taking account of the allocation of resources 
within the household
As seen earlier in the Report, couples do not al-
ways (or even often) act as a single unit. They 
might have different preferences and might not 
completely share their income—and, in the end, 
their different bargaining power will drive the 
outcome of household decisions. Changing the 
bargaining power within households can result 
from a range of policies from direct transfers to 
changes in income-earning opportunities. How 
will bargaining power change, and how will 
that affect program design? A female-targeted 
village savings and loan program of the Inter-
national Rescue Committee in Burundi aimed 
to increase women’s control over the resources 
that the program would bring into households. 
It piloted a six-session course for participants 
and their spouses analyzing household decision 
making. Women who participated in this course 
reported greater autonomy in decision making 
and less violence at home than those in the mi-
crofi nance program who did not get this addi-
tional course.
Thinking on this type of policy can evolve. 
Initially, many conditional cash transfer pro-
grams targeted women, in part because women 
were likely to spend more of the transfer on 
children’s endowments. However, these trans-
fers themselves changed bargaining power 
within the household and, in some cases, such 
as Mexico, resulted in short-term increases in 
domestic violence.149 While this effect can dis-
appear or change in the longer term, a number 
of these transfer programs took proactive action 
to tackle domestic violence and broader issues 
within household relations by including condi-
tions to discourage domestic violence (Brazil), 
training and awareness of these issues for moth-
ers and families (Colombia, Peru), and even 
dedicated social workers (Chile).150
WANTED: BETTER EVIDENCE
To better understand whether policies to address 
gender inequalities are working, two actions are 
needed. First, programs and projects need to put 
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P
rogress toward gender equality entails 
shifts toward a new equilibrium where 
women have access to more endow-
ments, more economic opportunities, 
and more ways to exercise their agency—and 
where this new arrangement becomes the domi-
nant order. Schooling for girls and women’s suf-
frage are widely accepted in most countries to-
day, but that once was not so. The changes were 
shaped by interactions between households, 
markets, formal institutions, and informal insti-
tutions. And each of these interactions affected 
markets, formal institutions, and informal insti-
tutions in a continuous feedback loop.
Chapter 7 discussed policy interventions to 
correct specifi c market failures, and institutional 
or normative constraints that underlie gen-
der gaps. But whether these policies are put in 
place or not, and whether they will work or not, 
depends also on the political economy context. 
A successful policy in one country may not 
necessarily transfer to another. The context de-
termines how the fi ndings from one country 
are relevant or replicable in another.1 
So, policy design and implementation must 
be attuned to the societal actors and the policy 
environment. Successful interventions and les-
sons from one country must be adapted and 
attuned to the social circumstances of another. 
Following our conceptual framework, this chap-
ter describes the role of societal actors and their 
interventions in:
• Informal institutions—through collective 
action
• Markets—through fi rm behavior 
• Formal institutions—through state actions 
and structures that evaluate, advocate, design, 
implement, or enforce gender equality poli-
cies and laws (fi gure 8.1)
Collective action through social networks 
and civil society groups has been a formidable 
force in advancing gender equality. Policy re-
forms arise from a political process where state 
and nonstate societal actors vie to shape their en-
vironment. Their interests and spheres of infl u-
ence determine the power dynamics that fashion 
policy reform in relation to the trade-offs and 
costs in the short and long term. Policies require 
trade-offs in allocating resources to competing 
priorities within given budget constraints and 
fi nancial and political costs. For instance, im-
proving maternal care and delivery in remote 
areas may confl ict with expanding hospital ser-
vices for the broader population. Opposition to 
any given reform may come from societal actors 
who do not want (or cannot afford) to bear the 
related costs or prefer a competing agenda.
Given multiple and diverging societal actors, 
coalitions are indispensable for building support 
and countering resistance from infl uential inter-
est groups. After the demise of General Augusto 
Pinochet’s regime, centrist and center-left gov-
ernments in Chile failed for nearly 15 years to 
legalize divorce, despite large popular support. 
The Catholic Church was among the most vocal 
opponents of liberalizing family laws. Eighteen 
bills were rejected before Congress, with the 
support of a large coalition of political parties, 
approved a divorce law in 2004.
Markets too have a role to play: fi rms—big 
and small—have articulated a business case 
The political economy 
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in law fi rms—those who hold an ownership 
interest—are women.2
Finally, state action is at the epicenter of 
gender-progressive policy making and imple-
mentation. The social contract determines the 
form, timing, and legitimacy of state regulation 
and intervention in markets, formal institutions, 
and social norms. In Scandinavian countries, 
the state explicitly pursues policies to strengthen 
women’s position in society, in what might be 
called a “gender contract.” In the Philippines, the 
2009 “Magna Carta of Women” affi rms the role 
of the state to “provide the necessary mecha-
nisms to enforce and guarantee the realization 
of women’s rights as well as adopt and under-
take steps to include temporary special measures 
which encompass a wide variety of legislative, 
executive, administrative and other regulatory 
instruments, policies and practices aimed at ac-
celerating the equal participation of women in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or 
any other fi eld.”3
for gender equality. In a fast-changing global 
economy the demand for skills has swelled, so 
fi rms have sought to expand their talent pool. 
Diverse opinions may enrich decision making 
and stimulate ingenuity. And gender equality 
has become a desirable trait that customers 
and investors look for. Corporate social re-
sponsibility is an avenue for fi rms to enhance 
competitiveness by differentiating products 
and capturing the loyalty of women’s growing 
market share. 
Attracting and retaining female talent and 
customer loyalty requires an organizational 
shift. Corporate culture must accommodate 
the many demands of work and home for men 
and women. Career mentoring and advance-
ment are also central in realizing the benefi ts of 
gender diversity. Much remains to be done in 
these domains. In the United States, for exam-
ple, even though half of law school graduates 
are women and 90 percent of law fi rms have a 
diversity program, only 15 percent of partners 
F I G U R E  8.1   Social actors and their interactions shape the role of markets, formal and informal 
institutions in advancing gender equality 
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will of social actors, opening new opportunities. 
When policy formulation and implementation 
follow cues from ongoing shifts in markets and 
social norms, convergence and alignment can 
fuel sustainable change. But such “incremental” 
reforms may not be enough to overcome the 
path dependence and institutional rigidities that 
result in persistent gender inequality. Bold gov-
ernment action with “transformative” reforms 
can alter social dynamics and move countries 
and societies to a more equitable equilibrium. 
In these circumstances, policy implementation 
and enforcement must follow through to pro-
duce sustainable behavioral changes. 
Women and men are partners in realizing 
gender equality. Effective government action 
demands the building of broad-based coali-
tions with local, national, and international ac-
tors to advocate for and produce reform. It also 
demands adopting a cross-cutting gender lens 
to assess outcomes and implications, building 
sound institutional structures for implementa-
tion and enforcement, seizing windows of op-
portunity to engender change, and balancing 
the pace of change with the risk of backlash. 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS—SOCIAL 
NETWORKS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE
Societal actors have a direct hand in shaping the 
policy and institutional environment—by ad-
vocating policies, designing interventions, and 
implementing programs. Individuals can in-
fl uence government policy through voting and 
public opinion. 
Individuals can also organize collectively 
into social networks and civil society groups to 
realize common political or social goals. Col-
lective agency can shape community and indi-
vidual outcomes. And social organizations and 
cooperatives can pool risks and investments in 
community driven-development, microfi nance, 
child care, and other programs to realize bigger 
benefi ts. These social networks and organiza-
tions can also diffuse information, such as shar-
ing knowledge on technological innovations to 
enhance agricultural productivity.4 
Participation in social networks and groups 
can build capacity and serve as a springboard 
for collective action in other spheres, such as 
exercising political voice in local government. A 
social movement can grow as more supporters 
Politicians and policy makers negotiate the 
design, approval, and implementation of state 
policies. “Gender machineries” are specialized 
state structures to deliver on specifi c gender 
equality goals. They can involve institutions 
that monitor the social conditions of men and 
women, generate knowledge, provide opera-
tional support for gender reforms, or ensure 
their enforcement. Other state structures—such 
as the justice system—are also critical as agents 
of social change. 
Cutting across these actors, economic growth, 
technological development, globalization, natu-
ral disasters, and postconfl ict reconstruction all 
spur waves of policy change as households adapt 
to new realities (box 8.1). Social actors can seize 
these emerging windows of opportunities to 
catalyze and realize gains in gender equality.
The path of reform also matters. Govern-
ments often follow society’s cues for reform. Pol-
icy change captures the collective aspirations and 
Georgia’s independence in 1991 led to a deep economic downturn. Households 
had to fi nd novel ways to earn incomes. Adapting to the new political and eco-
nomic realities proved transformative for gender roles.
Widespread closures of fi rms and industries after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union left thousands in Georgia unemployed. Many women became 
breadwinners and sole providers for their households. They realized long before 
men that there was no return to secure state employment, and they proved 
more fl exible in adjusting to occupational change. They often took jobs below 
their qualifi cations, opting to be unskilled workers in informal activities such as 
street vendors, running shuttle services to Turkey, sitting babies, or cleaning 
houses. Petty trade remains the largest arena of self-employment for women, 
who were ready to “downgrade” their work to provide for their families, while 
their husbands and other men remained at home and refused to take jobs that 
did not match their status and educational training.
Horizontal gender segregation of employment also contributed to women’s 
greater economic independence. The “female sectors”—teachers, nurses, and 
doctors—remained largely unperturbed, while traditionally male occupations 
were less in demand. In 2007, women made up 89 percent of university aca-
demic staff  and 69 percent of medical doctors. 
The absence of jobs led many men and women to migrate. Their remittances 
reach 1 in 10 people in Georgia, and those from female migrants are on average 
$40 higher than remittances from male migrants.
The rise of female involvement in formal and informal economic activities 
has been paired with a generational shift in values. Today, men have grown 
more involved in family life, child care, and domestic work. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that more men are taking parental leave from work. These changes in 
gender roles and norms were fueled not by policy interventions but by a drastic 
deterioration in the economic environment that challenged the traditional dis-
tribution of labor.
BOX 8.1  Georgia—Evolving gender roles in a new society
Source: Sumbadze 2011.
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nity labor legislation, and family law (box 8.2).7
Globalization and new communication tech-
nologies have created new opportunities to raise 
awareness, create networks, generate debate, and 
mobilize stakeholders against inequalities.
Reforms usually create winners and losers, so 
understanding the political realities and trade-
offs that shape the incentives for key stakehold-
ers in a program or policy is vital to building 
coalitions and securing consensus. Society’s ac-
tors can drive policy reform, or they can block, 
neglect, or reverse it in accord with their inter-
ests and motives. Shaping their relative power 
are the resources they can allocate to defending 
(or resisting) policy positions and the impor-
tance, or salience, they attach to reform out-
comes. Their visibility, legitimacy, constituen-
cies, social standing, social networks, and ability 
to access information channels determine their 
spheres of infl uence and the effi cacy of their ac-
tions within them. 
adopt its point of view. As coordination mecha-
nisms, groups can inspire individuals to take ac-
tion, transforming passive stakeholders into so-
cietal actors (fi gure 8.2).5 Women workers have 
been more willing to challenge their employers 
and the state through such organizations as the 
Self Employed Women’s Association and Ma-
hila Samakhya in India and Kormojibi Nari and 
Nijera Kori in Bangladesh.6 
Collective action: In numbers there 
is power
Over the past 250 years, women’s rights groups, 
political parties, trade unions, faith-based orga-
nizations, state-sponsored mass organizations, 
and civil society groups have all championed the 
cause of gender equality. Women’s organizations 
have been central in standing against gender in-
equality and acting as a force for change in the 
international, national, and local arenas on mat-
ters such as reproductive rights, equal opportu-
F I G U R E  8.2   Social networks can engage public opinion, mobilize support, and inspire change
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sidered a threat by castes, ethnic minorities, or 
religious interest groups that stand to lose some 
of their limited infl uence (box 8.3).
Those who benefi t from the status quo will 
likely resist changes that they perceive as dimin-
ishing their returns. They can increase the trans-
action costs for other stakeholders, making a re-
Political economy structures and dynamics 
can make the difference between a well-designed 
and sustainable intervention that mobilizes sup-
port and a failed initiative that alienates crucial 
constituencies. For instance, redistributing po-
litical power to women through parliamentary 
quotas may increase women’s voice but be con-
B OX  8.2   Feminism in perspective
Sources: Andreasen and others 1991; Antrobus 2004; Basu 1995; Hooks 2000; Marx Ferree and Hess 2000; Paxton and Hughes 2007; Whelehan 1995.
Women’s movements have long been a driving force for social 
change. They have given voice to the cause of gender equality, cre-
ating a space for public debate and setting the stage for change 
and reform. 
Women mobilize as political actors and social agents for a wide 
variety of causes—social, political, economic, environmental. For 
example, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina—mothers 
demanding the safe return of their children who disappeared dur-
ing the military dictatorship—are organized around a nongender 
equality issue. 
Feminism (and the women’s movement associated with it) refers 
to groups organized around women’s inequalities and disadvan-
tages deriving from their gender. The feminist movement is a politi-
cal movement concerned with changing social conditions. Aware-
ness of disadvantage and rejection of the prevalent social order is a 
central pillar of its politics. The feminist movement is made up of 
several groups and strands with a common concern—women’s 
position in society—but with diff erent priorities, identities, and 
strategies for action. So as a movement, it does not contain a set of 
fi xed common objectives, continuity, unity, and coordination—as 
some other social movements do. 
Feminism as a social movement began in the early 1920s—the 
“fi rst wave” in the United States and Europe—seeking to reform 
specifi c laws perceived as holding women in a subordinate posi-
tion. Focusing on suff rage, the right to own property, and access to 
the justice system, it engaged women politically, won legal recogni-
tion of women, and challenged legal barriers to gender equality. 
The second wave, radical feminism, recognized that legal equal-
ity was not enough to change women’s subordination in society. 
Organized around the slogan, “the personal is political,” a new 
agenda aimed at transforming the social and economic status of 
women. Focal areas included control over women’s own bodies—
particularly reproduction—equal pay claims, and domestic vio-
lence. The emphasis on subordination and diff erence was articu-
lated around “intersectionality” and the interrelations among sex, 
race, and class oppression. 
The third wave, postfeminism, shifts attention from legal rights 
and group identity to emphasize (and act on) a new concept of 
equality that disregards all fundamental diff erences between men 
and women. Rejecting all possible factors that unite women as a 
class or a group, as well as all homogenizing defi nitions and gener-
alizations, postfeminism focuses instead on cultural and individual 
rights.
Perspectives and points of public action have shifted over time, 
but the women’s movement has solidifi ed, nationally and interna-
tionally. The international, or global, women’s movement can be 
derived from the national organizations that came together around 
the 1975 declaration of the Decade of Women by the United Nations 
and its four international conferences—Mexico City (1975), Copen-
hagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995). These conferences 
were the fi rst to bring together women from developed and de-
veloping countries, creating common interests and strategies for 
action the world over. 
The number of women’s international nongovernmental orga-
nizations (WINGOs) has swelled, with more than 300 new groups 
founded each year around the world. They espouse a broad variety 
of goals but share a commitment to advancing women’s concerns 
in society. Their focus, priorities, and means of action have also 
shifted from one decade to another, building on past successes and 
responding to new social realities. 
Two forces are at constant play: controversy and coalition. Coali-
tion has given the movement strength in the international and 
national sphere when it has managed to bring women together 
around a common topic. Controversy—as the recognition of diff er-
ences within the movement—gives the movement life.
Ten years ago women were not involved; but women hold positions of authority now. 
People attend community meetings and women are very much involved. Ten years 
ago women were subject to men. Our level of development is enhanced by women’s 
participation.
Adult woman, Liberia
“
”
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ary family law.11 It has also reduced the hold of 
social norms blocking greater gender equality. 
During the debate in Cambodia leading to the 
2005 Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence 
and Protection of Victims, the draft law was 
 denounced for being antagonistic to Khmer cul-
In India, a constitutional amendment to set aside 33 percent of parliamentary 
seats for women has been under discussion since 1996. Supported by many 
women’s groups, it has failed to pass. Why?
In India’s fragmented political landscape, small ethnic and caste-based par-
ties in the states are central in building coalitions to constitute a government. 
Some of these parties oppose the proposed amendment on the grounds that 
lower-caste men will be displaced by upper-caste women. They contend that 
the current version of the reservation bill does not provide special allotments 
to lower-caste women (or possibly Muslim women) within the 33 percent 
quota. In turn, political parties and women’s organizations that support the 
existing legislation reject a “quota within quota” system. The politics of gender 
and the politics of caste in this arena have been gridlocked ever since. 
In contrast, after the fall of Saddam Hussein the Iraqi Governing Council was 
constituted to ensure adequate representation from ethnic and religious 
groups—Shi’as, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrian Christians—leaving 
women’s political participation in the transitional government largely rele-
gated in importance. U.S. offi  cials emphasized that there were “no plans for 
[female] quotas.” When the Iraqi constitution was drafted, however, power-
sharing notions among ethnic and religious groups had been abandoned and 
replaced by provisions on decentralization, federalism, and majoritarianism. 
The voices of women actors and women’s groups, by contrast, had grown 
louder in favor of female parliamentary quotas. Article 47 established an expec-
tation of 25 percent female representation in the National Assembly. Later, the 
new electoral law established that one of the fi rst three candidates on the bal-
lot list must be a woman.
BOX 8.3   Competing interests—Caste, ethnic, and religious 
politics and gender
Sources: Krook and O’Brien 2010; Menon 2009; UNRISD 2005.
form initiative less accessible or even regressive. 
When costs are perceived to be too high, poten-
tial losers may jeopardize the policy process or 
hinder its implementation. For instance, some 
men feel threatened by policy change, whether 
in their economic or social roles, so they may 
lash out and look for ways to return to “the old 
ways.” In India, the response by some men to 
legislation to protect women’s status and well-
being has been to call for a return to a tradi-
tional equilibrium.8 The Protection of Women 
from Domestic Violence Act of 2005 has been 
actively fought by organizations such as “Save 
Indian Family,” while the Dowry Prohibition 
Act of 1986 has been resisted by “Men against 
Dowry Act Misuse” organizations.9 
Even so, political activism and social organi-
zation have gone hand in hand with important 
social gains. In the political sphere, constitutional 
reform has been a focal concern of women’s re-
cent mobilization. Women’s organizations have 
sought to repeal any bias in civil and political 
rights (box 8.4). There is a positive and signifi -
cant relationship between the global rise of the 
women’s international movement—measured 
by the number of women’s organizations and 
international treaties or conventions dedicated 
to women—and the achievement of milestones 
in women’s political participation in 151 coun-
tries. Examples include attaining female suf-
frage, electing the fi rst female parliamentarian, 
and women progressively reaching 10, 20, and 
30 percent of the seats in national legislatures.10 
Collective action has drawn “private life” into 
the public arena, identifying and addressing 
gender bias in statutory, religious, or custom-
B OX  8.4   More women in public offi ce—The Namibian Women’s Manifesto 
Network 
Sources: Geisler 2004; Mensah-Williams 2010.
The Namibian Women’s Manifesto Network, 
launched in 1999 as a coalition of more than 30 
groups, strives for greater women’s political repre-
sentation. In the 50/50 campaign, the main objec-
tive has been to promote party candidate lists with 
50 percent quotas for women, structured in “zebra” 
fashion, alternating men and women on the lists. 
The South West Africa People’s Organization (the 
majority political party) placed 28 percent of 
women candidates on the party list that year, and 
female representation in the National Assembly 
jumped to 26 percent. 
Today, Namibia ranks 42nd in the world for 
women representatives in parliament. Nineteen of 
78 National Assembly members are women. The 
Network continues to promote gender parity in 
politics. Its regional and local facilitators hold work-
shops across the country. It has also promoted the 
appointment of gender focal points and gender 
budgeting approaches to planning. 
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it are so powerful that many African women are 
strong advocates for its continuance.15
Race, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, and class 
identity coexist with gender (or “intersect” with 
gender, where their interactions create specifi c 
effects). As a result, different groups of women 
differ in their needs, experiences, and percep-
tions of social, economic, and political reality; in 
turn, those differences infl uence their political 
preferences and interpretation of policy options. 
In Brazil and the United Kingdom, black women 
complained that gender equality advocacy was 
blind to their particular needs.16 Other groups 
have established their own identity groups and 
identity politics to make their specifi c claims 
heard (box 8.6). 
When these intersections are not recognized 
or are rendered invisible, they can stand between 
effective cooperation and advocacy—and in the 
way of realizing common goals for women’s 
well-being. The term “violence against women” 
emerged in the global arena in the 1970s, but 
it took more than two decades for the Decla-
ration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women, the fi rst international statement in this 
area, to become a reality in 1993. The UN World 
Conferences on Women in Mexico (1975) and 
Nairobi (1985) saw little progress in articulat-
ing an overarching framework to fi ght gender 
violence. Women’s advocates actively disagreed 
over priorities and avenues for remediation. The 
global movement against gender-based violence 
reached a turning point only after it developed 
explicit norms to acknowledge differences and 
promote inclusiveness. Consensus on a frame-
work for dealing with gender-based violence 
emerged through a commitment to incorporate 
marginalized groups and institute avenues to 
voice dissent.17
Men as allies toward gender equality
The transition toward a more egalitarian society 
has required the contribution and commitment 
of male actors. As heads of states and govern-
ment ministers, as leaders of religious and faith-
based institutions, as judges, as heads of armies, 
as employers and business managers, as village 
heads, and indeed as husbands and fathers, men 
have held and continue to hold signifi cant power 
over many aspects of women’s lives. Men’s at-
titudes and behaviors are crucial in the debate 
and in the design of gender-related policies.18
ture. Parliamentarians criticized it for “provid-
ing women with too many freedoms and rights, 
which will cause them to be so happy with their 
freedom that they do not respect ancient Cam-
bodian customs. . . . A cake cannot be bigger 
than the cake pan.”12 The Cambodia Committee 
of Women, a coalition of 32 nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), persistently lobbied the 
government and the Ministry of Women’s Af-
fairs to secure the legislation’s passage. 
Women are a heterogeneous group
Women differ not only in their endowments 
and access to opportunities but also in their 
values and ideology. They typically have differ-
ing defi nitions of sexuality, family, and desir-
able state intervention.13 The interests of some 
women may be directly opposed to the interests 
of other women. Women in Switzerland stood 
against universal suffrage (box 8.5). Women in 
the United States are divided on issues of abor-
tion rights, maternity leave, and affi rmative ac-
tion policies.14 Some women fi ght to prohibit 
the use of the veil in France—others stand for 
their right to wear it. While female genital cut-
ting has signifi cant physical and psychological 
consequences, the beliefs and traditions around 
Swiss women gained the right to vote in federal elections and to run for politi-
cal offi  ce after a national referendum in 1971. Eleven women (5.5 percent) were 
even elected as members of parliament. But some women had been a major 
factor in blocking passage of those rights in an earlier referendum.  
The Federation of Swiss Women against Women’s Right to Vote, founded in 
1959, opposed women’s suff rage, arguing that women’s duties lie in the house-
hold. German-speaking cantons abided by cultural perceptions of women’s 
role in society as bound to Kinder, Kirche, und Küche (Children, Church, and 
Kitchen): Men operated in the public space, and women in the private sphere. 
“Look what female suff rage has done to other countries: Everywhere the 
so-called equality of women has resulted in women losing their natural privi-
leges and suff ering through having to compete with men on their own ground. 
A woman’s place is in the home, not in the political arena. To make political 
decisions, you must read newspapers, and a woman who does her housework 
and looks after her children has no time to read newspapers,” said Gertrud 
Haldimann, the president of the federation. 
The 1959 national referendum resulted in a resounding no. Sixty-seven per-
cent of voters opposed women voting. In the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, 
an overwhelming 95 percent opposed the extension of the franchise.
BOX 8.5   Differences among women about their right to 
vote—The case of Switzerland 
Source: The Spokesman-Review, October 25, 1959, p. 12.
 The political economy of gender reform 337
tion between Republicans and Democrats—and 
their desire to expand the universe of voters who 
might support their policies—as well as the en-
actment of suffrage in neighboring states.21 
The UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 
1995 sought to “encourage men to participate 
fully in all actions towards gender equality”—in 
education, socializing children, child care and 
housework, sexual health, and violence against 
women. Men’s organizations have rallied in 
support of gender equality. One example is 
the Rwanda Men’s Resources Centre, an NGO 
founded in October 2006 to engage men and 
boys in the fi ght against gender-based violence. 
The MenEngage Alliance is a global network 
of NGOs and UN partners working to en -
gage men and boys in efforts for greater gender 
equality. The alliance has more than 400 NGO 
members working in more than 70 countries, 
ranging from small programs to larger advo-
cacy efforts. Most members work in collab-
oration or are associated with women’s rights 
organizations.22
A consensus is growing that it is necessary to 
work with both men and women to break harm-
ful gender norms. As two researchers put it, 
Gender roles are constructed and recon-
structed—and must be questioned—by 
both men and women. Girls and women 
can contribute to traditional, harmful ver-
sions of manhood, just as boys and men can 
The reforms of child custody and marital 
property laws in 19th-century England and the 
United States preceded the granting of wom-
en’s political rights. These early expansions in 
women’s rights were passed by all-male legis-
latures accountable only to all male voters.19 It 
happened because as development proceeded, 
rising capital accumulation, declining fertility, 
and growing demand for human capital gave 
fathers the incentives to accord rights to their 
daughters.20 
The extension of the franchise to women in 
the United States occurred eventually in great 
part from the vigorous advocacy of women’s or-
ganizations. But in its early stages, the strength of 
the suffrage movement increased the likelihood 
of a suffrage bill’s introduction, not its passage. 
For instance, Wyoming was the fi rst state to enact 
universal suffrage in 1890 even though it lacked 
a strong organized suffrage movement. Early 
adoption in western states is partly explained by 
a rising number of educated professional and 
progressive middle-class men. Other contribut-
ing factors included intense political competi-
B OX  8.6  Domestic workers in Brazil 
Sources: Gonçalves 2010; Moreira Gomes and Martins Bertolin 2011.
The organization of women domestic workers in Brazil challenges 
universalizing notions of women. Domestic workers constitute 7 
percent of the labor force, and black women make up 60 percent of 
all domestic workers. Domestic workers face diff erences in social 
class and race in relation to their predominantly middle- and upper-
class white female employers, who benefi t from low-cost domestic 
help.  
Legal provisions for domestic workers include a minimum sal-
ary, paid leave, maternity or paternity leave, and a right to unem-
ployment compensation. Yet 28 percent of domestic workers 
receive half the minimum salary, and 41 percent receive something 
between half and full minimum salary. 
Supported by the National Federation of Domestic Workers 
(FENATRAD), founded in 1997, a proposal for constitutional reform 
is under discussion to improve enforcement of these rights as well 
as to equalize domestic workers’ rights with workers’ rights in gen-
eral, including family allowances, overtime payment, and accident 
insurance. The proposal has met signifi cant resistance from employ-
ers: the Employers Union president in São Paulo state warned that 
the approval of domestic workers rights in the Federal Congress 
would make labor costs unsustainable. 
In 2003, the government established a permanent table for 
negotiations with FENATRAD, leading to programs such as “Citizen 
Domestic Worker” to strengthen the voice of domestic workers. The 
program off ers education and public awareness campaigns on such 
topics as violence against women, the eradication of domestic child 
labor, and the right to housing, health, work, and social security as 
well as tips on organizing trade unions for domestic workers in 
seven cities across Brazil. 
For a good future, men must 
change.
Adult man, Peru
“ ”
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sponsibility for care still lies largely with women, 
the policies have had fairly high acceptance. In 
2003, Swedish fathers took 18 percent of paren-
tal leave days.26
In Brazil, Chile, Croatia, and Mexico, adult 
men overwhelmingly express that “men do not 
lose out when women’s rights are promoted” 
(an exception is India) (fi gure 8.3). Support for 
female quotas in executive positions, university 
enrollments, and public offi ce also run relatively 
high. Even in India, where survey data suggest 
men are considerably less supportive of gender 
equality overall, the support for some specifi c 
policies is broadly based.27
The inclusion of men can convey the idea 
that gender equality is a public good benefi t-
ing all. Using local data, research, and testimo-
nials in mass media and advocacy campaigns 
can facilitate policy dialogue and frame gender 
equality—in relationships, in households, and 
in communities—as a public good for everyone. 
Engaging with youth can shape lasting social at-
titudes toward gender roles and gender justice.28
Broadening coalitions
Society’s actors can create political space for 
reform by building coalitions to increase the 
demand for change. Social mobilization and 
awareness-raising efforts can widen the plat-
form of support and the range of policy options. 
Coalitions can change the net political returns 
of a given policy alternative. 
The strength of supporting and opposing 
forces surrounding a divisive policy change 
depends on the national political context and 
the openness to international infl uences. In 
functioning democracies, politicians, civil soci-
ety, women’s organizations, labor unions, and 
religious groups openly debate the merits or 
consequences of policy change. Naturally, the 
specifi c issue at hand matters. The range of sup-
porting and opposing actors varies depending 
on whether the subject is gender-based violence, 
political quotas, labor laws relating to child 
care, or reproductive health. The fault lines are 
shaped by the intersection of gender with race, 
social class, or doctrinal beliefs. 
Gender-based violence is generally the least 
polarizing of these issues—men and women 
from different economic or ideological back-
grounds tend to regard domestic or gender-
based violence as intrinsically wrong. But each 
domain has a different resonance for different 
contribute to traditional, restrictive versions 
of womanhood. True and lasting changes in 
gender norms will only be achieved when 
it is widely recognized that gender is rela-
tional, that it is short-sighted to seek to em-
power women without engaging men, and 
that is diffi cult if not impossible to change 
what manhood means without also engag-
ing young women.23
Public policies that incorporate men and 
boys have been the exception. Sexual and re-
productive health initiatives should consider 
that women’s knowledge and access to contra-
ception is higher when men’s knowledge is also 
increased.24 Microcredit programs cannot ig-
nore how they challenge gender and household 
norms for men and women. A household sur-
vey in rural Bangladesh found that 78 percent of 
women said they had at some point been forced 
to cede money to their husbands, and 56 percent 
said that their husbands had forced them not to 
work outside the home.25
Most policy initiatives that do call on men to 
support gender equality are small, often lacking 
a strategic vision for scaling up and encourag-
ing broader social change. A notable exception 
is Scandinavia, where paternity leave provisions 
promote changes in gender norms and encour-
age men to partake in child care. Although re-
F I G U R E  8.3   Men around the world support women’s rights and 
policies 
Source: Barker and others 2011.
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ity, linking machismo to a form of violence.30 “I 
wash, iron, and cook . . . and so what?” contends 
a man looking straight into a television camera 
while tending to a toddler. 
Media outreach can also serve broader edu-
cational purposes. The Soul City Institute in 
South Africa uses radio, television, and newspa-
pers to disseminate information and promote 
refl ection on pressing health and social issues. 
Love Stories in a Time of HIV and AIDS is a series 
constituencies. Women and men in higher-in-
come groups may be opposed to state or private 
subsidized maternity leave or child-care provi-
sions because of higher taxes or higher costs of 
employing workers. Abortion legislation attracts 
opposition from conservative religious groups.
Which side will ultimately “win” depends on 
political alliances. Left-leaning governments in 
Sweden, supported by labor unions and wom-
en’s groups, championed maternity and child-
care legislation in the 1970s. But existing power 
coalitions could not reform the family code in 
Mali to defi ne marriage as a secular institution, 
raise the minimum age of marriage, and extend 
inheritance rights to women. Religious groups 
have continued to directly contest these efforts. 
Despite parliamentary approval in August 2009, 
President Amadou Toure recently announced 
that “after extensive consultations with the vari-
ous state institutions, with civil society, with the 
religious community and the legal profession, I 
have taken this decision to send the family code 
for a second reading to ensure calm and a peace-
ful society, and to obtain the support and under-
standing of our fellow citizens.”29 
Whether a proposed policy reform aimed 
at gender equality is perceived as a benefi t or a 
threat to the social order and political alliances 
is also determined by factors unique to each 
country. In Latin America, government alliances 
with religious groups have obstructed abortion 
legislation. Abortion may, therefore, be a doctri-
nal issue in Chile, but it raises no controversy in 
China, where it has been accepted in reinforcing 
the one-child policy.
Unleashing the power of information
Political support stems from information, inter-
ests, and perceptions. Transparency and stra-
tegic communication reduce information asym-
metries, promote a more effective public debate, 
and enable the exploration of public policy is-
sues from multiple perspectives. 
Media exposure can engage stakeholders di-
rectly and infl uence their private beliefs. Popu-
lar culture and information campaigns can 
contribute to changes in social norms, values, 
or preferences (box 8.7). Consider how new me-
dia outreach across Latin America is taking on 
machismo. Reacciona Ecuador, a public aware-
ness television campaign with support from 
several government agencies, calls into question 
traditional notions of masculinity and feminin-
In the 18th and 19th centuries, those campaigning to end slavery knew that 
sustained success required bringing about widespread societal changes in how 
people, especially infl uential elites, understood the practice. Pioneering meth-
ods of public persuasion that remain commonplace today, the abolitionists 
invented campaign buttons, testimonials from recent “converts,” endorse-
ments from sympathetic public fi gures and celebrities, mass-produced posters, 
and community drama. 
The women’s movement subsequently adopted many of these tools as it 
undertook campaigns for suff rage, equal pay, and reproductive health rights, 
and against domestic violence. It recognized that mainstreaming feminist prin-
ciples required changing how women and men everywhere understood these 
issues, which in turn required deploying modes of communication familiar to 
diff erent social groups, whether poems, novels, and plays for elites or street 
theater and popular songs for everyday citizens.
An example is the work of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, a poet in the Vice-
Royalty of New Spain, now Mexico. The 17th-century writings of this Tenth 
Muse, as she was known, were widely read by elites (those who were literate 
and could aff ord books) not only in the Americas but also in Spain.  Her work 
was published by the fi rst printing press in New Spain.  She provided lyrical 
accounts of the constraints on women’s freedoms and articulated the hypoc-
risy of prevalent societal values that held men and women to diff erent stan-
dards: “Who sins more, she who sins for pay? Or he who pays for sin?”
Between the 1740s and 1760s, three famous novels by men about young 
women—Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Lisa and Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa and 
Pamela—also embodied and promulgated a wholesale change in understand-
ing gender relations. At that time, the novel was a new form of mass communi-
cation, transporting readers into new worlds of emotion and imagination, 
presenting alternative but visceral renderings of women’s experiences and 
responses to crushing social conventions. 
The novels were best-sellers across Europe and eagerly translated. For mid-
18th-century readers, it was a revelation that men could write movingly and 
sympathetically about the plight of vibrant young women who, through the 
binding powers of social norms, were trapped in loveless relationships and 
unable to pursue their desires, talents, and aspirations. Yet it was an even big-
ger revelation that these women then summoned the courage to defy expecta-
tions and laws, to leave unhappy circumstances, and to strike out on their own. 
Ibsen’s A Doll’s House revisited this theme a century later, as did the novels of 
George Elliot and the Brontë sisters. Before gender policy changes could be 
articulated, campaigned for, and enacted, the very possibility of such changes 
fi rst had to be revealed. Put more generally, changing what is thinkable often 
precedes changing what is sayable and then doable.
BOX 8.7  How popular culture can change social attitudes
Sources: Hunt 2007; Hochschild 2005; Smith and Carroll 2000.
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mance has failed to elicit an equivalent federal 
response.33 
In the 21st century’s communication revolu-
tion, social media—blogs and social networking 
sites like Facebook—have opened new and in-
creasingly popular channels for social and polit-
ical participation. Unlike other media channels, 
social media are two-way and interactive, so 
people can now collaborate and share informa-
tion in fresh ways (chapter 6). Social networking 
websites have become platforms for awareness 
raising, social mobilization, political discussion, 
and fundraising. The opportunity to “invite” 
others to join discussion boards in social net-
working sites has heightened their potential for 
grassroots activism.34 For example, HarrassMap 
is an Egyptian NGO that compiles information 
from individual women reporting cases of sex-
ual assault using a web-based software mapping 
platform.35
INCLUSIVE MARKETS
Before World War II, many fi rms in the United 
States were reluctant to hire women, especially 
in the defense industry. Necessity changed all 
that. An example is the Fairchild Aircraft plant 
in Hagerstown, Maryland, which employed 
10,000 workers. The composition of its work-
force jumped from 20 percent female at the be-
ginning of the war to almost 70 percent in 1945. 
Overall, women held four of fi ve defense jobs 
in Maryland.36 In developing countries, formal 
wage employment usually is a much smaller 
fraction of total employment, but necessity can 
play a role here as well. In Nepal, war-related 
displacement of men as a result of the Maoist-
led insurgency led to a large increase in women’s 
labor force participation.37
Today, workforce diversifi cation is driven 
by different circumstances. The private sector’s 
embrace of gender equality in the workplace re-
sponds to four emerging trends (fi gure 8.4). First, 
in an increasingly globalized economy, skills are 
in high demand (chapter 6). Tapping the full 
 talent pool can reap signifi cant economic re-
wards. Second, diversity is considered a path-
way to better corporate decision making and 
inno vation. Third, women represent a growing 
market, and there is a desire to attune products 
and cater services to their needs. Fourth, gen-
der equality is a valued attribute in the market-
of 10 short fi lms for television from 10 coun-
tries in southern Africa that challenges people 
to think differently about their sexual lives and 
to debate and discuss cultural and social norms 
that put them at risk. Umtshatho (The Wedding) 
is set in a village in the Eastern Cape in South 
Africa, where Nomandla discovers on the day of 
her traditional Xhosa wedding that her fi ancée 
is cheating on her and that she needs to make 
some diffi cult choices.31 In Vietnam, the Popu-
lation Media Center uses radio as a means to 
address stigma and discrimination. Khat Vong 
Song is a radio serial drama starring Suu and her 
eldest daughter Mo. Suu is verbally and physi-
cally abused by her husband Tuat, the head of 
a clan in his village. Having three daughters al-
ready, Tuat desperately wants a son.32
Information also raises awareness, shapes 
public opinion, builds a constituency, and 
serves as a call to action. Gender inequality in 
education garnered the spotlight in the United 
States in a 1992 report, How Schools Shortchange 
Girls, by the American Association of University 
Women. The report and its related media out-
reach articulated how schooling marginalized 
girls in science and mathematics. It described 
how teachers bestowed preferential attention to 
boys, while girls’ grades and self-esteem fl oun-
dered. Its impact on national policy and pub-
lic opinion was swift and signifi cant. The 1994 
Gender Equity in Education Act in the United 
States identifi ed girls as a disadvantaged group 
and set aside federal fi nancing for a wide range 
of interventions meant to boost girls’ self-
confi dence and participation in science, en-
gineering, and mathematics—from science 
camps for girls to teacher training programs 
in classroom equality, and from gender-fair in-
structional materials to a new writing section 
to the Scholastic Achievement Test, a domain 
where girls excel, in part to increase scores on 
this high-stakes test. 
The pendulum has now swung in the op-
posite direction in the United States. Many 
scholars have argued that schools are failing 
boys—particularly African-American boys. 
Boys have lower literacy, lower school grades, 
lower engagement in school, higher dropout 
from school, higher repetition rates, higher 
placement in special education, higher rates of 
suspensions and expulsions, and lower rates of 
postsecondary enrollment and graduation. So 
far, however, boys’ educational underperfor-
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Women also tend to have higher job attrition 
and turnover rates than men.39 
Businesses have increasingly sought to at-
tract, recruit, and retain female talent (box 8.8), 
for high staff turnover comes at a price. Some 
analysts suggest that staff replacement costs 
range between 0.25 to 2.0 times the salary of the 
departing individual (depending on whether all 
costs are recognized).40 For instance, the costs 
of hiring and training a new nurse has been 
estimated at 1.3 times the salary of a departing 
nurse.41 
Work-life balance schemes strive to accom-
modate the dual demands of jobs and parenting 
to encourage staff loyalty and retention. As chap-
ter 7 discussed, part-time employment, extended 
family leave benefi ts, and subsidized child care 
have opened new job opportunities for work-
ing parents. The Sainsbury’s supermarket chain 
in the United Kingdom offers policies to en-
place—for potential employees, for investors, 
and for customers.
Attracting and retaining talent
Public and private enterprises look to attract the 
best possible talent. Women make up half the 
population and, in a majority of countries, the 
majority of university graduates (chapter 1). 
Although female labor force participation 
surged in past decades, it remains constrained 
(chapter 5). Women still do the majority of par-
enting around the world. And care responsibili-
ties pose a signifi cant burden to entering and 
staying in the labor market for many women—
their aspirations stopped short not necessarily 
by a glass ceiling but rather a “maternal wall.”38
So, women have concentrated in selected seg-
ments of the economy—such as teaching or 
public sector employment—that allow them 
to reconcile work and home responsibilities. 
F I G U R E  8.4   Economic and political economy considerations have prodded fi rms to promote gender 
equality policies
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work” in 2001 to promote online sales of home-
produced merchandise.43 T-Center is an Inter-
net portal for teleworkers to offer their services 
and for employers to advertise online work op-
portunities. Sponsored by the National Infor-
mation Technology Council in 2002, T-Center 
was designed to “empower women, youth and 
pensioners as an important economic factor in 
the family, community and the nation.”44
Employers have also looked to ease the rein-
tegration of new mothers into the workplace. In 
its efforts to increase the number of female pro-
fessors, Queen’s University Belfast gives women 
returning from maternity leave a semester for 
research, rather than the typical teaching and 
administration workload.45 Working mothers’ 
pre- and postmaternity medical needs at Sa-
faricom Ltd., a Kenya-based communications 
provider, are fully covered by insurance. Human 
resource policies at the company include three 
months of paid maternity leave. Work shifts are 
adjusted to accommodate breast-feeding moth-
ers for up to seven months, and lactation rooms 
and child-care facilities are available onsite.46 
A representative survey of 1,001 companies 
in Germany found that family-friendly fi rms 
receive 31 percent more applications for staff 
openings and retained employees 14 percent 
longer than other fi rms. Staff members were 
also 22 percent more likely to return following 
parental leave, and their absence was 8 percent 
shorter.47
But family-friendly work arrangements entail 
certain possible hazards. First, they can increase 
some costs of doing business for fi rms. Thus, 
 on-site child-care requirements or generous 
maternity leave policies can reduce incentives to 
hire women. Second, such arrangements also can 
reinforce existing social norms for gender roles 
in productive and reproductive activities. De-
loitte & Touche estimated that its fl exible work 
arrangements saved $13 million in reduced attri-
tion in 1997. Yet, employees who exercised fl exi-
ble work benefi ts were perceived as less dedicated 
or reliable, dampening their chances for career 
advancement and promotion. Male accountants 
equated commitment with long hours, assum-
ing that those working fl exibly were less com-
mitted.48 Fathers who wish to take advantage 
of family-friendly benefi ts to be more active in 
child-care responsibilities can face even higher 
barriers than mothers, whose nurturing role is 
more culturally accepted.
hance work-life balance, including part-time 
work, fl exible contracts, job sharing, extended 
maternity leave and pay, paternity leave, parental 
leave, career breaks of up to fi ve years for child 
care, and special leave of up to one year for per-
sonal development or care responsibilities.42
Information technologies have enabled tele-
commuting or teleworking, making it easier for 
women and men to work from home (chap-
ter 6). Telework is a core strategy for expanding 
female labor force participation in Malaysia’s 
formal and informal sectors. The Ministry of 
Women, Family and Community Development 
and the Ministry of Science, Technology and the 
Environment fi nanced an “eHomemakers net-
McKinsey and Company interviewed a dozen companies notable for increasing 
women’s participation in their workforces, managements, and boardrooms. 
Four practices stand out in promoting gender diversity:
Create transparency through gender diversity, knowledge, and perfor-
mance indicators. The main indicators included the proportion of women in 
the company’s various business lines, at each level of management, and among 
new recruits; pay levels and attrition rates between men and women with simi-
lar functions; and the ratio of women promoted to women eligible for promo-
tion. Monitoring these indicators should raise awareness about the magnitude 
of the gaps to be closed within the organization.
Implement measures to facilitate work-life balance. Two elements are 
important here. The fi rst is workplace fl exibility (telecommuting, part-time 
work, fl exible hours). Flexibility is not a woman-only policy. It should be part of 
the general development of a company’s business model, requiring the adap-
tation of organization and culture. The second is career fl exibility and support 
during career breaks. That women tend to take career breaks needs to be taken 
into account to prevent any negative impacts on their career paths or pay. 
Companies that manage maternity leave best retain contact through this 
period, have one-on-one meetings before and after to ensure their employees 
are properly reintegrated, and keep a watch on pay raises and bonuses in the 
years following the return to ensure equal treatment.
Adapt the human resource management process. Companies must ensure 
that their recruitment, appraisal, and career management systems do not hold 
women back in their professional development. And to the extent possible, 
companies should off er personalized career paths to retain the best talent.
Help women master the dominant social codes and nurture their ambi-
tion. Coaching, network-building, and mentoring programs can be highly 
eff ective in raising women’s awareness and enabling them to respond to male-
centric corporate environments. Setting up women’s networks within compa-
nies creates opportunities for broader professional exposure while also raising 
the profi le of female leaders in the organization.
BOX 8.8  Four good practices for greater gender diversity
Source: McKinsey & Company Inc. 2007.
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the workplace to enable men and women with 
different skills, perspectives, and working styles 
to contribute to meeting organizational goals 
and employees’ professional needs. The third 
is to engender greater staff commitment and 
loyalty. And the fourth is to allow the public to 
associate a fi rm’s products and services with a 
commitment to gender equity in the workplace 
through a Gender Equity Seal. Firms use a self-
diagnostic tool to analyze their policies and 
practices for gender equity and identify pos-
sible biases. Capacity-building opportunities 
include training in the practical importance of 
gender equity for fi rms, staff recruitment, train-
ing and career development, and in preventing 
sexual harassment. Audits, conducted by an 
independent agency, determine whether a fi rm 
has reached its established gender equity goals. 
Successful fi rms receive a Gender Equity Seal in 
recognition of their commitment to gender eq-
uity in human resource management. 
Arafa Holding, a textile and apparel fi rm par-
ticipating in GEME, offers incentives to women 
to retain them as valuable employees. Married 
women are at times exempted from working 
longer hours so they may satisfy family respon-
sibilities. Housing is also provided for married 
couples working in the company. Company 
transportation is available free of charge to em-
ployees who live in distant areas. Special time al-
lowance is given to mothers to visit their young 
children at day care.54 
Female Future, a gender equality initiative 
launched in March 2003 by the Confederation 
of Norwegian Enterprises (Næringslivets Hove-
dorganisasjon, or NHO), is a national organiza-
tion for employers and a leading business lobby-
ist. Its primary goal is to assist NHO members 
to identify female talent for leadership positions, 
thus bringing new perspectives to management. 
Firms identify potential candidates for executive 
and board posts and sign a binding agreement 
to increase gender diversity within two years. 
Female Future runs leadership and networking 
programs for prospective candidates for mana-
gerial positions. More than 1,000 women have 
participated in the program, and about 62 per-
cent of them have advanced their careers. Austria, 
Japan, and Uganda have similar initiatives.55
Women as customers and employees
Women, a growing market segment, make up 
a formidable share of shoppers in much of the 
Diversity for better decision making
Gender diversity practices have been espoused 
as a means to achieve greater organizational ef-
fectiveness. Indeed, staff diversity can spur cre-
ativity and innovation by enriching business 
decision making through multiple perspectives. 
Data from a national sample of for-profi t busi-
ness organizations in the United States found 
that gender diversity was associated with higher 
sales revenue, more customers, and greater prof-
its.49 But diversity has also been linked to more 
confl ict and less cohesion. Diverse groups or 
business units do not necessarily function better 
or experience higher levels of satisfaction.50 
Similarly, international evidence on the ef-
fect of gender diversity in corporate boards, as 
measured by various indicators of fi rm perfor-
mance, is mixed (chapter 5). Disparate results 
refl ect different economic environments, regu-
latory structures, company types, and fi nancial 
performance. Diversity may also affect differ-
ent corporate board functions in unique ways, 
making it diffi cult to generalize about the links 
between board composition and overall fi rm 
performance.51 For 68 Spanish fi rms, the ra-
tio of men to women on corporate boards has 
a signifi cant effect on fi rm value,52 but for 443 
Danish corporations, there was no relationship 
between female board representation and orga-
nizational performance.53 
The relationship between diversity and per-
formance refl ects the organizational culture. 
Changing that culture requires moving beyond 
“tokenism” and achieving a critical mass of staff 
diversity at different organizational levels. In 
some cases, as fi rms become more diverse, they 
must contend with entrenched organizational 
contexts that may be inhospitable to women. 
Managers and staff alike must value diversity. 
Avenues for communication and problem solv-
ing must be fl uid so that dissent can give way 
to consensus building. Creating an enabling en-
vironment for high performance may require 
changing attitudes and eliminating behaviors 
that refl ect both subtle and overt gender bias.
The Gender Equity Model Egypt (GEME) 
is a certifi cation program to promote labor 
practices that foster gender equity and improve 
women’s equal access to jobs and opportunities 
in private fi rms. One GEME goal is to optimize 
human resources to increase organizational ef-
fi ciency and competitiveness. The second is to 
promote positive interpersonal relationships in 
344 WO R L D  D E V E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 2
shareholders). Gender equality can thus en-
hance the corporate image. And equal oppor-
tunity or family-friendly policies can boost a 
fi rm’s reputation, with benefi ts accruing in staff 
recruitment, media interest, public attention, 
and customer loyalty. 
Financial incentives for gender sensitivity 
and diversity targets can be consequential. Some 
investment funds (CalPERS in the United States, 
Amazone in Europe) include gender equality 
among their investment criteria, and some rat-
ing agencies (Core Rating, Innovest, Vigeo) are 
developing tools to measure gender diversity.60
Since 2001, Better Factories Cambodia uses 
national and international standards in moni-
toring and reporting on working conditions 
in more than 300 Cambodian garment facto-
ries (where the workforce is primarily female). 
Under a trade agreement, the United States 
gives Cambodia better access to U.S. markets 
in exchange for better working conditions in 
the garment sector. Participation, a condition 
for export licensing in Cambodia, represents a 
convergence of common interests of the gar-
ment industry, international buyers, and the 
expectation of American and Western European 
consumers for sweatshop-free products. Better 
Factories Cambodia is managed by the Interna-
tional Labor Organization and fi nanced by the 
U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Agency for In-
ternational Development, Agence Française de 
Developpement, the Garment Manufacturers’ 
Association in Cambodia, the Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia, and international buyers.61
Sri Lanka’s Apparel Association Forum, an 
umbrella group representing the $3.5 billion gar-
ment industry, launched the “Garments without 
Guilt” program in 2006 to create “garments with 
conscience and care.”62 As in Cambodia, a media 
campaign has sought to portray Sri Lanka’s ap-
parel factories—mainly employing women—as 
ethical businesses so that its products will stand 
out in a competitive international market. For 
example, MAS Holdings has established a state-
of-art factory in Thulhiriya, brandishing the 
country’s social responsibility credentials.63 But 
working conditions are varied. Some factories 
require six days a week with mandatory overtime 
and work on successive shifts without a break; 
some also fi ne workers for lateness, talking, or 
going on toilet breaks. These factories are more 
likely to be older, smaller, and not owned by 
companies incorporated in high-income coun-
tries.64 There are thus limits to the effectiveness 
world—accounting for an estimated 83 percent 
of all consumer purchases in the United States 
and 70 percent in Europe.56 Understanding and 
targeting this base can be critical for business 
success.
Many private fi rms have expanded their 
female workforce and managerial staff to cre-
ate a more business-friendly environment for 
women customers. Best Buy is a $12 billion con-
sumer electronics company headquartered in 
the United States. “We’re not known for being 
a destination for women,” a spokesman attested. 
“We need to change that. And if we’re going to 
grow market share, we need to make sure that 
Best Buy is a great place for women to work.”57 
In recent years, the fi rm has hired additional 
women sales managers, lowered the turnover 
rate for  female staff, and attracted more women 
customers.
Women have also made enormous strides 
in nurturing small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), spurring local development and gen-
erating new employment opportunities. In East 
Asia, 35 percent of SMEs are women-owned—
more than 500,000 in Indonesia alone. Women-
owned businesses account for 48 percent of 
all micro, small, and medium enterprises in 
Kenya—producing around 20 percent of GDP. 
In Vietnam, the number of SMEs headed by 
women grew 43 percent annually between 2000 
and 2004; in Morocco, 8 percent between 2000 
and 2007.58 
Some private banks have begun to respond 
to women’s good credit and loan repayment re-
cords, easing traditional credit constraints (see 
box 7.5). Founded in 2000, the Global Banking 
Alliance for Women includes 25 members—
including NBS Bank in Malawi, Access Bank in 
Nigeria, First National Bank of South Africa, and 
Selfi na in Tanzania. Promoting fi nancial services 
to women, its goal is to accelerate the growth of 
women in business, while supporting superior 
business outcomes for member fi nancial insti-
tutions. Through a collaborative network for 
 exchanging best practices and research, mem-
bers provide access to capital, markets, educa-
tion, and training to increase the likelihood of 
success for women‘s businesses.59 
Gender equality to benefi t the corporate 
image and the bottom line
Gender equality is now used in assessing whether 
an enterprise is committed to corporate so-
cial responsibility (while maximizing value for 
The political economy of gender reform 345
initiate and promote policies that reduce or elim-
inate gender inequalities directly (fi gure 8.5). 
A fi rst step in bringing gender into the policy 
process is to understand the gender dimensions 
of policy design and enforcement. A gender lens 
should thus be a feature in all state agencies. Such 
a lens, for example, could reveal the existence of 
court procedures that restrict women’s access to 
justice, or statistical data collection systems that 
do not allow for assessing the impact of gov-
ernment policies on men and women (chapter 
9). Governments can also set up specialized 
agencies, often termed gender machineries, spe-
cifi cally to promote women’s rights.
Advances in gender equality do not always 
require wholesale action. Gender-neutral inter-
ventions can become more strategic and effec-
tive when gender considerations are taken into 
account. For example, a land titling program in 
Peru increased joint ownership rates by including 
provisions to lift constraints women faced (box 
8.9). It also increased mothers’ participation in 
the labor market and decreased fertility.68
of external standards when they are not socially 
embedded in the local milieu. And in a highly 
competitive commercial environment, the un-
certainty of returns relative to the costs of com-
pliance makes ethical concerns vulnerable.65
Nonetheless, claims of corporate misbehav-
ior, discrimination, or sexual harassment can di-
minish a company’s attractiveness to consumers 
and investors. In July 2009, the Dell computer 
company agreed to pay $9.1 million to settle a 
class-action suit claiming it had not given its fe-
male employees equal training, pay, or promo-
tions.66 In response, the fi rm has reviewed its 
diversity and inclusion practices, and formed 
a Global Diversity Council to review corporate 
policies, action plans, and progress.67
BRINGING GENDER INTO FORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES
While collective action and social movements 
often catalyze state action, governments typically 
F I G U R E  8.5  State action is central for the design and adoption of gender-progressive policies
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Beijing Platform of Action. Others work to in-
sert gender perspectives into all areas of gov-
erning through “gender mainstreaming.” Their 
approaches include promoting policy adoption 
and implementation, conducting assessments, 
delivering services, raising awareness, and sup-
porting NGOs.
No single organizational form has been con-
sistently more successful than others, whether 
statutory, centralized, or generously funded. 
Some countries have a central executive com-
mission, others a ministry or bureaucratic of-
fi ce. Some have all three, and still others, a range 
of single issue agencies—for labor, health, and 
education. Machineries can be more active in 
regional and local governments than at the cen-
tral level. 
But in some instances, gender machineries 
are more “modern” window dressing than au-
thoritative channels for gender equality within 
the state. They can thus be weak institutions 
with few staff, threadbare resources, and limited 
leverage to infl uence policy decisions (box 8.10).
Six organizational features are critical to the 
success of state institutions for gender equality:70 
•  Clarity of mission and an explicit understand-
ing of expected functions are essential.
•  Organizational structure must be aligned to 
expected functions. For example, the United 
States has espoused a model of multiple 
single-issue administrative offi ces to focus 
deeply on specifi c policy areas such as labor 
(the Women’s Bureau in the Department of 
Labor) or health (the Maternal and Child 
Health Bureau in the Department of Health 
and Human Services).
•  The statutory authority to propose policy and 
proximity to executive or central adminis-
tration increase the likelihood of policy 
adoption. 
•  Resourceful leadership that is committed to 
gender equality goals and has political stand-
ing in relation to decision makers and poten-
tial allies. 
•  Discretion over fi nancial resources is essen-
tial to perform (including budgets to sup-
port NGOs in areas not reached by policy 
decisions).
•  Strategic partnerships with civil society groups 
can foster coordinated action and advocacy. 
State structures promoting gender equality
In the past few decades, gender machineries—
formal government structures that promote 
gender equality and improve the status and 
rights of women—have proliferated in response 
to demands from women’s organizations and an 
international consensus for governmental lead-
ership and more decisive action toward gender 
equality.69 They provide gender-disaggregated 
policy analysis and support state institutions 
in designing and carrying out gender-sensitive 
policies. Assessing the implications of proposed 
policy actions for women and men can produce 
benefi ts for all, reducing disparities.
Gender machineries range from formal min-
istries to executive and parliamentary commis-
sions, to advisory boards, to institutes, to ombuds 
offi ces. They may be established by formal stat-
ute, executive decree, or bureaucratic rules. New 
forms include gender “focal points” and “desk 
offi ces” in some Sub-Saharan African countries 
and the Offi ces of Plenipotentiary in Poland. 
Gender machineries can have different mis-
sions. Some focus on specifi c gender equal-
ity policies, such as those outlined in the UN’s 
The Peruvian government launched a Special Land Titling and Cadastre Project 
(PETT, in Spanish) in 1992 to increase land tenure security and enhance agri-
cultural productivity and production. The project has been categorized as 
gender-neutral because it did not adopt any gender-specifi c regulations for 
implementation. The government’s rationale was that no extra measures were 
needed because there was no overt discrimination against women. 
But rural women suff er from higher illiteracy rates and are more likely to be 
monolingual than men. Women in consensual unions were also vulnerable to 
exclusion. A lack of identifi cation papers was another problem, because proof 
of identifi cation was necessary for land registration.
The NGO Red Nacional de la Mujer Rural, organized by the Peruvian 
Women’s Center Flora Tristán, led a nationwide awareness campaign to sup-
port women’s rights, reinforcing government eff orts. In 1998, it lobbied PETT 
offi  cials for clarifi cation of the land rights of women in consensual unions, argu-
ing that such women should be recognized as co-owners. The NGO drafted 
widely circulated administrative guidelines with a gender perspective. It also 
conducted gender-sensitivity training for PETT offi  cials.
PETT improved the distribution of land ownership. Fifty-six percent of plots 
in male-headed households were jointly titled in 2004, up from 49 percent of 
households in a control group that had not received PETT titles. More remark-
ably, joint ownership rates jumped from 13 percent of households in 2000 to 43 
percent in 2004.
BOX 8.9   Land titling in Peru—Using a gender lens for a 
gender-neutral program
Sources: Deere and León 2003; Orge Fuentes and Wiig 2009.
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The judiciary itself can be a driver of gender-
progressive change, or it can be a tool of the state 
in bringing about change. Country dynamics 
and specifi cities infl uence how and how much a 
court can contribute to change—the judiciary’s 
relationship to other state structures, the legiti-
macy of court authority, the independence of 
the courts themselves, and the existence of ex-
plicit laws that recognize gender equality as an 
enforceable right all infl uence the scope of the 
judiciary for action.
Courts typically have the exclusive right to in-
terpret the constitution and laws (box 8.11). For 
example, the Botswana High Court and Court of 
Appeals interpreted the country’s constitution as 
prohibiting sex discrimination, even though such 
discrimination was not explicitly identifi ed as 
being unconstitutional.71 Courts have also been 
instrumental in striking down legal provisions 
and state actions that discriminate on the basis 
of gender, such as unequal inheritance rights in 
Nepal.72 In Bahrain, a court case is pending that 
addresses the inability of women to transmit na-
tionality to their children. Previous court action 
Additionally, these partnerships can increase 
legitimacy to speak on behalf of women’s 
 issues.
Gender progressiveness in the application 
of the law
The role of the judiciary is to make an authori-
tative determination on any persistent dispute 
in a manner that is impartial, fi nal, and likely to 
be enforced. Courts of justice that operate with 
integrity can thus be powerful agents for social 
change when they work without gender bias or 
any other kind of prejudice. 
Why is the judiciary important? Although 
only a small percentage of people directly use 
courts in any country, the judiciary’s infl uence 
goes beyond those who come into direct contact 
with it. Courts that consistently and reliably en-
force the law through their decisions will affect 
the future behavior of most citizens and institu-
tions. In communities where courts issue con-
sistent, predictable decisions, community mem-
bers will normally seek to avoid behaviors that 
the courts are likely to punish or invalidate. 
B OX  8.10  Gender machineries in practice
Sources: McBride and Mazur 2011; World Bank, IADB, and SERNAM 2007.
Finland. Since the 1970s, the Council for Equality between Men 
and Women in Finland, an executive commission of political nomi-
nees from diff erent parties, has had few resources—and nothing 
more than a small staff , from fi ve to eight employees. In the 1970s 
it was primarily symbolic, limited to debates on job training. In 
the 1980s it was relocated from the Prime Minister’s offi  ce to the 
Ministry of Social Aff airs and Health, more distant from central 
power but inside one of the main arenas for policy making on 
social issues. It also received statutory responsibility for proposing 
reforms on gender equality. Under its new confi guration, the 
council registered more success in debates about prostitution, job 
training, and political representation. Under new leadership in 
1995, it promoted parliamentary gender quotas. Its success 
stemmed from its statutory responsibility for gender issues, pro-
posal powers, proximity to systems for social policy, assertive lead-
ership, and allies in parliament. 
Spain. The Institute for Women was established in 1983 as an admin-
istrative offi  ce in the Ministry of Culture and was later moved to the 
Ministry of Social Aff airs. The institute has always had the power to 
recommend and enforce actions to deal with discrimination com-
plaints as well as to design, promote and evaluate the four national 
gender equality plans implemented between 1988 and 2006. But it 
was hampered in performing these roles by its lack of statutory 
authority for making policy proposals and its distance from centers 
of political power. To increase its eff ectiveness, it became part of 
the broader General Secretary of Equality Policies within the Minis-
try of Labor and Social Aff airs in 2004 and in 2008 became part of 
the Ministry of Equality when that was created. The institute has 
been most successful in mainstreaming gender issues during the 
debate on abortion legislation in 1986, and more recently for laws 
against gender-based violence and the law on equality between 
men and women.
Chile. The National Service for Women, SERNAM, focuses on main-
streaming gender in sector ministries, with a limited mandate for 
project implementation. Its chair now has ministerial status and is a 
member of the Cabinet, a status that considerably improves its 
capacity to infl uence the intersectoral policy dialogue with line 
ministries. It also has an independent budget. But its human 
resource structure, with just 10 percent of its 270 total staff  under 
permanent contracts, and its lack of specialized personnel constrain 
its organizational capacity. Reorganizations following changes in 
political administration have further debilitated the institution, 
leading to the discontinuation of important lines of work.
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stances, such as a national disaster. Others arise 
from shifts in the political or economic land-
scape. And yet others emerge from the advocacy 
of transnational agencies and role modeling in 
the global arena.
Responding to local dislocations
An isolated event can be a catalyst to generate 
change. In Nicaragua in 1998, Hurricane Mitch 
created the conditions for a national dialogue 
on domestic violence. The NGO Puntos de En-
cuentro developed a campaign with the slogan, 
“Violence against women is a disaster that men 
can prevent,” building on the need for solidarity 
that Hurricane Mitch left in its wake.76 
Political transitions can provide the space for 
broader transformative reforms. General Fran-
co’s death in Spain in 1975 opened the door to 
a dramatic shift in the social landscape. During 
Franco’s years, contraception was prohibited, 
and married women needed their husbands’ 
permission to engage in economic opportuni-
ties, own property, or travel. Democracy allowed 
for a rapid transformation in the prevailing legal 
code to catch up with social expectations. The 
marital permit was abolished in 1975. Adultery 
laws and the ban on the sale of contraceptives 
were repealed in 1978. Divorce was legalized in 
1981. Legalized abortion in specifi c cases—rape, 
malformed fetus, or to save the mother’s life—
followed in 1985; public opinion remained 
largely opposed to abortion on demand. There 
has since been a large decline in the gender gap 
in employment as women, particularly married 
women, entered the labor force.77 
Transitions can, however, risk a reversal. The 
collapse of the Iron Curtain meant that Eastern 
European women lost some of the gains in gen-
der equality made under communism. In the 
1980s, about 90 percent of women in Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were em-
ployed. Women enjoyed free health care, long 
maternity leave, and state-sponsored child care. 
They also benefi ted from parliamentary quo-
tas that gave them some voice in the political 
system. But in the Russian Federation, female 
parliamentary representation dropped from 
35 percent in 1987 to 10 percent in 1999, and 
in Slovakia, from 30 percent to 13 percent. For-
mal employment recruitment heavily preferred 
men. Half of the day-care centers in Lithuania 
and Poland closed between 1992 and 1994. And 
Bulgarian slogans to increase birth rates urged 
women to go “back to home and family.”78 The 
led the government to waive government fees for 
public services to children of Bahraini mothers 
married to foreign nationals.73 
In some countries, courts lay down directives 
and guidelines in the absence of laws. The Su-
preme Court in India, in addition to declaring 
sexual harassment unlawful under the constitu-
tion and international conventions, provided 
guidelines for observance at all workplaces and 
other institutions, public or private, applicable 
until legislation is passed by parliament.74 In 
another case, it provided directions to improve 
various government schemes for maternal and 
infant mortality.75
Special courts (such as family courts or courts 
for rape and sexual offenses) or specifi c regimes 
(family matters reserved to religious or custom-
ary courts) can infl uence outcomes and shape 
the content of rights. These alternative mecha-
nisms, as well as gender units in the judiciary, 
can support a gender-responsive environment 
for the application of law. For example, as noted 
in chapter 4, even where women have access to 
justice, their ability to navigate the judicial sys-
tem might be impaired by gender norms and 
sensitivities. Women subjected to sexual violence 
may be reticent to testify publicly, so allowing tes-
timony in private chambers may facilitate more 
sexual assault cases to be prosecuted in court.
SEIZING WINDOWS OF 
OPPORTUNITIES
Windows of opportunity for gender policy 
sometimes stem from unpredictable circum-
In 2003, in the Constitutional Court of Uganda, the Uganda Association of 
Women Lawyers successfully challenged discriminatory divorce laws as uncon-
stitutional. Under an 1857 version of an English Marriage Act—which still 
applied in Uganda but had long since been reformed in the United Kingdom—
husbands were allowed to obtain a divorce on the grounds of adultery; yet a 
wife had to prove aggravated adultery (adultery plus another off ense such as 
incest, bigamy, cruelty, or desertion) to obtain a divorce. The judge held that 
this diff erent treatment refl ected pre-20th-century English perceptions that a 
man was superior to a woman, which was impossible to reconcile with modern 
concepts of equality and nondiscrimination between the sexes as embedded 
in the 1995 Ugandan constitution.
BOX 8.11   Courts and constitutional challenges in Uganda’s 
divorce law
Source: Uganda Association of Women Lawyers v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2003) 
UGCC1.
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deep knowledge of local conditions, these or-
ganizations can assist governments in assessing 
gender-differentiated impacts of various policy 
responses and lobby for policy change in prior-
ity areas. International development partners 
have also been repositories of ideas for policy 
innovation to create lasting economic and social 
change. They are vocal advocates and sponsors 
of promising approaches to address gender in-
equality, offering tools for mainstreaming gen-
der issues in specifi c sectors, and conducting 
training to increase awareness of gender and 
development (chapter 9).
The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
 (CEDAW) and other international treaties pro-
vide an umbrella framework delineating inter-
national norms for gender equality—an inter-
national code of conduct. CEDAW facilitates 
consultations, provides models of good prac-
tice, and stimulates cooperation on technical 
assistance. It has been a channel for gender re-
form in many countries (box 8.12), even if some 
do not always uphold their commitments. 
Oversight and regular monitoring by the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women provide occasions for national 
governments to refl ect on their record and draw 
rise of capitalism and a new political order in 
Eastern Europe thus set women back on some 
aspects of endowments, agency, and economic 
opportunities.
Even without social, political, or economic 
change, shifts in the relative political power of 
various actors can open room for reform. In 
Morocco, after more than 10 years of efforts 
by women’s groups, a new family code was en-
dorsed by the king and unanimously adopted 
by parliament in 2004 in response to popular 
support.79 The legislation raised the minimum 
age of marriage to 18 for women, controlled po-
lygamy, allowed women to initiate divorce pro-
ceedings, enabled women to retain custody of 
children, and improved inheritance rights.80
Riding on transnational efforts
Transnational networks have driven the dif-
fusion of gender issues around the globe as 
has international role modeling (chapter 6). 
Reform-oriented policy makers are attuned to 
the successes and failures in nations near and 
afar. Policy shifts beyond a nation’s borders 
can increase their receptivity and legitimacy at 
home, as the vertiginous speed and deep pene-
tration of mass media and telecommunications 
facilitate the spread of new ideas.
Between 1930 and 1990, about 20 countries 
adopted quotas to increase female representa-
tion in political offi ce. In the 1990s, gender quo-
tas expanded to 50 more countries, and an addi-
tional 50 approved quota systems in the 2000s.81 
In November 1997, the heads of governments 
of the Southern African Development Com-
munity adopted the Declaration on Gender and 
Development, committing to 30 percent repre-
sentation of women in decision-making posts 
by 2005. In 2005, they boosted the goal for 2015 
to 50 percent.82
Much of the force of transnational networks 
emanates from international women’s organi-
zations, the United Nations, and international 
development and cooperation agencies. The 
Inter-American Commission of Women, es-
tablished in 1928 as an offi cial forum for debat-
ing and formulating gender equality policies 
in the Americas, was the fi rst intergovernmen-
tal agency to ensure recognition of the human 
rights of women.
International NGOs and networks of wom-
en’s groups can be allies in spurring and moni-
toring reform. Working locally, regionally, and 
nationally, with a strong fi eld presence and 
Fiji’s ratifi cation of CEDAW and its constitutional commitment to adhere to the 
convention were critical for its adoption of a new egalitarian family law in 2003. 
Principles of equal partnership and unpaid contributions to property had 
not been recognized, divorce was diffi  cult to obtain, women could be excluded 
from the home, and postdivorce maintenance was limited and not reliably 
enforceable. Family law reform started in 1995, when Fiji acceded to the con-
vention, but was stalled by a civilian uprising in 2000. When calm returned, 
reform was fi ercely resisted. Imrana Jalal, the Family Law Reform Commissioner 
in the mid-1990s, credits the state’s ratifi cation of CEDAW and the 2002 CEDAW 
review as signifi cant in overcoming opposition. Supporters were bolstered by 
the constitution then in force, which specifi cally prohibited discrimination on 
the basis of gender. 
The new family law noted that several specifi c provisions meet CEDAW 
norms: fi nancial and nonfi nancial contributions taken into account in property 
division; presumption of equal contribution; and enforceable postmarital main-
tenance from either spouse, depending on the circumstances. In addition, the 
age of marriage was raised to 18 years for both men and women in 2009. 
In its 2010 review, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women commended the state for adopting family laws in compliance 
with the convention but noted that inheritance practices remain a problem. 
BOX 8.12   Fiji: International norms as a driver of gender 
equality in family law
Source: Byrnes and Freeman 2011.
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informed the expansion of reproductive health 
guarantees in the Colombian Consitution, ad-
opted in 1990, and facilitated greater access to 
contraception.85 
Trade and economic cooperation agree-
ments, through antidiscriminatory clauses and 
minimum standards, are another channel for 
widening gender reform. In September 1999, 
for example, the Asia Pacifi c Economic Coop-
eration ministers endorsed a Framework for the 
Integration of Women and established an Ad 
Hoc Advisory Group on Gender Integration to 
ensure its effective implementation.86
Under many of these agreements, noncom-
pliance may result in a reduction of economic 
benefi ts or the application of sanctions. Breaches 
of labor standards in a side agreement to the 
North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion have led to transnational legal action and 
social mobilization. Female employees of a U.S.-
owned vehicle parts plant based in Mexico fi led 
a sexual harassment complaint with Mexican 
authorities. During the investigation, the par-
ent company—American United Global—shut 
down the plant and fi red the women. A sexual 
harassment suit was then fi led in Los Angeles Su-
perior Court, claiming severance pay owed to the 
women under Mexican law. With assistance from 
the California-based Support Committee for 
Maquiladora Workers, the United Auto Workers 
sought to enforce a clause in their contracts with 
Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors not to use 
parts made under unfair labor conditions. After 
eight months of legal wrangling and community 
activism, the case was settled out of court.87 
PATHWAYS TO CHANGE
There is no single path to greater gender equal-
ity, for policy change is an adaptive and complex 
process. Progress in advanced and developing 
economies has come through different routes, 
and public action has varied. Governments have 
espoused a wide range of gender-equalizing pol-
icies through changes in family laws and prop-
erty rights, antidiscrimination statutes in labor 
markets, and more targeted interventions. Some 
have subsidized girls’ education and women’s 
wage employment. Others have experimented 
with cash benefi ts for child care and parental 
work leave provisions for new fathers. The se-
quencing of reforms has also differed across 
countries, as have the pace and depth of their 
possible options for action from the commit-
tee’s recommendations.
The UN World Conferences on Women held 
in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1995 also galvanized 
national and international support for improv-
ing the political, economic, and social status of 
women—as did the UN Population Confer-
ences, particularly the 1994 conference in Cairo. 
These international conferences opened politi-
cal space for national governments and societal 
actors to raise concerns, generate awareness, 
learn about cross-national experiences, gener-
ate momentum, and apply pressure to advance 
a gender equality agenda nationally.83 Ratifi -
cations of women’s rights conventions, such 
as CEDAW, have been clustered around these 
major international human rights conferences 
(fi gure 8.6).84
Synergies are strong between national gov-
ernments, nonstate actors, and the interna-
tional development community. First, CEDAW 
and the Millennium Development Goals of-
fer a framework for mutual accountability, by 
delineating gender equity goals tied to specifi c 
targets and deadlines. Both have rallied national 
governments and international stakeholders to 
take time-bound actions to achieve precise ob-
jectives. Second, NGOs and international part-
ners have been pivotal in the effectiveness of the 
international women’s rights regime, buttress-
ing its mutual accountability framework. For 
instance, the monitoring and advocacy by Co-
lombian local women’s groups under CEDAW 
F I G U R E  8.6   Progress toward increasing women’s rights is 
clustered around major international human 
rights conferences
Source: Byrnes and Freeman 2011.
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proposal has been adopted almost without 
opposition. The gratitude which we women 
feel is mingled with the knowledge that we 
are much less worthy of this great success 
than the women of England and America, 
who have struggled so long and so faithfully, 
with much more energy and perseverance 
than we.89
Similarly, granting voting rights to women 
in postcolonial Africa was little contested. Uni-
versal suffrage was enmeshed with the struggle 
for independence. A gendered concept of citi-
zenship would have been widely repudiated 
because it was inconsistent with the prevailing 
belief in equal voice.
The Republic of Korea is the only Asian 
country that has reversed rising male-female sex 
ratios at birth. Despite rapid economic growth, 
greater female labor force participation, and 
better women’s education, a preference for sons 
persisted there through the mid-1990s. Earlier 
policy interventions reinforced Confucian tra-
ditions to channel resources toward rapid de-
velopment. The 1990 reform of the Family Law 
upheld the male family headship, along with 
patrilineal inheritance. Children belonged to the 
father’s lineage after a divorce. But industrializa-
tion and urbanization fueled normative changes 
in society that quickly led to a turnaround in 
 attitudes. Civil society began to pressure gov-
ernment to change laws upholding the margin-
alization of women in their domestic and pub-
lic lives. In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that 
women could remain members of their birth 
household after marriage—and that women 
and men have equal rights and responsibilities 
to care for their ancestors.90 These changes in 
the value and status of daughters in turn pro-
gressively weakened the preference for sons. 
When gender policy follows societal cues, 
an alignment between social expectations and 
policy design usually eases the convergence of 
policy’s intentions and outcomes. Several waves 
of policy reform in Tunisia increased social pres-
sure and consensus to liberalize family law. Later 
reforms stood on the successes and perceived 
benefi ts of earlier efforts (box 8.14).
But gender reform can also inspire spirited 
resistance to sway public opinion. In Ireland in 
May 1995, when the vote to remove the con-
stitutional ban on divorce through a national 
referendum was announced, 69 percent of the 
electorate said they would support it. Yet, by the 
impacts on gender outcomes and opportuni-
ties. Even in rich countries, the goal of gender 
equality remains a work in progress—even after 
many decades of campaigning and reform.
This range of experiences refl ects an ongo-
ing call to policy action, both nationally and 
globally. Leadership, civic activism, policy ne-
gotiation, and effective implementation man-
agement are essential to support and promote 
greater gender equality—especially in domains 
seemingly resistant to change, such as domestic 
violence.
Considered here are two possible pathways to 
policy reform, already introduced in chapter 7. 
Gender policies can be “incremental,” working 
within prevailing social norms or responding to 
emerging social demands and refl ecting changes 
in the broader institutional and normative envi-
ronment. Alternatively, government action can 
be “transformative” and strive to induce change 
in existing gender dynamics. In practice, incre-
mental policies can become transformative in 
nature; while transformative policies can and 
often fail or achieve more modest results.
Incremental change—Responding to 
emerging social demands
Many policy reforms follow shifts in the existing 
economic and social environment. Social norms 
can be remarkably stable, and their longevity 
can further buttress their resilience. But social 
norms are not immutable. Shifts in attitudes 
can occur quite rapidly, literally reaching a tip-
ping point when isolated or individual behavior 
garners critical mass appeal.88
Policy change happens as a means to resolve 
internal tensions between markets and formal, 
and informal institutions. In other words, gov-
ernment action responds to emerging or estab-
lished social demands. Indeed, bringing about 
such change—whether directly, through mak-
ing explicit demands of governments, or indi-
rectly, by seeking to alter broader societal un-
derstandings—is precisely the objective of most 
social movements and international campaigns 
(box 8.13).
Policy formulation and enactment are less 
likely to be contested or to encounter political 
resistance if a basis for consensus already exists. 
In 1906, The Englishwoman’s Review reported 
the extension of voting rights in Finland: 
The miracle has happened . . . Our victory 
is in all cases great and the more so as the 
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divorce laws protect the interests of different 
parties in a terminated marriage, specifying 
property splits, child custody, and entitled ali-
mony. But divorce laws also infl uence the be-
havior of married couples by shifting bargaining 
positions between husbands and wives. 
In Ireland, the legalization of divorce—and 
concomitant risk of marital dissolution—
increased female labor force participation. 
The participation rate of nonreligious mar-
ried women increased by around 10 percent-
age points (a 25 percent increase) relative to 
religious married women.92 The legalization of 
divorce also increased savings by married in-
dividuals.93 And in Chile, divorce legislation 
 increased school investments for children of 
married couples.94
time of the vote in November, a concerted cam-
paign against divorce had shrunk public sup -
port to 49 percent. The “yes” vote eventually 
won by a narrow 0.6 point margin.91 
Policy intentions and actions also can have 
unintended spillovers that give rise to new social 
dynamics and processes of change. For example, 
B OX  8.13  Changing social norms from the bottom up 
Sources: Mackie and LeJeune 2009; U.S. Department of State 2001; http://www.tostan.org.
Female foot binding, a painful and dangerous practice, lasted 1,000 
years in China but ended in a single generation in the early 20th 
century. Female genital cutting can be traced to the 2nd century 
B.C. (to Red Sea tribes) but was abandoned within a single genera-
tion in parts of Senegal. 
The persistence of such practices can be attributed to the beliefs 
held by members of an intermarrying group. Households comply 
with prevailing social norms because they do not want to be 
shunned by society or placed at a severe disadvantage in the mar-
riage market. Another contributing factor is the general acceptance 
of the status quo as the only possible alternative. Interviews with 
women in Tanzania indicate that many had never thought that not 
being cut was an option. Similarly, “when fi rst-contact foreigners 
asked Chinese why they bound their women’s feet, their response 
was astonishment that not everyone in the world engaged in the 
practice.” Because the conventions of foot binding and female gen-
ital cutting regulate access to marriage, noncomplying families are 
unlikely to reproduce. This makes it diffi  cult for variation in the 
practice within the community to take root.
What explains the rapid abandonment of these practices after a 
long history of adherence?  
Modernization appears to have had little to do with it. Instead 
what occurred was a grassroots social restructuring of beliefs. In 
China, a series of activist groups (the Anti-Foot Binding Society and 
the Natural Foot Society) emerged in the late 19th century. Their 
strategy involved pledging members of the community not to bind 
their daughters and not to let their sons marry bound women. 
These groups advertised the disadvantages of foot binding in Chi-
nese cultural terms, promoted pledge associations, and subtly con-
veyed international disapproval of the custom. As public support to 
end the practice grew, a political ban was instituted in the early 
20th century, cementing the earlier eff ort of mass mobilization and 
education.
Tostan, an NGO based in Senegal, espoused an analogous 
model in the 1990s to eradicate female genital cutting in parts of 
Senegal: 
•  Education. An innovative 30-month education program, known 
as the Community Empowerment Program, included modules 
on human rights, hygiene and health, literacy, and project 
management.
•  Public discussion. These modules were then discussed in small 
group settings. In these meetings, women and men deliberated 
their aspirations for themselves, their families, and their commu-
nity. Refl ection on individual and societal needs led individuals to 
revise their beliefs about existing cultural practices.
•  Public declaration and organized diff usion. Acting on their new 
established ideals, communities coordinated the abandonment 
of female genital cutting through public declaration or pledging 
and urging neighboring communities to do the same.
Initially, Tostan did not state whether female genital cutting 
was right or wrong. It was women’s decision to reject the practice. 
Women in Malicounda Bambara (population 3,000) mobilized to 
raise awareness among their fellow villagers about the harmful 
health eff ects of the practice.  Then these women traveled to Ngerin 
Bambara to spread the word. Their eff orts continued to grow, even-
tually leading to the Diabougou Declaration, in which 50 represen-
tatives of 8,000 villagers from 13 communities in the regions of 
Thies and Fatick publicly decided to abandon female genital cut-
ting. A law passed in January 1999 made it a criminal act in Senegal 
punishable by a sentence of one to fi ve years in prison.
These histories are similar, suggesting that community action 
led to widespread individual self-realization that then shifted the 
social norm. 
Even though we have been told several times that female 
circumcision is bad (and I agree with them), there are still 
beliefs that it is good. That is why in a hidden manner, there are 
women who take their children for circumcision; or they do it 
themselves when a kid is still small.
Adult woman, Tanzania
“
”
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viding public child care and granting generous 
parental leave. In 1995, Sweden reserved one 
month of paid parental leave for the father, a 
“daddy quota” that cannot be transferred to the 
mother (box 8.15) even though mothers spent 
Gradually phasing in reforms can bring about 
change in ways that generate less resistance, and 
spillover effects may be better managed. Policy 
action can begin where popular social attitudes 
provide a foothold. A recent survey in Bangla-
desh suggests that two-thirds of household heads 
(mostly men) believe that daughters and sons 
should have similar rights to inherit property, 
despite existing legal provisions that daughters 
inherit half as much as sons.95
Transformative change—Inducing greater 
gender equality
In some instances, governments propose social 
policy programs or agendas to induce a more 
gender-equalizing equilibrium. These efforts can 
be transformative in the sense that they pre-
cede a social consensus or challenge prevailing 
social norms. State policies can signal appropri-
ate behavior, providing incentives for behavioral 
change and thus affecting the structure of re-
wards and costs. Such policies may come from 
an ambitious social policy vision and strong 
political will to reform. Or they may cover as-
pects that matter relatively little to most of the 
population. 
Transformative change usually seeks to cata-
lyze progress in “sticky” domains. Scandinavian 
states, for example, are at the forefront of pro-
Since Tunisia won its independence in 1956, several reform waves have been 
enacted to promote equality between men and women. The Tunisian Code of 
Personal Status reformed laws on marriage (including imposing a ban on 
polygamy), divorce, custody, and, to some extent, inheritance. In the 1960s, fur-
ther reforms introduced wage equality, mandatory schooling for boys and girls, 
and widely available contraception. These reforms could be labeled as top-
down, imposed by a state that was trying to modernize at a fast pace.
Beginning in the 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s, a women’s movement 
developed, building on this fi rst wave of progress. Women’s associations—
such as the Club Taher al Haddad, the Association des Femmes Tunisiennes 
pour la Recherche et le Développment, and the National Union of Tunisian 
Women—emerged, and feminist discourse came to the forefront of public 
debates by highlighting women’s rights and issues. 
In 1993, new legislation secured additional rights for women, such as 
nationality rights (for the fi rst time a Tunisian woman could pass her nationality 
to a child born abroad, regardless of the nationality of the child’s father), and 
protections against domestic violence and workplace discrimination were 
adopted. In 1997, the government enacted new social policies to support low-
income working women and divorced women and their children.
BOX 8.14  Tunisia—Women’s voice and women’s rights
Sources: Baliamount-Lutz 2011; Moghadam 2007.
Source: Nyberg 2011.
B OX  8.15 Sweden—Encouraging an involved fatherhood
When Olof Palme, the Swedish prime minister, made a speech in 
1970 for a women’s organization in the United States, he surprised 
the audience by not speaking about women but about men. The 
title of his lecture was “The Emancipation of Man,” and Palme 
argued that only if both women and men share a dual role—at 
home and at work—can any substantial change take place. That is, 
men should be given the same rights and duties as women in their 
parental capacity. 
The transformation of maternity leave into parental leave 
encourages Swedish men to take an active part in parenthood. This 
change took place in 1974 and meant that the leave following the 
birth of a child was no longer reserved for the mother but could 
also be used by the father. Over time, parental leave was extended 
from 6 months in 1974 to 16 months today. 
The share of fathers taking parental leave grew slowly and in 
small numbers. Some argued that there should be an obligatory 
division of the entitlement between parents. A heated debate on 
parental “freedom to choose” ensued. Since then, numerous gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental campaigns have encouraged 
fathers to use parental leave.
In 1995, a one-month “daddy quota” was adopted to encourage 
fathers to take parental leave and stimulate gender equality; that is, 
one month of the parental leave could no longer be transferred to 
the other parent. In 2002, the “daddy quota” was increased by 
another month.
Of the claimants to parental leave in 2007, fathers accounted for 
44 percent. Around 49 percent of fathers of children born in 1993, 
before the introduction of the father’s months, did not use a single 
day of the parental leave allowance. Two years later, only 19 percent 
of fathers did not take parental leave; while the proportion that 
took 30 days or more increased from 33 percent to 53 percent. 
There is still a way to go, though. In 2007, a mere 5 percent of 
fathers and mothers shared their parental allowance days equally 
(40–60 percent). In July 2008, a gender equality bonus was intro-
duced as an incentive to share the parental allowance more equally. 
The parent with the lower income (usually the mother) receives a 
tax deduction of at most €300 for going back to work full-time while 
the other parent (usually the father) takes parental leave.
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pliant companies. However, some companies 
changed their legal status from public to private 
limited companies to avoid gender representa-
tion rules.100
Transformative change can also open new 
dynamics in economic and social relationships. 
Governments can legislate new rights and enact 
new policies, some enforceable and others sym-
bolic. In Brazil electoral list quotas for women 
have had limited impact.101 In Afghanistan, par-
liamentary seats reserved for women allowed 
more women to participate in politics.102 Female 
quotas have also induced political parties to in-
vest in training a new generation of female po-
litical cadres—sooner rather than later. Women 
can bring new perspectives and new priorities 
to the policy realm. Indeed, female legislators 
in Argentina, Colombia, and Costa Rica initiate 
more legislation on women’s, family and chil-
dren’s issues than their male counterparts.103
It has been argued that when 5 percent of a 
society—innovators—accept a new idea, it be-
comes “embedded.” And that normally half of 
the population must be “aware” of the idea in 
order to reach the 5 percent who will adopt it. 
When 20 percent—early adopters—espouse it, 
the new idea becomes “unstoppable.” Transfor-
mative change comes from systematically locat-
ing innovators and early adopters.104 
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much more time on caring for young children 
than did fathers.96 Germany also recently in-
troduced a similar nontransferable two-month 
parental leave allowance. The proportion of fa-
thers taking up parental leave increased from 3.5 
percent in 2006 to 16 percent in 2009. And more 
than a third of fathers take more than the two 
months of parental leave reserved for them.
The introduction of transformative change 
without enabling conditions, such as new legis-
lation, can decouple policy intentions and out-
comes, calling into question the sustainability of 
reform. Strong enforcement mechanisms may 
be required for behavioral change. The risk of 
reversal—especially if enforcement is relaxed—
threatens this new equilibrium. 
For example, the Marriage Law of 1950 in 
China sought to eliminate arranged marriages, 
authorize divorce, and establish rights for women 
to inherit property and have control of their 
children. Female cadres attached to the Women’s 
Federation were charged with implementing 
these policies in villages and households. But the 
law met deep-seated resistance from men and 
older women, both standing to lose control over 
their young daughters and daughters-in-law.97 
Although the Marriage Law reduced the inci-
dence of arranged marriages, increased the age 
of fi rst marriage, and incorporated the option of 
divorce into family law, its enforcement tapered 
off when it began to threaten the family system 
and generate political disaffection.98
Enforcing policy change is shaped by the ca-
pacity of the state machinery to follow through 
and by the extent to which the wider commu-
nity accepts reforms. New laws may refl ect pre-
vailing traditions or social norms. But if they 
confl ict with local attitudes or customs, they 
may be simply ignored or not widely dissemi-
nated. So, simply legislating policy change is 
not enough. Financing, implementation, pub-
lic awareness campaigns, and enforcement all 
need to support the intended policy changes. 
In Norway, the government introduced volun-
tary quotas to increase female representation on 
corporate boards in 2003. After fi rms failed to 
take action, a mandatory quota was instituted. 
In 2006, Norway required that the boards of di-
rectors of public limited companies have at least 
40 percent female members within two years. 
By 2009, the average female share on boards of 
directors among affected fi rms had almost tri-
pled.99 Success relied heavily on tough sanctions, 
including the forced dissolution of noncom-
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omestic action is central to reducing 
gender inequalities, and global ac-
tion—by governments, people, and 
organizations in developed and de-
veloping countries, and by international institu-
tions—cannot substitute for equitable and effi -
cient domestic polices and institutions. But 
global action can complement domestic policies 
by strengthening their impact and ultimately by 
infl uencing whether greater global integration 
brings about greater gender equality and better 
lives for all women, or just for some.
This chapter discusses how the World Bank, 
international partners, and civil society can sup-
port countries in their efforts to promote gen-
der equality and proposes an agenda for global 
action by the international development com-
munity that is complementary to the domestic 
public agenda for action presented in chapter 7. 
The agenda calls for action by the interna-
tional development community in fi ve areas. 
These include the four priority areas identifi ed 
in this Report (reducing gender gaps in health 
and education—particularly among severely 
disadvantaged populations, promoting access to 
economic opportunities among women, closing 
gender gaps in voice and agency, and prevent-
ing the intergenerational reproduction of gen-
der inequality)—plus a fi fth cross-cutting area, 
deploying data and knowledge as pillars for 
evidence-based public action. The agenda iden-
tifi es those initiatives within each priority area 
where the rationale for global action is strongest 
and where the international development com-
munity has a comparative advantage.
RATIONALE FOR AND FOCUS 
OF A GLOBAL AGENDA 
The motivation for an agenda for global ac-
tion is threefold. First, progress on some fronts 
requires channeling more resources from rich 
to developing countries (for example, to cre-
ate greater equity in human endowments or to 
tackle the root causes of excess female mortal-
ity around the world). Second, effective action 
sometimes hinges on producing a public good, 
such as generating new global information or 
knowledge. And third, when the impact of a 
particular policy cuts across borders, coordina-
tion among a large number of countries and in-
stitutions can enhance its effectiveness, not least 
by building momentum and pressure for action 
at the domestic level.
Based on these criteria, initiatives included 
in the proposed agenda for global action can be 
grouped into three types of activities:
•  Providing fi nancial support. Improvements in 
the delivery of clean water and sanitation or 
better health services, such as the ones needed 
to bring down excess female mortality among 
girls and mothers in the developing world, will 
require signifi cant resources—often beyond 
the means of individual governments, partic-
ularly those of relatively poor countries. The
international development community can 
fi nancially support countries willing and able 
to undertake such reforms in a coordinated 
manner through specifi c initiatives or fund-
ing facilities to ensure maximum impact and 
minimize duplication.
A global agenda for greater 
gender equality
9CHAPTER
 A global agenda for greater gender equality 361
and, more broadly, with the private sector 
in increasing access to economic opportuni-
ties. Together, they could support countries 
in leveraging the resources and information 
needed to successfully promote gender equal-
ity in today’s globalized world.
The relative importance of these three activi-
ties will obviously vary across countries. Table 
9.1 provides a bird’s-eye view of the proposed 
agenda for global action. Within each priority 
area, the table identifi es new or additional initia-
tives requiring support from the international 
development community, as well as in some 
cases existing initiatives where a refocus is called 
for (all marked with a check). For instance, ex-
panding access to clean water requires new in-
vestments, as well as a redefi nition of existing 
service delivery models that better takes into ac-
count health impacts. In all cases, the initiatives 
are consistent with and complementary to those 
presented in chapter 7 and satisfy the criteria for 
global action discussed above. Of course, im-
•  Fostering innovation and learning. A great 
deal has been learned about what works and 
what does not when it comes to promoting 
greater gender equality, yet progress is often 
held back by the lack of data or adequate so-
lutions to “sticky” problems. That is the case, 
for example, regarding gender differences in 
time use patterns and the norms around care 
that foster these differences. The development 
community could promote innovation and 
learning through experimentation and evalu-
ation in ways that pay attention to results and 
process, as well as to context, and could facili-
tate scaling up of successful experiences.
•  Leveraging effective partnerships. As chapter 8 
makes clear, successful reform often requires 
coalitions or partnerships that can act within 
and across borders. Such partnerships could 
be built among those in the international 
development community around funding is-
sues, with academia and think tanks for the 
purpose of experimentation and learning, 
TA B L E  9.1  The agenda for global action at a glance
Priority area New/additional initiatives that need support
Directions for the global development community
Providing fi nancial
support
Fostering innovation
and learning Leveraging partnerships
Closing gender gaps in 
human endowments
Increasing access to education 
among disadvantaged groups √ √
Increasing access to 
clean water √ √
Increasing access to 
specialized maternal services √ √ √
Strengthening support for 
prevention and treatment of 
HIV/AIDS
√ √
Promoting women’s access to 
economic opportunities
Increasing access to child 
care and early childhood 
development
√ √
Investing in rural women √ √
Closing gender gaps in voice 
and agency
Increasing women’s access to 
the justice system √
Shifting norms regarding 
violence against women √ √
Preventing intergenerational 
reproduction of gender 
inequality
Investing in adolescent girls 
and boys √
Supporting evidence-based 
public action
Generating new information √ √
Facilitating knowledge sharing 
and learning √
Source: WDR 2012 team.
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sector programs. This will allow for strategic 
gender mainstreaming. 
•  No size fi ts all. The nature, structure, and 
functioning of markets and institutions varies 
widely across countries as do norms and cul-
tures, and, as a result, so do household and in-
dividual behavior. Depending on the context, 
the same policy can have very different results. 
And, as the discussion in chapter 8 made clear, 
there are multiple paths to reform. Policy de-
sign and implementation must be attuned to 
societal actors and the political economy of 
reform. Action (both global and domestic) is 
most likely to succeed when it has broad-based 
support, but political will and leadership from 
the top can be an engine of change.
WHAT TO DO AND HOW TO DO IT
Priority 1: Closing gender gaps in human 
endowments
● Increasing access to education among 
severely disadvantaged populations
T H E  FAC T S
Gender issues in schooling are now increas-
ingly concentrated in severely disadvantaged 
populations:
➜ In Vietnam, about 30 percent of ethnic mi-
nority women older than 15 years have never 
gone to school—this is three times more 
likely than ethnic majority women and twice 
more likely than ethnic minority men.
➜ In India, the median boy in the poorest fi fth 
of the population reaches grade 6; the me-
dian girl only reaches grade 1.
➜ In 2008 in the Sub-Saharan African countries 
of Benin, Chad, the Central African Republic, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, 
and Togo, the primary completion rate for 
girls was 75 percent or lower than that for 
boys.
➜ In Lesotho, educational gender gaps are re-
versed. While 70 percent of girls ages 15–19 
years complete grade 7, merely 40 percent of 
boys do so. 
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 3)
• Tremendous progress has been made in clos-
ing education gaps around the world.
portant ongoing efforts occur in the unchecked 
areas as well—for instance, innovation around 
the delivery models for the prevention of HIV/
AIDS, or partnerships focused on adolescents. 
In these unchecked areas, the focus should be 
on sustaining ongoing efforts and partnerships 
and on meeting commitments.
Finally, the framework and analysis pre-
sented in the Report provide four general prin-
ciples for policy and program design that can 
enhance the impact and effectiveness of global 
action across all priority areas and initiatives. 
These principles are
•  Comprehensive gender diagnostics as the basis 
for policy and program design. Gender dispari-
ties persist for multiple reasons: there may be 
a single institutional or policy “fi x” that is dif-
fi cult and easily blocked; there may be multi-
ple reinforcing constraints in markets, formal 
institutions, and households that combine to 
block progress; or there may be deeply rooted 
gender roles or social norms that evolve only 
slowly. Effective policy design requires a good 
understanding of which of these situations 
prevails, and of where and what are the bind-
ing constraints. To be useful, this diagnostic 
must drill down into what happens in house-
holds, markets, and formal institutions, their 
interactions and how they are shaped by so-
cial norms.
•  Targeting determinants versus targeting out-
comes. In choosing and designing policies, it 
is necessary to identify and target the market 
and institutional constraints that generate ex-
isting gender gaps, rather than targeting the 
outcomes themselves. These constraints may 
be multiple and are often outside the domain 
where the outcome is observed.
•  “Upstreaming” and strategic mainstreaming. 
Because gender gaps often result from mul-
tiple and mutually reinforcing market and in-
stitutional constraints, effective policy action 
may require coordinated multisectoral inter-
ventions or sequential interventions. In many 
instances, such interventions can take the 
form of general policies that are made “gen-
der smart” by incorporating gender-related 
issues into their design and implementation. 
To maximize impact, it is thus necessary for 
gender issues to be upstreamed from specifi c 
sector products and projects to country and 
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out-of-school girls continues to be an inter-
national priority, in many developing coun-
tries it is now boys who are falling further 
and further behind in secondary school par-
ticipation, and a lack of international action 
to reverse this trend poses signifi cant risks. 
School dropout and underperformance are 
often associated with increasing likelihood of 
engaging in risky behaviors, crime and vio-
lence, or unsafe sexual behavior (see priority 
4 below).
 ● Improving public health: Clean water, 
sanitation, waste removal, and vector 
control
T H E  FAC T S
➜ Every year, 1.5 billion episodes of acute diar-
rhea occur among children under fi ve, killing 
2 million children.
➜ Reducing infectious diseases reduces child 
mortality—more so for girls. Between 1900 
and 1930 large-scale public health, clean wa-
ter, and sanitation campaigns wiped out his-
torical patterns of excess female mortality in 
today’s rich countries. In the United States, 
these campaigns accounted for virtually all 
the decline in child mortality during this 
period.
➜ The biggest impacts come from clean water 
at the point of use because considerable con-
tamination occurs between source and use: 
Contamination of samples from improved 
water sources increased from 12 percent at 
source to 41 percent in household storage to 
51 percent in drinking cups.
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 3)
• Private solutions can go only so far in reduc-
ing the burden of infectious diseases. Public 
investments are required both because of 
“externalities”—people with infectious dis-
eases infect others—and because of the dif-
fi culties in learning about the causal path-
ways from actions to consequences.
• These investments will benefi t both boys and 
girls—but especially girls. The provision of 
clean water, sanitation, vector control, and 
waste disposal used to be a standard part of 
public health packages in most countries, but 
their importance in health budgets has de-
clined over the past three decades. It is time 
to reverse that trend.
  At the same time, in poor and socially 
excluded populations or in countries with 
poor economic opportunities, low levels of 
schooling remain a problem. Education can 
increase women’s and men’s access to eco-
nomic opportunities and productivity and 
strengthen their voice and agency. Efforts at 
leveling the playing fi eld for primary and sec-
ondary education have to focus on severely 
disadvantaged populations, be they girls or 
boys, to ensure that they are not left behind 
in a globalized world.
What to do?
• Providing fi nancial resources. Existing 
funding commitments need to be sustained 
and increased to bring in girls who are cur-
rently out of school. In some places, these 
out-of-school girls appear similar to those 
who are in school, suggesting that supply-
side initiatives may increase their enroll-
ment and completion rates. Building schools 
is the fi rst step on the supply side, but it is 
not enough. To ensure that there are enough 
teachers, it is important to build up cohorts 
who are educated beyond the levels they are 
expected to teach. Financing should also 
support reforms to strengthen the gover-
nance, accountability, and information fl ows 
that ensure that schools and teachers are as 
effective as possible in raising learning and 
keeping children in school. In other places, 
where the supply is already in place, it may 
be low household incomes and poor re-
turns to education that keep children out of 
school—whether these are boys or girls de-
pends on what other opportunities there 
are for children. In such situations, demand-
side interventions—such as conditional 
cash transfers that give households incen-
tives to keep their children in school when 
times are bad—have proven successful in 
increasing enrollment in many countries 
around the world.
• Leveraging partnerships. The Education for 
All Fast Track Initiative—together with in-
ternational partners and civil society—pro-
vides a strong, partnership-based framework 
for action. Efforts to mobilize external re-
sources toward meeting the education Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) war-
rant urgent attention. While the plight of 
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vest more in girls with a higher chance of 
survival in adulthood.
• Reductions in maternal mortality also re-
duce maternal morbidity, allowing women 
to lead more productive and healthy lives. 
Female labor force participation will also in-
crease as lifelong disabilities associated with 
childbirth decline. Almost all the increase in 
labor force participation of married women 
between 1920 and 1950 in countries for 
which data are available can be attributed to 
reductions in maternal morbidity.
• And reductions are possible: when countries 
put their minds to it, maternal mortality 
has been brought down in a surprisingly 
short time.
What to do?
• Providing fi nancial support. Many maternal 
deaths can be avoided if mothers give birth in 
institutions, but the institutions need to 
function well, with trained staff and surgeons 
and regular supplies. Providers need to be ac-
countable to local communities—all too of-
ten critical health providers are “missing in 
action.” More funding could help establish a 
network of facilities dedicated to maternal 
and child care. These facilities could also en-
gage in valuable outreach to provide prenatal 
care to expecting mothers.1 
• Promoting innovation and learning. In 
many countries, little is known about mater-
nal mortality and still less about maternal 
morbidity. And because poor data systems 
and bad health go together, these are coun-
tries where the problem is worse. Investing in 
better vital registration data is an important 
step. New technology opens up new opportu-
nities. For instance, increased mobile tele-
phony would allow users to report any mater-
nal death in any part of the world to a central 
global and open database. These reports could 
trigger a “maternal audit” so that every mater-
nal death is recorded and publicized. The em-
phasis on every single death was a key part of 
successful campaigns to lower maternal mor-
tality in countries like Turkey and Honduras.
• Leveraging partnerships. A renewed em-
phasis on maternal mortality has led to the 
creation of a partnership, the Grand Chal-
lenge for Development, between bilateral 
What to do?
• Providing fi nancial resources. A simple goal 
needs to be adopted: clean water for every 
household and a clean environment for chil-
dren to grow up in. Reaching this goal 
 requires substantive funding to build and 
maintain systems. Funding is needed not 
only for infrastructure improvements but 
also for systems of accountability that can 
ensure the continuation and sustainability of 
these services. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone 
the estimated costs of clean water run to $11 
billion a year. Large in absolute funding, this 
amount is small relative to the benefi ts: in the 
United States, the benefi t-cost ratio of clean 
water in the early 20th century was 23 to 1.
• Promoting innovation and learning. Two 
areas need urgent attention. First, little sys-
tematic information is available on water 
contamination and even less on sanitation. 
Collecting and disseminating such data 
would help the global community to under-
stand the scale of the problem and to moni-
tor the impact of policies. Second, pharma-
ceutical innovations that provide immediate 
feedback on water quality to households 
would engender informed decisions. For in-
stance, contaminated water usually looks 
clean, but a pill that changes water color 
when it is contaminated, together with point-
of-use treatments like chlorine pills, could 
lead to immediate improvements even while 
better delivery systems are being developed.
 ● Increasing access to specialized maternal 
services
T H E  FAC T S
➜ For every woman who dies during childbirth 
in Sweden, 1,000 women die during child-
birth in Afghanistan, 815 women in Somalia, 
495 in Nigeria, and 122 in Pakistan.
➜ Excess female mortality in low-income coun-
tries is tied to maternal mortality, as it was 
historically in rich countries. In Afghanistan, 
1 out of every 11 women dies in childbirth, 
and many more face severe functional dis-
abilities from associated risks like fi stula and 
anemia.
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 3)
• Reductions in maternal mortality can in-
crease female education because families in-
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tional coordination that need to be sustained 
and scaled up.2
Priority 2: Promoting women’s access to 
economic opportunities
 ● Increasing access to child care and early 
childhood development programs 
T H E  FAC T S
➜ Married women with children under age six 
spend 14 to 42 percent of their nonleisure 
time on child care, compared with 1 to 20 
percent for married men.
➜ In 62 countries, of 113 with data, the avail-
ability of child care—both formal and infor-
mal—is limited or very limited as a result of 
high costs, insuffi cient supply, or both. And 
in most countries where child care is avail-
able, it is informally provided by extended 
family members.
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 5)
• Gender differences in care (and housework) 
responsibilities imply that women face im-
portant fi xed costs associated with market 
work. They are also more likely to value fl ex-
ible work arrangements and to supply fewer 
hours of work than men, with a potential risk 
of being channeled into lower-quality, lower-
pay jobs.
• Access to (subsidized) child care is associated 
with increases in the number of hours spent 
in market work and, in developing countries, 
with access to formal employment. Where 
care options are not available, the opposite is 
true—for instance, in Botswana, Guatemala, 
Mexico, and Vietnam, the lack of child care 
pushes mothers into informal employment.
• (Subsidized) child care can provide an effec-
tive platform for the delivery of developmen-
tal and nutritional interventions for small 
children, particularly in low-income settings 
and among poor households.
What to do?
• Providing fi nancial support. Increasing ac-
cess to quality child care for those who cur-
rently do not have access or who rely on in-
formal arrangements will require additional 
resources—often beyond the means of inter-
ested governments. These resources can be 
and multilateral agencies and private foun-
dations. This partnership is key to moni-
toring and building accountability and shar-
ing knowledge. Further partnerships include 
South-South knowledge exchange programs 
where countries such as Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Turkey, and Honduras—which 
sharply decreased maternal mortality in a 
short time—participate on a global platform 
to share their experiences.
 ● Strengthening support for the 
prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS
T H E  FAC T S
➜ In countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, excess mortality 
among women under age 60 increased close 
to 10-fold between 1990 and 2008.
➜ Adult mortality rates in some southern Afri-
can countries increased 5-fold between 1980 
and 2008 and approached those seen in 
Rwanda and Cambodia in genocide years.
➜ An enormous global effort has led to better 
treatment and better availability of treat-
ment. Innumerable lives are now being saved 
every day around the world.
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 3)
• The HIV/AIDS epidemic has hit women in 
Sub-Saharan Africa particularly hard. Greater 
availability of treatment is saving lives of 
those affected with HIV around the world. 
But much remains to be done. 
What to do?
• Providing fi nancial support. Increasing 
funding and sustaining existing efforts can 
ensure universal access to HIV prevention, 
treatment, care, and support by 2015. A new 
strategic investment framework suggests that 
investments need to increase from the cur-
rent $16 billion a year to $22 billion a year by 
2015. After 2015, resource needs will decline 
as coverage reaches target rates, effi ciency 
gains from scaling up are realized, and new 
infections start to decline. 
• Leveraging partnerships. The existing part-
nerships through the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) are shining examples of interna-
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Why do we care? A recap (chapters 5 and 6)
• According to the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization, equalizing access to productive re-
sources between female and male farmers 
could increase agricultural output in devel-
oping countries by 2.5 to 4 percent.
• Cell phone access and use can alleviate time 
and mobility constraints for women—par-
ticularly those in rural areas—by cutting 
down the physical labor or travel required to 
get information, reducing the costs of money 
transfers, and increasing women’s ability to 
balance family and work life. Over 40 percent 
of rural women in Bolivia, the Arab Republic 
of Egypt, India, and Kenya declared that 
owning a mobile phone had increased their 
access to economic opportunities and their 
income, with higher impacts among female 
entrepreneurs.
• Putting money in the hands of rural women 
will empower them in and outside their 
households and will also benefi t others in 
their families.
What to do?
• Fostering innovation and learning. Few fi -
nancial institutions offer products specifi -
cally tailored to the needs of female farmers 
and entrepreneurs. Access to extension ser-
vices and farmer fi eld schools is still very 
low, and the information and resources they 
provide are not always relevant for female 
farmers. Mobile phones can provide an effec-
tive platform for the delivery of information 
and services to rural populations, but exist-
ing gender gaps in access can translate into 
limited benefi ts for women. The interna-
tional development community can support 
experimentation in three key areas: access to 
formal credit, access to agricultural technol-
ogy and knowledge, and access to informa-
tion and communication technologies—
particularly mobile phones. The focus should 
be on testing and evaluating new business 
and delivery models that effectively respond 
to women’s needs within local contexts.
• Leveraging partnerships. The international 
development community can partner with 
the private sector to ensure that successful in-
novations grow into new services for rural 
used to directly fi nance the provision of ser-
vices or to subsidize the use of existing ser-
vices, where affordability—rather than sup-
ply—is the main constraint. 
• Fostering innovation and learning. Most 
successful child-care delivery models have 
been tested and evaluated in urban (often 
middle-income) settings; however, signifi -
cantly less is known about what works and 
what does not in rural areas or for transient 
populations. The international development 
community could support experimentation 
in this area with a focus on delivery models 
that address the needs of the poor, who are 
most likely to use informal care arrangements 
with potentially negative consequences for 
children and for those providing the care—
frequently older sisters. Attention should also 
be paid to the possibility of using the provi-
sion of child care as an opportunity to create 
employment locally, while ensuring caregiv-
ers are adequately trained. Successful experi-
ences could then be scaled up through the 
funding window.
● Investing in rural women
T H E  FAC T S
➜ Women represent 43 percent of the rural 
workforce.
➜ For those developing countries for which data 
is available, women represent only 10 to 20 
percent of landholders, and farms operated 
by female-headed households are smaller in 
almost all countries. Female farmers and rural 
entrepreneurs—particularly those running 
small businesses—are less likely to receive 
(formal) credit than their male counterparts.
➜ Women are not worse farmers than men, but 
lower access to productive inputs and tech-
nology means that the average agricultural 
productivity among female farmers is 20 to 
30 percent lower than that of their male 
counterparts.
➜ A woman is still 21 percent less likely to own 
a mobile phone than a man; that rate is 23 
percent in Africa, 24 percent in the Middle 
East, and 37 percent in South Asia. Nearly 
half a billion women in the developing world 
have access to a mobile phone only by bor-
rowing it. 
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tion, implementation, and enforcement of 
the law; and the raising of awareness in dif-
ferent elements of the justice systems to 
make them more sensitive to women’s needs. 
The international development community 
can support the implementation and evalu-
ation of innovative approaches in these 
three areas, as well as the evaluation of 
promising ongoing initiatives. In doing so, 
attention should be paid to the role that 
technology, particularly mobile phones, can 
play in fostering the dissemination of data 
and other information, as well as in enhanc-
ing the accountability of legal institutions.
● Shifting norms regarding domestic 
violence
T H E  FAC T S
➜ Domestic violence statistics around the world 
are horrifying:
• At least 1 of every 10 ever-partnered women 
is physically or sexually assaulted by an 
intimate partner or someone she knows at 
some point in her life.
• Even a seemingly low domestic abuse inci-
dence rate of 3 percent in Poland trans-
lates into 1,465 women being abused each 
day.
• 14 million, or 81 percent of, Ethiopian 
women ages 15–49 think being beaten by 
their husbands for disagreeing with him, 
burning the food, or refusing to have sex 
is justifi able.
➜ The prevalence of domestic violence varies 
greatly across countries with no clear rela-
tionship to incomes, but violence against 
women is higher in societies with higher gen-
der inequality.
➜ Increased women’s education has a pro-
tective infl uence by altering population atti-
tudes toward lower acceptability of violence. 
Women’s asset ownership is associated with 
lower violence incidence in Colombia, India, 
South Africa, and Uganda.
 Why do we care? A recap (chapter 4)
• Violence is the opposite of freedom—an ex-
treme form of coercion that is by defi nition 
the negation of agency. Women are at far 
greater risk of violence from an intimate 
women, and with academic institutions, civil 
society, and think tanks to adequately evalu-
ate the impact of these models.
Priority 3: Closing gender gaps in voice 
and agency
● Increasing women’s access to justice
T H E  FAC T S
➜ 187 countries have ratifi ed the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Discrimination 
against Women, but such rights have not 
necessarily become effective because women 
have limited mechanisms to demand that 
their rights be enforced and to seek redress.
➜ In many situations lack of awareness of 
rights, high direct costs, and mobility con-
straints prevent women from actively de-
manding enforcement.
➜ In 9 countries from different regions, only 10 
percent of women who had been physically 
abused reported the event or sought services.
➜ In Indonesia, the average cost of a divorce 
case was $220—around 10 times a poor 
woman’s monthly income. Fee waivers have 
led to increased access.
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 4)
• Effective rights matter for women. Improve-
ment in the legal status of girls can, by 
i ncreasing their value, induce other changes: 
investments in girls’ education may increase, 
ages at marriage may increase, and child-
bearing may be delayed. Laws that increase 
control over income and assets can improve 
women’s position within their own house-
holds, and laws that allow or facilitate divorce 
can increase women’s ability to choose.
• For laws to be effective, enforcement needs to 
be improved and women’s access to justice 
increased.
What to do?
• Promoting innovation and learning. Im-
proving women’s access to justice requires 
collection and publication of gender- 
disaggregated data on access and use; an 
 increase in women’s representation in the 
organizations charged with the formula-
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vention of violence against women, includ-
ing those in remote or excluded populations.
Priority 4: Preventing the 
intergenerational reproduction of 
gender inequality
 ● Investing in adolescent boys and girls
T H E  FAC T S
➜ The number of adolescents, boys and girls, 
who are out of school is similar to that of 
children of primary school age who are out 
of school (70 million versus 69 million); yet 
the problem has received limited attention. 
Some of them have not completed primary 
schooling, but a large fraction simply dropped 
out of secondary school. Teenage pregnancy, 
risky behaviors, and the need to work (either 
at home or in the market) account for a sig-
nifi cant share of dropouts.
➜ Approximately 16 million girls, ages 15−19, 
become mothers every year, with 95 percent 
of these births happening in developing 
countries. This makes up 11 percent of all 
births worldwide.
➜ Young men are overwhelmingly the perpe-
trators and the victims of violent crime. In 
South Africa, between 1982 and 1990, mur-
der caused close to half of all deaths of young 
men between the ages of 16 and 30—the pri-
mary cause of death in this age group.
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 3, 4, and 5)
• The “stickiest” aspect of gender outcomes is 
the way patterns of gender inequality are re-
produced over time, and adolescence is a 
particularly important period in this regard. 
Gender norms and roles become more bind-
ing, and the prevalence of risky social and 
sexual behaviors increases. In addition, ado-
lescents are underserved by existing institu-
tions, including health systems and labor 
markets, have limited control over assets, and 
have lower access to networks.
• In a world where education and skills are 
 becoming increasingly important, keeping 
young girls and boys in school (and out 
of trouble) and helping them transition 
smoothly into the labor market can have 
partner or somebody they know than from 
violence by other people. And women are 
more likely than men to be killed, seriously 
injured, or victims of sexual violence from 
intimate partners.
• The threat of violence can affect women’s 
ability to freely choose and to take advantage 
of endowments and opportunities.
• Domestic violence has also been associated 
with long-term health outcomes, negative 
health outcomes among the children of 
abused women, and the intergenerational 
 reproduction of the acceptance of violence.
What to do?
• Promoting innovation and learning. The 
international development community can 
support innovation and learning in three dif-
ferent ways. First, it can invest in rigorously 
evaluating ongoing initiatives and improv-
ing the quality of existing data. Second, it can 
help scale up those innovations that have 
worked. And, third, it can help test new 
 approaches aimed at shifting norms re-
garding violence against women. Two types 
of programs hold promise for testing new 
approaches: education and awareness cam-
paigns (targeted to couples), and inter-
ven tions that increase women’s bargaining 
power within the household. In both cases 
a broad focus is needed to account for some 
higher-level determinants, such as norms 
on income generation and asset owner-
ship and control, legal frameworks on mar-
riage, and divorce and child custody. Finally, 
bringing service providers—police and ju-
diciary, health, and social services—closer 
to women to deal with time and mobility 
constraints can not only help victims but 
also contribute to changing norms in the 
community. Experimentation can focus, 
among other things, on access to paralegals 
and mobile legal aid clinics for women to 
use the justice system.
• Leveraging partnerships. The international 
development community should continue 
to support initiatives such as the United 
Nations (UN) Trust Fund to End Violence 
against Women, which provides funding to 
grassroots organizations devoted to the pre-
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causes), and other important life events re-
main a challenge in most of the world. The 
same is true of property registries, including 
those for land and real estate.
Why do we care? A recap (chapters 3, 4, and 7)
• A key challenge for advances in gender equal-
ity is the availability of gender-relevant data.
• Gender analyses of social conditions and 
the incidence of poverty often rely on com-
parisons between male- and female-headed 
households. Still, measuring gender gaps 
based on characteristics of household heads 
is based on the underlying assumption that 
households are undifferentiated units, that 
resources are evenly shared, and that no 
 intrahousehold inequality exists—assump-
tions the evidence contradicts.
• Knowledge about what happens within 
households continues to be, at best, insuffi -
cient and, at worst, nonexistent. This knowl-
edge, however, is key to understanding and 
tackling many of the gender gaps identifi ed 
in this Report. Information about who con-
trols and has access to different resources, 
who makes decisions and how those deci-
sions take into account or refl ect the views 
and interests of others within the household, 
and what factors shape the available options 
can help identify the most binding con-
straints behind specifi c gaps and hence in-
form the design and implementation of pub-
lic policy.
• Accurate recording of life events and prop-
erty are essential to ensure adequate enforce-
ment of existing laws and to fi ll in important 
knowledge gaps (for instance, about cause of 
death).
What to do?
• Providing fi nancial support. The interna-
tional development community can provide 
resources for the improvement of existing 
surveys and country information systems. 
New survey modules can be developed that 
include questions on assets (ownership, use, 
registration status when relevant, and path 
to accumulation), family businesses (owner-
ship and decision-making capacity, employ-
ment of household members), time use, and 
large payoffs both in improved gender out-
comes and in economic effi ciency.
What to do?
• Promoting innovation and learning. Young 
girls and boys can benefi t from access to a net-
work of peers with shared values and aspira-
tions; they can learn from and be inspired by 
others. The international development com-
munity can support experimentation around 
programs that focus on the creation of “safe 
spaces”—through support to networks of 
adolescents with common objectives and ex-
pectations—and the promotion of role mod-
els. Those transitioning into the labor market 
can also benefi t from interventions that help 
them overcome information and other con-
straints that may be particularly binding for 
new market entrants. In this respect, experi-
mentation with active labor market policies 
targeted to youth, including placement and 
apprenticeship programs, wage subsidies, 
and training hold signifi cant promise, as does 
experimentation with second- chance pro-
grams. Innovative approaches in these three 
areas have been piloted and, in some cases, 
evaluated under the Adolescent Girls Initia-
tive, and could be taken to scale and adapted 
to different contexts.
Priority 5: Supporting evidence-based 
public action
 ● Generating new information
T H E  FAC T S
➜ Only 8 of 65 surveys examined (including 
national household and labor force surveys, 
and specialized surveys covering rural areas) 
contain information on land ownership at 
the individual level; information on owner-
ship of consumer and productive durables, 
livestock, and other assets is more limited (in 
most cases 1 survey of 65). And information 
on decision making within the household is 
also scarce, with questions being asked only 
in specialized surveys (such as the Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys) and often only 
of women.
➜ The coverage and reliability of vital statistics 
on births, marriages, divorces, deaths (and its 
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frontiers of program design and implemen-
tation have no systematic way of moving that 
knowledge “up” the global chain.
What to do?
• Promoting innovation and learning. There 
is no global repository of knowledge on gen-
der issues. A global repository would serve as 
a single source for knowledge and infor-
mation about gender issues, but that is not 
enough. New technological advances could 
be used to create a more democratic and open 
data system that allows us to learn from the 
best examples around the world. One part of 
such a global repository would systematize 
existing information on gender from reports, 
research, and evaluations of programs. This 
indexed and searchable database would be-
come a “one-stop shop” for stakeholders and 
individuals to obtain more information about 
gender issues. User feedback and reviews 
would allow for an interactive site that fi lters 
high-quality knowledge and points to the 
global gaps in our understanding. 
A second part of the global repository 
would use new technology to democratize 
knowledge about gender issues in an open 
submission system. The Internet and mobile 
telephony could be used to “crowd-source” 
information about new initiatives, even at a 
very small scale, much like in systems such as 
Ushahidi, an open source project that allows 
users to crowd-source crisis information to 
be sent via mobile phone. Allowing those at 
the front lines to provide information and 
feedback on gender initiatives can increase 
knowledge and recognition of gender activi-
ties around the world, and this information 
can feedback into the global community’s 
understanding of what works and what does 
not. A global repository could capitalize on 
ongoing initiatives, such as the World Bank 
Open Data Initiative, but will still require 
committed funding to set up and maintain.
NOTES
1.  High Level Taskforce on International Innovative 
Financing for Health Systems 2009. The Techni-
cal Working Group 1 of this taskforce argued that 
strengthening health systems is key to reducing 
individual consumption. Clear entry points 
could be the Living Standards Measurement 
Study, Demographic and Health Surveys, 
and other cross-country survey platforms. 
Resources are also needed to strengthen 
country information systems by simplifying 
administrative and registration procedures 
and computerizing database management to 
increase the coverage and accuracy of exist-
ing records. Emphasis should be put on mov-
ing from one-off efforts to sustained action 
on gender-relevant data collection to provide 
opportunities for longitudinal trend analyses 
and overcome the paucity of reliable, high-
quality information.
• Leveraging partnerships. UN Women—the 
United Nations organization dedicated to 
gender equality and the empowerment of 
women—can play a leadership role in this 
area. The international development com-
munity should continue to support existing 
initiatives, such as the World Bank Statistical 
Capacity Building program, in these areas 
and to help forge effective partnerships to 
promote sharing of information, knowledge, 
and experiences.
 ● Facilitating knowledge sharing and 
learning
T H E  FAC T S
➜ There is limited research on low-income 
countries, and this knowledge is hard to fi nd 
and access. 
➜ A survey of the top 202 economics journals 
between 1985 and 2004 found seven papers 
published on Afghanistan, one on Chad, two 
on the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
four on Eritrea. These were on all topics.
➜ There is no systematic way to search for in-
formation on gender, parse out the high-
quality work, and obtain information on lo-
cal initiatives that work. 
Why do we care? A recap (chapter 7)
• Information and knowledge are crucial to 
adequately diagnose existing problems, iden-
tify relevant constraints, and design effective 
policy responses.
• Every year, knowledge is lost because entre-
preneurs and organizations working at the 
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Gross enrollment ratio
     % of relevant age group
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Male Female Male Female Male   Female
1991 2009 1991 2009 1991 2009 1991 2009 1991 2009 1991    2009
Table A1 Participation in education
Afghanistan 37 123 20 83 21 58 11 28 3 6 1 1
Albania 101 121 103 117 92 72 85 73 7 .. 7 ..
Algeria 103 111 88 104 67 96 53 97 .. 25 .. 36
Angola 79 141 72 114 .. .. .. .. 1 .. 0 ..
Argentina .. 117 .. 116 .. 80 .. 91 .. 55 .. 84
Armenia .. 97 .. 100 .. 92 .. 94 .. 44 .. 57
Australia 107 107 107 106 132 135 132 130 35 71 42 94
Austria 101 99 101 98 106 103 97 98 37 54 32 64
Azerbaijan 111 96 110 95 87 98 88 101 28 19 19 19
Bangladesh 78 93 66 97 24 40 12 45 7 10 1 6
Belarus 96 98a 96 100a 96 89a 100 91a .. 63 .. 91
Belgium 99 104 101 103 101 109 102 106 40 59 39 74
Benin 80 129 41 114 .. .. .. .. 4 .. 1 ..
Bolivia 110 108 102 107 .. 82 .. 80 .. 42 .. 35
Bosnia and Herzegovina .. 108 .. 110 .. 90 .. 92 .. 32 .. 42
Brazil 130 132 129 123 .. 96 .. 106 11 30 12 39
Bulgaria 95 102 93 101 98 89 98 86 30 46 33 61
Burkina Faso 41 83a 26 75a .. 24a .. 19a 1 5 0 2
Burundi 78 149 65 144 7 25 4 18 1 .. 0 ..
Cambodia 119 120 96 113 .. 44 .. 36 2 9 0 5
Cameroon 101 122 87 106 31 45 22 38 .. 10 .. 8
Canada 105 99 103 98 101 103 101 101 85 .. 105 ..
Central African Republic 80 107a 51 76a 16 16a 7 9a 3 3 0 1
Chad 70 105 31 74 11 34 2 14 .. 3 .. 1
Chile 105 109 103 104 96 89 98 92 29 54 25 56
China 132 111 121 115 46 76 35 81 .. 24 .. 25
 Hong Kong SAR, China .. 103 .. 105 .. 81 .. 83 23 56 16 58
Colombia 105 120 107 120 48 90 57 99 14 36 15 38
Congo, Dem. Rep. 83 98 62 83 29 47 14 26 .. 8 .. 3
Congo, Rep. 125 123 115 116 54 .. 41 .. 8 11 2 2
Costa Rica 103 110 102 109 43 93 46 99 .. .. .. ..
Côte d’Ivoire 77 81 55 66 .. .. .. .. .. 11 .. 6
Croatia 82 95 82 95 81 94 84 97 26 43 25 55
Czech Republic 96 104 97 103 93 94 90 96 18 51 14 71
Denmark 98 98 98 99 109 117 110 120 34 63 39 92
Dominican Republic .. 114 .. 98 .. 72 .. 82 .. .. .. ..
Ecuador 123 117 122 118 54 74 56 77 .. 39 .. 45
Egypt, Arab Rep. 96 103 80 99 77 68 61 66 15 .. 9 ..
El Salvador 97 117 96 113 36 63 40 64 .. 23 .. 26
Eritrea 20 53 19 44 12 37 11 26 .. 3a .. 1a
Ethiopia 39 107 26 98 16 39 12 30 1 5 0 2
Finland 99 98 99 97 106 106 127 112 46 82 52 101
France 109 109 108 108 98 113 103 113 37 49 43 62
Georgia 97 108 97 108 96 92 94 88 38 23 35 28
Germany 98 104 99 103 101 104 99 99 40 .. 30 ..
Ghana 84 106 72 105 42 61 28 54 1 11 0 7
Greece 99 101 98 101 95 104 93 99 25 87 26 95
Guatemala 86 117 75 110 26 58 23 55 .. 18 .. 18
Guinea 48 97 23 83 16 46 5 27 2 14 0 5
Haiti 47 .. 45 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Honduras 106 116 107 116 30 57 36 72 10 15 8 22
Hungary 90 100 90 99 86 99 87 98 14 53 15 72
India 105 115 80 111 47 64 27 56 8 16 4 11
Indonesia 119 123 116 119 50 80 42 79 12 24 8 23
Iran, Islamic Rep. 114 103 103 102 61 85 46 81 8 35 3 38
Iraq 115 111 97 94 54 59 35 44 14 .. 9 ..
Ireland 102 104 103 105 96 115 105 121 31 55 28 66
Israel 96 110 99 112 90 88 95 90 34 54 35 71
Italy 99 104 99 103 80 101 79 100 33 56 31 79
Japan 100 102 100 102 96 101 98 101 36 62 23 55
Jordan 107 97 106 97 80 87 83 90 22 39 24 43
Kazakhstan .. 109a .. 109a 94 100a 96 97a .. 32 .. 47a
Kenya 100 114 97 111 .. 62 .. 56 .. 5 .. 3
Korea, Rep. 108 105 109 103 93 99 90 95 51 117 25 82
Kyrgyz Republic 109 95 111 95 99 84 101 85 20 44 26 58
Lao PDR 111 117 88 106 28 48 19 39 2 15 1 12
Lebanon 98 104 95 102 59 78 63 87 29 48 27 57
Liberia .. 96 .. 86 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 .. 14 ..
Lithuania 95 98 89 96 86 99 83 99 39 63 27 96
Madagascar 105 162 102 158 19 32 18 31 4 4 3 3
Malawi 78 118 69 121 21 31 13 28 1 1 0 0
Malaysia 93 95 93 94 56 66 58 71 .. 32 .. 41
Mali 36 105a 21 89a 10 49a 5 34a 1 9 0 3
Mauritania 56 101 43 108 18 26 9 23 5 5 1 2
Mexico 115 117 112 116 54 87 53 93 15 28 12 28
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Gross enrollment ratio
     % of relevant age group
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Male Female Male Female Male   Female
1991 2009 1991 2009 1991 2009 1991 2009 1991 2009 1991    2009
Table A1 Participation in education (continued)
Moldova 93 94 93 93 87 88 94 90 .. 32 .. 45
Morocco 76 112 52 103 41 60 30 51 14 14 8 12
Mozambique 69 122a 51 110a 9 28a 5 23a 1 .. 0 ..
Myanmar 108 117 103 115 23 53 22 54 4 9 5 12
Nepal 135 .. 85 .. 46 .. 21 .. 8 .. 3 ..
Netherlands 101 108 104 106 124 122 115 120 43 58 36 65
New Zealand 104 101 102 102 92 124 93 129 43 68 48 99
Nicaragua 88 118 93 116 25 64 41 72 8 .. 7 ..
Niger 33 73a 20 60a 10 16a 4 11a 2 2a 0 1a
Nigeria 93 95 73 84 28 34 21 27 .. .. .. ..
Norway 100 99 100 99 101 112 105 109 39 56 46 92
Pakistan 62 92 32 77 31 37 15 29 4 6 2 5
Panama 109 111 104 107 59 70 63 76 .. 36 .. 55
Papua New Guinea 70 .. 60 .. 14 .. 9 .. .. .. .. ..
Paraguay 107 101 104 98 30 65 32 68 9 30 8 43
Peru 119 109 116 109 69 89 65 89 .. .. .. ..
Philippines 109 111 108 109 70 79 72 86 21 26 30 32
Poland 99 97 97 97 86 99 89 99 19 59 25 84
Portugal 122 114 116 111 62 105 71 109 20 56 26 67
Romania 88 100 89 99 93 94 92 93 10 58 9 77
Russian Federation 109 97 109 97 94 86 96 84 47 66 58 89
Rwanda 79 150 78 151 20 27 16 26 1 6 0 4
Saudi Arabia .. 101 .. 97 .. 104 .. 90 11 29 10 36
Senegal 64 82 47 85 20 34 10 27 .. 10 .. 6
Serbia .. 98 .. 97 .. 90 .. 93 .. 44 .. 56
Sierra Leone 57 .. 38 .. 21 .. 12 .. .. .. .. ..
Singapore .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovak Republic 101 102 100 102 86 92 90 92 16 43 16 69
Somalia .. 42 .. 23 .. 11 .. 5 .. .. .. ..
South Africa 110 103 108 99 64 92 75 96 14 .. 11 ..
Spain 107 108 106 107 102 118 108 124 36 66 39 82
Sri Lanka 115 97 111 97 69 .. 75 .. 4 .. 2 ..
Sudan 53 78 41 70 22 40 18 36 3 .. 2 ..
Sweden 100 97 100 96 88 103 92 102 29 56 35 88
Switzerland 90 104 91 103 101 98 95 94 35 51 19 52
Syrian Arab Republic 106 125 96 120 56 75 41 74 22 .. 14 ..
Tajikistan 92 104 90 100 .. 90 .. 78 .. 28 .. 12
Tanzania 71 105 69 105 6 31 5 24 1 .. 0 ..
Thailand 102 92 100 90 31 74a 31 80a 18 39a 21 51a
Togo 115 119 75 111 30 54 10 28 4 .. 1 ..
Tunisia 120 109 107 107 50 87 39 94 10 27 7 42
Turkey 102 101 95 98 59 87 37 77 17 43 9 34
Turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 75 121 64 122 14 30 8 25 2 5 1 4
Ukraine 107 97 107 98 92 95 96 93 .. 72 .. 91
United Arab Emirates 116 106 113 105 63 95 73 96 4 22 14 41
United Kingdom 105 106 105 106 85 98 88 100 30 50 29 69
United States 105 98 103 99 91 93 92 94 66 72 82 101
Uruguay 108 115 107 112 .. 82 .. 94 .. 48 .. 83
Uzbekistan 112 93 110 91 .. 104 .. 103 .. 11 .. 8
Venezuela, RB 109 105 108 102 50 79 62 86 28 59 25 99
Vietnam .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
West Bank and Gaza .. 79 .. 79 .. 84 .. 90 .. 40 .. 52
Yemen, Rep. .. 94 .. 76 .. .. .. .. 7 14 2 6
Zambia .. 113 .. 112 .. 53 .. 44 3 .. 1 ..
Zimbabwe 108 .. 104 .. 54 .. 43 .. 8 4 4 3
World 105 w 109 w 93 w 105 w 54 w 69 w 45 w 67 w .. w 26 w .. w 28 w
Low income 81 108 67 101 30 42 22 36 .. 8 .. 5
Middle income 110 110 97 107 52 70 42 68 .. 24 .. 25
 Lower middle income 110 110 94 104 48 61 35 55 .. 17 .. 14
 Upper middle income 112 111 109 111 68 81 67 86 .. 30 .. 36
Low and middle income 105 110 91 106 49 65 38 63 .. 21 .. 22
 East Asia & Pacifi c 123 111 115 112 46 74 37 78 .. 24 .. 26
 Europe & Central Asia 99 99 97 98 86 91 84 87 .. 50 .. 61
 Latin America & the Caribbean 114 119 113 115 56 86 57 93 .. 33 .. 41
 Middle East & North Africa 106 106 87 98 61 75 46 69 16 28 9 27
 South Asia 98 113 74 107 47 58 27 51 .. 13 .. 9
 Sub-Saharan Africa 78 104 65 95 25 40 19 32 .. 8 .. 5
High income 103  102  102  101  91  100  92  100  ..  63  ..  77
a. Data are for 2010.
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Table A2 Health
 Life expectancy at birth Child mortality rate Maternal mortality ratio
 years per 1,000 per 100,000 live births
     National
 Male Female Male Female estimates Modeled estimates
 1990 2009 1990 2009 1990 2004–09a 1990 2004–09a 2004–09a 1990 2008
Afghanistan 41 44 41 44 .. .. .. .. .. 1,700 1,400
Albania 69 74 75 80 .. 3 .. 1 21 48 31
Algeria 66 71 68 74 .. .. .. .. .. 250 120
Angola 40 46 44 50 .. .. .. .. .. 1,000 610
Argentina 68 72 75 79 .. .. .. .. 40 72 70
Armenia 65 71 71 77 .. 8 .. 3 27 51 29
Australia 74 79 80 84 .. .. .. .. .. 10 8
Austria 72 77 79 83 .. .. .. .. .. 10 5
Azerbaijan 61 68 70 73 .. 9 .. 5 26 64 38
Bangladesh 53 66 55 68 .. 16 .. 20 348 870 340
Belarus 66 65 76 76 .. .. .. .. 3 37 15
Belgium 73 78 79 84 .. .. .. .. .. 7 5
Benin 53 61 55 63 .. 64 .. 65 397 790 410
Bolivia 57 64 61 68 51 18 51 20 310 510 180
Bosnia and Herzegovina 62 73 74 78 .. .. .. .. 3 18 9
Brazil 63 69 70 76 17 .. 20 .. 75 120 58
Bulgaria 68 70 75 77 .. .. .. .. 6 24 13
Burkina Faso 47 52 48 55 .. .. .. .. 307 770 560
Burundi 45 49 48 52 .. 65 .. 65 615 1,200 970
Cambodia 53 60 57 63 .. 20 .. 20 461 690 290
Cameroon 53 51 57 52 64 73 75 72 669 680 600
Canada 74 79 81 84 .. .. .. .. .. 6 12
Central African Republic 47 46 52 49 .. 74 .. 82 543 880 850
Chad 49 48 53 50 .. 96 .. 101 1,099 1,300 1,200
Chile 71 76 77 82 .. .. .. .. 18 56 26
China 67 72 70 75 .. .. .. .. 34 110 38
 Hong Kong SAR, China 75 80 80 86 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Colombia 64 70 72 77 11 4 6 3 76 140 85
Congo, Dem. Rep. 46 46 50 49 .. 70 .. 64 549 900 670
Congo, Rep. 57 53 61 55 .. 49 .. 43 781 460 580
Costa Rica 73 77 78 82 .. .. .. .. 27 35 44
Côte d’Ivoire 56 57 60 59 .. .. .. .. 543 690 470
Croatia 69 73 76 80 .. 1 .. 1 13b 8 14
Czech Republic 68 74 75 80 .. .. .. .. 6 15 8
Denmark 72 77 78 81 .. .. .. .. .. 7 5
Dominican Republic 65 70 70 76 18 6 20 4 159 220 100
Ecuador 66 72 71 78 .. 5 .. 5 60 230 140
Egypt, Arab Rep. 62 69 64 72 38 5 46 5 55 220 82
El Salvador 61 67 71 76 .. .. .. .. 59 200 110
Eritrea 46 58 50 62 .. .. .. .. .. 930 280
Ethiopia 45 54 48 57 .. 56 .. 56 673 990 470
Finland 71 77 79 83 .. .. .. .. .. 7 8
France 73 78 81 85 .. .. .. .. .. 13 8
Georgia 67 68 74 75 .. 5 .. 4 14 58 48
Germany 72 77 79 83 .. .. .. .. .. 13 7
Ghana 56 56 58 58 78 38 79 28 451 630 350
Greece 75 78 80 83 .. .. .. .. .. 6 2
Guatemala 59 67 65 74 .. .. .. .. 133 140 110
Guinea 47 56 50 60 122 89 112 86 980 1,200 680
Haiti 54 60 56 63 .. 33 .. 36 630 670 300
Honduras 64 70 69 75 .. 8 .. 9 .. 210 110
Hungary 65 70 74 78 .. .. .. .. 17 23 13
India 58 63 58 66 .. 9 .. 12 254 570 230
Indonesia 60 69 63 73 36 13 35 12 228 620 240
Iran, Islamic Rep. 64 70 66 73 .. .. .. .. 25 150 30
Iraq 58 65 72 72 .. 6 .. 7 84 93 75
Ireland 72 77 77 82 .. .. .. .. .. 6 3
Israel 75 80 78 84 .. .. .. .. .. 12 7
Italy 74 79 80 84 .. .. .. .. .. 10 5
Japan 76 80 82 86 .. .. .. .. .. 12 6
Jordan 65 71 69 75 6 3 6 7 19 110 59
Kazakhstan 64 64 73 74 .. 5 .. 4 37 78 45
Kenya 58 54 62 55 35 27 33 25 488 380 530
Korea, Rep. 67 77 76 84 .. .. .. .. .. 18 18
Kyrgyz Republic 64 62 73 72 .. 8 .. 4 55 77 81
Lao PDR 53 64 56 67 .. .. .. .. 405 1,200 580
Lebanon 66 70 71 74 .. .. .. .. .. 52 26
Liberia 47 57 50 60 .. 62 .. 64 994 1,100 990
Libya 66 72 70 77 .. .. .. .. .. 100 64
Lithuania 66 68 76 79 .. .. .. .. 9 34 13
Madagascar 50 59 52 62 85 30 82 31 498 710 440
Malawi 48 53 50 55 126 52 114 54 807 910 510
Malaysia 68 72 72 77 .. .. .. .. 29 56 31
Mali 43 48 43 50 .. 117 .. 114 464 1,200 830
Mauritania 54 55 57 59 .. 53 .. 44 686 780 550
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 Life expectancy at birth Child mortality rate Maternal mortality ratio
 years per 1,000 per 100,000 live births
     National
 Male Female Male Female estimates Modeled estimates
 1990 2009 1990 2009 1990 2004–09a 1990 2004–09a 2004–09a 1990 2008
Mexico 68 73 74 78 .. .. .. .. 63 93 85
Moldova 64 65 71 72 .. 7 .. 4 38 62 32
Morocco 62 69 66 74 21 9 24 11 132 270 110
Mozambique 42 47 45 49 .. .. .. .. .. 1,000 550
Myanmar 57 60 61 64 .. .. .. .. 316 420 240
Nepal 54 66 54 68 .. 21 .. 18 281 870 380
Netherlands 74 79 80 83 .. .. .. .. .. 10 9
New Zealand 73 78 78 82 .. .. .. .. .. 18 14
Nicaragua 61 70 67 77 .. .. .. .. 77 190 100
Niger 41 51 42 53 212 138 232 135 648 1,400 820
Nigeria 43 48 46 49 118 91 102 93 545 1,100 840
Norway 73 79 80 83 .. .. .. .. .. 9 7
Pakistan 60 67 61 67 22 14 37 22 276 490 260
Panama 70 73 75 79 .. .. .. .. 60 86 71
Papua New Guinea 52 59 58 64 .. .. .. .. 733 340 250
Paraguay 66 70 70 74 10 .. 12 .. 118 130 95
Peru 63 71 68 76 29 13 31 4 .. 250 98
Philippines 63 70 68 74 .. 10 .. 9 162 180 94
Poland 67 72 76 80 .. .. .. .. 5 17 6
Portugal 70 76 77 82 .. .. .. .. .. 15 7
Romania 67 70 73 77 .. .. .. .. 14 170 27
Russian Federation 64 63 74 75 .. .. .. .. 32b 74 39
Rwanda 31 49 35 52 87 69 73 55 750 1,100 540
Saudi Arabia 66 73 70 74 .. 3 .. 4 14 41 24
Senegal 51 54 53 57 .. 43 .. 39 401 750 410
Serbia 69 71 74 76 .. 4 .. 3 6 13 8
Sierra Leone 38 47 42 49 .. 67 .. 61 857 1,300 970
Singapore 72 79 77 84 .. .. .. .. .. 6 9
Slovak Republic 67 71 75 79 .. .. .. .. 4 15 6
Somalia 43 49 46 52 .. 53 .. 54 1,044 1,100 1,200
South Africa 58 50 65 53 .. .. .. .. .. 230 410
Spain 73 79 81 85 .. .. .. .. .. 7 6
Sri Lanka 66 71 73 78 .. .. .. .. 39 91 39
Sudan 51 57 54 60 62 38 63 30 1,107 830 750
Sweden 75 79 80 83 .. .. .. .. .. 7 5
Switzerland 74 80 81 84 .. .. .. .. .. 8 10
Syrian Arab Republic 66 73 70 76 .. 5 .. 3 .. 120 46
Tajikistan 60 64 66 70 .. 18 .. 13 38 120 64
Tanzania 49 56 53 57 63 56 57 52 578 880 790
Thailand 66 66 73 72 .. .. .. .. 12 50 48
Togo 56 61 60 65 75 55 90 43 .. 650 350
Tunisia 69 73 72 77 19 .. 19 .. .. 130 60
Turkey 62 70 67 75 .. 6 .. 6 29 68 23
Turkmenistan 59 61 66 69 .. .. .. .. 15 91 77
Uganda 46 53 50 54 97 75 86 62 435 670 430
Ukraine 66 64 75 75 .. 4 .. 1 16 49 26
United Arab Emirates 71 77 75 79 .. .. .. .. .. 28 10
United Kingdom 73 78 79 82 .. .. .. .. .. 10 12
United States 72 76 79 81 .. .. .. .. 13 12 24
Uruguay 69 73 76 80 .. .. .. .. 34 39 27
Uzbekistan 64 65 70 71 .. 11 .. 7 21 53 30
Venezuela, RB 68 71 74 77 .. .. .. .. 61 84 68
Vietnam 64 73 67 77 .. 5 .. 4 75 170 56
West Bank and Gaza 67 72 70 75 .. 3 .. 3 .. .. ..
Yemen, Rep. 54 62 55 65 41 10 47 11 .. 540 210
Zambia 49 46 53 47 30 66 33 55 591 390 470
Zimbabwe 57 45 64 46 .. 21 .. 21 555 390 790
World 63 w 67 w 67 w 71 w .. w .. w .. w .. w    400 w 260 w
Low income 51 56 53 59 .. .. .. ..  860 590
Middle income 62 67 66 71 .. .. .. ..  350 210
 Lower middle income 58 63 61 67 .. .. .. ..  540 300
 Upper middle income 66 70 70 75 .. .. .. ..  110 60
Low and middle income 61 65 64 69 .. .. .. ..  440 290
 East Asia & Pacifi c 65 71 68 74 .. .. .. ..  200 89
 Europe & Central Asia 64 66 73 75 .. .. .. ..  69 34
 Latin America & the Caribbean 65 71 72 77 .. .. .. ..  140 86
 Middle East & North Africa 63 69 66 73 .. .. .. ..  210 88
 South Asia 58 63 58 66 .. 9 .. 13  610 290
 Sub-Saharan Africa 48 51 52 54 .. .. .. ..  870 650
High income 72 77 79 83 .. .. .. ..  15 15
a. Data are for the most recent year available. b. Data are for 2010.
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 Employment by economic activity  
 Agriculture Industry Service
 Male Female Male Female Male Female
 % of male % of female % of male % of female % of male % of female
 employment employment employment employment employment employment 
% of total seats
 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 1990 2010
Afghanistan .. .. .. ..  .. .. 4 28
Albania .. .. .. .. .. .. 29 16
Algeria .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 8
Angola .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 39
Argentina 2c 0b,c 33c 10c 65c 89c 6 39
Armenia 39 49 25 8 35 43 36 9
Australia 4 2 32 9 64 88 6 25
Austria 5 5 37 11 58 83 12 28
Azerbaijan 37 40 18 7 45 53 .. 11
Bangladesh .. .. .. .. .. .. 10 19
Belarus 15 9 33 24 37 64 .. 35
Belgium 2 1 35 10 63 88 9 39
Benin .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 11
Bolivia 34 38 28 9 38 52 9 25
Bosnia and Herzegovina ..  .. .. .. .. .. .. 19
Brazil 21 12 29 13 50 75 5 9
Bulgaria 9 5 43 27 49 67 21 21
Burkina Faso .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15
Burundi .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32
Cambodia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21
Cameroon .. .. .. .. .. .. 14 14
Canada 3c 1c 32c 10c 65c 89c 13 22
Central African Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 10
Chad .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5
Chile 15 6 31 11 54 83 .. 14
China .. .. .. .. .. .. 21 21
 Hong Kong SAR, China 0b,c 0b,c 19c 4c 80c 96c .. ..
Colombia 27 6 22 16 51 78 5 8
Congo, Dem. Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 8
Congo, Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14 7
Costa Rica 17 4 27 13 56 82 11 39
Côte d’Ivoire .. .. .. .. .. .. 6 9
Croatia 13 15 39 16 47 68 .. 24
Czech Republic 4 2 49 24 47 74 .. 22
Denmark 4 1 29 10 66 89 31 38
Dominican Republic 21 2 26 14 53 84 8 21
Ecuador 34 23 24 11 43 66 5 32
Egypt, Arab Rep. 28 46 27 6 44 49 4 2
El Salvador 28 4 26 20 46 76 12 19
Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22
Ethiopia 9c 10c 25c 20c 76c 64c .. 28
Finland 6 3 37 10 56 87 32 40
France 4 2 34 10 62 87 7 19 
Georgia 51 57 17 4 33 39 .. 7
Germany 2 1 41 15 57 84 .. 33
Ghana .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8
Greece 12 12 30 9 59 79 7 17
Guatemala 44 16 24 21 32 63 7 12
Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19
Haiti .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4
Honduras 48 10 22 22 30 68 10 18
Hungary 6 3 41 19 52 78 21 9
India .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 11
Indonesia 40 39 21 15 39 46 12 18
Iran, Islamic Rep. 19 31 33 27 47 42 2 3
Iraq 17 51 22 4 61 46 11 25
Ireland 8 1 31 9 60 89 8 14
Israel 3 1 30 10 67 89 7 18
Italy 4 3 39 15 57 82 13 21
Japan 4 4 35 17 60 78 1 11
Jordan 3 2 21 10 75 88 0 6
Kazakhstan 31 29 26 12 43 59 .. 18
Kenya .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 10
Korea, Rep. 7 8 32 15 61 77 2 15
Kyrgyz Republic 37 35 26 11 37 54 .. 26
Lao PDR .. .. .. .. .. .. 6 25
Lebanon .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 3
Liberia 47 49 4 1 17 13 .. 13
Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8
Lithuania 12 7 37 18 51 75 .. 19
Madagascar .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 8
Malawi .. .. .. .. .. .. 10 21
Malaysia 17 9 32 23 51 68 5 10
Mali 68 64 8 3 24 33 .. 10
Mauritania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22
Table A3 Employment by economic activity and political participation
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 Employment by economic activity  
 Agriculture Industry Service
 Male Female Male Female Male Female
 % of male % of female % of male % of female % of male % of female
 employment employment employment employment employment employment 
% of total seats
 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 2006–09a 1990 2010
Table A3 Employment by economic activity and political participation (continued)
Mexico 19 4 30 18 50 77 12 26
Moldova 34 28 26 14 41 58 .. 24
Morocco 34 59 24 15 42 25 0 11
Mozambique .. .. .. .. .. .. 16 39
Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nepal .. .. .. .. .. .. 6 33
Netherlands 3 2 25 7 63 85 21 41
New Zealand 9 4 31 10 61 86 14 34
Nicaragua 42 8 21 19 37 72 15 21
Niger .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 12
Nigeria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7
Norway 4 1 32 7 64 92 36 40
Pakistan 37 75 22 12 41 13 10 22
Panama 20 4 26 9 55 87 8 9
Papua New Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 1
Paraguay 31 19 25 10 44 71 6 13
Peru 10c 6c 28c 13c 62c 82  6 28
Philippines 42 24 18 10 40 66 9 21
Poland 13 13 43 17 44 70 14 20
Portugal 11 12 39 16 50 72 8 27
Romania 28 31 37 22 36 47 34 11
Russian Federation 11 7 38 19 51 74 .. 14
Rwanda .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 56
Saudi Arabia 5 0b 23 2 72 98 .. 0
Senegal 34 33 20 5 33 42 13 23
Serbia 25 23 32 16 43 61 .. 22
Sierra Leone .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13
Singapore 2 1 26 17 73 83 5 23
Slovak Republic 5 2 50 22 45 76 .. 15
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 7
South Africa 6 4 35 13 59 83 3 45
Spain 6 3 36 10 59 88 15 37
Sri Lanka 30c 37c 25c 25c 27c 27c 5 5
Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 26
Sweden 3 1 31 8 65 91 38 45
Switzerland 4 2 30 10 61 81 14 29
Syrian Arab Republic 18 26 32 8 50 66 9 12
Tajikistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19
Tanzania 71 78 7 3 22 19 .. 31
Thailand 44 39 21 18 35 43 3 13
Togo 61 48 10 4 29 46 5 11
Tunisia .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 28
Turkey 17 38 29 15 54 47 1 9
Turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 26 17
Uganda .. .. .. .. .. .. 12 32
Ukraine .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8
United Arab Emirates 5 0b 28 7 66 92 0 23
United Kingdom 2 1 30 8 68 91 6 22
United States 2 1 30 9 68 90 7 17
Uruguay 16c 5c 29c 13c 56c 83c 6 15
Uzbekistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22
Venezuela, RB 13 2 31 11 57 87 10 19
Vietnam 50 54 24 16 26 30 18 26
West Bank and Gaza 10 28 29 11 60 60 .. ..
Yemen, Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 0
Zambia .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 14
Zimbabwe .. .. .. .. .. .. 11 15
World .. w .. w .. w .. w .. w .. w 13 w 19 w
Low income .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20
Middle income .. .. .. .. .. .. 13 17
 Lower middle income .. .. .. .. .. .. 11 15
 Upper middle income .. .. .. .. .. .. 14 20
Low and middle income .. .. .. .. .. .. 13 18
 East Asia & Pacifi c .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 19
 Europe & Central Asia 16 15 35 18 49 66 .. 15
 Latin America & the Caribbean 18 9 29 14 52 77 12 24
 Middle East & North Africa 25 42 28 17 47 42 4 9
 South Asia .. .. .. .. .. .. 6 19
 Sub-Saharan Africa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20
High income 4 3 34 12 62 85 12 23
Note: Data on employment by economic activity may not sum to 100 percent because of workers not classifi ed by sector.
a. Data are for the most recent year available. b. Less than 0.5. c. Limited coverage.
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Table A1. Participation in education
Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, 
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
offi cially corresponds to the level of education shown. 
(Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)
Primary education (International Standard Classifi cation of 
Education [ISCED] 1) refers to programs normally designed 
to give students a sound basic education in reading, writing, 
and mathematics along with an elementary understanding 
of other subjects such as history, geography, natural science, 
social science, art, and music. Religious instruction may also be 
featured. It is sometimes called ele mentary education. (Source: 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics)
Secondary education refers to programs of lower (ISCED 2) 
and upper (ISCED 3) secondary education. Lower secondary 
education continues the basic programs of the primary level, 
but the teaching is typically more subject focused, requiring 
more specialized teachers for each subject area. In upper 
secondary education, instruction is often organized even 
more along subject lines, and teachers typically need a higher 
or more subject-specifi c qualifi cation. (Source: UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics)
Tertiary education refers to a wide range of programs with 
more advanced educational content. The fi rst stage of tertiary 
education (ISCE 5) refers to theoretically based programs 
intended to provide suffi cient qualifi cations to enter advanced 
research programs or professions to enter advanced research 
programs or professions with high-skill requirements and 
programs that are practical, technical, or occupationally 
specifi c. The second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) 
refers to programs devoted to advanced study and original 
research and leading to the award of an advanced research 
qualifi cation. (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)
Table A2. Health
Life expectancy at birth is the number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the 
time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
(Source: World Bank)
Child mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 of dying 
between ages 1 and 5—that is, the probability of a 1-year-
old dying before reaching age 5—if subject to current age-
specifi c mortality rates. (Source: Macro International and 
World Bank)
Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who 
die from pregnancy-related causes during pregnancy and 
childbirth per 100,000 live births. National estimates are 
reported based on national surveys, vital registration records, 
and surveillance data or are derived from community and 
hospital records. (Source: UNICEF) Modeled estimates 
are derived based on an exercise by the World Health 
Organization, United Nations Children’s Fund, United 
Nations Population Fund, and World Bank. For countries 
with good attribution of cause of death, the data are used 
to directly estimate maternal mortality. For countries 
without complete registration data but with other types 
of data and for countries with no empirical national data, 
maternal mortality is estimated with a multilevel regression 
model using available national-level model using available 
national-level maternal mortality data and socioeconomic 
information including fertility, birth attendants and GDP. 
(WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, and World Bank)
Table A3. Employment by economic activity and 
political participation
Employment in agriculture corresponds to division 1 (ISIC 
revision 2) or tabulation categories A and B (ISIC revision 3) 
and includes hunting, forestry, and fi shing. (Source: ILO)
Employment in industry corresponds to divisions 2-5 (ISIC 
revision 2) or tabulation categories C-F (ISIC revision 3) and 
includes mining and quarrying (including oil production), 
manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity, 
gas, and water). (Source: ILO)
Employment in services corresponds to divisions 6-9 (ISIC 
revision 2) or tabulation categories G-P (ISIC revision 3) 
and includes wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and 
hotels; transport, storage, and communications; fi nancing, 
insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, 
social, and personal services. (Source: ILO)
Women in parliaments are the percentage of parliamentary 
seats in a single or lower chamber held by women. (Source: 
IPU)
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n this year’s edition, development data are in six tables 
presenting comparative socioeconomic data for 132 
economies for the most recent year for which data are 
available and, for some indicators, for an earlier year. An 
additional table presents basic indicators for 84 economies 
with sparse data or with populations of less than 3 million.
The indicators presented here are from more than 800 
included in World Development Indicators 2011. Published 
annually, World Development Indicators (WDI) refl ects a 
comprehensive view of the development process. WDI’s 
six sections recognize the contribution of a wide range of 
factors: progress on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and human capital development, environmental 
sustainability, macroeconomic performance, private sector 
development and the investment climate, and the global links 
that infl uence the external environment for development.
WDI is complemented by a separately published database 
that gives access to more than 1,000 time-series indicators 
for 240 economies and regions. This database is available at 
the Open Data website (http://data.worldbank.org).
Data sources and methodology
Socioeconomic and environmental data presented here 
are drawn from several sources: primary data collected by 
the World Bank, member country statistical publications, 
research institutes, and international organizations such as 
the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (See 
the data sources in the technical notes following the tables 
for a complete listing.) Although international standards 
of coverage, defi nition, and classifi cation apply to most 
statistics reported by countries and international agencies, 
inevitable differences in timeliness and reliability arise from 
differences in the capabilities and resources devoted to basic 
data collection and compilation. For some topics, competing 
sources of data require review by the World Bank staff to 
ensure that the most reliable data available are presented. In 
some instances, where available data are deemed too weak 
to provide reliable measures of levels and trends or do not 
adequately adhere to international standards, the data are 
not shown.
The data presented are generally consistent with those in 
World Development Indicators 2011. However, data have been 
revised and updated wherever new information has become 
available. Differences may also refl ect revisions to historical 
series and changes in methodology. Thus, data of different 
vintages may be published in different editions of World 
Bank publications. Readers are advised not to compile data 
series from different publications or different editions of the 
same publication. Consistent time-series data are available 
on the Open Data website (http://data.worldbank.org).
All dollar fi gures are in current U.S. dollars unless 
otherwise stated. The various methods used to convert from 
national currency fi gures are described in the technical notes 
following the tables.
Because the World Bank’s primary business is providing 
lending and policy advice to its low- and middle-income 
members, the issues covered in these tables focus mainly on 
those economies. Where available, information on the high-
income economies is also provided for comparison. Readers 
may wish to refer to national statistical publications and 
publications of the OECD and the European Union (EU) for 
more information on the high-income economies.
Classification of economies and 
summary measures
The summary measures at the bottom of most tables include 
economies classifi ed by income per capita and by region. 
Gross national income (GNI) per capita is used to determine 
the following income classifi cations: low income, US$1,005 
or less in 2010; middle income, US$1,006—$12,275; and 
high income, US$12,276 and above. A further division at GNI 
per capita US$3,975 is made between lower-middle-income 
and upper-middle-income economies. The classifi cation of 
economies based on per capita income occurs annually, so 
the country composition of the income groups may change 
annually. When these changes in classifi cation are made on 
the basis of the most recent estimates, aggregates based on 
the new income classifi cations are recalculated for all past 
periods to ensure that a consistent time series is maintained. 
See the classifi cation of economies at the end of this 
discussion for a list of economies in each group (including 
those with populations of less than 3 million).
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Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999); any exceptions are 
noted. Kosovo became a World Bank member on June 29, 
2009, and its data are shown in the tables where available.
Technical notes
Because data quality and intercountry comparisons are often 
problematic, readers are encouraged to consult the technical 
notes that follow the tables, the list of classifi cation of econo-
mies by region and income that follows this discussion, and 
the footnotes to the tables. For more extensive documenta-
tion, see WDI 2011.
Symbols
..  means that data are not available or that aggregates cannot 
be calculated because of missing data in the years shown.
0 or 0.0 means zero or small enough that the number would 
round to zero at the displayed number of decimal places.
/ in dates, as in 2003/04, means that the period of time, 
usually 12 months, straddles two calendar years and refers 
to a crop year, a survey year, or a fi scal year.
$  means current U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
>  means more than.
<  means less than.
Readers may fi nd more information in WDI 2010, and orders 
can be made online, by phone, or fax as follows:
For more information and to order online: http://data
.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
To order by phone: 1-800-645-7247
To order by fax: 1-703-661-1501
To order by mail: The World Bank, P.O. Box 960, Herndon,
VA 20172-0960, USA
Summary measures are either totals (indicated by a t 
if the aggregates include estimates for missing data and 
nonreporting countries, or by an s for simple sums of the 
data available), weighted averages (w), or median values (m) 
calculated for groups of economies. Data for the countries 
excluded from the main tables (those presented in table 6) 
have been included in the summary measures, where data 
are available; otherwise, it is assumed that they follow the 
trend of reporting countries. This approach gives a more 
consistent aggregated measure by standardizing country 
coverage for each period shown. Where missing information 
accounts for a third or more of the overall estimate, however, 
the group measure is reported as not available. The section 
on statistical methods in the technical notes provides fur-
ther information on aggregation methods. Weights used to 
construct the aggregates are listed in the technical notes for 
each table.
Terminology and country coverage
The term country does not imply political independence 
but may refer to any territory for which authorities report 
separate social or economic statistics. Data are shown for 
economies as they were constituted in 2010, and historical 
data are revised to refl ect current political arrangements. 
Throughout the tables, exceptions are noted. Unless 
otherwise noted, data for China do not include data for Hong 
Kong SAR, China; Macao SAR, China; or Taiwan, China. 
Data for Indonesia include Timor-Leste through 1999 unless 
otherwise noted. Montenegro declared independence from 
Serbia and Montenegro on June 3, 2006. When available, 
data for each country are shown separately. However, 
some indicators for Serbia continue to include data for 
Montenegro through 2005; these data are footnoted in the 
tables. Moreover, data for most indicators from 1999 onward 
for Serbia exclude data for Kosovo, which in 1999 became a 
territory under international administration pursuant to UN 
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Classifi cation of economies by region and income, FY2012
East Asia and Pacifi c    Latin America and the Caribbean  South Asia   High-income OECD
American Samoa UMC Antigua and Barbuda UMC Afghanistan LIC Australia
Cambodia LIC Argentina UMC Bangladesh LIC Austria
China UMC Belize LMC Bhutan LMC Belgium
Fiji LMC Bolivia LMC India LMC Canada
Indonesia LMC Brazil UMC Maldives UMC Czech Republic
Kiribati LMC Chile UMC Nepal LIC Denmark
Korea, Dem. Rep. LIC Colombia UMC Pakistan LMC Estonia
Lao PDR LMC Costa Rica UMC Sri Lanka LMC Finland
Malaysia UMC Cuba UMC    France
Marshall Islands LMC Dominica UMC Sub-Saharan Africa    Germany
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. LMC Dominican Republic UMC Angola LMC Greece
Mongolia LMC Ecuador UMC Benin LIC Hungary
Myanmar LIC El Salvador LMC Botswana UMC Iceland
Palau UMC Grenada UMC Burkina Faso LIC Ireland
Papua New Guinea LMC Guatemala LMC Burundi LIC Israel
Philippines LMC Guyana LMC Cameroon LMC Italy
Samoa LMC Haiti LIC Cape Verde LMC Japan
Solomon Islands LMC Honduras LMC Central African Republic LIC Korea, Rep.
Thailand UMC Jamaica UMC Chad LIC Luxembourg
Timor-Leste LMC Mexico UMC Comoros LIC Netherlands
Tonga LMC Nicaragua LMC Congo, Dem. Rep. LIC New Zealand
Tuvalu LMC Panama UMC Congo, Rep. LMC Norway
Vanuatu LMC Paraguay LMC Côte d’Ivoire LMC Poland
Vietnam LMC Peru UMC Eritrea LIC Portugal
   St. Kitts and Nevis UMC Ethiopia LIC Slovak Republic
Europe and Central Asia    St. Lucia UMC Gabon UMC Slovenia
Albania UMC St. Vincent and the   Gambia, The LIC Spain
Armenia LMC Grenadines UMC Ghana LMC Sweden
Azerbaijan UMC Suriname UMC Guinea LIC Switzerland
Belarus UMC Uruguay UMC Guinea-Bissau LIC United Kingdom
Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC Venezuela, RB UMC Kenya LIC United States
Bulgaria UMC    Lesotho LMC 
Georgia LMC Middle East and North Africa  Liberia LIC Other high income
Kazakhstan UMC Algeria UMC Madagascar LIC Andorra
Kosovo LMC Djibouti LMC Malawi LIC Aruba
Kyrgyz Republic LIC Egypt, Arab Rep. LMC Mali LIC Bahamas, The
Latvia UMC Iran, Islamic Rep. UMC Mauritania LMC Bahrain
Lithuania UMC Iraq LMC Mauritius UMC Barbados
Macedonia, FYR UMC Jordan UMC Mayotte UMC Bermuda
Moldova LMC Lebanon UMC Mozambique LIC Brunei Darussalam
Montenegro UMC Libya UMC Namibia UMC Cayman Islands
Romania UMC Morocco LMC Niger LIC Channel Islands
Russian Federation UMC Syrian Arab Republic LMC Nigeria LMC Croatia
Serbia UMC Tunisia UMC Rwanda LIC Curaçao
Tajikistan LIC West Bank and Gaza LMC São Tomé and Principe LMC Cyprus
Turkey UMC Yemen, Rep. LMC Senegal LMC Equatorial Guinea
Turkmenistan LMC     Seychelles UMC Faeroe Islands
Ukraine LMC     Sierra Leone LIC French Polynesia
Uzbekistan LMC    Somalia LIC Gibraltar
       South Africa UMC Greenland
       Sudan LMC Guam
       Swaziland LMC Hong Kong SAR, China
       Tanzania LIC Isle of Man
       Togo LIC Kuwait
       Uganda LIC Liechtenstein
       Zambia LMC Macao SAR, China
       Zimbabwe LIC Malta
         Monaco
         New Caledonia
         Northern Mariana Islands
         Oman
         Puerto Rico
         Qatar
         San Marino
         Saudi Arabia
         Singapore
         Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
         St. Martin (French part)
         Taiwan, China
         Trinidad and Tobago
         Turks and Caicos Islands
         United Arab Emirates
            Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Source: World Bank data. 
This table classifi es all World Bank member economies, and all other economies with populations of more than 30,000. Economies are divided among income groups according to 2010 GNI per 
capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income (LIC), $1,005 or less; lower middle income (LMC), $1,006–$3,975; upper middle income (UMC), $3,976–$12,275; 
and high income, $12,276 or more.
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Table 1.   Key indicators of development
    Population  PPP  Life
  
Population
  age Gross national gross national Gross expectancy Adult
    composition income (GNI)
a income (GNI)b domestic at birth literacy
  Average Density %  $  $ product   rate
  annual people Ages $ per $ per per capita Male Female % ages 15
 millions % growth per sq. km 0–14 billions capita billions capita % growth Years Years and older
 2010 2000–10 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2009–10 2009 2009 2005–09
 Afghanistan 31 2.6 46 46 .. ..c .. .. .. 44 44 ..
 Albania 3 0.3 115 23 12.7 4,000 28.0 8,840 3.0 74 80 96
 Algeria 35 1.5 15 27 157.9 4,460 288.0d 8,130d 1.5 71 74 73
 Angola 19 2.9 15 45 75.2 3,960 103.1 5,430 –0.4 46 50 70
 Argentina 41 1.0 15 25 343.6 8,450 616.1 15,150 8.1 72 79 98
 Armenia 3 0.0 108 20 9.6 3,090 16.8 5,450 0.7 71 77 100
 Australia 22 1.5 3 19 956.9 43,740 842.4 38,510 .. 79 84 ..
 Austria 8 0.5 101 15 391.5 46,710 330.3 39,410 1.7 77 83 ..
 Azerbaijan 9 1.0 106 24 46.0 5,180 81.9 9,220 3.8 68 73 100
 Bangladesh 164 1.6 1,246 31 104.5 640 267.2 1,620 4.4 66 68 56
 Belarus 10 –0.4 48 15 58.2 6,030 135.2 14,020 7.8 65 76 100
 Belgium 11 0.6 356 17 493.5 45,420 411.2 37,840 1.4 78 84 ..
 Benin 9 3.2 81 43 6.9 750 13.9 1,510 –0.1 61 63 42
 Bolivia 10 1.9 9 36 18.0 1,790 45.7 4,560 2.5 64 68 91
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 0.2 74 15 18.0 4,790 33.7 8,970 1.0 73 78 98
 Brazil 195 1.1 23 25 1,830.4 9,390 2,129.0 10,920 6.8 69 76 90
 Bulgaria 8 –0.6 70 14 47.2 6,240 99.9 13,210 0.5 70 77 98
 Burkina Faso 16 3.3 58 46 9.0 550 20.5 1,260 5.7 52 55 29
 Burundi 9 2.7 323 38 1.4 160 3.4 390 1.3 49 52 67
 Cambodia 14 1.3 79 33 10.7 760 28.9 2,040 5.5 60 63 78
 Cameroon 20 2.3 41 41 23.2 1,160 43.7 2,190 0.4 51 52 71
 Canada 34 1.0 4 16 1,415.4 41,950 1,257.7 37,280 1.8 79 84 ..
 Central African Republic 5 1.8 7 40 2.1 460 3.4 760 1.4 46 49 55
 Chad 12 3.1 9 46 6.9 600 13.6 1,180 1.6 48 50 34
 Chile 17 1.1 23 22 170.3 9,940 238.0 13,890 4.2 76 82 99
 China 1,338 0.6 143 20 5,700.0 4,260 10,132.3 7,570 9.7 72 75 94
 Hong Kong SAR, China 7 0.5 6,721 12 231.7 32,900 333.1 47,300 6.4 80 86 ..
 Colombia 46 1.5 41 29 255.3 5,510 416.5 9,000 2.9 70 77 93
 Congo, Dem. Rep. 68 2.9 29 46 12.0 180 21.2 310 4.4 46 49 67
 Congo, Rep. 4 2.1 11 40 8.7 2,310 12.3 3,280 6.6 53 55 ..
 Costa Rica 5 1.7 90 25 30.5 6,580 50.5d 10,880d 2.1 77 82 96
 Côte d’Ivoire 22 2.2 66 40 23.0 1,070 35.5 1,650 0.6 57 59 55
 Croatia 4 0.0 79 15 61.0 13,760 82.9 18,710 –1.1 73 80 99
 Czech Republic 11 0.3 136 14 188.3 17,870 248.8 23,620 1.9 74 80 ..
 Denmark 6 0.4 130 18 328.3 58,980 223.4 40,140 1.4 77 81 ..
 Dominican Republic 10 1.5 209 31 49.7 4,860 88.9d 8,700d 6.3 70 76 88
 Ecuador 14 1.1 55 31 62.1 4,510 127.8 9,270 2.5 72 78 84
 Egypt, Arab Rep. 84 1.9 83 32 197.9 2,340 499.3 5,910 3.3 69 72 66
 El Salvador 6 0.4 297 32 20.8 3,360 39.6d 6,390d 0.5 67 76 84
 Eritrea 5 3.6 50 42 1.8 340 2.8d 540d –0.7 58 62 67
 Ethiopia 85 2.6 83 43 32.4 380 85.4 1,010 7.3 54 57 30
 Finland 5 0.4 18 17 253.0 47,170 199.4 37,180 2.7 77 83 ..
 France 65 0.7 118 18 2,749.8 42,390 2,234.2 34,440 1.0 78 85 ..
 Georgia 4e 0.1e 77e 17 12.0e 2,690e 22.1e 4,960e 5.4e 68 75 100
 Germany 82 –0.1 235 13 3,537.2 43,330 3,116.1 38,170 3.9 77 83 ..
 Ghana 24 2.2 105 38 30.1 1,240 39.0 1,600 4.4 56 58 67
 Greece 11 0.4 88 14 308.6 27,240 309.9 27,360 –4.9 78 83 97
 Guatemala 14 2.5 131 42 39.3 2,740 66.2d 4,610d 0.1 67 74 74
 Guinea 10 2.1 41 43 4.0 380 10.1 980 –0.6 56 60 39
 Haiti 10 1.4 364 36 6.5 650 11.1d 1,110d –4.3 60 63 49
 Honduras 8 2.0 67 37 14.3 1,880 28.4d 3,730d 0.6 70 75 84
 Hungary 10 –0.2 112 15 129.9 12,990 192.8 19,280 1.3 70 78 99
 India 1,171 1.4 389 31 1,566.6 1,340 4,170.9 3,560 8.3 63 66 63
 Indonesia 233 1.2 127 27 599.1 2,580 1,000.7 4,300 4.9 69 73 92
 Iran, Islamic Rep. 74 1.4 45 24 330.4 4,530 832.6 11,420 .. 70 73 85
 Iraq 32 2.5 72 41 74.9 2,320 107.3 3,320 –1.7 65 72 78
 Ireland 4 1.6 65 21 182.5 40,990 145.7 32,740 –1.1 77 82 ..
 Israel 8 1.9 344 28 207.2 27,340 210.7 27,800 2.8 80 84 ..
 Italy 61 0.6 205 14 2,125.8 35,090 1,883.0 31,090 0.7 79 84 99
 Japan 127 0.0 350 13 5,369.1 42,150 4,432.1 34,790 5.3 80 86 ..
 Jordan 6 2.4 67 34 26.5 4,350 35.1 5,770 0.7 71 75 92
 Kazakhstan 16 0.9 6 24 121.4 7,440 173.1 10,610 4.4 64 74 100
 Kenya 41 2.6 70 43 31.8 780 65.9 1,610 2.6 54 55 87
 Korea, Rep. 49 0.4 503 16 972.3 19,890 1,417.9 29,010 5.9 77 84 ..
 Kyrgyz Republic 5 0.9 28 29 4.7 880 11.7 2,180 –2.2 62 72 99
 Lao PDR 6 1.7 27 37 6.5 1,010 14.8 2,300 6.5 64 67 73
 Lebanon 4 1.2 413 25 38.4 9,020 60.3 14,170 6.2 70 74 90
 Liberia 4 3.7 41 42 0.8 190 1.4 330 1.7 57 60 59
 Libya 7 2.0 4 30 77.1 12,020 104.8d 16,330 d .. 72 77 89
 Lithuania 3 –0.5 53 15 37.8 11,400 59.4 17,880 2.0 68 79 100
 Madagascar 20 2.8 34 43 8.8 440 19.7 980 –1.1 59 62 64
 Malawi 15 2.8 154 46 4.9 330 12.7 850 3.8 53 55 74
 Malaysia 28 1.8 84 29 220.4 7,900 400.7 14,360 5.4 72 77 92
 Mali 15 3.1 12 44 9.1 600 15.6 1,020 1.4 48 50 26
 Mauritania 3 2.6 3 39 3.6 1,060 6.7 2,000 2.7 55 59 57
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 Mexico 109 1.0 55 28 1,012.3 9,330 1,629.2 15,010 4.4 73 78 93
 Moldova  4f –0.2f 124f 17 6.5f 1,810f 11.9f 3,340f 7.0f 65 72 98
 Morocco 32 1.2 72 28 94.1g 2,850g 150.1g 4,560g 2.0g 69 74 56
 Mozambique 23 2.5 29 44 10.3 440 21.5 920 4.9 47 49 55
 Myanmar 50 0.8 77 27 .. ..c .. .. .. 60 64 92
 Nepal 30 2.0 205 36 14.5 490 35.9 1,200 2.7 66 68 59
 Netherlands 17 0.4 490 18 826.5 49,720 707.9 42,590 1.2 79 83 ..
 New Zealand 4 1.2 16 20 125.4 29,050 121.0 28,050 1.2 78 82 ..
 Nicaragua 6 1.3 48 35 6.3 1,080 15.2d 2,610d 3.1 70 77 78
 Niger 16 3.7 12 50 5.7 360 11.1 700 4.7 51 53 29
 Nigeria 158 2.4 170 42 186.4 1,180 341.7 2,160 5.4 48 49 61
 Norway 5 0.8 16 19 416.9 85,380 279.0 57,130 –0.7 79 83 ..
 Pakistan 173 2.3 220 37 182.5 1,050 482.3 2,780 2.1 67 67 56
 Panama 4 1.7 46 29 24.5 6,990 45.4d 12,940d 5.8 73 79 94
 Papua New Guinea 7 2.5 15 39 8.9 1,300 16.4d 2,390d  5.6 59 64 60
 Paraguay 6 1.9 16 34 19.0 2,940 35.1 5,430 13.3 70 74 95
 Peru 29 1.3 23 30 139.0 4,710 263.7 8,940 7.6 71 76 90
 Philippines 94 1.9 308 33 192.2 2,050 368.0 3,930 5.8 70 74 95
 Poland 38 –0.1 125 15 474.0 12,420 726.1 19,020 3.7 72 80 100
 Portugal 11 0.4 116 15 232.6 21,860 262.9 24,710 1.2 76 82 95
 Romania 21 –0.5 93 15 168.2 7,840 301.4 14,050 1.1 70 77 98
 Russian Federation 142 –0.3 9 15 1,404.2 9,910 2,720.5 19,190 4.1 63 75 100
 Rwanda 10 2.6 405 42 5.5 540 12.2 1,180 4.6 49 52 71
 Saudi Arabia 26 2.3 13 32 436.6 17,200 607.0 23,900 .. 73 74 86
 Senegal 13 2.6 65 43 13.5 1,050 23.7 1,850 1.5 54 57 50
 Serbia 7 –0.3 83 18 42.4 5,820 81.9 11,230 2.2 71 76 ..
 Sierra Leone 6 3.2 80 43 2.0 340 4.8 830 2.4 47 49 41
 Singapore 5 2.4 7,125 16 210.3 40,920 281.1 54,700 11.1 79 84 95
 Slovak Republic 5 0.1 113 15 88.1 16,220 125.6 23,140 0.3 71 79 ..
 Somalia 9 2.4 15 45 .. ..c .. .. .. 49 52 ..
 South Africa 50 1.3 41 30 304.6 6,100 513.8 10,280 1.5 50 53 89
 Spain 46 1.4 92 15 1,462.9 31,650 1,458.2 31,550 –0.7 79 85 98
 Sri Lanka 20 0.9 324 24 46.7 2,290 103.8 5,070 7.2 71 78 91
 Sudan 44 2.4 18 39 55.3 1,270 87.9 2,020 1.9 57 60 70
 Sweden 9 0.6 23 16 469.0 49,930 372.0 39,600 4.5 79 83 ..
 Switzerland 8 0.8 193 15 548.0 70,350 383.1 49,180 1.8 80 84 ..
 Syrian Arab Republic 22 2.7 115 35 57.0 2,640 105.3 4,870 0.7 73 76 84
 Tajikistan 7 1.4 50 36 5.5 780 14.6 2,060 2.0 64 70 100
 Tanzania 45 2.8 49 45 23.4h 530h 62.1h 1,420h 3.9h 56 57 73
 Thailand 68 0.9 133 21 286.7 4,210 561.5 8,240 7.2 66 72 94
 Togo 7 2.6 122 40 3.0 440 5.4 790 0.9 61 65 57
 Tunisia 11 1.0 67 23 42.8 4,070 85.8 8,140 2.7 73 77 78
 Turkey 76 1.3 97 26 719.4 9,500 1,104.1 14,580 7.7 70 75 91
 Turkmenistan 5 1.4 11 29 19.2 3,700 37.1d 7,160d 6.7 61 69 100
 Uganda 34 3.2 166 49 16.6 490 41.5 1,230 1.8 53 54 73
 Ukraine 46 –0.7 79 14 137.9 3,010 301.1 6,580 4.8 64 75 100
 United Arab Emirates 5 3.7 55 19 .. ..i .. .. .. 77 79 90
 United Kingdom 62 0.6 256 17 2,399.3 38,540 2,276.9 36,580 0.6 78 82 ..
 United States 310 0.9 34 20 14,600.8 47,140 14,561.7 47,020 2.0 76 81 ..
 Uruguay 3 0.2 19 23 35.6 10,590 46.6 13,890 8.1 73 80 98
 Uzbekistan 28 1.3 65 29 36.1 1,280 87.1d 3,090d 7.0 65 71 99
 Venezuela, RB 29 1.7 32 29 334.1 11,59 0 344.5 11,950 –3.4 71 77 95
 Vietnam 88 1.3 281 25 96.9 1,100 257.2 2,910 5.5 73 77 93
 West Bank and Gaza 4 3.2 672 44 .. ..j .. .. .. 72 75 95
 Yemen, Rep. 24 2.9 45 43 25.0 1,060 54.7 2,320 .. 62 65 62
 Zambia 13 2.4 17 46 13.8 1,070 17.7 1,370 5.9 46 47 71
 Zimbabwe 13 0.2 32 39 5.8 460 .. .. 8.0 45 46 92
World 6,855s 1.2w 52w 27w 62,364.1t 9,097w 75,803.5t 11,058w 3.0w 67w 71w 84w
Low income 817 2.2 53 39 416.8 510 1,018.1 1,246 3.6 56 59 61
Middle income 4,915 1.2 60 27 18,503.1 3,764 33,326.1 6,780 6.5 67 71 83
 Lower middle income 2,467 1.6 107 32 4,090.2 1,658 9,128.1 3,701 5.7 63 67 71
 Upper middle income 2,449 0.7 42 22 14,410.0 5,884 24,254.3 9,904 7.0 70 75 93
Low and middle income 5,732 1.3 59 29 18,939.8 3,304 34,344.5 5,991 6.3 65 69 80
 East Asia & Pacifi c 1,957 0.8 123 22 7,223.3 3,691 12,961.6 6,623 8.8 71 74 94
 Europe & Central Asia 408 0.2 18 19 2,944.8 7,214 5,388.5 13,200 5.2 66 75 98
 Latin America & 
  the Caribbean 578 1.2 28 28 4,509.7 7,802 6,329.6 10,951 5.1 71 77 91
 Middle East & North Africa 337 1.8 38 31 1,293.0 3,839 2,598.0 7,851 ..  69 73 74
 South Asia 1,591 1.5 329 32 1,929.8 1,213 5,103.4 3,208 7.3 63 66 61
 Sub-Saharan Africa 862 2.5 36 42 1,003.6 1,165 1,816.6 2,108 2.3 51 54 62
High income 1,123 0.7 33 17 43,412.3 38,658 41,755.9 37,183 2.5 77 83 98
a. Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method.  b. PPP is purchasing power parity; see Technical notes.  c. Estimated to be low income ($1,005 or less). d. The estimate is based on 
regression; others are extrapolated from the 2005 International Comparison Program benchmark estimates.  e. Excludes Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  f. Excludes Transnistria.  g. Includes 
Former Spanish Sahara.  h. Covers mainland Tanzania only.  i. Estimated to be high income ($12,276 or more).  j. Estimated to be lower middle income ($1,006–$3,975).
Table 1.   Key indicators of development (continued)
    Population  PPP  Life
  
Population
  age Gross national gross national Gross expectancy Adult
    composition income (GNI)a income (GNI)b domestic at birth literacy
  Average Density %  $  $ product   rate
  annual people Ages $ per $ per per capita Male Female % ages 15
 millions % growth per sq. km 0–14 billions capita billions capita % growth Years Years and older
 2010 2000–10 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2009–10 2009 2009 2005–09
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Table 2.  Poverty
 Population below national poverty linea Population below international poverty linea
      Population Poverty   Population Poverty
      below gap at Population  below gap at Population
      $1.25 $1.25 below  $1.25 $1.25 below
 Survey National Survey National Survey a day a day $2.00 a day Survey a day a day $2.00 a day
 yearc % yearc % yearc % % % yearc % % %
Afghanistan  .. 2008d 36.0e  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Albania 2005 18.5e 2008 12.4e 2005 <2 <0.5 7.9 2008 <2 <0.5 4.3
Algeria  ..  .. 1988 6.6 1.8 23.8 1995 6.8 1.4 23.6
Angola  ..  ..  .. .. .. 2000f 54.3 29.9 70.2
Argentina  ..  .. 2006f,h 2.8 0.6 8.0 2009f,h <2 <0.5 <2
Armenia 2008 23.5e 2009 26.5e 2003 10.6 1.9 43.5 2008 <2 <0.5 12.4
Australia  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Austria  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Azerbaijan 2001 49.6e 2008 15.8e 2005 <2 <0.5 <2 2008 <2 <0.5 7.8
Bangladesh 2000 48.9 2005 40.0 2000i 57.8 17.3 85.4 2005i 49.6 13.1 81.3
Belarus 2008 6.1 2009 5.4 2005 <2 <0.5 <2 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
Belgium  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Benin  .. 2003d 39.0  .. .. .. 2003 47.3 15.7 75.3
Bolivia 2006g 59.9 2007g 60.1 2005h 19.6 9.7 30.4 2007h 14.0 5.8 24.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 17.7e 2007 14.0e 2004 <2 <0.5 <2 2007 <2 <0.5 <2
Brazil 2008g 22.6 2009g 21.4 2008h 4.3 1.4 10.4 2009h 3.8 1.1 9.9
Bulgaria 1997 36.0e 2001 12.8e 2003 <2 <0.5 2.4 2007 <2 <0.5 7.3
Burkina Faso  .. 2003d 46.4 1998 70.0 30.2 87.6 2003 56.5 20.3 81.2
Burundi  .. 2006d 66.9 1998 86.4 47.3 95.4 2006 81.3 36.4 93.5
Cambodia 2004 34.7e 2007 30.1e 2004 40.2 11.3 68.2 2007 28.3 6.1 56.5
Cameroon  .. 2007d 39.9 2001 32.8 10.2 57.7 2007 9.6 1.2 30.8
Canada  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Central African Republic  .. 2008d 62.0 1993 82.8 57.0 90.8 2003 62.4 28.3 81.9
Chad  .. 2003d 55.0  .. .. .. 2003 61.9 25.6 83.3
Chile 2006g 13.7 2009g 15.1 2006h <2 <0.5 2.4 2009h <2 <0.5 <2
China  ..  .. 2002j 28.4 8.7 51.1 2005j 15.9 4.0 36.3
 Hong Kong SAR, China  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Colombia 2008g 46.0 2009g 45.5 2003h 15.4 6.1 26.3 2006h 16.0 5.7 27.9
Congo, Dem. Rep.  .. 2005 71.3  .. .. .. 2006 59.2 25.3 79.6
Congo, Rep.  .. 2005 50.1  .. .. .. 2005 54.1 22.8 74.4
Costa Rica 2008g 20.7 2009g 21.7 2005h 2.4 <0.5 8.6 2009h <2 <0.5 4.8
Côte d’Ivoire  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Croatia 2002 11.2 2004 11.1 2005 <2 <0.5 <2 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
Czech Republic  ..  .. 1993h <2 <0.5 <2 1996h <2 <0.5 <2
Denmark  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Dominican Republic 2005g 53.5 2006g 49.4 2006h 4.0 0.7 13.5 2007h 4.3 0.9 13.6
Ecuador 2008g 35.1 2009g 36.0 2007h 4.7 1.2 12.8 2009h 5.1 1.6 13.4
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2005 19.6 2008 22.0 2000 <2 <0.5 19.4 2005 <2 <0.5 18.5
El Salvador 2007g,k 34.6 2008g,k 40.0 2005h 11.0 4.8 20.5 2008h 5.1 1.1 15.2
Eritrea  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Ethiopia 2000 44.2 2005 38.9 2000 55.6 16.2 86.4 2005 39.0 9.6 77.6
Finland  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
France  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Georgia  .. 2007 23.6e 2005 13.4 4.4 30.4 2008 14.7 4.6 32.6
Germany  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Ghana 1998 39.5 2006 28.5 1998 39.1 14.4 63.3 2006 30.0 10.5 53.6
Greece  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Guatemala 2000g 56.2 2006g 51.0 2002h 16.9 6.5 29.8 2006h 12.7 3.8 25.7
Guinea  .. 2007d 53.0 2003 70.1 32.2 87.2 2007 43.8 15.2 70.0
Haiti  .. 2001g 77.0  .. .. .. 2001h 54.9 28.2 72.2
Honduras 2008g,k 59.6 2009g,k 58.8 2006h 18.2 8.2 29.7 2007h 23.2 11.3 35.6
Hungary  ..  .. 2004 <2 <0.5 <2 2007 <2 <0.5 <2
India 1994 36.0 2005 27.5 1994j 49.4 13.6 81.7 2005j 41.6 10.5 75.6
Indonesia 2009 14.2 2010 13.3 2005j 21.4 4.6 53.8 2009j 18.7 3.6 50.7
Iran, Islamic Rep.  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Iraq  .. 2007 22.9  .. .. .. 2007 4.0 0.6 25.3
Ireland  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Israel  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Italy  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Japan  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Jordan 2002 14.2 2006 13.0 2003 <2 <0.5 11.0 2006 <2 <0.5 3.5
Kazakhstan 2001 17.6e 2002 15.4e 2003 3.1 <0.5 17.2 2007 <2 <0.5 <2
Kenya  .. 2005d 45.9 1997 19.6 4.6 42.7 2005 19.7 6.1 39.9
Korea, Rep.  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Kyrgyz Republic 2003 49.9e 2005 43.1e 2004 21.8 4.4 51.9 2007 <2 <0.5 29.4
Lao PDR 2002 33.5e 2008 27.6e 2002 44.0 12.1 76.9 2008 33.9 9.0 66.0
Lebanon  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Liberia  .. 2007 63.8e  .. .. .. 2007 83.7 40.8 94.8
Libya  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Lithuania  ..  .. 2004 <2 <0.5 <2 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
Madagascar 2004 72.1 2005 68.7 2001 76.3 41.4 88.8 2005 67.8 26.5 89.6
Malawi 1998 54.1 2004 52.4 1998 83.1 46.0 93.5 2004 73.9 32.3 90.5
Malaysia 2007 3.6e 2009 3.8e 2004h <2 <0.5 7.8 2009h <2 <0.5 <2
Mali  .. 2006d 47.4 2001 61.2 25.8 82.0 2006 51.4 18.8 77.1
Mauritania  .. 2000d 46.3 1996 23.4 7.1 48.3 2000 21.2 5.7 44.1
Mexico 2006g 42.6 2008g 47.4 2006 <2 <0.5 4.8 2008 <2 <0.5 8.6
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Moldova 2004 26.5e 2005 29.0e 2004 8.1 1.7 29.0 2008 <2 <0.5 12.5
Morocco  .. 2001 15.3 2001 6.3 0.9 24.3 2007 2.5 0.5 14.0
Mozambique 2003 54.1 2008 54.7 2003 74.7 35.4 90.0 2008 60.0 25.2 81.6
Myanmar  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Nepal 1996 41.8 2004 30.9 1996 68.4 26.7 88.1 2004 55.1 19.7 77.6
Netherlands  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
New Zealand  ..   ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Nicaragua 2001g 45.8 2005g 46.2 2001h 19.4 6.7 37.5 2005h 15.8 5.2 31.9
Niger  .. 2007d 59.5 2005 65.9 28.1 85.6 2007 43.1 11.9 75.9
Nigeria  .. 2004d 54.7 1996 68.5 32.1 86.4 2004 64.4 29.6 83.9
Norway  ..    ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Pakistan 2005 23.9 2006 22.3 2005 22.6 4.4 60.3 2006 22.6 4.1 61.0
Panama 2003 36.8 2008 32.7 2006h 9.5 3.1 17.9 2009h 2.4 <0.5 9.5
Papua New Guinea  ..   ..  .. .. .. 1996 35.8 12.3 57.4
Paraguay 2008g 37.9 2009g 35.1 2007h 6.5 2.7 14.2 2008h 5.1 1.5 13.2
Peru 2008 36.2 2009 34.8 2006h 7.9 1.9 18.5 2009h 5.9 1.4 14.7
Philippines 2006 26.4 2009 26.5 2003 22.0 5.5 43.8 2006 22.6 5.5 45.0
Poland 2001 15.6e 2002 16.6e 2005 <2 <0.5 <2 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
Portugal  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Romania 2005 15.1e 2006 13.8e 2005 <2 <0.5 3.4 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
Russian Federation 2005 11.9e 2006 11.1e 2005 <2 <0.5 <2 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
Rwanda  .. 2006d 58.5 2000 76.6 38.2 90.3 2006 76.8 40.9 89.6
Saudi Arabia  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Senegal  .. 2005d 50.8e 2001 44.2 14.3 71.3 2005 33.5 10.8 60.4
Serbia 2006 9.0e 2007 6.6e  .. .. .. 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
Sierra Leone  .. 2003d 66.4 1990 62.8 44.8 75.0 2003 53.4 20.3 76.1
Singapore  ..   ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Slovak Republic  ..  .. 1992h <2 <0.5 <2 1996h <2 <0.5 <2
Somalia  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
South Africa 2000 38.0 2005 23.0 1995 21.4 5.2 39.9 2000 26.2 8.2 42.9
Spain  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Sri Lanka 2002 22.7 2007 15.2 2002 14.0 2.6 39.7 2007 7.0 1.0 29.1
Sudan  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Sweden  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Switzerland  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Syrian Arab Republic  ..  ..  .. .. .. 2004 <2 <0.5 16.9
Tajikistan 2007 53.1e 2009 47.2e 2003 36.3 10.3 68.8 2004 21.5 5.1 50.9
Tanzania 2000 35.6 2007 33.4 2000 88.5 46.8 96.6 2007 67.9 28.1 87.9
Thailand 2008 9.0 2009 8.1 2004 <2 <0.5 11.5 2009 12.8 2.4 26.5
Togo  .. 2006 61.7  .. .. .. 2006 38.7 11.4 69.3
Tunisia  ..  .. 1995 6.5 1.3 20.4 2000 2.6 <0.5 12.8
Turkey 2008 17.1 2009 18.1  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Turkmenistan  ..  .. 1993h 63.5 25.8 85.7 1998 24.8 7.0 49.7
Uganda 2005 31.1 2009 24.5 2005 51.5 19.1 75.6 2009 37.7 12.1 64.5
Ukraine 2004 14.0e 2005 7.9e 2005 <2 <0.5 <2 2008 <2 <0.5 <2
United Arab Emirates  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
United Kingdom  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
United States  ..  ..  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Uruguay 2007g 26.0 2008g 20.5 2006h <2 <0.5 4.2 2009h <2 <0.5 <2
Uzbekistan  ..  .. 2002 42.3 12.4 75.6 2003 46.3 15.0 76.7
Venezuela, RB 2008g 32.6 2009g 29.0 2005h 10.0 4.5 19.8 2006h 3.5 1.1 10.2
Vietnam 2006 16.0 2008 14.5 2006 21.5 4.6 48.4 2008 13.1 2.3 38.4
West Bank and Gaza 2007 31.2 2009 21.9  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
Yemen, Rep. 1998 40.1 2005 34.8 1998 12.9 3.0 36.4 2005 17.5 4.2 46.6
Zambia 2004 58.4 2006 59.3 2003 64.6 27.1 85.2 2004 64.3 32.8 81.5
Zimbabwe  .. 2003d 72.0  .. .. ..  .. .. ..
a. Based on per capita consumption estimated from household survey data, unless otherwise noted. b. Based on nominal per capita consumption averages and distributions estimated from 
household survey data, unless otherwise noted.  c. Refers to the year in which the underlying household survey data were collected and, in cases for which the data collection period bridged 
two calender years, the year in which most of the data were collected is reported. d. Estimates based on survey data from earlier year(s) are available, but are not comparable with the most 
recent year reported here; these are available online via data.worldbank.org. e. World Bank estimates. f. Covers urban areas only. g. Based on income per capita estimated from household 
survey data. h. Based on per capita income averages and distribution data estimated from household survey data. i. Adjusted by spatial consumer price index data. j. Population weighted 
average of urban and rural estimates. k. Measured as share of households.
Table 2.  Poverty   (continued)
 Population below national poverty linea Population below international poverty linea
      Population Poverty   Population Poverty
      below gap at Population  below gap at Population
      $1.25 $1.25 below  $1.25 $1.25 below
 Survey National Survey National Survey a day a day $2.00 a day Survey a day a day $2.00 a day
 yearc % yearc % yearc % % % yearc % % %
396 WO R L D  D E V E LO P M E N T  R E P O RT  2 0 1 2
Table 3.  Millennium Development Goals: Eradicating poverty and improving lives
  Achieve      Develop
  universal Promote Reduce Improve   a global
  primary gender child maternal Combat HIV/AIDS Ensure environmental partnership for
 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger education equality mortality health and other diseaes sustainability development
 Share of   Prevalence  Ratio of    Incidence Carbon Access to 
 poorest  of child  girls to boys  Maternal HIV of dioxide improved 
 quintile Vulnerable malnutrition  enrollments  Under fi ve mortality prevalence tuberculosis  emissions sanitation Internet
 in national employment  % of Primary  in primary mortality ratio per % of per per capita facilities users
 consumption % of children completion and secondary rate 100,000 population 100,000 metric % of per 100
 or income % employment under 5 rate % school % per 1,000 live births ages 15–49 people tons population peoplea
 1995–2009b 2009 2004–09b 2009 2009 2009 2008 2009 2009 2007 2008 2009
Afghanistan 9.0c .. 32.9 .. 62 199 1,400 .. 189 0.0 37 3.4
Albania 8.1c .. 6.6 90 100 15 31 .. 15 1.4 98 41.2
Algeria 6.9c .. 3.7 91 98 32 120 0.1 59 4.1 95 13.5
Angola 2.0c,d .. .. .. .. 161 610 2.0 298 1.4 57 3.3
Argentina 4.1d,e 20f 2.3 105 105 14 70 0.5 28 4.6 90 30.4
Armenia 8.8c 38 4.2 98 103 22 29 0.1 73 1.6 90 6.8
Australia .. 9 .. .. 98 5 8 0.1 6 17.7 100 72.0
Austria 8.6e 9 .. 97 97 4 5 0.3 11 8.3 100 73.5
Azerbaijan 8.0c 55 8.4 92 102 34 38 0.1 110 3.7 45 42.0
Bangladesh 9.4c .  41.3 61 108 52 340 <0.1 225 0.3 53 0.4
Belarus 9.2c .. 1.3 96 102h 12 15 0.3 39 6.9 93 45.9
Belgium 8.5e 10 .. 87 98 5 5 0.2 9 9.7 100 75.2
Benin 6.9c .. 20.2 62 .. 118 410 1.2 93 0.5 12 2.2
Bolivia 2.8e 57 4.5 99 99 51 180 0.2 140 1.4 25 11.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.7c .. 1.6 .. 102 14 9 .. 50 7.7 95 37.7
Brazil 3.3e 25 2.2 .. 103 21 58 .. 45 1.9 80 39.2
Bulgaria 5.0c 9 1.6 94 97 10 13 0.1 41 6.8 100 44.8
Burkina Faso 7.0c .. 26.0 47h 88h 166 560 1.2 215 0.1 11 1.1
Burundi 9.0c .. .. 52 93 166 970 3.3 348 0.0 46 0.8
Cambodia 6.6c .. 28.8 79 90 88 290 0.5 442 0.3 29 0.5
Cameroon 5.6c .. 16.6 73 86 154 600 5.3 182 0.3 47 3.8
Canada 7.2e .. .. .. 99 6 12 0.2 5 16.9 100 77.7
Central African Republic 5.2c .. .. 40h 69h 171 850 4.7 327 0.1 34 0.5
Chad 6.3c .. 33.9 33 64 209 1,200 3.4 283 0.0 9 1.7
Chile 4.1e 25 0.5 95 99 9 26 0.4 11 4.3 96 34.0
China 5.7e .. 4.5 .. 105 19 38 0.1g 96 5.0 55 28.8
 Hong Kong SAR, China 5.3e 7f .. 93 102 .. .. .. 82 5.8 .. 61.4
Colombia 2.5e 48 5.1 115 105 19 85 0.5 35 1.4 74 45.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. 5.5c .. 28.2 56 77 199 670 .. 372 0.0 23 0.6
Congo, Rep. 5.0c .. 11.8 74 .. 128 580 3.4 382 0.4 30 6.7
Costa Rica 4.2e 20 .. 96 102 11 44 0.3 10 1.8 95 34.5
Côte d’Ivoire 5.6c .. 16.7 46 .. 119 470 3.4 399 0.3 23 4.6
Croatia 8.1c 17 1.0 97 102 5 14 <0.1 25 5.6 99 50.4
Czech Republic 10.2e 13 .. 99 101 4 8 <0.1 9 12.1 98 63.7
Denmark 8.3e 5 .. 97 102 4 5 0.2 7 9.1 100 85.9
Dominican Republic 4.4e 42 3.4 90 97 32 100 0.9 70 2.1 83 26.8
Ecuador 4.2e 42f 6.2 106 102 24 140 0.4 68 2.2 92 15.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 9.0c 27 6.8 96 96 21 82 <0.1 19 2.3 94 20.0
El Salvador 4.3e 37 .. 89 98 17 110 0.8 30 1.1 87 14.4
Eritrea .. .. .. 48 77 55 280 0.8 99 0.1 14 4.9
Ethiopia 9.3c .. 34.6 55 88 104 470 .. 359 0.1 12 0.5
Finland 9.6e 10 .. 97 102 3 8 0.1 9 12.1 100 83.9
France 7.2e 7 .. .. 100 4 8 0.4 6 6.0 100 71.3
Georgia 5.3c 63 2.3 107 96 29 48 0.1 107 1.4 95 30.5
Germany 8.5e 7 1.1 104 96 4 7 0.1 5 9.6 100 79.5
Ghana 5.2c .. 14.3 83 95 69 350 1.8 201 0.4 13 5.4
Greece 6.7e 27 .. 101 97 3 2 0.1 5 8.8 98 44.1
Guatemala 3.4e .. .. 80 94 40 110 0.8 62 1.0 81 16.3
Guinea 6.4c .. 20.8 62 77 142 680 1.3 318 0.1 19 0.9
Haiti 2.5e .. 18.9 .. .. 87 300 1.9 238 0.2 17 10.0
Honduras 2.0e 50 8.6 90 107 30 110 0.8 58 1.2 71 9.8
Hungary 8.4c 7 .. 95 99 6 13 <0.1 16 5.6 100 61.6
India 8.1c .. 43.5 95 92 66 230 0.3 168 1.4 31 5.3
Indonesia 7.6c 64 17.5h 109 98 39 240 0.2 189 1.8 52 8.7
Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.4c 42 .. 101 97 31 30 0.2 19 7.0 .. 38.3
Iraq .. .. 7.1 64 81 44 75 .. 64 3.3 73 1.0
Ireland 7.4e 12 .. .. 103 4 3 0.2 9 10.2 99 68.4
Israel 5.7e 7 .. 102 102 4 7 0.2 5 9.3 100 49.7
Italy 6.5e 18 .. 104 99 4 5 0.3 6 7.7 .. 48.5
Japan .. 10 .. 102 100 3 6 <0.1 21 9.8 100 77.7
Jordan 7.2c 10 1.9 99 102 25 59 .. 6 3.8 98 29.3
Kazakhstan 8.7c 32 4.9 108h 99h 29 45 0.1 163 14.7 97 33.4
Kenya 4.7c .. 16.4 .. 95 84 530 6.3 305 0.3 31 10.0
Korea, Rep. 7.9e 24 .. 101 97 5 18 <0.1 90 10.4 100 80.9
Kyrgyz Republic 8.8c .. 2.7 94 101 37 81 0.3 159 1.2 93 41.2
Lao PDR 7.6c .. 31.6 75 87 59 580 0.2 89 0.3 53 4.7
Lebanon .. 28 4.2 85 104 12 26 0.1 15 3.2 .. 23.7
Liberia 6.4c 80 20.4 58 .. 112 990 1.5 288 0.2 17 0.5
Libya .. .. 5.6 .. .. 19 64 .. 40 9.3 97 5.5
Lithuania 6.6c 10 .. 96 99 6 13 0.1 71 4.5 .. 58.8
Madagascar 6.2c .. 36.8 79 97 58 440 0.2 261 0.1 11 1.6
Malawi 7.0c .. 15.5 59 100 110 510 11.0 304 0.1 56 4.7
Malaysia 4.5e 22 .. 97 103 6 31 0.5 83 7.3 96 57.6
Mali 6.5c .. 27.9 64h 80h 191 830 1.0 324 0.0 36 1.9
Mauritania 6.2c .. 16.7 64 103 117 550 0.7 330 0.6 26 2.3
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Table 3.  Millennium Development Goals: Eradicating poverty and improving lives (continued)
  Achieve      Develop
  universal Promote Reduce Improve   a global
  primary gender child maternal Combat HIV/AIDS Ensure environmental partnership for
 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger education equality mortality health and other diseaes sustainability development
 Share of   Prevalence  Ratio of    Incidence Carbon Access to 
 poorest  of child  girls to boys  Maternal HIV of dioxide improved 
 quintile Vulnerable malnutrition  enrollments  Under fi ve mortality prevalence tuberculosis  emissions sanitation Internet
 in national employment  % of Primary  in primary mortality ratio per % of per per capita facilities users
 consumption % of children completion and secondary rate 100,000 population 100,000 metric % of per 100
 or income % employment under 5 rate % school % per 1,000 live births ages 15–49 people tons population peoplea
 1995–2009b 2009 2004–09b 2009 2009 2009 2008 2009 2009 2007 2008 2009
Mexico 3.9e 30 3.4 104 102 17 85 0.3 17 4.5 85 26.5
Moldova 6.8c 29 3.2 93 101 17 32 0.4 178 1.3 79 35.9
Morocco 6.5c 51 9.9 80 88 38 110 0.1 92 1.5 69 32.2
Mozambique 5.2c .. .. 61h 89h 142 550 11.5 409 0.1 17 2.7
Myanmar .. .. .. 99 100 71 240 0.6 404 0.3 81 0.2
Nepal 6.1c .. 38.8 .. .. 48 380 0.4 163 0.1 31 2.1
Netherlands 7.6e 10 .. .. 99 4 9 0.2 8 10.6 100 90.0
New Zealand 6.4e 11 .. .. 102 6 14 0.1 8 7.7 .. 83.4
Nicaragua 3.8e 45 4.3 75 102 26 100 0.2 44 0.8 52 3.5
Niger 8.3c .. 39.9 41h 78h 160 820 0.8 181 0.1 9 0.8
Nigeria 5.1c .. 26.7 79 85 138 840 3.6 295 0.6 32 28.4
Norway 9.6e 6 .. 100 99 3 7 0.1 6 9.1 100 91.8
Pakistan 9.0c  63 .. 61 82 87 260 0.1 231 1.0 45 12.0
Panama 3.6e 27 .. 102 101 23 71 0.9 48 2.2 69 27.8
Papua New Guinea 4.5c .. 18.1 .. .. 68 250 0.9 250 0.5 45 1.9
Paraguay 3.8e 45 .. 93 100 23 95 0.3 47 0.7 70 15.8
Peru 3.9e 40 f 5.4 101 99 21 98 0.4 113 1.5 68 27.7
Philippines 5.6c 44 f .. 94 102 33 94 <0.1 280 0.8 76 6.5
Poland 7.6c 19 .. 95 100 7 6 0.1 24 8.3 90 58.8
Portugal 5.8e 18 .. .. 101 4 7 0.6 30 5.5 100 48.6
Romania 8.1c 31 .. 96 99 12 27 0.1 125 4.4 72 36.2
Russian Federation 6.0c 6 .. 95 98 12 39 1.0 106 10.8 87 42.1
Rwanda 4.2c .. 18.0 54 100 111 540 2.9 376 0.1 54 4.5
Saudi Arabia .. .. 5.3 88 91 21 24 .. 18 16.6 .. 38.6
Senegal 6.2c .. 14.5 57 95 93 410 0.9 282 0.5 51 7.4
Serbia 9.1c 28 1.8 96 101 7 8 0.1 21 .. 92 56.1
Sierra Leone 6.1c .. 21.3 88 .. 192 970 1.6 644 0.2 13 0.3
Singapore 5.0e 10 .. .. .. 3 9 0.1 36 11.8 100 73.3
Slovak Republic 8.8e 12 .. 97 101 7 6 <0.1 9 6.8 100 75.0
Somalia .. .. 32.8 .. 53 180 1,200 0.7 285 0.1 23 1.2
South Africa 3.1c 10 .. 93 99 62 410 17.8 971 9.0 77 9.0
Spain 7.0e 11 .. 103 102 4 6 0.4 17 8.0 100 61.2
Sri Lanka 6.9c 40f 21.6 97 .. 15 39 <0.1 66 0.6 91 8.7
Sudan .. .. 31.7 57 89 108 750 1.1 119 0.3 34 9.9
Sweden 9.1e 7 .. 95 99 3 5 0.1 6 5.4 100 90.3
Switzerland 7.6e 9 .. 96 98 4 10 0.4 5 5.0 100 70.9
Syrian Arab Republic 7.7c 38 10.0 112 97 16 46 .. 21 3.5 96 18.7
Tajikistan 9.3c .. 14.9 98 91 61 64 0.2 202 1.1 94 10.1
Tanzania 6.8c .. 16.7 102 96 108 790 5.6 183 0.1 24 1.5
Thailand 3.9c 53 7.0 .. 103 14 48 1.3 137 4.1 96 25.8
Togo 5.4c .. 22.3 61 75 98 350 3.2 446 0.2 12 5.4
Tunisia 5.9c .. 3.3 90 103 21 60 <0.1 24 2.3 85 33.5
Turkey 5.7c 34 3.5 93 93 20 23 <0.1 29 4.0 90 35.3
Turkmenistan 6.0c .. .. .. .. 45 77 .. 67 9.2 98 1.6
Uganda 5.8c .. 16.4 73 99 128 430 6.5 293 0.1 48 9.8
Ukraine 9.4c .. .. 95 99 15 26 1.1 101 6.8 95 33.3
United Arab Emirates .. 1 .. 99 100 7 10 .. 4 31.0 97 82.2
United Kingdom 6.1e 11 .. .. 101 6 12 0.2 12 8.8 100 83.2
United States 5.4e .. 1.3 96 101 8 24 0.6 4 19.3 100 78.1
Uruguay 5.6e 25 f 6.0 106 104 13 27 0.5 22 1.9 100 55.5
Uzbekistan 7.1c .. 4.4 92 99 36 30 0.1 128 4.3 100 16.9
Venezuela, RB 4.9e 31 3.7 95 102 18 68 .. 33 6.0 .. 31.2
Vietnam 7.3c ..  20.2 .. .. 24 56 0.4 200 1.3 75 27.5
West Bank and Gaza .. 27 2.2 82 104 30 .. .. 19 0.6 89 8.8
Yemen, Rep. 7.2c .. .. 61 .. 66 210 .. 54 1.0 52 1.8
Zambia 3.6c .. 14.9 87 96 141 470 13.5 433 0.2 49 6.3
Zimbabwe 4.6c .. 14.0 .. .. 90 790 14.3 742 0.8 44 11.4
World  ..w 21.3w 88w 96w 61w 260w 0.8w 137w 4.6w,i 61w 27.1
Low income  .. 27.7 65 91 119 590 2.6 296 0.3 36 2.6
Middle income  .. 20.8 92 97 52 210 0.7 139 3.3 56 20.7
 Lower middle income  .. 24.0 88 93 71 300 0.7 179 1.5 46 10.3
 Upper middle income  .. .. 98 103 21 60 0.7 99 5.0 68 31.1
Low and middle income  .. 22.4 87 96 66 290 0.9 161 2.9 54 18.2
 East Asia & Pacifi c  .. 8.8 97 103 26 89 0.2 136 4.0 59 24.1
 Europe & Central Asia  18 .. 95 97 21 34 0.6 89 7.2 89 36.6
 Latin America & 
  the Caribbean  30 3.8 102 102 23 86 0.5 45 2.7 79 31.5
 Middle East & North Africa  37 6.8 88 93 33 88 0.1 39 3.7 84 21.5
 South Asia  .. 42.5 86 92 71 290 0.3 180 1.2 36 5.5
 Sub-Saharan Africa  .. 24.7 67 89 130 650 5.5 342 0.8 31 8.8
High income  .. .. 97 100 7 15 0.3 14 12.5 100 72.3
a. Data are from the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) World Telecommunication Development Report database. Please cite ITU for third-party use of these data. b. Data are for 
the most recent year available.  b. Data are for the most recent year available. c. Refers to expenditure shares by percentiles of population, ranked by per capita expenditure. d. Urban data. 
e. Refers to income shares by percentiles of population, ranked by per capita income. f. Limited coverage. g. Includes Hong Kong SAR, China. h. Data are for 2010. i. Includes emissions not 
allocated to specifi c countries.
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Table 4.  Economic activity
    General
 Gross domestic Agricultural Household government  External 
 product productivity fi nal fi nal Gross balance of GDP
   consumption consumption capital goods and implicit
   Agricultural  Value added as % of GDP  expenditure expenditure formation services defl ator
  Average value added        Average
 $ annual per worker        annual
 millions % growth 2000 $ Agricultural Industry Services % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % growth
 2010 2000–10 1990–92 2005–07 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2000–10
 Afghanistan 11,757 .. .. .. 29 26 45 88 9 25 –32 8.3
 Albania 11,786 5.4 837 1,663 21 20 60 87 10 29 –26 3.3
 Algeria 159,426 3.8 1,823 2,232 12 55 34 41 14 41 4 8.3
 Angola 84,391 12.9 176 222 10 59 31 .. .. 15 6 36.1
 Argentina 368,712 5.6 6,919 11,192 8 32 61 59 15 21 5 13.0
 Armenia 9,265 9.1 1,607a 4,510 21 35 45 82 11 32 –25 0.5
 Australia 924,843 3.3 20,676 30,830 3 29 68 57 17 28 –2 4.0
 Austria 376,162 1.9 13,607 20,508 2 29 69 54 20 21 5 1.7
 Azerbaijan 51,092 17.1 1,000a  1,198 8 60 32 37 14 22 28 9.5
 Bangladesh 100,076 5.9 255 387 19 29 53 77 5 24 –7 5.4
 Belarus 54,713 8.2 2,042a 4,007 10 42 48 57 17 38 –11 21.4
 Belgium 467,472 1.6 .. 38,913 1 22 78 52 25 20 3 2.1
 Benin 6,633 4.0 429 661 .. .. .. .. .. 25 –14 3.3
 Bolivia 19,786 4.1 703 732 14 36 50 66 15 17 3 6.9
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 16,888 4.6 .. 10,352 8 28 64 80 23 22 –25 3.9
 Brazil 2,087,890 3.7 1,611 3,310 6 25 69 62 22 17 0 8.0
 Bulgaria 47,714 4.8 4,396 8,204 6 30 64 66 16 26 –8 5.9
 Burkina Faso 8,820 5.5 126 182 33 22 44 75 22 18 –15 2.7
 Burundi 1,611 3.2 117 70 .. .. .. 91 29 16 –36 10.7
 Cambodia 11,343 8.5 .. 366 35 23 42 74 8 21 –3 5.1
 Cameroon 22,394 3.2 409 703 19 31 50 72 9 18 –4 2.1
 Canada 1,574,052 2.0 28,542 46,233 2 32 67 59 22 21 –2 2.5
 Central African Republic 2,013 1.0 322 404 56 15 29 93 5 11 –8 2.8
 Chad 7,588 9.0 209 .. 14 49 38 79 16 34 –28 5.4
 Chile 203,443 4.0 3,618 6,145 3 43 54 59 14 19 8 6.2
 China 5,878,629 10.8 269 459 10 46 43 35 13 48 4 4.4
  Hong Kong SAR, China 224,458 4.6 .. .. 0 7 93 62 9 21 7 –1.1
 Colombia 288,189 4.5 3,123 2,781 7 34 58 64 16 22 –2 5.9
 Congo, Dem. Rep. 13,145 5.3 209 162 43 24 33 75 8 29 –12 26.6
 Congo, Rep. 11,898 4.3 .. .. 5 71 24 42 12 25 21 7.4
 Costa Rica 34,564 4.8 3,158 5,132 7 27 66 62 17 20 1 9.9
 Côte d’Ivoire 22,780 1.1 652 875 25 25 50 72 9 11 8 3.2
 Croatia 60,852 3.2 5,546a 11,701 7 27 66 57 20 27 –3 3.9
 Czech Republic 192,152 3.8 .. 5,945 2 37 60 51 22 22 6 2.0
 Denmark 310,405 0.9 15,190 36,627 1 23 77 49 30 17 4 2.3
 Dominican Republic 51,577 5.6 2,055 3,829 6 32 61 85 8 15 –8 12.6
 Ecuador 58,910 4.8 1,801 1,879 7 26 67 66 11 35 –12 8.0
 Egypt, Arab Rep. 218,912 5.3 1,826 2,758 14 37 49 76 11 19 –7 8.5
 El Salvador 21,796 2.3 1,774 2,389 12 27 60 92 10 13 –15 3.5
 Eritrea 2,117 0.2 .. 118 15 22 63 86 33 11 –16 16.7
 Ethiopia 29,717 8.8 .. 187 51 11 38 88 8 22 –18 11.5
 Finland 238,801 2.2 17,520 34,349 3 28 69 54 25 18 2 1.2
 France 2,560,002 1.3 22,126 47,910 2 19 79 58 25 19 –2 1.9
 Georgiab 11,667 6.9 2,359a 1,871 10 21 69 83 24 12 –19 6.9
 Germany 3,309,669 1.0 13,863 27,598 1 26 73 59 20 16 5 1.0
 Ghana 31,306 5.9 .. 388 32 19 49 82 10 20 –11 26.2
 Greece 304,865 2.9 7,668 8,980 3 18 79 75 19 16 –11 3.0
 Guatemala 41,190 3.6 2,304 2,736 12 28 59 87 10 13 –10 5.5
 Guinea 4,511 2.9 156 311 17 52 31 76 8 21 –5 16.2
 Haiti 6,710 0.6 .. .. .. .. .. 92 9 27 –30 14.2
 Honduras 15,400 4.6 1,227 1,841 12 27 60 80 19 20 –19 6.3
 Hungary 130,419 1.9 3,943 8,136 4 29 66 67 9 22 1 5.2
 India 1,729,010 8.0 359 459 18 27 55 56 12 36 –4 5.9
 Indonesia 706,558 5.3 519 657 15 48 33 57 10 31 3 11.1
 Iran, Islamic Rep. 331,015 5.4 2,042 2,931 10 44 45 45 11 33 11 16.4
 Iraq 82,150 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.1
 Ireland 203,892 3.0 .. 12,247 1 32 67 51 19 14 15 1.5
 Israel 217,334 3.6 .. .. .. .. .. 57 24 16 2 1.4
 Italy 2,051,412 0.3 11,714 26,843 2 25 73 60 22 19 0 2.4
 Japan 5,497,813 0.9 20,350 41,492 1 28 71 59 20 21 0 –1.1
 Jordan 27,574 6.7 2,348 2,443 3 32 65 83 24 15 –21 6.5
 Kazakhstan 142,987 8.3 1,781a 1,730 6 40 53 50 12 30 8 14.9
 Kenya 31,409 4.3 379 367 23 15 62 76 16 21 –13 6.1
 Korea, Rep. 1,014,483 4.1 5,804 14,501 3 36 61 54 16 26 4 2.3
 Kyrgyz Republic 4,616 4.4 684a 1,018 29 19 51 86 22 22 –30 8.6
 Lao PDR 7,491 7.1 382 495 34 27 39 43 5 28 –13 8.7
 Lebanon 39,155 4.9 .. 31,477 5 17 78 79 15 30 –24 3.1
 Liberia 986 0.9 .. .. 61 17 22 202 19 20 –142 10.3
 Libya 62,360 5.4 .. .. 2 78 20 23 9 28 40 17.9
 Lithuania 36,306 5.3 .. 4,683 3 27 70 69 22 11 –1 3.9
 Madagascar 8,721 3.4 210 182 29 16 55 79 12 33 –24 10.9
 Malawi 5,106 5.2 86 133 31 16 53 62 21 25 –8 15.8
 Malaysia 237,804 5.0 3,984 5,807 10 44 46 50 14 14 22 3.8
 Mali 9,251 5.2 405 515 37 24 39 77 10 22 –9 4.5
 Mauritania 3,636 4.4 671 392 21 35 45 72 21 25 –18 10.7
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Table 4.  Economic activity (continued)
    General
 Gross domestic Agricultural Household government  External 
 product productivity fi nal fi nal Gross balance of GDP
   consumption consumption capital goods and implicit
   Agricultural  Value added as % of GDP  expenditure expenditure formation services defl ator
  Average value added        Average
 $ annual per worker        annual
 millions % growth 2000 $ Agricultural Industry Services % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % growth
 2010 2000–10 1990–92 2005–07 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2000–10
 Mexico 1,039,662 2.2 2,274 3,025 4 34 61 68 12 22 –1 7.4
 Moldovac 5,809 5.2 1,349a 1,301 10 13 77 87 22 27 –36 10.7
 Moroccod 91,196 4.9 1,788 2,306 16 29 55 57 18 36 –11 2.1
 Mozambique 9,586 7.8 117 174 31 24 45 85 13 20 –18 8.2
 Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 Nepal 15,701 3.8 245 241 33 15 52 81 11 29 –21 7.2
 Netherlands 783,413 1.6 24,752 40,365 2 24 74 46 28 18 7 2.0
 New Zealand 126,679 2.6 19,148 26,315 6 25 69 60 20 18 2 2.7
 Nicaragua 6,551 3.1 .. 2,334 19 29 52 91 12 23 –26 8.2
 Niger 5,549 4.2 242 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.3
 Nigeria 193,669 6.7 .. .. 33 41 27 .. .. .. 9 13.7
 Norway 414,462 1.8 19,077 37,855 1 40 58 43 22 20 15 4.5
 Pakistan 174,799 5.1 765 890 22 24 54 80 8 19 –8 9.2
 Panama 26,777 7.0 2,341 3,996 6 18 76 47 11 25 16 2.3
 Papua New Guinea 9,480 3.8 555 643 36 45 20 69 11 20 1 6.2
 Paraguay 18,475 3.8 1,648 2,136 19 21 59 78 12 16 –5 9.6
 Peru 153,845 6.1 879 1,390 8 35 57 63 10 23 4 3.3
 Philippines 199,589 4.9 839 1,078 13 32 55 75 10 17 –1 4.7
 Poland 468,585 4.3 1,605 2,629 4 30 66 61 19 20 0 2.7
 Portugal 228,538 0.7 4,789 6,203 2 23 75 67 21 20 –8 2.5
 Romania 161,624 5.0 2,129 6,179 7 26 67 61 15 31 –7 14.7
 Russian Federation 1,479,819 5.4 1,917a 2,607 5 33 62 53 20 19 7 15.1
 Rwanda 5,628 7.6 193 .. 34 14 52 81 15 22 –17 10.4
 Saudi Arabia 375,766 3.8 8,476 17,419 3 60 37 38 25 26 11 7.6
 Senegal 12,954 4.2 251 223 17 22 62 83 9 28 –20 2.7
 Serbia 39,128 4.6 .. .. 13 28 59 73 20 25 –17 15.1
 Sierra Leone 1,905 8.8 .. .. 52 23 25 84 14 15 –13 9.6
 Singapore 222,699 6.6 22,695 50,828 .. 26 74 43 10 29 18 1.1
 Slovak Republic 89,034 5.2 .. 8,149 3 35 63 47 20 38 –4 3.3
 Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 South Africa 363,704 3.9 2,149 3,149 3 31 66 60 21 20 –1 7.2
 Spain 1,407,405 2.4 9,583 18,603 3 26 71 57 21 24 –2 3.4
 Sri Lanka 49,552 5.6 697 823 13 30 58 64 18 24 –6 10.6
 Sudan 62,046 6.7 526 844 30 26 44 67 14 25 –6 10.6
 Sweden 458,004 2.2 23,318 43,543 2 25 73 48 28 17 7 1.7
 Switzerland 523,772 1.9 19,369 23,373 1 27 72 58 11 20 11 1.1
 Syrian Arab Republic 59,103 4.9 2,778 4,479 21 34 45 73 13 16 –2 7.4
 Tajikistan 5,640 8.6 370a 501 22 24 54 93 28 22 –43 19.7
 Tanzaniae 23,057 7.1 219 271 29 24 47 62 20 30 –12 7.4
 Thailand 318,847 4.5 480 653 11 43 45 55 13 21 11 3.2
 Togo 3,153 2.7 345 394 .. .. .. .. 9 .. –20 2.4
 Tunisia 44,291 4.8 2,975 3,424 7 27 66 67 12 24 –3 4.2
 Turkey 735,264 4.7 2,198 3,223 9 26 65 72 15 15 –1 14.1
 Turkmenistan 21,074 13.1 1,272a 2,087 12 54 34 53 11 12 32 13.0
 Uganda 17,011 7.7 186 210 25 26 50 76 12 24 –11 5.9
 Ukraine 137,929 4.8 1,232a 2,010 8 29 62 65 19 17 –2 16.7
 United Arab Emirates 230,252 7.0 10,414 29,465 2 61 38 46 10 20 23 10.2
 United Kingdom 2,246,079 1.6 23,020 27,715 1 21 78 65 23 14 –2 2.7
 United States 14,582,400 1.9 19,714 44,041 1 21 77 71 17 14 –3 2.5
 Uruguay 40,265 3.9 5,720 8,535 10 26 64 68 13 18 1 8.1
 Uzbekistan 38,982 7.1 1,427a 2,231 20 33 47 56 18 26 0 24.0
 Venezuela, RB 387,852 4.5 4,584 7,386 .. .. .. 64 13 25 –2 25.2
 Vietnam 103,572 7.5 229 335 21 40 39 66 6 38 –10 8.7
 West Bank and Gaza .. –0.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.4
 Yemen, Rep. 26,365 3.9 412 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.0
 Zambia 16,193 5.6 189 227 22 34 44 61 13 22 3 15.9
 Zimbabwe 7,474 –6.0 245 202 18 29 53 113 13 2 –28 5.1
 World 63,048,802t 2.8w 809w 1,029w 3w 27w 70w 62w 19w 19w 0w 
 Low income 413,913 5.5 233 269 26 24 50 79 10 24 –13 
 Middle income 19,561,744 6.4 501 730 10 35 55 57 15 28 1 
  Lower middle income 4,312,196 6.3 485 637 17 31 51 64 12 28 –4 
  Upper middle income 15,246,704 6.5 512 797 7 36 57 55 15 28 2 
 Low and middle income 19,997,455 6.4 471 664 10 35 55 57 15 28 1 
  East Asia & Pacifi c 7,579,386 9.4 318 504 11 45 43 42 13 40 5 
  Europe & Central Asia 3,055,026 5.4 2,061 2,738 7 30 62 62 18 19 1 
  Latin America & 
  the Caribbean 4,969,416 3.8 2,216 3,246 6 31 63 64 16 20 0 
  Middle East & 
  North Africa 1,068,481 4.7 1,846 2,824 11 43 46 55 13 28 5 
  South Asia 2,088,236 7.4 372 479 18 27 55 61 11 33 –5 
  Sub-Saharan Africa 1,097,899 5.0 299 316 13 30 57 67 18 21 –4 
 High income 43,002,153 1.8 13,796 23,626 1 25 73 63 20 17 0 
a. Data for all three years are not available.          
b. Excludes Abkhazia and South Ossetia. c. Excludes Transnistria.  d. Includes Former Spanish Sahara.  e. Covers mainland Tanzania only.
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Table 5.  Trade, aid, and fi nance
    High  Foreign Net   Domestic 
   Manufactured technology Current direct offi cial   credit 
 Merchandise trade exports exports account investment development External debt  provided 
 exports imports % of total % of balance net infl ows assistance 
a Total Present by banking Net
 $ $ merchandise manufactured $ $ $ $ value sector migration
 millions millions exports exports millions millions per capita millions % of GNI b % of GDP thousands
 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2005–10 c
Afghanistan 560 3,970 18 .. .. 185 204 2,328 5 2 1,000
Albania 1,088 4,548 70 1 –1,875 978 113 4,719 31 68 –75
Algeria 45,194 39,294 2 1 .. 2,847 9 5,345 3 –9 –140
Angola 40,080 17,000 .. .. –7,572 2,205 13 16,715 24 29 80
Argentina 55,668 38,780 33 9 8,632 3,902 3 120,183 41 28 30
Armenia 698 3,304 33 4 –1,369 777 171 4,935 36 20 –75
Australia 154,234 165,471 19 13 –47,786 22,572 .. .. .. 144 500
Austria 137,672 143,382 81 11 10,995 8,714 .. .. .. 141 160
Azerbaijan 21,097 6,514 3 1 10,178 473 26 4,865 10 23 –50
Bangladesh 15,084 21,833 88 1 3,345 674 8 23,820 17 60 –570
Belarus 21,283 28,563 48 3 –6,389 1,884 10 17,158 30 34 0
Belgium 369,854 351,945 77d 10 3,522 –38,860 .. .. .. 119 200
Benin 1,000 2,040 .. .. –536 93 76 1,073 12e 19 50
Bolivia 4,848 4,410 6 5 813 423 74 5,745 16e 50 –100
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,929 8,773 61 3 –1,175 235 110 9,583 45 58 –10
Brazil 152,995 133,669 39 14 –24,302 25,949 2 276,932 17 97 –229
Bulgaria 16,455 23,330 53 8 –4,751 4,595 .. 40,582 85 70 –50
Burkina Faso 850 2,083 12 1 –1,709 171 69 1,835 17e 15 –65
Burundi 64 402 21 12 –164 0 66 518 13e 36 323
Cambodia 4,200 6,200 96 0 –866 530 49 4,364 38 19 –5
Cameroon 3,000 4,250 .. .. –1,137 340 33 2,941 4e 7 –19
Canada 316,713 329,904 50 18 –38,380 19,898 .. .. .. 178 1,050
Central African Republic 120 300 .. .. .. 42 54 396 12e 17 5
Chad 2,800 1,950 .. .. .. 462 50 1,743 22e 8 –75
Chile 53,735 42,427 11 4 4,217 12,7022 5 71,646 43 100 30
China 1,201,534 1,005,688 94 31 297,142 78,193 1 428,442 9 145 –1,731f
 Hong Kong SAR, China 329,422g 352,241 79g 31 17,418 52,395 .. .. .. 168 113
Colombia 32,853 32,898 28 5 –5,001 7,207 23 52,223 20 37 –120
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3,100 3,600 .. .. .. 951 36 12,183 24e 7 –100
Congo, Rep. 5,600 2,900 .. .. –2,181 2,083 77 5,041 20e –16 –50
Costa Rica 8,788 11,395 47 41 –537 1,347 24 8,070 27 54 30
Côte d’Ivoire 8,900 6,050 15 12 1,670 381 112 11,701 46e 23 –145
Croatia 10,474 21,203 66 11 –3,314 2,951 38 .. .. 76 10
Czech Republic 113,437 105,179 87 16 –2,147 2,666 .. .. .. 62 226
Denmark 93,344 82,947 65 18 11,222 2,905 .. .. .. 223 30
Dominican Republic 5,463 12,283 70 5 –2,159 2,067 12 11,003 22 41 –140
Ecuador 13,799 15,093 9 4 –268 316 15 12,930 23 21 –350
Egypt, Arab Rep. 23,062 44,946 37 1 –3,349 6,712 11 33,257 16 75 –340
El Salvador 3,797 7,255 72 5 –373 431 45 11,384 49 45 –280
Eritrea 15 540 .. .. .. 0 29 1,019 34e 113 55
Ethiopia 1,596 7,963 9 4 –2,191 221 46 5,025 12e 37 –300
Finland 62,798 60,753 77 18 6,814 60 .. .. .. 99 55
France 484,725 559,817 79 23 –51,857 59,989 .. .. .. 130 500
Georgia 1,135 4,378 55 3 –1,210 658 213 4,231 28 33 –250
Germany 1,126,383 938,295 82 16 165,471 39,153 .. .. .. 132 550
Ghana 5,500 8,140 19 1 –1,198 1,685 66 5,720 27e 28 –51
Greece 20,093 59,858 54 11 –35,913 2,419 .. .. .. 114 150
Guatemala 7,214 11,531 43 5 8 600 27 13,801 33 37 –200
Guinea 1,010 1,400 32 0 –403 50 21 2,926 44e .. –300
Haiti 576 2,050 .. .. –232 38 112 1,244 15e 26 –140
Honduras 5,196 7,788 35 1 –449 500 61 3,675 13e 54 –100
Hungary 83,778 78,175 82 26 –699 2,783 .. .. .. 80 75
India 162,613 249,590 67 9 –26,626 34,577 2 237,692 17 69 –1,000
Indonesia 119,481 91,749 41 13 10,743 4,877 5 157,517 30 37 –730
Iran, Islamic Rep. 78,113 50,375 .. .. .. 3,016 1 13,435 4 37 –500
Iraq 39,500 37,000 0 0 27,133 1,070 89 .. .. –16 –577
Ireland 114,587 62,507 86 25 –6,488 25,233 .. .. .. 225 200
Israel 47,935 49,278 94 23 7,592 3,894 .. .. .. 78 85
Italy 405,777 412,721 83 8 –66,199 28,976 .. .. .. 142 1,650
Japan 580,719 551,960 88 20 142,194 11,834 .. .. .. 323 150
Jordan 6,366 14,075 73 1 –1,251 2,382 128 6,615 27 99 250
Kazakhstan 43,196 28,409 14 30 –4,248 13,619 19 109,873 96 55 –100
Kenya 4,421 10,207 37 5 –1,661 141 45 8,005 19 45 –189
Korea, Rep. 363,534 323,085 90 32 42,668 1,506 .. .. .. 112 –30
Kyrgyz Republic 1,439 3,037 34 5 –102 189 59 2,900 36e 14 –75
Lao PDR 940 1,260 .. .. 9 319 66 5,539 78 10 –75
Lebanon 4,187 16,574 72 7 –7,555 4,804 152 24,864 80 163 –13
Liberia 150 552 .. .. –277 218 128 1,660 316e 149 248
Libya 35,600 10,150 .. .. 9,381 1,711 6 .. .. –66 20
Lithuania 16,452 18,234 55 10 1,646 230 .. 31,717 72 70 –100
Madagascar 1,140 3,250 57 2 .. 543 23 2,213 17e 12 –5
Malawi 920 1,700 9 3 .. 60 51 1,093 16e 32 –20
Malaysia 157,433 123,832 70 47 31,801 1,387 5 66,390 31 137 130
Mali 2,100 2,644 22 3 –1,066 109 76 2,667 14e 11 –202
Mauritania 1,370 1,430 0 .. .. –38 87 2,029 83e .. 10
Mexico 229,637 241,515 76 22 –6,228 14,462 2 192,008 18 44 –2,430
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Table 5.  Trade, aid, and fi nance (continued)
    High  Foreign Net   Domestic 
   Manufactured technology Current direct offi cial   credit 
 Merchandise trade exports exports account investment development External debt  provided 
 exports imports % of total % of balance net infl ows assistance 
a Total Present by banking Net
 $ $ merchandise manufactured $ $ $ $ value sector migration
 millions millions exports exports millions millions per capita millions % of GNI b % of GDP thousands
 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2005–10 c 
Moldova 1,288 3,278 23 5 –465 128 68 3,457 55 41 –172
Morocco 13,863 32,892 65 7 –4,971 1,970 28 23,752 23 100 –425
Mozambique 2,147 3,764 12 10 –1,171 881 88 4,168 18e 22 –20
Myanmar 6,710 4,316 .. .. .. 323 7 8,186 .. .. –500
Nepal 813 4,392 67 0 –10 38 29 3,683 23 68 –100
Netherlands 498,330 445,496 56 24 36,581 33,287 .. .. .. 224 100
New Zealand 24,932 25,545 23 10 –3,624 –1,259 .. .. .. 154 50
Nicaragua 1,391 3,477 10 6 –841 434 135 4,420 36e 67 –200
Niger 900 1,500 7 8 –651 739 31 991 13e 13 –28
Nigeria 52,500 39,000 4 3 21,659 5,787 11 7,846 4 37 –300
Norway 120,880 69,292 20 20 50,122 11,271 .. .. .. .. 135
Pakistan 17,680 31,710 76 2 –3,583 2,387 16 53,710 24 48 –1,416
Panama 948 7,801 10 0 –44 1,773 19 12,418 54 84 11
Papua New Guinea 4,328 3,200 .. .. –672 423 61 1,555 18 39 0
Paraguay 3,167 6,940 11 11 86 205 23 4,323 26 25 –40
Peru 26,885 21,706 16 3 247 4,760 15 29,593 23 19 –625
Philippines 38,436 45,878 86 66 8,552 1,948 3 62,911 35 47 –900
Poland 134,466 146,626 80 5 –9,598 13,796 .. .. .. 61 –120
Portugal 43,358 69,844 72 4 –23,952 2,808 .. .. .. 195 200
Romania 40,633 54,247 79 10 –7,298 6,310 .. 117,511 53 53 –200
Russian Federation 303,388 191,803 17 9 49,365 36,751 .. 381,339 26 34 250
Rwanda 193 1,227 19 31 –379 119 93 747 8e .. 15
Saudi Arabia 192,296 95,567 8 0 22,765 10,499 –5 .. .. 1 150
Senegal 2,180 4,713 41 14 –1,884 208 81 3,503 20e 27 –100
Serbia 8,345 15,582 66 .. –2,412 1,921 83 33,402 71 46 0
Sierra Leone 231 520 .. .. –193 74 77 444 20e 11 60
Singapore 269,832g 245,785 74g 49 32,628 16,809 .. .. .. 91 500
Slovak Republic 55,980 55,301 87 5 –2,810 –31 .. .. .. 54 20
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. 108 72 2,973 .. .. –250
South Africa 62,603 73,172 47h 6 –11,327 5,354 22 42,101 15 184 700
Spain 218,511 287,567 73 5 –80,375 6,451 .. .. .. 228 1,750
Sri Lanka 7,345 10,207 67 1 –215 404 35 17,208 35 40 –300
Sudan 7,834 9,691 0 34 –3,908 2,682 54 20,139 73e 20 135
Sweden 131,243 119,839 76 17 31,460 11,538 .. .. .. 145 150
Switzerland 172,850 155,706 90 25 38,972 27,588 .. .. .. 191 100
Syrian Arab Republic 10,400 16,300 33 2 66 1,434 12 5,236 9 44 800
Tajikistan 1,009 2,569 .. .. –180 16 59 2,514 39 27 –200
Tanzania 3,096 6,347 25 4 –1,816 415 67 7,325 13e 18 –300
Thailand 152,498 133,801 75 26 21,861 4,976 –1 58,755 22 137 300
Togo 800 1,500 62 0 –222 50 75 1,640 50e 27 –5
Tunisia 14,445 19,096 75 6 –1,234 1,595 45 21,709 54 68 –20
Turkey 102,129 140,921 80 2 –14,410 8,403 18 251,372 35 63 –44
Turkmenistan 6,595 6,750 .. .. .. 1,355 8 576 3 .. –25
Uganda 2,478 4,310 27 1 –451 604 55 2,490 8e 11 –135
Ukraine 39,703 45,436 63 3 –1,732 4,816 15 93,153 62 89 –80
United Arab Emirates 175,000 140,000 4 3 .. .. .. .. .. 115 343
United Kingdom 352,491 481,707 72 23 –37,050 72,924 .. .. .. 229 948
United States 1,056,043 1,605,296 67 23 –378,435 134,710 .. .. .. 232 5,052
Uruguay 5,386 6,907 26 5 215 1,262 15 12,159 37 28 –50
Uzbekistan 10,735 9,023 .. .. .. 750 7 4,109 12 .. –400
Venezuela, RB 57,595 40,597 3 4 8,561 –3,105 2 54,503 19 20 40
Vietnam 57,096 69,949 55 5 –6,274 7,600 43 28,674 27 123 –200
West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. 535 52 748 .. .. .. –10
Yemen, Rep. 5,594 8,500 2 0 –2,565 129 21 6,356 17 19 –135
Zambia 4,312 3,793 8 2 –406 699 98 3,049 10e 19 –85
Zimbabwe 2,269 2,900 34 1 .. 60 59 5,015 .. .. –700
World 12,491,383t 12,592,947t 70w 20w  1,163,758s 19w ..s .. 169w .. is
Low income 63,864 112,493 56 3  8,168 45 119,100 .. 38 –2,536
Middle income 3,740,618 3,544,565 59 20  351,327 11 3,426,014 .. 89 –13,415
 Lower middle income 724,117 865,722 48 13  92,846 17 904,779 .. 57 –7,916
 Upper middle income 3,016,877 2,678,489 61 21  258,481 5 2,521,235 .. 98 –5,499
Low and middle income 3,804,486 3,656,996 59 20  359,495 22 3,545,114 .. 89 –15,951
 East Asia & Pacifi c 1,747,540 1,493,538 80 32  101,428 5 825,602 .. 134 –3,781
 Europe & Central Asia 657,956 636,419 37 9  86,161 20 1,126,252 .. 48 –1,681
 Latin America & 
  the Caribbean 677,205 668,496 51 13  76,629 16 912,980 .. 67 –5,214
 Middle East & 
  North Africa 276,399 289,612 .. 2  27,766 41 141,321 .. 41 –1,089
 South Asia 204,760 323,199 68 8  38,414 9 339,983 .. 66 –2,376
 Sub-Saharan Africa 242,566 253,161 31 6  29,096 53 198,976 .. 79 –1,810
High income 8,689,059 8,942,776 73 19  804,263 0 .. .. 203 15,895
a. Regional aggregates include data for economies not listed in the table. World and income group totals include aid not allocated by country or region. b. The numerator refers to 2009, 
whereas the denominator is a three-year average of 2007–09 data. c. Total for the fi ve-year period. d. Includes Luxembourg. e. Data are from debt sustainability analysis for low–income 
countries. f. Includes Taiwan, China. g. Includes re-exports.  h. Data on total exports and imports refer to South Africa only. Data on export commodity shares refer to the South African Customs 
Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa).  i. World total computed by the UN sums to zero, but because the aggregates shown here refer to World Bank defi nitions, regional and 
income group totals do not equal zero.
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Table 6.  Key indicators for other economies
 
             Adult
   
Population
        Gross   literacy
     Population     domestic   rate
   Average Density age      product   %
   annual people composition  per  per per   ages
   %  per % $ capita $ capita capita Male Female 15 and
  Thousands growth sq. km Ages 0–14 millions $ millions $ % growth Years Years older
  2010 2000–10 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2009–10 2009 2009 2005–09
American Samoa 68 1.7 336 .. .. ..c .. .. .. .. .. ..
Andorra 87 2.2d 181 .. 3,447 41,130 .. .. 1.6 .. .. ..
Antigua and Barbuda 89 1.4 199 .. 939 10,610 1,362e 15,380
e
 –10.4 .. .. 99
Aruba 107 1.7 592 19 .. ..f .. .. .. 72 78 98
Bahamas, The 346 1.3 34 25 6,973 20,410 8,318 e  24,340 
e
 –0.3 71 77 ..
Bahrain 807 2.2 1,041 26 19,714 25,420 26,005 33,530 4.1 75 78 91
Barbados 257 0.2 595 17 3,454 13,500  5,137 
e 20,080 e –5.5 75 80 ..
Belize 345 3.2 15 35 1,288 3,740 2,059e 5,970
e
 –1.4 75 79 ..
Bermuda 65 0.4 1,288 .. .. ..f .. .. –8.4 76 82 ..
Bhutan 708 2.3 18 30 1,361 1,920 3,596 5,070 5.8 65 68 53
Botswana 1,978 1.4 3 33 13,633 6,890 27,508 13,910 5.7 55 55 84
Brunei Darussalam 407 2.0 76 26 12,461 31,180 19,488 48,760 –3.6 75 80 95
Cape Verde 513 1.6 125 35 1,620 3,160 1,879 3,670 4.0 69 74 85
Cayman Islands 56 3.3 229 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. 99
Channel Islands 150 0.2 789 15 10,241 68,600 .. .. 5.7 77 82 ..
Comoros 675 2.2 354 38 550 820 796 1,180 –0.3 64 68 74
Cuba 11,204 0.1 105 17 62,204 5,550 .. .. 4.3 77 81 100
Curacao 143 0.6 321 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. ..
Cyprus 880 1.1 94 17 24,383g 30,460g 24,142g 30,160g –1.9g 77 82 98
Djibouti 879 1.9 37 36 1,105 1,280 2,130 2,460 3.2 54 57 ..
Dominica 74 0.4 98 .. 367 4,960 635e 8,580
e
 1.1 .. .. ..
Equatorial Guinea 693 2.7 24 41 10,182 14,680 16,511 23,810 –1.5 49 52 93
Estonia 1,340 –0.2 32 15 19,247 14,360 26,136 19,500 1.8 70 80 100
Faeroe Islands 49 0.6 35 .. .. ..f .. .. .. 77 82 ..
Fiji 854 0.6 46 31 3,085 3,610 3,833 4,490 –0.5 67 71 ..
French Polynesia 272 1.4 74 26 .. ..f .. .. .. 72 77 ..
Gabon 1,501 2.0 6 36 11,655 7,760 19,804 13,190 3.8 60 62 88
Gambia, The 1,751 3.0 171 42 770 440 2,229 1,270 2.3 55 58 46
Gibraltar 31 0.7 3,105 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. ..
Greenland 56 –0.1 0h .. 1,466 26,150 .. .. –5.0 66 70 ..
Grenada 104 0.3 306 27 580 5,560 789e 7,560
e
 –1.5 74 77 ..
Guam 180 1.5 329 27 .. ..f .. .. .. 73 78 ..
Guinea–Bissau 1,647 2.3 57 43 890 540 1,782 1,080 1.2 47 50 52
Guyana 761 0.1 4 29 2,491 3,270 2,689e 3,530
e
 4.5 65 71 ..
Iceland 318 1.3 3 20 10,787 33,870 9,116 28,630 –3.3 80 83 ..
Isle of Man 80 0.5 141 .. 3,972 49,300 .. .. 7.4 .. .. ..
Jamaica 2,712 0.5 249 29 12,892 4,750 20,139e 7,430
e
 –1.0 69 75 86
Kiribati 100 1.7 121 .. 200 2,010 349e 3,510
e
 0.3 .. .. ..
Korea, Dem. Rep. 23,991 0.5 199 21 .. ..i .. .. .. 65 70 100
Kosovo 1,815 0.7 166 .. 5,981 3,300 .. .. 3.4 68 72 ..
Kuwait 2,863 2.7 157 23 116,970 43,920 142,827 53,630 1.9 76 80 94
Latvia 2,243 –0.6 36 14 26,056 11,620 36,682 16,360 0.2 68 78 100
Lesotho 2,084 1.0 68 39 2,248 1,080 3,986 1,910 2.4 45 46 90
Liechtenstein 36 1.0 224 .. 4,903 136,540 .. .. –1.9 81 85 ..
Luxembourg 507 1.5 192 18 40,281 79,510 32,346 63,850 1.7 78 83 ..
Macao SAR, China 548 2.2 19,213 12 21,261 39,520 30,729 57,120 –0.9 79 83 93
Macedonia, FYR 2,061 0.3 82 18 9,319 4,520 22,320 10,830 0.5 72 77 97
Maldives 314 1.4 1,031 27 1,340 4,270 1,721 5,480 3.3 70 74 98
Malta 418 0.7 1,297 15 7,616 18,350 9,573 23,070 –2.8 78 82 92
Marshall Islands 62 2.0 339 .. 187 2,990 .. .. –1.7 .. .. ..
Mauritius 1,282 0.8 628 22 9,925 7,740 17,519 13,670 3.5 69 76 88
Mayotte 202 2.3j 531 38 .. ..c .. .. .. 72 80 ..
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 111 0.4 158 37 300 2,700 380e 3,420
e
 0.1 68 70 ..
Monaco 33 0.3 16,406 .. 6,479 197,460 .. .. –2.9 .. .. ..
Mongolia 2,701 1.2 2 26 5,106 1,890 10,001 3,700 5.0 64 70 97
Montenegro 626 –0.5 46 19 4,183 6,690 7,950 12,710 0.9 72 77 ..
Namibia 2,212 1.9 3 36 10,286 4,650 14,559 6,580 2.9 61 62 89
New Caledonia 254 1.7 14 25 .. ..f .. .. .. 72 81 96
Northern Mariana Islands 88 2.5 189 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. ..
Oman 2,905 1.9 9 31 49,840 17,890 67,992 24,410 10.4 75 78 87
Palau 21 0.7 44 .. 133 6,460 221e 10,760
e
 0.4 .. .. ..
Puerto Rico 3,980 0.4 447 20 .. ..f .. .. .. 75 83 90
Qatar 1,508 8.9 122 16 .. ..f .. .. –1.3 75 77 95
Samoa 179 0.1 63 39 524 2,930 769e 4,300
e
 0.9 69 75 99
San Marino 32 0.8d 524 .. 1,572 50,670 .. .. 0.4 80 86 ..
PPP gross national 
income (GNI)b
Gross national income
(GNI)a Life expectancy
at birth
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São Tomé and Príncipe 165 1.7 170 40 199 1,200 315 1,910 2.8 64 68 89
Seychelles 89 0.9 191 .. 845 9,490 1,821e 20,470
e
 5.0 68 79 92
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 38 2.2 1,113 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovenia 2,065 0.4 101 14 49,276 23,860 55,704 26,970 0.1 76 82 100
Solomon Islands 536 2.5 19 39 552 1,030 1,183e 2,210
e
 4.5 66 68 ..
St. Kitts and Nevis 50 1.2 191 .. 499 9,980 658e 13,170
e
 –3.2 .. .. ..
St. Lucia 174 1.1 282 26 865 4,970 1,482e 8,520
e
 –3.3 .. .. ..
St. Martin (French part) 30 0.6 556 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. ..
St. Vincent and 
 the Grenadines 109 0.1 280 27 530 4,850 903e 8,260
e
 –6.8 70 74 ..
Suriname 524 1.2 3 29 3,076 5,920 3,955e 7,610
e
 2.2 66 73 95
Swaziland 1,202 1.1 69 39 3,119 2,600 5,872 4,890 –0.3 47 46 87
Timor–Leste 1,124 3.0 74 45 2,493 2,220 4,016e 3,570
e
 5.1 61 63 51
Tonga 104 0.6 144 37 353 3,380 483e 4,630
e
 –0.6 69 75 99
Trinidad and Tobago 1,344 0.4 261 21 20,664 15,380 32,243e 24,000
e
 –0.3 66 73 99
Turks and Caicos Islands 33 5.6 35 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. ..
Tuvalu 10 0.4 327 .. 36 3,700 .. .. 0.0 .. .. ..
Vanuatu 240 2.6 19 38 662 2,760 1,066e 4,450
e
 0.5 69 73 82
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 110 0.1 314 21 .. ..f .. .. .. 76 83 ..
a. Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. b. PPP is purchasing power parity; see Technical notes. c. Estimated to be upper middle income ($3,976–$12,275). d. Data are for 2004–10. 
e. The estimate is based on regression; others are extrapolated from the 2005 International Comparison Program benchmark estimates. f. Estimated to be high income ($12,276 or more).  
g. Data are for the area controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. h. Less than 0.5. i. Estimated to be low income ($1,005 or less).  j. Data are for 2002–10.  
Table 6.  Key indicators for other economies (continued)
  
             Adult
   
Population
        Gross   literacy
     Population     domestic   rate
   Average Density age      product   %
   annual people composition  per  per per   ages
   %  per % $ capita $ capita capita Male Female 15 and
  Thousands growth sq. km Ages 0–14 millions $ millions $ % growth Years Years older
  2010 2000–10 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2009–10 2009 2009 2005–09 
PPP gross national 
income (GNI)b
Gross national income
(GNI)a Life expectancy
at birth
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Technical notes
These technical notes discuss the sources and methods used 
to compile the indicators included in this edition of Selected 
World Development Indicators. The notes follow the order 
in which the indicators appear in the tables.
Sources
The data published in the Selected World Development Indi-
cators are taken from World Development Indicators 2011. 
Where possible, however, revisions reported since the clos-
ing date of that edition have been incorporated. In addition, 
newly released estimates of population and gross national 
income (GNI) per capita for 2010 are included in table 1 and 
table 6.
The World Bank draws on a variety of sources for the sta-
tistics published in the World Development Indicators. Data on 
external debt for developing countries are reported directly 
to the World Bank by developing member countries through 
the Debtor Reporting System. Other data are drawn mainly 
from the United Nations and its specialized agencies, from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and from country 
reports to the World Bank. Bank staff estimates are also used 
to improve currentness or consistency. For most countries, 
national accounts estimates are obtained from member gov-
ernments through World Bank economic missions. In some 
instances these are adjusted by staff to ensure conformity 
with international defi nitions and concepts. Most social data 
from national sources are drawn from regular administrative 
fi les, special surveys, or periodic censuses.
For more detailed notes about the data, please refer to the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2011.
Data consistency and reliability
Considerable effort has been made to standardize the data, 
but full comparability cannot be ensured, and care must 
be taken in interpreting the indicators. Many factors affect 
data availability, comparability, and reliability: statistical sys-
tems in many developing economies are still weak; statistical 
methods, coverage, practices, and defi nitions differ widely; 
and cross-country and intertemporal comparisons involve 
complex technical and conceptual problems that cannot be 
unequivocally resolved. Data coverage may not be complete 
because of special circumstances or for economies experienc-
ing problems (such as those stemming from confl icts) affect-
ing the collection and reporting of data. For these reasons, 
although the data are drawn from the sources thought to be 
most authoritative, they should be construed only as indi-
cating trends and characterizing major differences among 
economies rather than offering precise quantitative mea-
sures of those differences. Discrepancies in data presented 
in different editions refl ect updates by countries as well as 
revisions to historical series and changes in methodology. 
Thus readers are advised not to compare data series between 
editions or between different editions of World Bank publi-
cations. Consistent time series are available from the Open 
Data website (http://data.worldbank.org).
Ratios and growth rates
For ease of reference, the tables usually show ratios and rates 
of growth rather than the simple underlying values. Values 
in their original form are available from the Open Data web-
site (http://data.worldbank.org). Unless otherwise noted, 
growth rates are computed using the least-squares regres-
sion method (see the section on “Statistical methods” later in 
this discussion). Because this method takes into account all 
available observations during a period, the resulting growth 
rates refl ect general trends that are not unduly infl uenced by 
exceptional values. Constant price economic indicators are 
used to exclude the effects of infl ation in calculating growth 
rates. Data in italics are for a year or period other than that 
specifi ed in the column heading—up to two years before or 
after for economic indicators and up to three years for social 
indicators, because the latter tend to be collected less regu-
larly and change less dramatically over short periods.
Constant price series
An economy’s growth is measured by the increase in value 
added produced by the individuals and enterprises operating 
in that economy. Thus, measuring real growth requires esti-
mates of gross domestic product (GDP) and its components 
valued in constant prices. The World Bank collects constant 
price national accounts series in national currencies that are 
recorded in the country’s original base year. To obtain com-
parable series of constant price data, it rescales GDP and value 
added by industrial origin to a common reference year, 2000 
in the current version of the WDI. This process gives rise to a 
discrepancy between the rescaled GDP and the sum of the res-
caled components. Because allocating the discrepancy would 
give rise to distortions in the growth rate, it is left unallocated.
Summary measures
The summary measures for regions and income groups, 
presented at the end of most tables, are calculated by simple 
addition when they are expressed in levels. Aggregate growth 
rates and ratios are usually computed as weighted averages. 
The summary measures for social indicators are usually 
weighted by population or by subgroups of population. See 
the notes on specifi c indicators for more information.
For summary measures that cover many years, calcula-
tions are based on a uniform group of economies so that 
the composition of the aggregate does not change over 
time. Group measures are compiled only if the data avail-
able for a given year account for at least two-thirds of the 
full group, as defi ned for the 2000 benchmark year. As long 
as this criterion is met, economies for which data are miss-
ing are assumed to behave like those that provide estimates. 
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Readers should keep in mind that the summary measures 
are estimates of representative aggregates for each topic and 
that nothing meaningful can be deduced about behavior at 
the country level by working back from group indicators. In 
addition, the estimation process may result in discrepancies 
between subgroup and overall totals.
Table 1. Key indicators of development
Population is based on the de facto defi nition, which counts 
all residents, regardless of legal status or citizenship—except 
for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, 
who are generally considered part of the population of the 
country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates.
Average annual population growth rate is the expo-
nential change for the period (see the section on statistical 
methods).
Population density is midyear population divided by 
land area in square kilometers. Land area is a country’s total 
area, excluding area under inland water bodies.
Population age composition, ages 0–14 refers to the per-
centage of the total population that is ages 0–14.
Gross national income (GNI) is the broadest measure of 
national income. It measures total value added from domes-
tic and foreign sources claimed by residents. GNI comprises 
gross domestic product plus net receipts of primary income 
from foreign sources. Data are converted from national cur-
rency to current U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas 
method. This approach involves using a three-year average of 
exchange rates to smooth the effects of transitory exchange 
rate fl uctuations. (See the section on statistical methods for 
further discussion of the Atlas method.)
GNI per capita is GNI divided by midyear population. It 
is converted into current U.S. dollars by the Atlas method. 
The World Bank uses GNI per capita in U.S. dollars to clas-
sify economies for analytical purposes and to determine 
borrowing eligibility.
PPP GNI is GNI converted into international dollars 
using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors. 
Because exchange rates do not always refl ect differences in 
price levels between countries, this table converts GNI and 
GNI per capita estimates into international dollars using 
PPP rates. PPP rates provide a standard measure allowing 
comparison of real levels of expenditure between countries, 
just as conventional price indexes allow comparison of real 
values over time. The PPP conversion factors used here are 
derived from the 2005 round of price surveys covering 146 
countries conducted by the International Comparison Pro-
gram. For OECD countries, data come from the most recent 
round of surveys, completed in 2005. Estimates for coun-
tries not included in the surveys are derived from statistical 
models using available data. For more information on the 
2005 International Comparison Program, go to http://www.
worldbank.org/data/icp.
PPP GNI per capita is PPP GNI divided by midyear 
population.
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth is 
based on GDP measured in constant prices. Growth in GDP 
is considered a broad measure of the growth of an economy. 
GDP in constant prices can be estimated by measuring the 
total quantity of goods and services produced in a period, 
valuing them at an agreed set of base year prices, and sub-
tracting the cost of intermediate inputs, also in constant 
prices. See the section on statistical methods for details of 
the least-squares growth rate.
Life expectancy at birth is the number of years a new-
born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at 
its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
Adult literacy rate is the percentage of persons ages 15 
and older who can, with understanding, both read and write 
a short, simple statement about their everyday life. In prac-
tice, literacy is diffi cult to measure. To estimate literacy using 
such a defi nition requires census or survey measurements 
under controlled conditions. Many countries estimate the 
number of literate people from self-reported data. Some use 
educational attainment data as a proxy but apply different 
lengths of school attendance or level of completion. Because 
defi nition and methodologies of data collection differ across 
countries, data need to be used with caution.
Table 2. Poverty
The World Bank periodically prepares poverty assessments 
of countries in which it has an active program, in close col-
laboration with national institutions, other development 
agencies, and civil society groups, including poor people’s 
organizations. Poverty assessments report the extent and 
causes of poverty and propose strategies to reduce it. Since 
1992 the World Bank has conducted about 200 poverty 
assessments, which are the main source of the poverty esti-
mates using national poverty lines presented in the table. 
Countries report similar assessments as part of their Poverty 
Reduction Strategies.
The World Bank also produces poverty estimates using 
international poverty lines to monitor progress in poverty 
reduction globally. The fi rst global poverty estimates for 
developing countries were produced for World Develop-
ment Report 1990: Poverty Using Household Survey Data for 
22 Countries (Ravallion, Datt, and van de Walle 1991). Since 
then, the number of countries that fi eld household income 
and expenditure surveys has expanded considerably.
National and international poverty lines
National poverty lines are used to make estimates of poverty 
consistent with the country’s specifi c economic and social 
circumstances and are not intended for international com-
parisons of poverty rates. The setting of national poverty 
lines refl ects local perceptions of the level of consumption 
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or income needed not to be poor. The perceived boundary 
between poor and not poor rises with the average income 
of a country and so does not provide a uniform measure 
for comparing poverty rates across countries. Nevertheless, 
national poverty estimates are clearly the appropriate mea-
sure for setting national policies for poverty reduction and 
for monitoring their results.
International comparisons of poverty estimates entail 
both conceptual and practical problems. Countries have dif-
ferent defi nitions of poverty, and consistent comparisons 
across countries can be diffi cult. Local poverty lines tend to 
have higher purchasing power in rich countries, where more 
generous standards are used, than in poor countries. Inter-
national poverty lines attempt to hold the real value of the 
poverty line constant across countries, as is done when mak-
ing comparisons over time, regardless of average income of 
countries.
Since the publication of World Development Report 1990, 
the World Bank has aimed to apply a common standard 
in measuring extreme poverty, anchored to what poverty 
means in the world’s poorest countries. The welfare of peo-
ple living in different countries can be measured on a com-
mon scale by adjusting for differences in the purchasing 
power of currencies. The commonly used $1 a day standard, 
measured in 1985 international prices and adjusted to local 
currency using purchasing power parities, was chosen for 
World Development Report 1990 because it was typical of the 
poverty lines in low-income countries at the time. Later this 
$1-a-day line was revised to $1.08 a day measured in 1993 
international prices. More recently, the international poverty 
lines were revised using the new data on PPPs compiled by 
the 2005 round of the International Comparison Program, 
along with data from an expanded set of household income 
and expenditure surveys. The new extreme poverty line is set 
at $1.25 a day in 2005 PPP terms, which represents the mean 
of the poverty lines found in the poorest 15 countries ranked 
by per capita consumption. The new poverty line maintains 
the same standard for extreme poverty—the poverty line 
typical of the poorest countries in the world—but updates it 
using the latest information on the cost of living in develop-
ing countries.
Quality and availability of survey data 
Poverty estimates are derived using surveys fi elded to collect, 
among other things, information on income or consumption 
from a sample of households. To be useful for poverty esti-
mates, surveys must be nationally representative and include 
suffi cient information to compute a comprehensive estimate 
of total household consumption or income (including con-
sumption or income from own production), from which it 
is possible to construct a correctly weighted distribution of 
consumption or income per person. Over the past 20 years, 
the number of countries that fi eld surveys and the frequency 
of the surveys have expanded considerably. The quality of 
data has improved greatly as well. The World Bank’s pov-
erty monitoring database now includes more than 600 sur-
veys representing 115 developing countries. More than 1.2 
million randomly sampled households were interviewed in 
these surveys, representing 96 percent of the population of 
developing countries.
Measurement issues using survey data
Besides the frequency and timeliness of survey data, other 
data issues arise in measuring household living standards. 
One relates to the choice of income or consumption as a 
welfare indicator. Income is generally more diffi cult to mea-
sure accurately, and consumption comes closer to the notion 
of standard of living. Also, income can vary over time even if 
the standard of living does not. However, consumption data 
are not always available: the latest estimates reported here 
use consumption for about two-thirds of countries. Another 
issue is that even similar surveys may not be strictly compa-
rable because of differences in number of consumer goods 
they identify, differences in the length of the period over 
which respondents must recall their expenditures, or differ-
ences in the quality and training of enumerators. Selective 
nonresponses are also a concern in some surveys.
Comparisons of countries at different levels of develop-
ment also pose a potential problem because of differences in 
the relative importance of the consumption of nonmarket 
goods. The local market value of all consumption in kind 
(including own production, which is particularly important 
in underdeveloped rural economies) should be included in 
total consumption expenditure, but may not be. Surveys now 
routinely include imputed values for consumption in-kind 
from own-farm production. Imputed profi t from the pro-
duction of nonmarket goods should be included in income, 
but sometimes it is omitted (such omissions were a bigger 
problem in surveys before the 1980s). Most survey data now 
include valuations for consumption or income from own 
production, but valuation methods vary.
Defi nitions
Survey year is the year in which the underlying data were 
collected.
Population below national poverty line, national is 
the percentage of the population living below the national 
poverty line. National estimates are based on population-
weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.
Population below $1.25 a day and population below 
$2.00 a day are the percentages of the population living on 
less than $1.25 a day and $2.00 a day at 2005 international 
prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty 
rates for individual countries cannot be compared with pov-
erty rates reported in earlier editions.
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Poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line 
(counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed 
as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure refl ects the 
depth of poverty as well as its incidence.
Table 3. Millennium Development Goals: Eradicating 
poverty and improving lives
Share of poorest quintile in national consumption or 
income is the share of the poorest 20 percent of the popula-
tion in consumption or, in some cases, income. It is a dis-
tributional measure. Countries with more unequal distri-
butions of consumption (or income) have a higher rate of 
poverty for a given average income. Data are from nation-
ally representative household surveys. Because the under-
lying household surveys differ in method and type of data 
collected, the distribution data are not strictly comparable 
across countries. The World Bank staff has made an effort to 
ensure that the data are as comparable as possible. Wherever 
possible, consumption has been used rather than income.
Vulnerable employment is the sum of unpaid family 
workers and own-account workers as a percentage of total 
employment. The proportion of unpaid family workers and 
own-account workers in total employment is derived from 
information on status in employment. Each status group 
faces different economic risks, and unpaid family workers 
and own-account workers are the most vulnerable—and 
therefore the most likely to fall into poverty. They are the 
least likely to have formal work arrangements, are the least 
likely to have social protection and safety nets to guard 
against economic shocks, and often are incapable of generat-
ing suffi cient savings to offset these shocks.
Prevalence of child malnutrition is the percentage of 
children under age fi ve whose weight for age is less than 
minus two standard deviations from the median for the 
international reference population ages 0–59 months. The 
table presents data based on the child growth standards 
released by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2006. 
Primary completion rate is the percentage of students 
completing the last year of primary school. It is the total 
number of new entrants in the last grade of primary educa-
tion, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the pop-
ulation at the entrance age to the last grade of primary. The 
primary completion rate refl ects the primary cycle as defi ned 
by the International Standard Classifi cation of Education 
Data (ISCED) limitation preclude adjusting for students 
who drop out during the fi nal year of primary education. 
Thus, this rate is a proxy that should be taken as an upper 
estimate of the actual primary completion rate.
Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary and secondary 
school is the ratio of the female gross enrollment rate in pri-
mary and secondary school to the male gross enrollment rate.
Under-fi ve mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 
children under fi ve years of age that a newborn baby will 
die before reaching age fi ve, if subject to current age-specifi c 
mortality rates. The main sources of mortality data are vital 
registration systems and direct or indirect estimates based on 
sample surveys or censuses. To make under-fi ve mortality esti-
mates comparable and to ensure consistency across estimates 
by different agencies, Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality 
Estimation, comprising the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations Population Division, WHO, 
the World Bank, and other universities and research insti-
tutes, developed and adopted a statistical method that uses 
all available information to reconcile differences. The method 
uses the weighted least squares to fi t a regression line to the 
relationship between mortality rates and their reference dates 
and then extrapolate the trend to present.
Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who 
die from pregnancy-related causes during pregnancy and 
childbirth, per 100,000 live births. The values are modeled 
estimates. The modeled estimates are based on an exercise 
by the WHO, UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), and the World Bank. For countries with good 
attribution of cause of death, the data are used to directly 
estimate maternal mortality. For countries without complete 
registration data but with other types of data and for coun-
tries with no empirical national data, maternal mortality is 
estimated with a multilevel regression model using available 
national-level model using available national-level maternal 
mortality data and socioeconomic information including 
fertility, birth attendants and GDP.
Prevalence of HIV is the percentage of people ages 15–49 
who are infected with HIV. Low national prevalence rates 
can be misleading, however. They often disguise serious epi-
demics that are initially concentrated in certain localities or 
among specifi c population groups and threaten to spill over 
into the wider population. In many parts of the develop-
ing world, most new infections occur in young adults, with 
young women especially vulnerable. 
Incidence of tuberculosis is the number of new and 
relapse tuberculosis cases (all types) per 100,000 people.
Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the 
burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement and 
include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of 
solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas fl aring divided by midyear 
population (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, 
World Bank).
Access to improved sanitation facilities is the percent-
age of the population with at least adequate access to excreta 
disposal facilities (private or shared, but not public) that can 
effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with 
excreta. Facilities do not have to include treatment to render 
sewage outfl ows innocuous. Improved facilities range from 
simple but protected pit latrines to fl ush toilets with a sewer-
age connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly 
constructed and properly maintained.
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Internet users are people with access to the worldwide 
network.
Table 4. Economic activity
Gross domestic product is gross value added, at purchas-
ers’ prices, by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products. It is calculated without deduction for the 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for the depletion or deg-
radation of natural resources. Value added is the net output 
of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. The industrial origin of value added is 
determined by International Standard Industrial Classifi ca-
tion (ISIC) revision 3. The World Bank conventionally uses 
the U.S. dollar and applies the average offi cial exchange rate 
reported by the IMF for the year shown. An alternative con-
version factor is applied if the offi cial exchange rate is judged 
to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate 
effectively applied to transactions in foreign currencies and 
traded products.
Gross domestic product average annual growth rate is 
calculated from constant price GDP data in local currency.
Agricultural productivity is the ratio of agricultural 
value added, measured in 2000 U.S. dollars, to the number of 
workers in agriculture. Agricultural productivity is measured 
by value added per unit of input. Agricultural value added 
includes that from forestry and fi shing. Thus, interpretations 
of land productivity should be made with caution.
Value added is the net output of an industry after add-
ing up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. The 
industrial origin of value added is determined by the ISIC 
revision 3.
Agriculture value added corresponds to ISIC divisions 
1–5 and includes forestry and fi shing.
Industry value added comprises mining, manufactur-
ing, construction, electricity, water, and gas (ISIC divisions 
10–45).
Services value added correspond to ISIC divisions 50–99.
Household fi nal consumption expenditure is the mar-
ket value of all goods and services, including durable prod-
ucts (such as cars, washing machines, and home computers), 
purchased by households. It excludes purchases of dwell-
ings but includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwell-
ings. It also includes payments and fees to governments to 
obtain permits and licenses. Here, household consumption 
expenditure includes the expenditures of nonprofi t insti-
tutions serving households, even when reported separately 
by the country. In practice, household consumption expen-
diture may include any statistical discrepancy in the use of 
resources relative to the supply of resources.
General government fi nal consumption expenditure 
includes all government current expenditures for purchases 
of goods and services (including compensation of employ-
ees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense 
and security, but excludes government military expenditures 
that are part of government capital formation.
Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions 
to the fi xed assets of the economy plus net changes in the 
level of inventories and valuables. Fixed assets include land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction 
of buildings, roads, railways, and the like, including com-
mercial and industrial buildings, offi ces, schools, hospitals, 
and private dwellings. Inventories are stocks of goods held 
by fi rms to meet temporary or unexpected fl uctuations in 
production or sales, and “work in progress.” According to the 
1993 System of National Accounts, net acquisitions of valu-
ables are also considered capital formation.
External balance of goods and services is exports of 
goods and services less imports of goods and services. Trade 
in goods and services comprise all transactions between 
residents of a country and the rest of the world involving a 
change in ownership of general merchandise, goods sent for 
processing and repairs, nonmonetary gold, and services.
GDP implicit defl ator refl ects changes in prices for all fi nal 
demand categories, such as government consumption, capital 
formation, and international trade, as well as the main com-
ponent, private fi nal consumption. It is derived as the ratio 
of current to constant price GDP. The GDP defl ator may also 
be calculated explicitly as a Paasche price index in which the 
weights are the current period quantities of output.
National accounts indicators for most developing coun-
tries are collected from national statistical organizations and 
central banks by visiting and resident World Bank missions. 
Data for high-income economies come from the OECD.
Table 5. Trade, aid, and fi nance
Merchandise exports show the free on board (f.o.b.) value 
of goods provided to the rest of the world valued in U.S. 
dollars.
Merchandise imports show the c.i.f. value of goods (the 
cost of the goods including insurance and freight) purchased 
from the rest of the world valued in U.S. dollars. Data on 
merchandise trade come from the World Trade Organiza-
tion in its annual report.
Manufactured exports comprise the commodities in 
Standard International Trade Classifi cation (SITC) sections 
5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 (machinery and 
transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured 
goods), excluding division 68.
High-technology exports are products with high research 
and development intensity. They include high-technology 
products such as aerospace products, computers, pharma-
ceuticals, scientifi c instruments, and electrical machinery.
Current account balance is the sum of net exports of 
goods and services, net income, and net current transfers.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is net infl ows of invest-
ment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent 
or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of 
equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital, as shown in the balance of 
payments. Net infl ows refer to new investments made dur-
ing the reporting period netted against disinvestments. Data 
on FDI are based on balance of payments data reported by 
the IMF, supplemented by World Bank staff estimates using 
data reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development and offi cial national sources.
Net offi cial development assistance (ODA) comprises 
grants and loans, net of repayments, that meet the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defi nition of 
ODA and that are made to countries and territories on the 
DAC list of aid recipients. DAC has three criteria for ODA: 
it is undertaken by the offi cial sector; it promotes economic 
development or welfare as a main objective; and it is provided 
on concessional terms, with a grant element of at least 25 per-
cent on loans (calculated at a 10 percent discount rate). 
ODA from the high-income members of the OECD is the 
main source of offi cial external fi nance for developing coun-
tries, but ODA is also disbursed by some important donor 
countries that are not members of the DAC. 
Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents credi-
tors and repayable in foreign currencies, goods, or services 
by public and private entities in the country. It is the sum of 
long-term external, short-term debt, and use of IMF credit.
Short-term debt is debt owed to nonresidents having an 
original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears 
on long-term debt and on the use of IMF credit.
Present value of debt is the sum of short-term external 
debt plus the discounted sum of total debt service payments 
due on public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaran-
teed long-term external debt over the life of existing loans. 
Data on external debt are mainly from reports to the 
World Bank through its Debtor Reporting System from 
member countries that have received International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development loans or International 
Development Association credits, with additional informa-
tion from the fi les of the World Bank, the IMF, the African 
Development Bank and African Development Fund, the 
Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Fund, 
and the Inter-American Development Bank. Summary tables 
of the external debt of developing countries are published 
annually in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance.
Domestic credit provided by banking sector includes all 
credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception 
of credit to the central government, which is net. The banking 
sector includes monetary authorities, deposit money banks, 
and other banking institutions for which data are available 
(including institutions that do not accept transferable depos-
its but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). 
Examples of other banking institutions include savings and 
mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations. 
Data are from the IMF’s International Finance Statistics.
Net migration is the net total of migrants during the 
period. It is the total number of immigrants less the total 
number of emigrants, including both citizens and nonciti-
zens. Data are fi ve-year estimates. Data are from the United 
Nations Population Division’s World Population Prospects: 
The 2008 Revision.
Table 6. Key indicators for other economies
See the technical notes for Table 1.
Statistical methods
This section describes the calculation of the least-squares 
growth rate, the exponential (endpoint) growth rate, and the 
World Bank’s Atlas methodology for calculating the conver-
sion factor used to estimate GNI and GNI per capita in U.S. 
dollars.
Least-squares growth rate
Least-squares growth rates are used wherever there is a suf-
fi ciently long time series to permit a reliable calculation. No 
growth rate is calculated if more than half the observations 
in a period are missing.
The least-squares growth rate, r, is estimated by fi tting a 
linear regression trendline to the logarithmic annual values 
of the variable in the relevant period. The regression equa-
tion takes the form
ln Xt = a + bt,
which is equivalent to the logarithmic transformation of the 
compound growth equation,
Xt = Xo (1 + r)
t.
In this equation, X is the variable, t is time, and a = log Xo 
and b = ln (1 + r ) are the parameters to be estimated. If b* 
is the least-squares estimate of b, the average annual growth 
rate, r, is obtained as [exp(b*)–1] and is multiplied by 100 to 
express it as a percentage.
The calculated growth rate is an average rate that is repre-
sentative of the available observations over the entire period. 
It does not necessarily match the actual growth rate between 
any two periods.
Exponential growth rate
The growth rate between two points in time for certain 
demographic data, notably labor force and population, is 
calculated from the equation
r = ln (pn /p1)/n,
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where pn and p1 are the last and fi rst observations in the 
period, n is the number of years in the period, and ln is the 
natural logarithm operator. This growth rate is based on 
a model of continuous, exponential growth between two 
points in time. It does not take into account the intermediate 
values of the series. Note also that the exponential growth 
rate does not correspond to the annual rate of change mea-
sured at a one year interval, which is given by
(pn – pn–1)/pn–1.
World Bank Atlas method
For certain operational purposes, the World Bank uses the 
Atlas conversion factor to calculate GNI and GNI per capita 
in U.S. dollars. The purpose of the Atlas conversion factor 
is to reduce the impact of exchange rate fl uctuations in the 
cross-country comparison of national incomes. The Atlas 
conversion factor for any year is the average of a country’s 
exchange rate (or alternative conversion factor) for that year 
and its exchange rates for the two preceding years, adjusted 
for the difference between the rate of infl ation in the country 
and that in Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and the Euro Area. A country’s infl ation rate is measured by 
the change in its GDP defl ator.
 The infl ation rate for Japan, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the euro area, representing international 
infl ation, is measured by the change in the SDR defl ator. (Spe-
cial drawing rights, or SDRs, are the IMF’s unit of account.) 
The SDR defl ator is calculated as a weighted average of these 
countries’ GDP defl ators in SDR terms, the weights being the 
amount of each country’s currency in one SDR unit. Weights 
vary over time because both the composition of the SDR and 
the relative exchange rates for each currency change. The 
SDR defl ator is calculated in SDR terms fi rst and then con-
verted to U.S. dollars using the SDR to dollar Atlas conver-
sion factor. The Atlas conversion factor is then applied to a 
country’s GNI. The resulting GNI in U.S. dollars is divided 
by the midyear population to derive GNI per capita.
When offi cial exchange rates are deemed to be unreliable 
or unrepresentative of the effective exchange rate during a 
period, an alternative estimate of the exchange rate is used in 
the Atlas formula.
The following formulas describe the calculation of the 
Atlas conversion factor for year t :
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and the calculation of GNI per capita in U.S. dollars for year t :
Yt
$ = (Yt/Nt)/et*,
where et* is the Atlas conversion factor (national currency to 
the U.S. dollar) for year t, et is the average annual exchange 
rate (national currency to the U.S. dollar) for year t, pt is the 
GDP defl ator for year t, pt 
S$ is the SDR defl ator in U.S. dollar 
terms for year t, Yt
$ is the Atlas GNI per capita in U.S. dollars 
in year t, Yt is current GNI (local currency) for year t, and Nt 
is the midyear population for year t.
Alternative conversion factors
The World Bank systematically assesses the appropriateness 
of offi cial exchange rates as conversion factors. An alterna-
tive conversion factor is used when the offi cial exchange rate 
is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from 
the rate effectively applied to domestic transactions of for-
eign currencies and traded products. This factor applies to 
only a small number of countries, as shown in the primary 
data documentation table in World Development Indicators 
2010. Alternative conversion factors are used in the Atlas 
methodology and elsewhere in Selected World Development 
Indicators as single-year conversion factors.
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The lives of women around the world have improved dramatically, at a pace and scope diffi cult to imagine 
even 25 years ago. Women have made unprecedented gains in rights, education, health, and access to jobs and 
livelihoods. More countries than ever guarantee equal rights in property, marriage, and other domains. Gender 
gaps in primary schooling have closed in many countries, while in a third of all countries girls now outnumber 
boys in secondary school. And more young women than men attend universities in 60 countries. Women are 
using their education to participate more in the labor force: they now make up for 40 percent of the global labor 
force and 43 percent of its farmers. Moreover, women now live longer than men in every region of the world.  
Despite the progress, gaps remain in many areas. Women are more likely to die—relative to males—in many 
low- and middle-income countries than their counterparts in rich countries—especially in childhood and 
during their reproductive years. Primary and secondary school enrollments for girls remain much lower than 
for boys in many Sub-Saharan African countries and some parts of South Asia, as well as among disadvantaged 
populations. Women are more likely than men to work as unpaid family laborers or in the informal sector, 
to farm smaller plots and grow less profi table crops, operate in smaller fi rms and less profi table sectors, and 
generally earn less. Women—especially poor women—have less say over decisions and less control over 
household resources. And in most countries, fewer women participate in formal politics than men and are 
underrepresented in the upper echelons. 
The World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development argues that closing these persistent 
gender gaps matters. It matters because gender equality is a core development objective in its own right. But 
it is also smart economics. Greater gender equality can enhance productivity, improve development outcomes 
for the next generation, and make institutions more representative. 
Building on a growing body of knowledge on the economics of gender equality and development, the Report 
identifi es the areas where gender gaps are most signifi cant—both intrinsically and in terms of their potential 
development payoff—and where growth alone cannot solve the issues. It then sets forth four priorities for 
public action:
• Reducing excess female mortality and closing education gaps where they remain 
• Improving access to economic opportunities for women 
• Increasing women’s voice and agency in the household and in society 
• Limiting the reproduction of gender inequality across generations. 
Policies need to focus on the underlying determinants of gender gaps in each priority area. In some priority 
areas—such as excess female mortality in infancy and early childhood as well as in the reproductive years—
improving service delivery (especially of clean water and sanitation, and maternal care) is of primary importance. 
For other priority areas—such as gender gaps in earnings and productivity—policies need to tackle the multiple 
constraints that originate in the workings of markets and institutions to limit progress. Policy makers will need 
to prioritize these constraints and address them simultaneously or sequentially. 
While domestic policies are central to reducing gender inequalities, development partners should focus on 
complementing these efforts in each of the four priority areas, and on supporting evidence-based public 
action through better data, evaluation, and learning. This will require a mix of more funding, efforts to foster 
innovation and learning, and broader partnerships. The funding should be directed particularly to supporting 
the poorest countries in reducing excess female mortality and gender gaps in education. Investments are 
needed to improve the availability of better gender-disaggregated data and support more experimentation and 
systematic evaluation. And the partnerships should involve the private sector, development agencies, and civil 
society organizations.
